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ABSTRACT
Global participation in space activity is growing as satellite technology matures and spreads.
Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are creating or reinvigorating national satellite
programs. These countries are building local capability in space through technological learning.
They sometimes pursue this via collaborative satellite development projects with foreign firms
that provide training. This phenomenon of collaborative satellite development projects is poorly
understood by researchers of technological learning and technology transfer. The approach has
potential to facilitate learning, but there are also challenges due to misaligned incentives and the
tacit nature of the technology. Perspectives from literature on Technological Learning,
Technology Transfer, Complex Product Systems and Product Delivery provide useful but
incomplete insight for decision makers in such projects. This work seeks a deeper understanding
of capability building through collaborative technology projects by conceiving of the projects as
complex, socio-technical systems with architectures. The architecture of a system is the
assignment of form to execute a function along a series of dimensions. The research questions
explore the architecture of collaborative satellite projects, the nature of capability building during
such projects, and the relationship between architecture and capability building. The research
design uses inductive, exploratory case studies to investigate six collaborative satellite
development projects. Data collection harnesses international field work driven by interviews,
observation, and documents. The data analysis develops structured narratives, architectural
comparison and capability building assessment. The architectural comparison reveals substantial
variation in project implementation, especially in the areas of project initiation, technical
specifications of the satellite, training approaches and the supplier selection process. The
individual capability building assessment shows that most trainee engineers gradually progressed
from no experience with satellites through theoretical training to supervised experience; a
minority achieved independent experience. At the organizational level, the emerging space
organizations achieved high levels of autonomy in project definition and satellite operation, but
they were dependent on foreign firms for satellite design, manufacture, test and launch. The case
studies can be summarized by three archetypal projects defined as "Politically Pushed,"
"Structured," and "Risk Taking." Countries in the case studies tended to start in a Politically
Pushed mode, and then moved into either Structured or Risk Taking mode. Decision makers in
emerging satellite programs can use the results of this dissertation to consider the broad set of
architectural options for capability building. Future work will continue to probe how specific
architectural decisions impact capability building outcomes in satellite projects and other
technologies.
Dissertation Supervisor: Annalisa Weigel
Title: Assistant Professor of Aeronautics & Astronautics and Engineering Systems
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1 Introduction and Background
Chapter 1 explains foundational concepts relating to the nature of satellite technology, national
development through technological capability building and global space activity.
1.1 Overview of Dissertation
International collaboration is a potentially powerful tool to enable developing countries to learn
to design and manufacture new technologies; however, the approach to collaboration must be
chosen carefully because it impacts the learning process. This study explores the opportunities
and challenges facing emerging space nations that are initiating new satellite programs. By
exploring this topic, it also contributes to the broader questions about technological learning in
developing countries. The study combines literature from economics, development and
technology policy with approaches from system architecture to bring unique insights about a
poorly understood phenomenon. The heart of the study is a set of inductive, exploratory case
studies about satellite projects. The satellite projects are unique because they represent the first
time that specific countries buy remote sensing satellites and include local engineers in the
design and manufacturing process. These developing countries aspire to establish local capability
to design, build and operate satellites. The countries view satellites as tools that provide useful
information for environmental management as well as catalysts for national development via
technological learning.
This section summarizes key ideas which are further developed later in the dissertation. The
study is grounded on the notion that technology plays a key role in national development.
Development is defined as progress in four areas, namely, technological capability, economic
activity, the human condition and sustainability. Space technology is one example of a tool that
can both increase a country's capability and contribute to economic, human and sustainable
aspects of development. Space can bring benefit through five types of activity: applying satellite
services, building technological capability, enabling economic activity, inspiring technology
applications and building scientific knowledge. A number of international actors and national
governments recognize this. They have long term programs and policies to harness the benefits
of space for developing counties. New nations on every continent are also establishing
indigenous satellite programs. Owning and operating satellites was once the purview of a few
advanced countries. Now many countries own domestic satellites for communication and remote
sensing. This is partly enabled by the emergence of smaller, less expensive satellites with useful
capabilities. Some countries pursue their first satellite project by procuring a satellite from a
foreign firm and paying that firm to train local engineers. This study explores a set of projects
that follow this model of collaborative satellite development. Projects of this type face some
inherent challenges due to differences in incentives, experience, culture and access to
information between the customer and supplier. The literature on technological learning,
technology transfer, project management provides some high level insights into projects such as
these. These areas of literature lack implementation details about how the customer that is
14
buying the satellite and training program makes strategic choices. The dissertation applies
concepts from Systems Architecture to help elucidate such implementation details.
The study explores five research questions that are designed to identify and organize information
about the challenges and opportunities of these collaborative satellite projects.
Research Question 1: What are the Architectures of Collaborative Satellite Projects?
Research Question 2: How are the Architectures of Collaborative Projects Similar and
Different?
Research Question 3: What Capability Building Experiences do Individuals Have?
Research Question 4: What Capability Building Achievements do Organizations Have?
Research Question 5: How are project architecture and capability building related?
To address these questions, the research design uses inductive, exploratory case studies. The data
for the dissertation is collected via long term field work. Data sources include interviews with
project participants, observation via site visits and conferences, as well as primary documents.
The interviewees include representatives from the national space organizations that initiated the
satellite projects, government leaders and the engineers and managers from the supplier firms
that delivered the satellite. The findings from Research Question 1 elucidate the specific
decisions that decision makers in national space organizations face when pursuing a
collaborative satellite project. Research Question 2 shows that there is great variety in the
approaches taken for each project, even when nations are faced with a similar set of options.
Research Questions 3 and 4 show the progress that individual engineers and organizations make
in building new capability. Research Question 5 categorizes the case studies into three
Archetypal Project Architectures. This lays a foundation for future work that will describe how
decisions made to define these collaborative satellite projects impact technical and social
outcomes. To summarize, Research Questions 1 and 2 examine implementation approaches in
the collaborative satellite projects using an Architectural Analysis. Next, Research Questions 3
and 4 examine progress in learning the new technology using a Capability Building Analysis.
Finally, Research Question 5 synthesizes to find that the impact of Architecture on Capability
Building is driven by contextual factors such as political support, leadership style and experience
level of the customer country.
1.2 Description of Satellite Technology
Satellites are electro-mechanical devices that deliver services while orbiting in space as semi-
independent robots. Each satellite is custom designed to perform a unique service, but most
satellites acquire and transfer information. The following discussion describes the services
satellites provide, key aspects of satellite technology, the satellite engineering process and the
nature of the satellite industry. The final sections discuss specific aspects of small, earth remote
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sensing satellites. These types of satellites are the focus of the case studies in the doctoral thesis
research.
1.2.1 Satellite Services
Satellites provide valuable services by transmitting information and supporting infrastructure.
Most earth-orbiting satellite missions can be classified into four major categories: remote
sensing, communication, positioning, and space science. Remote sensing satellites carry cameras
or other sensors to collect information about the state of the land, sea, atmosphere or water. The
information from remote sensing satellites is used to generate maps and reports to help
governments and organizations make decisions about environmental management and disaster
response. Communication satellites transfer information from a user at one point on the globe to
a user on another point. This information may be in the form of a phone call, radio broadcast,
internet link or video or other data stream. Positioning satellites provide information that helps
users precisely defining the time, determine their position and plan navigation routes. Space
science satellites carry instruments to observe space - both near the earth and in distance parts of
the universe. These satellite missions deliver data to scientists that could not be collected from
earth. The four satellite services introduced above -remote sensing, communication, positioning
and space science - are highly relevant to the requirements of organizations in countries around
the world that need such information or infrastructure to make decisions, perform analysis or
execute projects. In the United States, for example, satellite services are vital to the everyday
activities of banks, gas stations, news agencies, taxi companies, paramedics, weather analysts,
urban planners and logistic service providers. The same can be said about developing countries.
Even though many developing countries do not have local technical capabilities to build and
operate satellites, they are consumers of satellite services. Earth remote sensing satellites are the
key focus of this section because they are the types of satellites examined in the dissertation case
studies.
1.2.2 Satellite Technology
Satellites are generally characterized by the type of service they provide. A few other
distinguishing characteristics are their weight, expected lifetime and distance from which they
orbit the earth (known as orbital altitude). These four characteristics (size, lifetime, service type
and orbital altitude) are related by physical constraints. Satellites that offer higher quality service
for a longer lifetime are generally larger and more expensive than satellites that offer lower
quality service for a shorter lifetime. Figure 1-1 gives examples of three types of satellites that
could be used for earth remote sensing. Each satellite can carry a camera to take images of the
earth or sensors to collect data. On the right is the traditional satellite developed by commercial
firms for high performance requirements. The traditional commercial satellite is large - weighing
between 2000 to 4000 pounds (about 900 to 1800 kilograms). The large size is necessary to carry
the fuel, communication equipment and batteries necessary to ensure a long lifespan of 7 to 10
years. These large satellites are designed to carry multiple cameras or scientific instruments.
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Traditional commercial satellites are normally built with expensive electrical components that
were specifically designed to operate in space. The commercial satellites are also expensive
because they provide highly detailed data. The figure of merit for satellite imagery is the
resolution of the picture. Commercial earth remote sensing satellites are capable of delivering
very high resolution pictures that can clearly show objects of a few feet in size (or less than one
meter). In the center of Figure 1-1 is an example from a category known as "small satellites."
Small satellites are simpler, lighter and less expensive than the traditional commercial satellite.
Small satellites are designed to carry fewer instruments for a shorter lifespan - perhaps five years
or less. Small satellites are often built with electrical components that were designed for normal,
earth-bound use. This may give them a shorter functional period in space, but it also brings the
system cost down. In general, small satellites also provide lower resolution images, although
their quality is improving. A special type of small satellite is the CubeSat, shown on the left in
Figure 1-1. This tiny satellite has very limited capability, but is very affordable. CubeSats were
first developed by universities for low-cost missions. They weigh less than 3 pounds (about 1
kilogram) and last for a short time - usually less than one year. CubeSats are useful for testing
new technology and providing opportunities for students to participate in satellite projects. The
infrastructure requirements to build and operate CubeSats are low; thus universities and amateur
groups around the world are building them.
CubeSat Small Satellite Commercial Satellite
I
Weight 4000 pounds
High Quality
capability Earth RemoteSensing and
Space Science
Lifetime 7 to 10 years
Cost $100 - $500
(USD) Million
Figure 1-1: Examples of Three Types of Satelites
All satellites have two basic sections. One section is known as the payload. The payload is the
part of the satellite that provides service to an end user. For earth remote sensing satellites, the
payload is a camera or other sensor. The other main section of a satellite is called the bus. This
section takes up the majority of the size and weight of the satellite. The bus includes all the
systems that support the payload by providing a physical structure, controlling the temperature,
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Weight < 3 pounds
Technology
Capability demonstration
and Education
Lifetime <1 year
Cost with $50,000-
launch $50,000
(USD) $200,000
Weight 200 to 600pounds
Earth Remote
Capability Sensing andCapablity Space
Science
Lifetime - 5 years
Cost $10-$100
(USD) Million
communicating with the operations team on earth, and pointing the satellite in the appropriate
direction. Each of these functions is performed by a particular part of the satellite bus called a
subsystem. A complete satellite system includes the spacecraft as well as the supporting facilities
on earth. For earth remote sensing satellites, the supporting facilities include the communication
equipment and personnel to monitor the status of the satellite and send commands describing
what data the satellite should collect. There are also equipment and personnel on earth to receive
the data that is produced by the satellite. The data is stored in computers and converted into
useful information.
1.2.3 Satellite Engineering
Each new satellite goes through a rigorous and time consuming design and production process.
For traditional commercial satellites, it takes three to ten years to produce a customized satellite
once a customer has placed an order. Small satellites are often built more quickly, in one to three
years. This speed is achieved because small satellite manufacturers often reuse previous designs
and components. The typical satellite production process includes phases for specification of
customer requirements, design, manufacture, test and launch. During the requirements
specification phase, there is intense dialog between the supplier and potential customer to discuss
the customer's unique needs and the technical specifications of a satellite that will meet those
needs. Although all suppliers rely on previous experience, they view each project as
fundamentally unique. During the design phase, a large team of engineers uses specialized
software tools and a variety of physics-based disciplines to create models showing all aspects of
the satellite. A separate team of technicians works to implement the engineers' design. The test
phase is very important. This phase ensures that the satellite functions properly and that the
satellite can operate successfully in the harsh environment of space. The test phase requires the
use of expensive and highly specialized equipment and facilities. For example, the satellite is put
inside special chambers that simulate the temperature and pressure of the space environment.
Other facilities are used to ensure the satellite is structurally sound. Finally, after months of
testing, the satellite is loaded into a rocket and launched into space where it is operated by the
customer or a contracted operations team. Once a satellite completes its useful lifetime, it should
be destroyed or moved out of the range of operational satellites. For many earth remote sensing
satellites, this can be achieved by allowing the satellite to gradually drift into the atmosphere
where it burns harmlessly.
The team required to complete a satellite production project requires many players. For large
firms building traditional commercial satellites, there may be hundreds of people involved. Small
satellites are often built with teams closer to 50 to 100 people. There are engineers that focus on
the payload (i.e. cameras and sensors) and engineers that design specific aspects of the satellite
bus. There is also a team of managers to monitor cost, schedule, personnel and facilities.
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1.2.4 Satellite Industry
The satellite industry has several unique aspects. In the language of economics, there are
multiple market failures in the industry that reduce competition. There is imperfect competition
due to the small number of customers and suppliers. The industry is dominated by governments
and large firms as customers and another set of large firms as suppliers. Traditionally, these
suppliers have been concentrated in the US, Europe and Japan. There is, however, a current trend
for smaller, more innovative firms to enter the industry from around the world. Many of these
new firms build small satellites. For small and large firms, each satellite is manufactured as a
customized product in response to an order from a specific client. Satellites are craft products
that are manufactured by hand. The manufacturing process is highly capital intensive and
requires large teams with several types of specialized knowledge. The nature of the industry is
highly dependent on the type of service provided by the satellite. Satellite communication is the
most commercially driven service. In the areas of earth remote sensing, navigation and space
science, governments are the main customers that by and operate satellites. Governments often
invest in these satellites and provide their services to their citizens as public goods. Risk is a key
aspect of the satellite industry. There are many risks that may cause a satellite project to fail.
Failure comes at high cost to the customer and suppliers. The most significant risk is the launch
process. If there is a failure during launch, the satellite may be completely lost. There is also risk
of failure due to technical problems on the satellite once it is in space. Satellites are normally
insured against such loss. Since there are relatively few launches and the technical risk of failure
is high, satellite insurance rates are high. In the satellite industry, it is highly impractical to do
maintenance on the spacecraft after launch into space. Thus, the original design of a satellite
needs be excellent. The risk of technical failures during operations leads the overall industry to
change technology slowly. Once specific electronics or materials are demonstrated to work well
in space, many satellite engineers are hesitant to change to new, unproven designs or
technologies.
The satellite industry is highly political due to its origins. Satellite and launch vehicle technology
were developed as part of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The initial motivation for creating these technologies was purely defense oriented.
Satellites provided both the US and USSR with new capabilities for reconnaissance by sending
back images from space. The technology and science principles required to launch satellites are
nearly identical to the technology of missile launchers. Space technology has matured in close
association with nuclear technology. Space technology is inherently "dual use" for both military
and civil applications. Today the Armed Forces of the United States depend heavily on space
assets for communication, navigation, weather and surveillance services. Due to these realities,
the United States has thus taken a highly protectionist approach to trade in the space arena. The
US classifies most space-related technology as a defense technology. This highly restricts the
trade of space technology outside the country. The result is that the US space manufacturing
industry depends heavily on the US government as a customer. US firms can sell satellites or
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launch services to foreign customers, but they cannot share any information about how the
technology works with their customers. Countries around the world monitor and restrict the
export of space technology, but the level of restrictions is often more severe in the United States.
This means that the types of satellite training projects that are studied in the dissertation cannot
happen in the US. Countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America that want to buy training in
space technology must seek this service outside the US. They find the training in Europe and
Asia.
1.2.5 Focus on Small, Remote Sensing Satellites
The above discussion provides an overview of key aspects of the overall satellite industry. There
are unique characteristics of the programs for small satellites studied in this dissertation. These
programs are interesting precisely because they break many of the assumptions of the traditional
satellite industry. The space era started in the 1950s as the Soviets and United States raced to
achieve space milestones by orbiting satellites and people. For the next forty years, space
technology remained highly concentrated in the control of a relatively small number of countries.
Major space activity was undertaken by the US, Europe, Japan and later India and China. In the
background, an amateur satellite community was developing. This community used simple,
affordable technology to develop satellites based on volunteer labor and expertise. Amateur
satellites flew which carried simple communication payloads that allowed the global amateur
radio community to interact. The traditional satellite community emphasized rigorous
engineering and testing to reduce the risk of failure. The space industry evolved to become
highly capital intensive and risk averse. In the 1980s and 1990s, several universities added to the
activities of the amateur satellite community to create another approach to satellite engineering.
They began to develop what became known as small satellites. Small satellites have quickly
advanced in performance. They were initially built primarily for research and education, but
more of them are being used for commercial applications to compete with larger satellites. The
small satellite community is not just defined by the size of their satellites. They pursue satellite
engineering with a fundamentally different philosophy than the traditional space industry. They
view risk, failure and technology differently than the traditional space industry. The small
satellite community seeks to build satellites that have lower performance expectations, can
accept greater risk of failure and use newer technology than traditional satellites. Whereas the
traditional community tends to put as many payloads on one satellite as possible to save launch
costs, small satellites are often designed with only one payload. Whereas traditional satellites
rarely rely on electronic technology that has not been proven to operate in space, the small
satellite community wants to take advantage of the fast pace of innovation in the micro-
electronics industry. They see that technologies such as cell phones and other consumer
electronics lead to highly capable and small electronic packages. These consumer electronics are
not guaranteed to work for long periods in space due to the impact of radiation. The small
satellite community accepts that risk and designs shorter missions in order to use these new
electronics. The small satellite community also tends to apply different management approaches.
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Large, traditional satellite projects are executed by highly bureaucratic teams with many levels of
hierarchy and complex reporting chains. They generate large amounts of documentation to
enable the bureaucracy to communicate and to ensure the quality of their products. Small
satellite projects are typically executed by small teams which are much more agile and less
formal. They tend to produce less documentation and have more flat organizations. They may
also have less clearly defined team roles. People do whatever is required to complete the project.
Small satellite teams often define their own standards for testing and design quality that is not
based on traditional engineering. In this dissertation, three out of four of the case study satellite
projects are implemented with this small satellite philosophy. Thus, not only are the developing
countries entering a technical field that is new to them, they are joining a community that is
currently trying to redefine the field of satellite engineering.
2 Contributions of Space to Development
Space Technology has the potential to provide information, infrastructure and inspiration that
meets national needs in developing regions. Many countries recognize this; in response they are
investing in new national satellite programs to harness satellite services. This section discusses
the relationship between space technology and development. The findings in this section are
drawn from foundational research pursued by the author while defining the core study of
collaborative satellite projects. The section first explains the methods used in the foundational
research for data collection and analysis. Having established the methods, the next few sections
build a chain of ideas that begins broadly and gradually narrows to introduce the motivation for
the core research on collaborative satellite projects. The argument begins by evoking technology
as a key ingredient in national development. Technology related to space is one example of a
tool that can contribute to development both by addressing societal challenges and by advancing
a nation's technological capability. The research has reveals five specific ways that space has the
potential to promote national development. A number of international organizations, including
the United Nations, have recognized the opportunity for space technology to serve developing
countries. They have consistent activities to promote this potential. Meanwhile governments in
many developing countries also view space an important tool for their development. Most
nations have on-going activities to ensure that space is harnessed in their country. A smaller
number of nations are establishing programs to operate nationally owned satellites. This trend is
enabled by the increasing performance of small satellites. Several countries seek to transition
from owning satellites purchased abroad to attaining national capability to design and build
satellites. Among this group of countries, a set of them have taken a similar policy to partner
with foreign firms as they buy a satellite and pay for training of local engineers. This policy is
the core phenomenon that is studied in the dissertation. This chain of ideas is explored more
below.
The ideas presented in this section serve as motivation for the core study of six collaborative
satellite projects. In their own way, however, they are findings from a broader research program
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that seeks to understand the relationship between space technology and national development,
especially for countries that are pursuing domestic space activity. The next section explains the
approaches to collect and analyze data to develop these findings about connections between
space and development. The foundational research builds on work from the Master's degree
thesis by the author, which included similar efforts to capture data and perform analysis about
the use of satellite-based technology in developing countries.'
2.1 Data Collection Methods for Foundational Research
The data collection discussed here has two purposes. The first purpose is to provide broad
understanding for the potential and barriers shaping the use of space technology for
development. As part of this process, the foundational analysis helps identify trends and future
research questions in this area. Secondly, the foundational research provides serves as a pilot
study to help solidify the core research plans and select case studies. The data collection and
analysis methods presented here are only for the foundational work. The methods for data
collection and analysis for the core case studies will be discussed later.
Researching the relationship between space technology and national development involves
answering two broad questions: 1) In what space activities do developing countries participate?
and 2) How is space technology applied to support development? The data that addresses these
questions is limited and difficulty to find. A key step in the academic study of these issues is to
creatively identify and access data that describes the activities in developing countries that are
influenced by space. The information present here is based on a multi-year effort that combines
conference participation, field interviews and document review. The foundational data collection
process is highly exploratory and adaptive. The approaches evolve throughout the study as new
insights emerge. In order to answer the two broad questions introduced here, evidence is sought
that describes policies, programs and activities related to space and development.
Conference participation
Each year, several international organizations put on conferences and workshops that discuss the
relationship between space technology and development. There are on-going workshops
organized by the United Nations, the International Academy of Astronautics, the International
Astronautical Federation and professional societies such as International Society for
Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing. There are also national and regional organizations in
developing countries that discuss space issues. Part of this data collection involves participating
in conferences like these that bring together stakeholders concerned with the impact of space on
development. The formal conference presentations provide useful facts about projects and
organizations working in this area. The informal dialog with stakeholders provides useful
perspective. Table 2-1 shows a list of conferences in which the author participated while
preparing the research presented here. The conferences vary from large, general events that bring
together thousands of people from many space disciplines, to small, focused workshops that
convene hundreds of people to discuss the role of space in development. During each conference,
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the author is both an observer and a presenter. These events provide an opportunity to receive
feedback on the research from practitioners that are familiar with the issues under study.
Table 2-1: Ust of meetings attended related to the interaction of space technology and development
# Event Focus Organizer Year Location
International
Astronautical
International Large, general space Federation, International Glasgow,
1 Astronautical conference with sessions Academy of 2008 Scotlandfocused on space for SolnCongress developing countries Astronautics,
International Institute of
Space Law
International
Astronautical
International Large, general space Federation, International Daejeon,
2 Astronautical conference with sessionls Acdm f2009 South2 Atroautcal focused on space for Academy of 20 ot
Congress developing countries Astronautics, Korea
International Institute of
Space Law
International
Astronautical
International Large, general space Federation, International Prague,
3 Astronautical conference with sessions Acdm f2010 Czech3 Atroautcal focused on space for Academy of 21 zc
Congress developing countries Astronautics, Republic
International Institute of
Space Law
International
Large, general space Astronautical Cape
International conference with sessions Federation, International Town,
4 Astronautical focused on space for Academy of 2011 South
Congress developing countries Astronautics, Africa
International Institute of
Space Law
i oFocused meeting
Small Satellite convening practitioners
5 Programmes for .from governments, United Nations Office of Graz,5 uProgramme industry and academia Outer Space Affairs 2011 Austria
Deetablnt involved with small
satellite programs
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Focused meetingSymposium on convening practitioners
Small Satellite from governments, United Nations Office of Graz,6 Programmes for industry and academia Outer Space Affairs 2010 AustriaSustainable involved with small
Development satellite programs
Workshop on Focused workshop
Space convening practitioners
7 Technology from governments, United Nations Office of 2010 Istanbul,Applications for industry and academia Outer Space Affairs Turkey
Socio-Economic concerned with social
Benefits benefits of space
1st Annual Cape
South African Meeting of space South African Space Toa8 Space professionals in South Association 2010 South
Association Africa AfricaCongress
Meeting with policy International Academy
International makers and researchers to of Astronautics &
9 Symposium on discuss how equatorial Nigerian National Space 2010 Abuja,the Equatorial countries can participate in Research and Nigeria
Plane space technology and Development Agency
science
African
Leadership Gathering of space-related
Conference on policy makers from Governments of Kenya, Mombasa,
10 Space Science African countries as well South Africa, Nigeria, 2011 Kenya
and Technology as representatives from Algeria
for Sustainable industry and academia
Development
Field interviews and observation
In addition to participation in ten conferences, this foundational research builds on data
collection through field interviews and observation in multiple countries. Between July 2009 and
December 2010, the author visited 7 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia to conduct interviews
and site visits for foundational data collection. The field visits lasted from several days to several
months. Additional field work was done for the core case study data collection. The foundational
field visits were held at organizations that contribute to the application of space technology to
development. In addition to this international field work, several meetings were held with related
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organizations in the author's home country of the United States during 2011. Table 2-2 gives an
overview of the foundational field work by describing the countries, interviews and
organizations. In each country, field visits were pursued with organizations representing
governmental, academic or industrial sectors. The government organizations included agencies
or departments within the national government that pursue research or operate programs related
to space. The university representatives were involved with space research and education or
aspired to initiate such involvement. The industrial organizations were firms that participate in
some aspect of space technology. The European organizations included universities that have
partnered with developing countries on space-related projects. The "multilateral governmental"
organization in Europe refers to the United Nations Office of outer Space Affairs, which works
to promote awareness and activity regarding space resources for development. The Regional
Government referenced in Belgium refers to the European Commission. At the regional level,
European countries collaborate in multiple programs that facilitate the application of space
technology for development. Some of these are funded and led by the European Commission. In
the United States, relevant government organizations include the Department of State, the US
Agency for International Development and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Several meetings were held with representatives of these organizations.
In Kenya and South Africa, a relatively large number of interviews were conducted with
representatives of a variety of organizations related to space. These sets of field visits provided a
helpful overview of the national ecosystem of government offices, universities and firms that
participate in deriving value from space through various means. Interview questions with these
organizations sought to understand how organizations originally became involved with space,
what their space-related activities they perform, how they train personnel in space related skills
and how they work with foreign and domestic partners. In Singapore and Turkey, a more narrow
view of national space activities was afforded from the perspective of one university.
Table 2-2: Summary of Foundational Data Collection Field Visits
# Sites # of PeopleCountry Visited Interviewed Types of Organizations Visited
North America
United States 3 6-10 - National Government
Europe
Germany 1 1-5 - University
Austria 1 1-5 - Multilateral Government
Belgium 1 1-5 - Regional Government
Africa
Kenya 7 11-20 - University
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- National Government
- Regional Government
- Industry
- National Government
South Africa 19 21-30 - Industry
- University
Asia
Singapore 1 1-5 - University
Turkey 1 1-5 - University
The set of countries shown in Table 2-2 reflects the exploratory nature of this foundational data
collection process. They do not represent a complete sampling of relevant countries, but all the
sources provide useful information. The countries and organizations were chosen through a
combination of relationships and enabling circumstances. South Africa and Kenya were selected
for in-depth study because both countries currently face major policy transitions with regard to
national space activity. South Africa inaugurated a national space agency in 2011, while Kenya
is preparing to do the same. In both countries, a government office served as a liaison and helped
the research team arrange meetings and site visits.
Document Analysis
The third source that supports the foundational data collection is documentation. The
documentation provides additional information and perspective to describe how organizations
participate in space activities related to development. Some documentation is accessed during
field travel and some is available from anywhere via the internet. Several major categories of
documents are summarized in Table 2-3. The table indicates for each type of documentation the
level of review and the availability. Level of Review refers to the extent to which the authors
ensure that the documentation contains up to date, factual information. The document types with
higher levels of review include reports by the United Nations and other organizations, research
papers and published books. Some types of documentation - such as organizational websites,
brochures, conference papers and new articles - may face a less intense review process. With
both types of documents, the researcher must be wary because information from documentation
may be out of date or incomplete. The "Availability" column in the table refers to how the
document type may be accessed. Some types are regularly on the internet, especially United
Nations reports, organization websites and news articles. For other types of documents
availability varies; it may be necessary to request them during field visits. The United Nations
reports deserve special mention. After each UN meeting or workshop about the role of space in
development, the convening UN office generates a report that provides useful information for
academic research. For each meeting, the reports describe the nations that were represented,
summaries of key presentations and discussions and recommendations. Reports from the United
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Nations also tend to reference related UN documents, thus providing useful context for academic
study.
Table 2-3: Summary of Foundational Document Data Sources
Type of Documentation Level of Review Availability
United Nations Reports High Internet
Organizational Reports High Varies
Research Papers High Varies
Books High Varies
Organizational Websites Low Internet
Organizational Brochures and
Newsletters Low Varies
Conference Papers Low Varies
Conference Presentations Low Varies
News Articles Low Internet
2.2 Role of Technology in Development
National development is a multifaceted process through which countries progress in four areas,
namely: 1) Technological Capability; 2) Economic Activity; 3) Human Condition; and 4)
Sustainability. Table 2-4 defines each of these four components of national development by
drawing from literature and from the author's reflection. Progress in Technological Capability
means empowering people with skills and harnessing technology to facilitate productive activity.
Technology has a duality. It refers to the intangible knowledge, skills, process and techniques
used by people and organizations as well as technology in the form of tangible tools, equipment
and facilities. Amsden defines progress in technological capability as a transition from
productive activity that is driven by natural resources and raw materials to productive activity
that is at higher value step in the chain of production. In her words, it is "moving from a set of
assets based on primary products, exploited by unskilled labor, to a set of assets based on
knowledge, exploited by skilled labor."' Progress in economic activity means improving
institutions in order to improve the way a country functions in the global economy, manages
national debt, competes in foreign exchange, and balances the effects of population movements.
Stiglitz highlights that economic activity may be hampered in less developed countries due to
market failures such as imperfect and costly information. In such cases, economic progress may
require government intervention to formulate policies to address such failures."' Progress in the
Human Condition is made by addressing basic human needs such as security, health, shelter,
nourishment, education and self determination. As the United Nations Human Development
Report summarizes, progress in this area increases the chances for people to attain "a long and
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living." Finally, progress in sustainability
focuses on the relationship between the environment and the other three areas of development.
Progress in this area means managing the natural environment to balance short and long term
needs. A well accepted definition of sustainable development from the Brundtland Report under
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the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development states, "Sustainable
development.. .meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."
Table 2-4: Definition of Four Areas that Contribute to National Development
Development as Progress in Four Areas
Type of Progress Focus Author's Definition Definition from Source
____ ___ ___ ____________ ___________Literature
"...[M]oving from a
set of assets based on
Progress in Empowering people with primary products, Amsden, A. RisePrchnloginal Technology skills and harnessing exploited by unskilled Amsde Rse
Capability technology to facilitate labor, to a set of assets 2001.productive activity based on knowledge,
exploited by skilled
labor."
Improving stitutions to Stiglitz, J.
function in the global Formulating policies "Markets,fuciony inagll and non-market Market Failures,
Progress in econ omy, managng interventions to and
Economic Institutions .n.aitl debt, address failures that Development."
Activity competitive n foreign impeded the Perspectives on
exchange, and balance functioning of the Economic
the effects of population market Evelomet
movemnts.market. Development,movements. 18
Focuses on the human United Nations.
Addressing basic human experience, "Statistics of the
needs such as security, emphasizing "a long Human
Progress in People health, shelter, and healthy life, DevelopmentHuman Condition nourishment, education knowledge and a Report."
and self determination. decent standard of http://hdr.undp.o
living." rg/en/statistics/
"Sustainable
development is
development that
meets the needs of the
present without Brundtland
compromising the Report, United
Managing the natural ability of future
Progress in Environment environment to balance generations to meet Commission onSustamability short and long term their own needs...." Environment
needs Concerned with and
economic Development
competitiveness,
environmental
wholeness and
employment (Ashford
and Caldart)
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The four areas of development defined in Table 2-4 are all mutually related as shown in Figure
2-1. The figure shows connections between each of the four areas of development progress. It
also includes examples of references that describe the relationships.
Progress in Human tA shford and Caldar Progress in SustainabilityCondition
00
E C.)
CL
Progress in Technological Progress in Economic
Capability Slw mdnActivitySolow, Amisden
Figure 2-1: Relationships between the four areas of development
Beginning in the bottom left side of Figure 2-1, the first consideration explores relationships
between progress in technological capability and progress in the other areas of development.
Solow's Nobel Prize winning research shows that technological progress is a dominant factor in
long term economic growth."'' Amsden's extensive body of empirical work follows the post-
World War II histories of many late-industrializing countries to find links between their progress
in technological capability and progress in economic institutions. Amsden's work considers the
institutional and policy approaches pursued by a number of countries in order to foster
technological capability building and enable economic competitiveness. As one example,
Amsden studied the phenomenon of import substitution. Especially between 1950 and 1980,
many countries prospered under import substitution using various policies.v'vii There were two
basic motivations for import substitution: trade balance and capability building. Developing
countries realized that many consumer items such as refrigerators, televisions and air
conditioners were in high demand as imports. This harmed the balance of payment as imports
greatly exceeded exports. In order to improve the balance of payments while increasing local
manufacturing capability, developing countries chose to manufacturer what was formerly
imported. The governments created tariffs that penalized the import of certain goods and then
make capital available to private or state owned enterprises who could manufacture these goods.
Support for firms often came from development banks, in places such as Mexico, Brazil, India,
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Turkey. Development banks financed both infrastructure
and new manufacturing efforts. Other policy options included providing tax rebates to encourage
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specific industries (Malaysia and Thailand). If a country could not yet build an entire product,
they sometimes started with assembly on behalf of foreign firms and gradually moved into full
production. This was the case for electronics in Taiwan. Other countries attracted labor intensive
manufacturing in partnership with foreign firms (Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, etc). The story of Korea's efforts in Textiles shows the range of policies
that finally led to a viable industry. Korea competed with Japan's high-skill/high wage textile
industry. Some of the policies pursued by Korea included the following: laws against trade
unions to keep wages down; tariffs to protect Korean firms; hiring foreign experts; and forming a
university program on textiles. Overall, the countries that benefited the most from import
substitution had either large internal markets that could support nascent industries (i.e. India) or
had flexible policy makers who could respond to success and failure and change policies
dynamically if necessary (i.e. Taiwan). The second link is between technological capability and
sustainability. Tainter's book, The Collapse of Complex Societiesviii describes this link. Tainter
provides a broad definition for sustainability by contrasting it with the collapse of a complex
society. The current global society fits into Tainter's definition of a "problem solving
organizatio[n], in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social differentiation, more
inequality, and more kinds of centralization and control emerge as circumstances require."" The
complexity provides benefits in terms of social control and productivity. In the past, some
societies grew too complex to continue to exist based on their institutional, environmental and
economic resources. This led to collapse, in which the societies returned to a less complex state.
According Tainter, such a pattern is inevitable due to decreasing marginal returns from
investments in complexity, unless technical progress can find new strategies for growth. Thus,
technical progress is necessary for societies to continue to flourish according to Tainter's
definitions. The third link moves from the bottom left corner of Figure 2-1 to the top left corner,
showing a connection between progress in technological capability and the human condition.
The United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) defines human development as "the
expansion of people's freedoms and capabilities to lead lives that they value and have reason to
value."" When individuals gain new technological capability, this can help empower them with
more opportunities to pursue the outcomes highlighted by the HDR.
The next set of relationships focus on Progress in Sustainability. Ashford and Caldart propose a
broad approach to Sustainability that shows the links back to the Human Condition and
Economic Activity. Their writing focuses on strategies for regulating industry so as to reduce
harm to people and the environment from industrial products and processes. They argue that
sustainability is concerned with economic competitiveness, environmental wholeness and
employment. Employment is a key factor in Human Development. As Ashford and Caldart
show, an environmental policy agenda is narrower than a sustainability policy agenda. The final
link to discuss from Figure 2-1 is between the Human Condition and Economic Activity. The
Human Development Report includes Gross National Per Capita Income as a key indicator of the
Human Condition. This approach connects the individual experience to the national economic
situation. Stiglitz gives some examples of how national economic policies and institutional
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realities can impact opportunities for individuals to earn incomes."' Stiglitz discusses the role for
government intervention in establishing non-market institutions to address market failures such
as imperfect information. He also warns that in some cases government barriers are causing
market failures. Non-market institutions are discussed further by Douglas North, who focuses on
the role of institutions in allowing markets to function.""' North notes that because transactions
are not costless (another market failure), institutions such as contracts, legal enforcement and
brand names are needed to facilitate impersonal, non-repeated exchanges. North further explains
that the development of healthy institutions to facilitate market transactions is not an automatic
process in a society. It requires often requires conscious government strategies, which ultimately
allow individuals to earn the incomes that contribute to their human condition.
Development is thus defined here as progress in four mutually related areas: technological
capability, human condition, sustainability and economic activity. Underlying the progress in all
these areas is the concept of governance. Progress in national development relies on a functional
government that provides an effective public system. With governance as a foundation,
governments can play other key roles in promoting development - including enabling
international collaboration, promoting domestic safety and setting national vision. Dirk Swart
highlighted the role of the government to promote development via effort in governance,
collaboration, safety and vision." His ideas parallel the above discussion, but focus on
government initiative. In Swart's language, governance refers to the efforts by a government to
be politically transparent, provide services to the public, facilitate economic growth and help
their citizens achieve basic human needs. Collaboration means looking broadly and strategically
for partnerships that can enhance a country's technological potential and market opportunities.
As an example, the regional integration of countries in Eastern, Southern and Western Africa has
the potential to provide larger markets. This would provide a buffer from the volatility and
competition of the global market. Such approaches could help businesses grow, assuming there
is proper coordination. The third key factor for governments to create an enabling environment
for harnessing technology is safety. Lack of security influences the way people view the future.
When people feel insecure, they spend less time on the long term planning that is necessary to
solve complex problems. Insecurity also discourages highly trained people from settling in a
community. Countries must create an environment where talented people with technical training
feel comfortable building a life. Finally, governments can foster technology via Vision. In this
role, governments must seek opportunities to inspire their citizens to value the role of technology
and sustainability in development. Referring back to Figure 2-1, this study is particularly
interested in development as progress in technological capability and the potential impacts that
such progress can make on other aspects of development in the figure.
The above discussion addressed the definition of development. The next consideration is the
definition of a developing country. Development involves gradually progress in four different
areas. It is a process, and there is not a simple way to distinguish between a developed and
developing country. Development level is a continuum. For each of the four areas of
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development introduced in Table 2-4, the development community has created multifaceted
indices to compare the performance of countries to each other and over time. None of the indices
are perfect or complete, but all provide helpful references. The progress that a particular country
has made toward development may be different in the four areas. Table 2-5 provides examples of
indices that are relevant to each of the four development areas. The Information and
Communication Technology Development Index (IDI), published by the International
Telecommunication Union, is one reference point to understand the progress of a country with
regard to technological capability." While the index only captures one category of technology, it
is a category that has become pivotal to economic activity in the globalized marketplace. The IDI
is a composite index that accounts for performance related to access, use and skills with
Information and Communication Technology. Access is measured by considering the availability
of ICT hardware and service; ICT use measures the percentage of the population that harnesses
ICTs; and skills relates to education and literacy. The Global Competitiveness Index gives
information about technology capability and economic activity." It is a composite index that
combines dozens of national indicators in twelve categories, namely: institutions, infrastructure,
macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training,
goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological
readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation. Some of these twelve pillars -
especially infrastructure, education, technological readiness and innovation - relate directly to
progress in technological capability. Others - such as macroeconomic environment and financial
market development - are highly relevant to progress in economic activity and institutions. The
Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) is more focused on social institutions that can impact
economic activity." Transparency International generates annual CPIs for about 180 countries
using surveys and expert assessments. They summarize the results by ranking the countries on a
scale of 0 to 10. The UN Human Development Report features the Human Development Index
(HDI). In 2011, 187 countries received an HDI score between zero and one. There are four
categories of HDI scores, ranging from very high to low development. The HDR views
development in terms of human experience. The most important dimensions they consider are
lifespan, education access and income."" The HDI focuses more heavily on the social
conditions of a country than on the characteristics of its economic system. The Environmental
Performance Index gives evidence of national progress toward sustainability.m It assigns
rankings to 163 countries using 25 indicators of achievement with regard to environmental
public health and the state of ecosystems in the country. The environmental health indicators
include the burden of environmentally driven diseases, air pollution, human access to water and
sanitation. Ecosystem Vitality is measured with indicators in the areas of climate change,
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, biodiversity, water quality and air quality.
Table 2-5: Overview of Development Indices in Four Areas
Examples of Measurement Efforts to Track Progress in Development
TypeFocus Index SourceProgress Fou Inde
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Progress in
Technological
Capability
Progress in
Economic
Activity
Technology
Institutions
Information and Communication Technology
Development Index
Global Competitiveness Index
Corruption Perceptions Index
International
Telecommunications
Union
http://www.itu.int/IT
U-
D/ict/publications/idi/
20 l/index.html
World Economic
Forum
http://gcr.weforum.or
/gcr20 10/
Transparency
International
http://www.transpare
ncy.org/policy resear
ch/surveys indices/c
Vi
United Nations.
Progress in "Statistics of the
Human People Human Development Index Human Development
Condition http://hdr.undp.org/en
/statistics/
Yale and Columbia
S ssinabiliy Environment Environmental Performance Index Universityhttp://epi.yale.edu/
Countries develop in the four areas of technology, human condition, sustainability and
economics. The indices introduced in Table 2-5 provide approach for comparing the
development level of countries using quantitative indices. The historical context of a country is
also relevant. For example, a country may score well above the Human Development Index in
2011, after gradually moving up from scoring near the world average over several decades. This
country's story is qualitatively different from a country that has consistently scored several
points above the world average for human development. The first country is "less developed"
compared to the second in the sense that its rate of change of development scores is higher than
the second country.
Having discussed the nature of development and tools to compare the development levels of
different countries, the next step is to further explore the mechanisms by which technological
progress contributes to economic, human and sustainable development. Several historical and
theoretical explanations emphasize the importance of knowledge, division of labor and
innovation.
In The Gifts ofAthena, Joel Mokyr, argues that one must consider the role of advances in human
knowledge in order to understand the economic growth of the modem age.' The book uses this
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central thesis to interpret important historical eras such as the Industrial Revolution in order to
better understand how society arrived at its present state. Mokyr begins by formulating a "theory
of useful knowledge" that is the foundation for all the discussion to follow." He defines two
kinds of knowledge: descriptive knowledge (known as n) and prescriptive knowledge about
techniques (known as X). Descriptive knowledge includes awareness of phenomena in nature and
"an ability to make sense" of these natural phenomena."" Additions to K2 are thought of as
discoveries. Prescriptive knowledge includes the methods that are used to make and do useful
things. An addition to X is an invention. Mokyr further proposes that society knows something as
long as at least one individual knows it. Knowledge is more "tight," however, if many people
know and believe it."" This basic framework is used in several chapters to explain the historical
progression from the Enlightenment to the Industrial Revolution to the rise of the factory. These
historical changes can partly be understood by changes in the amount, tightness, and access to
useful knowledge. Mokyr's historical progression proposes the following relationships. In the
1 7 th and 1 8 th centuries, science gained an increasingly important role as Western Europe "sought
to rationalize and spread knowledge."*"" This partly explains why the Industrial Revolution was
able to emerge, starting around 1760. Growth in the amount and tightness of descriptive
knowledge led to an increase in inventions and techniques that could be economically valuable.
"As the two forms of knowledge [prescriptive and descriptive] co-evolved, they increasingly
enriched one another."' Eventually, the amount of knowledge needed to run a production
facility was so high that the cost of moving people was lower than the cost of moving
information. This partly explains why factories became so common, and household craft
gradually declined. Although there was not instantaneous economic growth during the Industrial
Revolution, the modern standard of living in the western world can be traced to the technology
developments of that era.
Adam Smith made similar observations to Mokyr when he wrote The Wealth of NationI"' in
1776. This was in the midst of the transition that Mokyr describes in hindsight. Smith explains
both how and why a region moves from a subsistence economy to an industrial economy. Smith
argues that people have a natural tendency to exchange with each other in order to benefit from
differing abilities. Trade leads to a division of labor, which is helped along when there is also
growing population density and large markets. Smith notes that when labor is divided, it
increases productivity for three reasons: 1) each specialized worker is an expert in their task; 2)
time is saved because people are not switching between tasks; and 3) specialists often to innovate
better ways to do their job.
Schumpeter provides more detail about the relationship between invention, technology adoption
and their impact on the overall economy in his series of books on development and business
cycles. In The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter creates a theoretical model by
which to explain endogenously why economies change rather than remain statically in
equilibrium."' He begins by assuming a static economy that experiences gradual growth due
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only to population growth and savings. Goods and services are produced in the economy by
combining land (natural resources) and labor in a "circular flow".x'1 People generally do the
same kind of work repetitively; there is very little incentive to change. No external crises cause
change in the economy. Given these assumptions, Schumpeter argues that no change or major
growth will occur in this economy unless there is innovation. Schumpeter carefully defines
innovation as distinct from invention. Innovation is not when a technology is first developed or a
scientific breakthrough is made. Innovation occurs when someone changes the way inputs are
combined to make outputs in economic activity. Schumpeter further proposed that innovation
happens because an individual called an entrepreneur takes a leadership role and challenges the
status quo in order to bring about change. Once one person takes this risk, other people imitate
the original entrepreneur and a cluster of innovations results. This cluster fundamentally changes
the technical rules by which the economy operates. The economy moves into a period of
increased prosperity because the innovations increase the capacity to create wealth. Schumpeter
claims that "the mechanisms of economic change in capitalist society pivot on entrepreneurial
activity". "x He terms such activity "creative destruction"' or "creative response"., a
Schumpeter's model of business cycles continues the story. From the static state, the economy
begins to experience increased prosperity due to innovation. This does not last, however.
Eventually some of the firms who do not adjust to the new technical rules of the economy are not
able to compete. Some firms have to reorganize while others simply close. This transition leads
to a recession and ultimately a depression. The economy suffers until a new wave of
entrepreneurs initiate innovations. Thus, the economy cycles continuously through periods of
prosperity, recession, depression and recovery, as shown in Figure 2-2. With each wave of
innovation and prosperity, though, the overall level of wealth increases so that the economy is on
an increasing wave of cycles. Schumpeter cites the work of other economists on cycles and
shows that there are multiple cycles happening to the economy simultaneously at different time
scales and levels of severity. X
I - Innovation
Figure 2-2: Schumpeter predicts economic cycles from innovation to prosperity to depression to innovation (Original Figure
summarizing concepts from Schumpeter 1939)"'
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Finally, Drucker provides a neat summary of the historical interaction between technological and
economic progress in his work Post-Capitalist Society." Drucker describes how the western
world moved from an Industrial Revolution in the 1 8 th century to a Productivity Revolution in
the 19th century to a Management Revolution in the 20h century. The Industrial Revolution put
technology and capital at the center of economic activity. The Productivity Revolution created
the bourgeois middle class as a powerful social force. The Management Revolution, in the era
since World War II, has been dominated by the importance of knowledge as a factor of
production. Knowledge has become a more vital factor than capital and labor.
These historical and theoretical reflections show how technological progress is integrally linked
to economic activity at both micro and macro scales. An individual or small team can initiate
innovation in their organization by adopting a new technique or product that changes their
economic activity. The aggregation of many such innovations led historical to major transitions
in the operations of society. Technology plays a key role in development because it dictates the
rules for what inputs and processes are required to achieve outputs. The rules, inputs and outputs
in turn dictate the opportunities and costs to progress in economic, human and sustainable
development.
2.3 Five Ways that Space Can Contribute to Development
The discussion above addressed the relationship between all technology and national
development. Development is defined to include four areas - human, economic, technological
and sustainability. This section shows how space technology in particular has the potential to
contribute to the four areas of national development. Table 2-6 introduces five types of space
activity and shows which areas of development they have the greatest potential to directly
impact. The rest of the section provides further explanation and examples.
Table 2-6: Space activity can provide benefit to the global community through five activities
Five Types of Space Activity that Human Economic Technological Sustainable
Provide Global Benefit
Applying Satellite Services X X X X
Building Technological Capability X
Enabling Economic Activity X
Inspiring Technology Applications X X
Building Scientific Knowledge X X X
The first type of space activity that contributes to development is applying satellite services.
Three major satellite services are remote sensing, communication and positioning. Satellite
remote sensing enables earth observation and monitoring of the environment. This can help
respond to problems such as disease outbreaks, drought, fires and deforestation. Satellite
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communication is a part of the global infrastructure that allows the world to share information
seamlessly. Satellite navigation and positioning have become integrated into the global
transportation infrastructure, while the timing function serves many industries and communities.
Satellite services are ubiquitous in the global community and less developed countries are part of
the user-base for these services.>' This activity has demonstrated the potential to promote all
four areas of development. In the short term, it promotes human development by providing
information and infrastructure that improves quality of life. This is particularly evident when
satellite communication, imaging and positioning are used during disaster response. Also in the
short term, satellite services can enable economic development when organizations create
business models based on satellite capabilities. Many firms currently build business around
satellite communication and positioning. In the long term, applying satellites services can
promote technological and sustainable development. The technological progress will come if
countries continuously learn about the technology they are applying and seek opportunities for
innovation. The sustainability progress can be achieved if satellite-based environmental data
harnessed as part of forming policies and strategies to manage natural resources. The second type
of space activity is building technological capability. The risks and challenges associated with
operating technology in space sharpen the skills of the global community of innovators. When a
country begins new activities with space technology, they necessarily enter a posture of learning
and self-improvement for both individuals and teams. This aspect of space activity directly
impacts the technological area of development. The third type of activity through which space
brings benefit is enabling economic activity. As space resources and information bring value to
customers, new organizations can be formed that create jobs and products that leverage space.
Several examples were given above in the area of satellite services. Economic activity also
includes firms or universities selling products and services related to the production of satellites.
The fourth activity area is inspiring technology applications. This can impact both human and
technological development. When engineers and technologists solve problems to allow
operations or innovation in a space system, the new invention is often relevant to terrestrial
applications as well. The unique environment of space often inspires unique approaches and
innovative solutions. Such spinoff solutions can be harnessed both on earth and in space -
providing double benefit. For example, several NASA technology spinoffs have great relevance
to social needs in developing countries. Two technologies related to agriculture and food
production are shown in Figure 2-3. NASA does research on food technology in order to prepare
for long duration human spaceflight. Due to this research effort, NASA created technology that
slows the decay of food by removing a specific chemical from the air. This is helpful to reduce
food waste and allow food to be transported over long distances while retaining freshness. The
technology was commercialized and is now used in many applications by private sector actors.
Another outcome of NASA's food research was a type of potato with increased crop yield and
disease resistance. The pictures on the bottom row of Figure 2-3 show an application of NASA
technology to water purification. NASA worked with an external partner to develop a technology
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called the Microbial Check Valve (MCV). This valve was incorporated into the water
purification system of the Space Shuttle. The MCV was spun out of NASA and repackaged in a
ground-based water cleaning system. This new system can be transported by truck and used to
pump clean water from a large, contaminated water source such as a lake or well. The ground-
based system has been deployed in multiple developing countries. For a more detailed survey of
NASA technologies that have been harnessed to address needs in the developing world, see the
2009 paper by Comstock."
AiroCide helps farmers avoid rotted Minitubers resist disease and
crops by extending the time to increase crop yield
market in India and elsewhere. throughout the world.
Kampang Salak, Malaysia Kendala, Iraq Chiapas, Mexico
Figure 2-3: These NASA spinoff technologies support food production (Figure credit: NASA
http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/odf/Soinoff dev.pdf)
There are also examples from space organizations within developing countries that make spinoff
connections based on their space activity. In South Africa a company called Space Commercial
Services was established by engineers with years of experience on the domestic satellite industry.
These engineers and a broader team of employees from other fields work to apply space-based
resources and knowledge to social applications. This represents a spinoff both because the team
has space experience and because of the business model to use space for social needs. Space
Commercial Services works in diverse areas, including geospatially enabled knowledge, socio-
economic development, program management and telecommunication infrastructure
management.' In Malaysia, the company called Astronautic Technology SB (ATSB) is the
primary implementer of national satellite projects. ATSB was initially founded in the late 1990s
order to establish a national capability for satellites, but they have diversified during their
history. By building on their skills in satellite design and fabrication, ATSB has also developed
terrestrial projects such a tsunami early warning systems, radiation monitoring systems,
differential satellite navigation systems, as well as sensors and information systems for airport
runways." This is a spinoff example because a company whose core business model was built
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around space used their knowledge and training to apply advanced technology to terrestrial
projects.
Finally, space activity builds the scientific knowledge of society. This can impact the human,
economic, and technological progress toward development. By venturing into space, the global
community has made immense discoveries. New players in space can achieve local scientific
progress with their own space activities. Even with limited resources, it is possible to access and
analyze space science data collected on satellite platforms. There are valuable measurements that
can be taken using terrestrial sensors that provide insights about the relationship between the
earth and sun. Human spaceflight and suborbital operations open the opportunity for scientists all
over the world to engage in microgravity research. All of these represent practical opportunities
to harness the benefits of space for improved infrastructure, valuable information and global
inspiration.
2.4 International activity to promote space for development
The potential for space activity to benefit developing countries has been recognized by the global
space community for decades. Early in the space era, just as the Soviet Union and the United
States made initial achievements to operate in space, the United Nations reacted to the global
impact of the new field of technology. The United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) were
established in 1958.'J The UNOOSA office serves as a full time UN organization to support the
COPUOS committee as it meets several times per year, gathering representatives from UN
member states. Both organizations were created with the dual role of encouraging all nations to
harness space for non-military purposes and to ensure that the benefits of space were shared by
all mankind, rather than a few technologically advanced nations. The COPUOS committee
contributed to maintaining space for peaceful ends by developing five space treaties which were
eventually adopted by the General Assembly. The treaties also addressed potential conflicts that
could arise from global space activity, such as the liability of Party A due Party B if a space
object owned by Party A damages property owned by Part B. The five space treaties are
summarized in Table 2-7.
Table 2-7: Summary of United Nations Space Treatiese
Short Name Long Name Yiar entered
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
Outer Space Treaty in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 1967
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Rescue Agreement Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 1968
Outer Space
Liability Convention Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 1972by Space Objects
Registration Convention Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 1975Outer Space
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Moon Agreement Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 1984Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
The five space treaties impact the opportunities for space to contribute to development because
they established a global consensus early in the space era on several key concepts. One concept
was that locations in space (including earth orbit, the moon or other planets) could not be
appropriated exclusively by a particular country. Unlike the colonial era during which powerful
countries took over weaker countries, the treaties specified that all countries should have, at
least, theoretical access to space. The UN treaties promoted "arms control, the freedom of
exploration, liability for damage caused by space objects, the safety and rescue of spacecraft and
astronauts, the prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment,...
scientific investigation and the exploitation of natural resources in outer space."
Another step by the United Nations to promote space for development was the initiation in 1971
of the Programme on Space Applications (PSA). The purpose of the PSA is to ensure that the
benefits of space technology are applied around the world. The PSA is implemented by the
members of the Office of Outer Space Affairs. They hold a series of workshops throughout the
year to provide information about the use of satellites services, satellite technology and space
science for development. They also partner with other organizations to implement practical
projects, such as scholarship programs or the establishment of local space organizations in
developing countries. The themes of the PSA include Basic Space Science, Basic Space
Technology, Human Space Technology, Global National Satellite Systems, Natural Resource
Management & Environmental Monitoring, Satellite Communications, as well as Space
Technology & Disaster Management. The Programme on Space Applications has consistently
spread awareness about the five types of space activity that promote development. They also
bring together experts from all over the world who work in these areas."'
The UNOOSA office is not the only United Nations body that is concerned with applying space
technology for development. UNOOSA plays a central role in developing policy and involving
developing counties. Many other United Nations organizations apply space technology as part of
their routine work to support development. The UN-SPIDER program (United Nations Platform
for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response) has the goal to
"[e]nsure that all countries and international and regional organizations have access to and
develop the capacity to use all types of space-based information to support the full disaster
management cycle.""v Other UN bodies that use space as integral parts of their missions include
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO); the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); the UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization; and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The WMO and ITU use
space technology and they coordinate the global use of satellites for communication and weather
monitoring.
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Outside of the United Nations, many other international organizations promote the use of
satellites and other space technology for development; Table 2-8 gives more examples. The
organizations described in Table 2-8 include several types. None of these organizations exists
exclusively to promote the application of space resources for development. All of them,
however, have specific programs, committees or events designed to increase space awareness or
capability among developing countries. One category of relevant organizations is the
international professional societies in fields related to space. Examples not shown in the table
include the International Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing
(http://www.isprs.org/) and the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics
(http://www.iugg.org/). Groups like these provide resources through which space professionals
from developing countries can integrate with the global network of people in their field.
Table 2-8: Examples of International Organizations that Promote Space for Development
Organization Type Overall Promotion of Space for Website
Purpose Development
Committee of Promote Hosts several Capacity Building http://cosparhg.c
Committee Non- international workshops per year that teach
on Space Governmenta scientific scientists fro developi coutries nes.fr/About/abo
Research I research sc skills in space research ut.htm
Organization space
"Providing a
International unified system
Charter: Collaboration of space data Creates a mechanism whereby http://www.disa
Space and by formal acquisition and developing countries can request sterscharter.org/delivery to those satellite data during disasters via
Major Agreement affected by partnerships with Charter Members. home
Disasters natural or man-
made disasters"
Recognize Hosts committee and study groups
International Honorific distmguihe that prepare events and reports http://www.iaaw
Academy of Professional individuals n related to the application of space 
b .org/
Astronautics Society astronautics and for development. Includes members eb.orgfcreate platform from developing countriesfor international
collaboration.
Connects member organizations
from developing countries with
International Advocate international community; host
International Iternationa ofknowledge, workshops and trainings for space http://iafastro.or
Astronautical federation of development professionals and educators from g/index.html?titl
Federation orgaizions and application developing countries; provide e=Main Page
of space assets scholarships for young professionals
and students to attend major space
conferences.
"Promote and Hosts an office of Astronomy for
International Professional safeguard the Development dedicated to http://www.iau.
Astronomical Poeo science of identifying and promoting the links org
Union Society astronomy in all between astronomy and national
its aspects development.
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through
international
cooperation."
Coordinating Working towards enhancing
Group on International developme of capacity in developing countries to http://wwvw.eart
Earth Coordinating obErt use earth observations from satellites hobservations.or
Observations Body Observation and other sources. Offering internet- g/index.shtmlSystems of based training opportunities.
Systems 
________
Develops Host user conferences in developing http://www.esri.
ESRI Company Geographic regions to promote their software com/
Information tools and provide training.
Systems 
________
2.5 National activity to harness space for development
The previous section discussed efforts from international organizations to promote activity in
space by and for developing countries. Within developing countries there are also domestic
efforts to harness space for development. This section focuses on the use of satellite services,
space research and space-related commerce. The next section will specifically discuss national
satellite programs in developing countries. Governments in many developing countries have
established regional or national organizations to manage satellite remote sensing,
communication, positioning and scientific data for the benefit of the country. In the area of
remote sensing, these organizations often have a primary purpose of ensuring that national and
local government agencies have access to satellite data; as a secondary purpose they may also
support private organizations and academics in accessing data. One example of a regional
organization that supports the use of satellite remote sensing and positioning services is the
Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD) in Nairobi, Kenya .
Although it is located in Kenya, RCMRD represents fifteen member states in southern and
eastern Africa. RCMIRD's purpose is to support the governments of their member states in the
use of geographically reference information technology - much of which is enabled by satellites.
The RCMRD does not own or operate satellites, but has agreements with international partners
to obtain satellite remote sensing data. One recent partnership that RCMRD established is the
SERVIR project with NASA which provides access to many types of scientific data. One
example of a national organization is South Africa's Earth Observation section within their
National Space Agency (SANSA Earth Observation). Part of this organization's expertise is
creating customized tools that apply satellite data to specific national challenges - such as fire
detection - for users in South Africa. SANSA Earth Observation also plays a role to ensure that
other government organizations have access to satellite data and techniques. In other regions,
Thailand's GISTDA (Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency) and
Mexico's CentroGeo (Centro de Investigacion en Geografia y Geomatica) are examples of
government organizations that play a role at the national level in obtaining, distributing and
applying satellite remote sensing, positioning and scientific resources. Here are several more
examples of national efforts to harness space activity within Brazil and South Africa.
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Brazil
Given Brazil's large territory and many natural resources, satellite remote sensing brings great
value to the nation. Brazil has been actively involved with remote sensing activities since 1969.
The Agencia Espacial Brasileira (AEB) partners with the Istituto Nacional de Pesquisas
Espaciais (INPE) to develop and operate remote sensing satellites that provide useful information
to decision makers in Brazil. AEB also collaborates with partner nations to access additional data
or conduct missions. Brazil has worked with China since 1988 on the CBERS (China-Brazil
Earth Resources Satellite) series of remote sensing satellites. The series is ultimately planned to
include 5 satellites with optical cameras and imagers that can pick up infrared light. The cameras
are useful for monitoring land use, water resources and soil erosion, while the infrared imager
can identify potential fires. CBERS images are used in a program called CANASAT, which
applies satellite imagery to monitor sugar-cane growth.d'vi Brazil also works with the United
States Geological Survey agency to acquire imagery from the Landsat series of satellites via a
local ground station. Landsat imagery is used throughout the world for mapping and resource
monitoring."'I Satellite data is also used by Brazilian organizations in studying areas such as
weather, UV radiation, and the effects of space radiation on earth.l"i"i The Embratel company
provides satellite communication services in Brazil, including television broadcast and two-way
voice or data lines. This allows users to access the internet, make international calls and manage
business information*d*. Satellite communication has also been used to enable distance learning
in isolate regions such as the State of Amazonas, where schools have limited resources'. In
addition to the services that Brazil receives from satellites, Brazil is active in space research,
education and exploration. Brazil has a number of facilities for research in space science. Several
of these facilities are within INPE, such as the site at Fortelza which focuses on studies the
magnetic and gravitational fields of the earth". Another example is the radio astronomy
observatory of Itapetingal". Brazil also uses space as also a tool to inspire the public and youth to
engage in science. One of INPE's observatories is set up to give public presentations about space
and astronomy"". Brazil also hosts a Centro Regional de Educacao em Ciencia y Tecnologia
Espacial Para America Latina e o Caribe (Regional Center for Space Science and Technology
Education for Latin America and the Carribean - CRECTEALC). The regional center offers
course in remote sensing, satellite communication, satellite meteorology and space science .
CRECTEALC works to connect Brazil to the international space community. Marcos Pontes is
the first Brazilian to enter space. He flew in a Russian spacecraft to the International Space
Station in 2006.
South Africa
Satellite remote sensing services are being used to meet societal needs for South Africa in areas
such as agriculture, environmental management, food security, water, disaster response, housing
development, utilities and infrastructure planning and national security. South Africa has only
operated two domestic satellites, however, the government works with partner nations and firms
to gain access to data from a variety of satellites. As mentioned above the SANSA Earth
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Observation center is a key player in accessing, archiving, processing and distributing remote
sensing data. They use data from satellites such as Terra and Aqua (United States), Earth
Resource Satellite 2 (Europe) and the SPOT series (France)". South Africa also contributes to
the international organization called the Group on Earth Observations (GEO); a representative
from South Africa served as a Co-Chair of GEO's Executive Committee. As seen in Table 2-8,
GEO is an international effort to improve the coordination and application of remote sensing
data.vi The South African government uses satellite imagery to enforce and plan environmental
regulations, in areas including water usage, fishing activity and land use.'vi The Council for
Geoscience uses satellite images as part of their process to map precious metals and stones in
South AfricaIviii and to explore potential sites for exploitation of groundwater in Limpopo.ix
South Africa is also the home of a project called MARA, a collaboration of scientists throughout
the continent that seeks to map malaria risk in Africa. The MARA project uses remote sensing
data as part of their analysis process because the spread of malaria is affected by environmental
variables such as moisture.1x Meanwhile the South African National Disaster Management
Center uses satellite data to publish an online map showing locations in danger of wild fires."x
Information from satellite remote sensing systems is used by many South African organizations
to produce useful information for government, industry and the public. Satellite navigation has
been applied to local activities in South Africa, such as wildlife management, the national census
and geological research. Wildlife is one of South Africa's valuable natural resources, and
satellite navigation is used for wild life research and management. In one case, small satellite
transmitters were attached to wild South African Karoo Blue Cranes as part of a research study.
The location data from the transmitters will help improve conservation efforts.'x" The South
African census agency, Statistics South Africa makes use of satellite remote sensing data and
satellite location information as part of data collection and planning for the national census.1Ui
Also, geological researchers from the Council for Geoscience use the timing signal from GPS to
synchronize research instruments that are placed in the ground for data collection. Satellite
communication impacts education, business and entertainment in South Africa. A non-profit,
South African organization called Mindset develops educational materials for schools, health
workers and under-developed communities. They distribute their material via satellite and
provide technical support to their end users."v Some universities in South Africa use satellite
communication as part of the infrastructure that allows students from all over the country to
study." Communication service providers such as Telkom offer satellite-based internet service
for businesses and homes that have limited connectivity options. NO Meanwhile, broadcasters
such as MultiChoice provide many South Africans with local and international television
programming via satellite.""" South Africa is also active in the areas of space research, education
and exploration. South Africa contributes richly in astronomy and space science research through
facilities such as the South African Astronomical Observatory, the Hartebeesthoek Radio
Astronomy Observatory and the Southern African Large Telescope.'""I Space related facilities
such as the Planetariums in Cape Town and Johannesburg serve to educate the public."' At the
Boyden Observatory near Bloemfontein, members of the Astronomical Society of Southern
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Africa volunteer to teach the public about astronomy and telescopes." At the university level,
students have made space milestones in South Africa. A team of students and professors from the
University of Stellenbosch designed and built the first South African satellite to fly in space. The
project, called SunSat, lead to the establishment of the company SunSpace and Information
Systems. Sunspace recently built South Africa's second satellite, SumbandillaSat." For younger
students, the University of Pretoria has held several Space and Aviation Camps, in which
learners from Grade 11 and 12 are exposed to the theory and technology in the space sector.
Finally, the first African to fly in space was a South African named Mark Shuttleworth who flew
to the International Space Station with a Russian team. One of Shuttleworth's goals is to use his
experiences in space to inspire South Africans to study science.'" A number of South African
firms build their business around space services or technology. SunSpace and Information
Systems designs and builds satellite systems. Denel - a major aerospace and defense firm -
operates the Overberg Test Range, which has the potential to be used as a satellite launch
facility." Firms such as Sentech, Space Television and Tellumat depend on satellite-enabled
technology to deliver their products. Sentech, a state owned enterprise, depends on satellites for
offering radio, television and internet services to consumer's homes and businesses."m Space
Television manufactures satellite transmission and receiving equipment to enable
communication."' Meanwhile, Tellumat supplies equipment that allows consumers to use
satellite-based information systems."" In the navigation area, firms like Optron Geomatics and
Laipac Africa distribute the ground-based systems that enable positioning and mapping
applications. bcxviii
2.6 National satellite programs
Space benefits all countries, but countries differ in the level to which they make direct
investments in local satellite activity. This concept is summarized in Figure 2-4. The broad base
of the figure represents the reality that every country is a user of satellite services - remote
sensing, communication, positioning and space science. These services have of their global reach
and decentralized operational models. As the levels rise on the pyramid, fewer countries make
direct investments in domestic satellite hardware (owning satellites or launch vehicles), local
satellite expertise or the infrastructure required to build and operate satellites.
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Figure 2-4: All countries use satellite service, but fewer invest in local space hardware, expertise and infrastructure.
There are both objective (technically-based) and subjective (value-based) motivations for
countries in every part of the world to invest in these various levels of the pyramid. Meanwhile,
the question of whether governments in developing countries should invest in owning and
operating national satellites is an area of debate. The terms of the debate are different for each of
the four satellite application areas: earth observation, communication, navigation and space
science. In the area of earth observation, some argue that there is enough data available on the
international market to meet the needs of developing countries. They conclude that developing
countries should not invest in satellite hardware, but should buy or share data from other sources.
With this approach, the country is focusing resources on utilization of the data for local needs
rather than production of the data. This is often a reasonable approach. Most developing
countries are currently in this situation. Their efforts to use satellite earth observation data are
facilitated by many international initiatives such as the Global Earth Observation System of
Systems, which seeks to integrate worldwide data sources."' During disasters, developing
countries can activate the International Charter: Space and Major Disasters, with the help of the
United Nations as described in Table 2-8. In the area of satellite communication, one can make a
similar argument. There are many commercial companies that own and operate communication
satellites for a profit. They provide service throughout the developing world. Does their presence
supersede the need for national governments to operate communication satellites? The argument
seems even clearer in the area of satellite navigation. The United States currently operates the
Global Positioning System. It is a constellation of 24 navigation satellites that freely broadcast
their location. Users can triangulate from multiple GPS satellites and calculate their own
location." Several other GNSS projects are currently underway. Russia is revitalizing their
GLONASS constellation; Europe is developing the Galileo constellation; and countries such as
India, China and Japan are planning to operate regional or global satellite navigation systems.""'
If at least one of the global systems offers a free signal, it can serve all developing countries. It
seems very likely that during the next few decades, the freely available navigation services will
increase for developing countries. Finally, in the area of space science, developing countries do
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not need to invest in national satellite projects to access scientific data. They can collaborate with
other space players to fly hosted payloads or share data.
All of these facts apparently lead to the conclusion that governments in developing countries do
not need to own and operate their own satellites. There are subtle realities, however, that
challenge this conclusion. In the area of earth observation, it is true that there are many
government programs through which data collected by the international community can be
shared with countries that do not own satellites. There are also commercial providers such as
Digital Globe, GeoEye and SpotImage that sell high resolution satellite imagery. The problem
remains, however, that developing countries cannot always get the data they need when they
need it. This may be because the data collected by other countries does not account for the
technical requirements of a particular user in a developing country. Such requirements can
include temporal frequency, spatial resolution, spectral frequency or geographic coverage. Also,
the global political infrastructure of data sharing policies is not yet complete. Organizations from
developing countries that wish to share international data may be obliged to establish bilateral
agreements with each data producer and keep those agreements up to date in order to ensure
access. This is a laborious and expensive process. Meanwhile, high resolution optical data, which
is particularly useful for projects in urban planning, is very expensive and mainly available from
commercial providers. It may not be cost effective for developing country governments to buy
high resolution imagery regularly. In the area of communication, one could argue that the need
for this service is provided by commercial vendors. It is common economic wisdom that a
company in a competitive market can offer a consumer service more efficiently than a
government can. This seems to imply that governments should open their markets to allow
competition among communication providers and not be involved as a service provider. Such an
economic prescription may not meet social goals, however. There is room to consider
government involvement to ensure that the neediest communities benefit from satellite
communication service. In the area of satellite navigation, developing countries do not need to
invest in their own global satellite constellations. The opportunities offered by the GPS, Galileo
and GLONASS systems are great. There are limitations, however. The free signals from this
publicly available infrastructure do not have high enough resolution for many applications. They
are adequate for consumer use in driving and walking. They are not precise or consistent enough
for safety-of-life applications, such as landing a plane. Also, for applications such as precision
agriculture and construction, highly detailed information may be needed. For these reasons,
developing countries cannot be passive consumers of satellite navigation signals in the long term.
They need to seek out ground-based and space-based systems to augment and improve the
navigation signals they receive.
Given all of this discussion, the framework in Figure 2-5 is helpful for organizing the
motivations for governments in developing countries to pursue satellite programs. The
framework considers separately the short term versus long term motivations for a country's
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actions. It also divides national investments into the four areas from Figure 2-4. The framework
specifically considers objective, technically rational motivations, rather than including political
or cultural motivations, which are more subjective. In general, both objective and subjective
motivations co-exist. National governments are influenced by many non-technical factors when
they consider space policy decisions, including factors such as geo-political relationships,
regional status, military postures and national pride. There is plentiful evidence, from both more
developed and less developed countries, that both technical and non-technical motivations play a
key role in motivating countries to pursue satellite activities. Paikowsky provides a deeper
discussion on the role of political motivations in shaping national satellite programs for emerging
space countries." While acknowledging the importance of these non-technical factors, this
section is focused on objective, technically driven motivations.
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Figure 2-5: Potential Motivations for Developing Country Investment in Satellite Service, Hardware, Expertise and
Infrastructure
Consider the four areas of investment in the two time dimensions shown in Figure 2-5. The first
investment area is in satellites services - including earth observation, communication, navigation
and science. In the short term, countries pursue satellite services because the applications meet
time sensitive needs for information to support the work of government, military and civilian
organizations. In the long term, these services from satellites facilitate improved infrastructure
48
and better informed regional planning. Satellite service can also improve the functioning of
commercial activity over time, in areas such as mineral exploitation, real estate development and
logistics. The second area of investment is in owning a satellite system - including the spacecraft
and related ground equipment to receive data and control the spacecraft. In the short term, a
developing country government may choose to own domestic satellite hardware because they are
not getting a particular type of required data or service from the international market. Owning
satellite hardware allows the country to specify the technical characteristics of the service they
receive such as how often the information is updated and the level of detail. In the long term,
operating a national satellite or set of satellites offers several benefits. It provides local personnel
the opportunity to understand satellite operations. This investment also ensures that service
continuity, even if foreign service providers change their offerings. Ultimately, this allows a
country to lessen their dependence on uncertain foreign technology sources. The third area of
investment is developing local satellite expertise. Such an investment in space expertise can take
many forms, such as university programs, government research projects, or training for civil
servants and companies related to satellite technology. Countries can choose to buy a national
satellite by procuring a turn-key system from a foreign company. This can be done with little
knowledge about how satellites are designed, manufactured or operated. At times it is logical for
a developing country to buy a turn-key system and forego any foray into learning satellite
technology. However, there are also rational reasons to invest in developing satellite expertise at
some level within developing countries. In the short term, such expertise help makes that country
an informed, savvy consumer of satellite hardware. Buying a satellite is a complex process; each
satellite is custom designed to perform a specific mission for the customer. It is not a commodity
product. A technically savvy customer can more effectively specify what kind of system they
need to solve local problems. In the long term, it is beneficial for developing countries to invest
in building local technological capability about satellites because it is good for the overall
scientific system in the country. Such experience can inspire young scholars to study in new
areas and help pave the way for other scientific and technical activities. Personnel trained in the
satellite field may also contribute to other industry sectors, such as electronics, information
technology and advanced manufacturing. The fourth area of technology investment is in
infrastructure to design, manufacture, integrate and test satellites. The decision to invest in
satellite services, hardware and expertise may not imply an investment in local fabrication
facilities. Such facilities include clean rooms, optical laboratories, environmental test facilities
and electronics laboratories. In the short term, a country may install this infrastructure as a way
to increase the technical involvement of local engineers beyond the satellite operations team,
such as engineers, construction personnel and technicians. In the long term, if a country has a
sustained satellite program, they can make use of these facilities during many projects and
continually reap the benefit of the investment.
Recently, several new countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are pursuing independent
capability with satellite hardware, local satellite expertise and domestic satellite infrastructure.
Examples of such countries include Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, the United Arab
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Emirates, Turkey, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Mexico, and Chile. Many of these countries
have defined a national policy to achieve local capability to design, manufacture and operate
nationally owned satellites. This section summarizes the emerging space activities of sixteen
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These countries were chosen because
they have demonstrated - or they are preparing for - a long term commitment to national-level
space activity. The discussion includes short paragraphs discussing the activities of each country;
this is followed by tables that summarize the information. The tables show, in the third column,
the national office in each country that plays a central role in space activities. In some cases,
such as Egypt, more than one organization shares this responsibility. Not all of the organizations
listed in the third column are formal "space agencies;" they are listed because they have
operational, procurement or regulatory involvement in space projects. Columns 4 through 8 list
potential technical milestones that the countries have reached. The milestones represent
increasing technical achievement, moving from left to right. Generally speaking, Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) satellites refer to small or medium sized earth observation or scientific satellites.
Geostationary (GEO) satellites in these examples are usually large, communication satellites that
require greater cost and complexity. An "X" in the boxes in columns 4 to 8 indicates that the
country has achieved the milestone at least once. If the country is currently pursuing a given
milestone, and the boxes are labeled, "In process." Note that Brazil, India, China and Japan are
excluded because of the relative maturity of their satellite programs. The data for the tables was
drawn from both the websites of the relevant agencies, news articles as well as field research in
Africa and Asia by the author.
Africa
" Algeria: Algeria established a formal space agency, Agence Spatiale Algerienne (ASAL) in
2002. The country bought three remote sensing satellites: one from Surrey Satellite
Technology Ltd (United Kingdom) and two from EADS Astrium in Europe. Algeria is
actively working to develop local capability to design and build satellites locally. )"WH
" Egypt: Egypt's remote sensing activity is lead by NARSS (National Authority for Remote
Sensing and Space Sciences). They oversaw the purchase of EgyptSat-1, an earth observation
satellite, from Ukraine's Yuzhnoe State Design Office.""' Meanwhile, the NileSat
organization - a quasi-commercial entity owned partly by the state - has procured
communication satellites from EADS Astrium.'""
* Kenya: Kenya does not currently own national satellites. They have made ministerial level
agreements with Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria to invest in an African Resource
Management Satellite (ARMS) Constellation."" They are also moving toward establishing
a national space agency. For now they have a Space Secretariat under the Ministry of
Defense.""' Kenya also has many local organizations with the ability to use satellite data.
* Nigeria: Nigeria established the National Space Research and Development Agency
(NASRDA) in 1999. NASRDA has taken the lead in procurement of three small, remote
sensing satellites from the Surrey Satellite Technology LTD (United Kingdom). As part of
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the procurement, Nigerian engineers are learning skills in satellite engineering. Nigeria also
set up a quasi-commercial company called NigComSat to procure and operate a
communication satellite from China. NigComSat-1 launched in 2007, but failed in 2009.
China launched a replacement for the communication satellite in 2 011. "Ejij
* South Africa: South Africa established the new South African National Space Agency in
201 0.'x6 South Africa built and operated two remote sensing satellites using local talent and
facilities. SunSat launched in 1999; SumbandilaSat launched in 2009. SunSat was built by
the University of Stellenbosch. The SunSat team started SunSpace and Information Systems
to market their skills.'
Figure 2-6 provides a summary of African satellite programs.
National
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Figure 2-6: Summary of African Satellite Programs (Dates show years of first achievement of each milestone)
Latin America
" Argentina: Argentina's National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE) was founded
in 1991, but it builds on work dating back to the 1960s. Since the 1990s they have worked to
build scientific and earth observation satellites." They invited US, Brazilian or European
organizations to supply instruments on their satellites. More recently, they worked to build
the first local communication satellite - ARSAT-1.*' xc"' The satellites are built with
INVAP, a national technology company.civ xCV
" Chile: In the 1990s Chile worked with the Surrey Satellite Technology LTD firm (United
Kingdom) to build 2 small, remote sensing satellites and train local engineers. They formed a
space agency in 2001 (Agencia Chilena Espacial).*" The nation's third remote sensing
satellite was built by European firm EADS Astrium and launched in 2011.** X***
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" Mexico: Mexico recently established a national space agency,"' the Agencia Espacial
Mexicana. Meanwhile, several Mexican universities have worked on micro-satellite projects.
Some of these satellites have been launched and operated.' c' Mexico has also been involved
commercially with operating satellite communications for decades. The SatMex
communication satellite firm, formerly owned by the Mexican government, is now owned
privately.cii
* Venezuela: The main project of Venezuela's Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities has
been the purchase of the Venesat-1 (Simon Bolivar) communications satellite from China. It
was launched in 2008.
Figure 2-7 provides a summary of Latin American satellite programs.
National Buy LEO Buy GEO Build LEO Sat Build GEO
Region Country Space Agency Sat. h Sat (Launch Loat. Sat LocallyOr Office (Launch Sa (Launch LYcally (Lauh
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Figure 2-7: Summary of Latin American Satellite Programs (Dates show years of first achievement of each milestone)
Asia
" Indonesia: The National Aeronautics and Space Agency of Indonesia (LAPAN) was
founded in 1963.' LAPAN worked with the Technical University of Berlin in Germany to
build a small remote sensing satellite called Tubsat, which carried a video camera. It was
launched by India in 2007."' They are working toward building a small satellite
independently."i In parallel, Indonesia has been active in buying and operating commercial
communication satellites. The first was built by Orbital and launched in 1997."CV1"
Indonesia is a member of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum.
" Malaysia: Malaysia's national space agency, ANGKASA, was established in 2002. Malaysia
worked with Surrey Satellite Technology LTD (United Kingdom) to build their first remote
sensing satellite; it launched in the early 2000s. Malaysia later worked with a Korean firm
called SaTReC Initiative to build a second remote sensing satellite, launched in 2009. The
Malaysian firm called ATSB implements the satellite projects and builds up local capability
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in satellite engineering. In parallel, the commercial firm MEASAT has been buying
communication satellites since 1996. Some of these communication satellites were bought
from the US.cix Malaysia is a member of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum.
* Pakistan: Pakistan's SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) was
established in 1981, after some early work on sounding rockets with NASA." During the
1990s, Pakistan sent engineers to the University of Surrey (United Kingdom). The Pakistani
team contributed to several of the university's satellite projects. The SUPARCO team then
built the BADR-1 experimental satellite."U SUPARCO plans to buy more advanced remote
sensing satellites.c" SUPARCO initially leased an existing communication satellite, but then
they purchased a replacement from China which launched in 2 0 1 1 .cxi" cvC* Pakistan is a
member of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum and the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization.
* South Korea: In just two decades since the founding of KARI (Korea Aerospace Research
Institute) in 1989, South Korea has achieved many technical milestones. They have built and
purchased multiple LEO satellites since 1992. They are steadily moving toward greater
technical independence. The COMS satellite, launched in June 2010 by Arianespace," is
their first GEO satellite. It was built by EADS Astrium. A small firm in South Korea, called
SATREC-Initiative, exported several remote sensing satellites. KARI is developing LEO
launch capability. South Korea is a member of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency
Forum.
* Thailand: Thai satellite activity started with a commercial communications company
(ThaiCom) purchasing satellites from the American company Hughes (now Boeing)."" The
ThaiCom-1 satellite was launched in 1993.cx* A Thai university worked with the University
of Surrey (United Kingdom) to build a small LEO satellite and train Thai engineers in
satellite engineering.' This satellite was launched in 1998.*" Building on previous work in
remote sensing, Thailand established its current space office, the Geo-Informatics and Space
Technology Development Agency (GISTDA), in 2000. In 2008, Thailand's THEOS (Thai
Earth Observing Satellite) satellite was launched from Russia. GISTDA bought this earth
observation satellite from EADS Astrium."' Thailand is a member of both the Asia-Pacific
Regional Space Agency Forum and the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization.
* Turkey: TUBITAK UZAY is a public research organization in Turkey that implements
national satellite projects. It was founded in 1985.o a"n Tubitak has executed two remote
sensing (LEO) satellite projects. The first was BilSat, launched in 2003. Tubitak bought
Bilsat through a training package from Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL in the
United Kingdom). SSTL also helped Tubitak set up local satellite manufacturing facilities.
Based on this experience, they have built RaSat in Turkey (launched 201 1)*"v. Meanwhile, a
commercial company called TurkSat operates a fleet of communication satellites, which were
built by European firms.'v Their first satellite was launched in 1994."i
* United Arab Emirates: In the UAE, the first satellite project has been executed by the
Emirates Institute for Advanced Science and Technology (EIAST), which was founded in
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2006.''"" They purchased a satellite and training package from the SATREC-Initiative firm
in South Korea. Their first satellite - DubaiSat-1 - launched in 2009.7'
Figure 2-8 provides a summary of Asian satellite programs.
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Figure 2-8: Summary of Asian Satellite Programs (Dates show years of first achievement of each milestone)
There are several key messages from the tables that summarize satellite activities in developing
countries. The first message relates to national space leadership. All the countries listed in the
tables either have established or are in the process of establishing an organization at the national
level to lead space activities. The organizations take various forms. Some are formal space
agencies; others are national remote sensing agencies or are national research organizations. The
specific roles of these national organizations vary, but they have the opportunity to consider how
their country will handle space technology transfer. The second message is that a wide variety of
countries are pursuing domestic capability to build satellites locally. Countries such as Brazil,
Argentina and South Korea have made extensive progress in creating local capacity and facilities
to build satellites. Other countries are still developing the local capability. In all of the examples,
the space activity will bring new technology into the country. The countries in these regions view
space technology as an opportunity to address domestic social needs via both satellite services
and technology advancement of the country.
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2.7 Enabling technology: Small Satellites
Some of the national satellite activity described above is enabled by new technical trends in
small satellites. There are new opportunities for capacity building in space technology because of
the gradual maturity of satellite technology. It is increasingly possible to build a new type of
satellite that is smaller, lighter and less expensive than traditional spacecraft, but that provide
valuable services. Small satellites, defined here as less than 1000 kilograms in mass, are
increasingly capable and offer potential for lower cost missions than traditional satellites. Small
satellites provide opportunities for efficient applications in areas such as remote sensing, space
science and non-real time communication. Because small satellite projects are relatively less
complex, they allow for flexibility in areas such as the following: building up local technology
infrastructure, including educational aspects in satellite missions, involving local industrial actors
in a project and expanding local scientific base. There are many opportunities for international
collaboration via small satellite projects. Creative collaboration models such as distributed
ownership of a constellation of satellites or a network of mutually supportive ground stations
have already been demonstrated. These new approaches to satellite engineering are lowering the
barriers to entry for new actors.' x
One specific type of small satellites, called CubeSat, is particularly accessible to universities and
organizations outside of government space programs. CubeSats are satellites that conform to a
standard size of ten cubic centimeters. The standard was developed by a joint team at California
Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly) and Stanford University in the United States. Because
the creators of the standard share it freely, they open the opportunity for anyone to build on their
idea and implement a satellite project. The Cal Poly team demonstrates by example that the
CubeSat approach is accessible to teams without previous space experience. They were new to
the area when they joined Stanford to work on this concept. The Cal Poly and Stanford teams
serve as the nexus of a global network of teams that build CubeSats. Each team designs their
satellite to perform a unique function. More and more types of organizations - including
universities, governments and companies - are participating in CubeSat projects. New
companies are emerging to supply parts designed especially for the CubeSats. All of these
factors make it possible for virtually any team to get involved. Although CubeSats have technical
limitations due to their small size and power capabilities, they have many advantages. CubeSats
allow new people to get directly involved with a space mission at a low cost. They also provide a
venue for space experiments which are high risk and infeasible on more expensive missions.
Thus CubeSats in particular, and small satellites in general, are enabling technologies that
increase the opportunities for emerging countries to participate in space.'
In addition to the government programs described above, there are also many new university or
private satellite programs around the world. For example, in South Africa the Cape Peninsula
University of Technology (CPUT) uses CubeSat projects to teach graduate students about
electronics. CPUT has a new postgraduate program in satellite engineering based in Cape Town.
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CPUT partners with the French government in a program called F'SATI (French-South African
Institute of Technology) at CPUT. Through the F'SATI program, they offer post-graduate
training in satellite engineering that includes hands on work with satellites. Graduates of the
program receive dual degrees from South Africa and France. The program includes academic
course work, an individual research project focused on satellite subsystems and team work after
graduation on a satellite project. The students that attend the program come from all over Africa
and beyond. Since the program started in February 2008, 45 students have registered, 30 students
have graduated and 10 students have participated in a year of professional development. During
this year after graduation, the engineers-in-training work on implementing a nano-satellite based
on the CubeSat standard. They execute the design and fabrication in preparation for spaceflight.
At the time of writing, one nano-satellite called ZACUBE-1 had been completed and the team
planned to begin a second one. The CPUT F'SATI program also reaches out to younger students
in South African and neighbouring countries.* "
2.8 Building local technological capability in satellite technology
As discussed above, space technology can promote development in a variety of ways. An
increasing number of developing countries is pursuing national satellite programs in order to
build local capability in the technology and increase their control over satellite services. This
dissertation pursues an in-depth exploration of the process by which countries that are new to
space start new satellite programs. This section presents a motivating pilot study. The study
reveals that countries pursue unique paths to technological capability; however, they face a
common set of strategic decisions.
2.8.1 Common Strategic Decisions and the Evolution of Satellite Programs
Once a government chooses to invest in having a national satellite program, there are several
challenging decisions that must be made about the scope and implementation of the program. *"'
Players outside the government may also shape satellite programs, but the focus of this
discussion is on the government perspective. In some cases government decisions are made
directly through a conscious policy process. In other cases, the strategy emerges organically as
many independent decisions and circumstances come together. The decisions discussed in this
section are highly influential in establishing the foundations of a young space program. These
decisions can be categorized into three key areas. As shown in Figure 2-9, these areas encompass
progressively broadening levels. First, there are narrow questions about the technical capabilities
to which the country aspires. The questions at this narrow level correspond to the four types of
satellite investment described above in Figure 2-4 - satellite services, hardware, expertise and
infrastructure. The scope of this level includes questions about which human resources to
develop and what technical facilities to procure and operate. Within this category are questions
that the government can answer in numerous ways. Will the country own and operate satellites?
What types of satellites do they need? How will they procure the satellites? Will they develop
any of the technology using local personnel - for the satellite or for the payload? Will they
develop the technology using local facilities? Each of these decisions involves complex trade-
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offs and potentially large investments of resources. At the second level are decisions about how
the satellite program fits into the domestic context. The new program will have some relationship
with existing entities in government, academia, industry and the military. Stakeholders from each
of these areas will seek to influence the program as well. Questions at this level include the
following: How will existing organizations in research, administration, industry and defense be
involved in the new satellite program? Will the government seek to foster specific local
industries via the program? Should the satellite program be executed directly by a government
entity, a commercial entity or a combination of both? Decisions at this second level are highly
driven by the local economic and technology context. At the third and broadest level, the satellite
program will be defined by how it relates to the international context. Most satellite programs
involve relationships with foreign governments or firms. Governments who begin new satellite
programs have to make strategic decisions about how and when to work with foreign players. A
political partnership with a foreign government can be useful, especially when it fulfills a
political objective and meets needs for both sides. It can often appear to save resources, for
example if two countries collaborate on a satellite project and share the costs. There are hidden
expenses to consider, however, due to the costs of coordination, travel, political delay and
potential language or cultural barriers. A commercial relationship with a foreign firm is often
used by developing country governments as part of their satellite program. They may buy a full
satellite or specific services from the firm. A commercial relationship has the advantage of
putting control in the hands of the customer. This can be more flexible than a political
partnership. Commercial relationships can be limited as well, however, due to the needs of the
firm to control their intellectual property and make a profit. All developing countries face these
three strategic decision areas - the program context, the domestic context and the international
context - if they choose to implement a national satellite program. There are important
relationships between the decisions made at the three levels.
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Figure 2-9: Common Strategic Decisions for New Satellite Programs
A motivating pilot study examines the experiences of eight countries that established national
satellite programs as part of their development process."' The countries included in the study
are Argentina, Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Korea. The study
compares the pathways of these countries in achieving key milestones along an idealized ladder
of technical autonomy called the Space Technology Ladder. This ladder is shown in Table 2-9. It
outlines a variety of implementation approaches in four areas, namely: 1) Establishing a national
space office; 2) Owning and operating low earth orbit (LEO) Satellites; 3) Owning and operating
geostationary (GEO) satellites; and 4) Launching satellites. Within each area, there is a vertical
progression toward increasing technical autonomy. For example, Levels 3 to 7 all show methods
for owning and operating a LEO satellite. At Level 3, however, the country buys the satellite
from a foreign partner and at Level 7 they are able to execute the project independently in their
own local facilities.
Table 2-9: The Space Technology Ladder shows levels of capability and autonomy
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12 Launch Capability: Satellite to LEO
11 GEO Satellite: Build Locally
10 GEO Satellite: Build through Mutual International Collaboration
9 GEO Satellite: Build Locally with Outside Assistance
8 GEO Satellite: Procure
7 LEO Satellite: Build Locally
6 LEO Satellite: Build Through Mutual International Collaboration
5 LEO Satellite: Build Locally with Outside Assistance
4 LEO Satellite: Build with Support in Partner's Facility
3 LEO Satellite: Procure with Training Services
2 Space Office: Establish Current National Space Organization
1 Space Office: Establish First National Space Organization
The pilot study's approach is to construct a timeline showing the first year in which a country
achieves a milestone on the Space Technology Ladder. Rather than showing every major project,
the timeline highlights key moments of technical accomplishment for the eight countries. The
major milestones of African, Asian and Latin American countries are shown in Figure 2-10
through Figure 2-12. The timeline highlights two pivotal ideas. First, there is a diversity of
approaches among the countries. They all found unique ways to answer the strategic questions
defined above and move along the Space Technology Ladder. For example, Argentina tended to
partner primarily with foreign governments via political agreements in their early LEO satellite
projects in the 1990s. They also contracted with an existing technology firm to do local
59
manufacturing of the satellite buses. In contrast, Malaysia's more recent efforts in LEO satellite
programs built heavily on commercial relationships with foreign firms. They also created a new
commercial firm within Malaysia to manage the projects. This is just one example of the
contrasts among the historical approaches to satellite programs. As can be seen in Figure 2-10
through Figure 2-12, countries do not move linearly along the Space Technology Ladder, they
bounce around it and find their own unique path to technological capability. A second key idea
resulting from the historical timelines of satellite programs is the importance of international
collaboration as part of the process of building technological capability. As countries progress
through the Space Technology Ladder, they are increasing their local level of technical expertise
regarding satellites. When developing country governments begin new satellite programs, they
often have limited domestic resources to help establish a technical workforce in satellites or set
up satellite manufacturing facilities. The local universities may not have specialties in satellite
engineering, and local industry does not yet have experience. In these cases they typically turn to
foreign firms or government partnerships for technical assistance. Thus, the foreign participation
in these satellite programs is a vital part of the process of technological capability building. This
history shows that many countries in the past have depended on foreign partnerships to grow
their capabilities in satellite technology. It is likely that many countries in the future will choose
a similar course of action. An international technology partnership does not guarantee successful
capability building, however. There are a number of challenges that can decrease the
effectiveness of capability building via international partnership.
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2.8.2 Collaborative Satellite Projects with Capability Building Goals
The motivating pilot study demonstrated that many countries harness international collaboration
as part of their process of building local capability in satellite technology. This common theme
emerges despite the diversity of satellite timelines for each country. The core research for this
dissertation is a study of four countries that each initiated national satellite programs by
partnering with foreign firms. They all procured satellites from these foreign firms and paid the
firms to provide long term training to local engineers in satellite engineering. A number of
countries have pursued this specific model for satellite projects. Several examples are shown in
Figure 2-13.
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UAE
Malaysia
Nigeria
Figure 2-13: Examples of countries that have pursued collaborative satellite training projects
The experience of South Korea shows a highly successful outcome from a series of collaborative
satellite training projects. Their story is summarized in Figure 2-14. For the first national satellite
(KitSat-1), a university in South Korea partnered with a university in the United Kingdom.
Several recent graduates from engineering undergraduate programs in South Korea's premier
technical university spent time in the United Kingdom to work on the satellite. This was their
first training in satellite engineering. A professor from the technical university in Korea formed
the team to travel to Korea and a complementary team that stayed in South Korea. After the first
satellite was complete, the two teams came together to build a second satellite that was identical
to the first (KitSat-2). The South Korean university purchased the components from the UK
university, but they assembled the satellite independently at home. The same university team
worked independently to design and build a third satellite over the next few years (KitSat-3).c"v
This university satellite team eventually spun out from academia and formed a company to
design and build satellites.'""" Several of the original trainees that went to the United Kingdom
took on leadership positions in the company. Within a decade, the new Korean satellite
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developer exported several small remote sensing satellites to foreign customers. In parallel to the
evolution of this firm, the Korean government was forming a national space program. An
government organization called the Korean Aerospace Research Institute was created in 1989 to
lead national space activity. Later, in 2005, the National Space Committee was established as the
leader for Korean space policy."' The government agency, KARI, pursued highly
sophisticated satellites in partnership with foreign firms. They also worked to develop local
launch capability." ' In Figure 2-14, South Korea's mission timeline is shown using two axes.
Time proceeds to the right along the horizontal axis; and satellites are positioned on the vertical
axis to show their relative technical complexity. The early remote sensing satellites developed by
the Korean university were not highly complex, but they did represent success efforts to
gradually establish autonomy in satellite engineering. The government satellites were more
complex and required external partnerships. The satellites exported to foreign governments by
the Korean firm were of medium complexity, but they represented a high degree of autonomy.
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Figure 2-14: South Korea used collaborative satellite training projects to initiate a national satellite program
The Korean experience with domestic satellite projects is impressive. In less than two decades,
they transitioned from learners with little space experience to trainers that were manufacturing
satellites for foreign customers and mentoring new engineers. In addition, both the commercial
and government space actors in Korea have achieved a sustained level of activity with satellites.
They not only pursue satellite projects, but also long term satellite programs. The Korean
experience is not typical. Their ability to build a satellite independently so soon after the first
project and to move to a higher level of technical complexity on their third project both stand in
contrast with the experiences of other countries. Korea achieved this despite inherent challenges
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of pursuing technological capability through collaborative satellite projects. There are challenges
in these types of projects in the areas of incentives, information, priorities and culture.
The issue with incentives relates to the objectives of the firms that provide training as compared
to those of the government customers. It is in the firm's interest to keep the space agency as a
dependent client, while the space agency is working toward independent capability. The
difficulty of incentives is further explained by the concept of the Principal-Agent problem in
economics. The concept applies to scenarios in which an individual or organization (the
principal) hires someone else (the agent) to perform a task on their behalf based on the agent's
specialized capability. Several dilemmas are inherent in such arrangements. The principal hopes
the agent will act according to their wishes, but such performance is not guaranteed. The utility-
maximizing agent may or may not have incentives to act according to the wishes of the principal.
There is a cost to the principal to monitor the agent's activities or provide incentives to
encourage compliance. The cost is increased by the fact that the agent has some knowledge about
the activity in question that is not available to the principal. The commonly cited characteristics
of an imperfect market - such as asymmetric information, unmatched risk aversion, imperfect
commitments and costly monitoring - combine to create tension in the relationship between
principal and agent. Incentive theory proposes that principals can attempt to ameliorate the
challenges of the principal-agent problem by designing a contract that provides incentives for the
agent to act as the principal desires. Much of the writing in this area formulates the kinds of
incentives that would be required under various scenarios. The satellite projects that are
studied in this thesis have the potential for engendering Principal-Agent Problems. In this case,
the principal is the national space organization that hires a foreign firm as an agent. The agent is
hired to accomplish two primary tasks, namely, to build a remote sensing satellite and to train
engineers who work for the national space organization. The foreign firm has many archetypal
characteristics of an agent. They are chosen because they have specialized knowledge about
satellite engineering, which the national space organization does not have. Because the firms are
in other countries and executing specialized techniques, it is very difficult for the national space
organization to monitor their performance. The monitoring difficulty is perhaps greater for the
training task than for the satellite manufacturing task. In both cases, however, the final proof of
the quality of work comes only after the project is completed. Also important to the principal is
the fact that the relationship with the agent is not repeated many times. The principal needs
excellent performance from the agent for each specific project, not average performance over
many projects. The national space organization needs to select a firm and create a contractual
relationship with them while operating in a state of imperfect information. They need to define
what the firm should deliver to them at a particular level of quality for a particular price; this is
challenging. Finally, these collaborative satellite projects are bringing together organizations
from different countries. They potentially have different cultures and first languages as well. The
cultural aspects of the collaboration can bring challenges.
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On a larger scale, there are also issues with the broader concepts introduced throughout this
section. This discussion has outlined the potential of space technology to promote development
in countries that have traditionally had limited involvement with the field. The possible benefits
from emerging satellite programs include information and infrastructure to enhance social
services as well as growth in technological capability. Research is needed on this topic because it
is poorly understood and poorly documented. Research may reveal sterling examples of
surprising technology success in developing countries; it may also reveal cases of unmet
potential from technology or cases of mixed outcomes that need to be explained. Whenever
technology is applied as part of a development solution, there is a need for caution about
unintended consequences, the effectiveness of the solution over time in a developing
environment, and the way the technology may impact social customs or values. Caution is
required because the concepts of development via increased technological capability are driven
by a western model of progress; the model may need to be adapted to apply to specific countries
and cultures. Satellite technology does have the potential to provide useful services, but
successful application is not guaranteed. In the case of remote sensing services, the data from
satellites needs to be managed and processed by skilled individuals and converted into relevant
information to support decision making in a variety of settings. A complex network of
organizations and technologies needs to be in place to achieve this. Satellite communication
service does not always provide the expected benefits because it can be more costly than
alternative services. Also, it requires specific equipment that may not be available in all the
places where the service is needed. As developing countries invest in national satellite programs,
they face many obstacles. There may be internal criticism from people that assume the
investment is not worthwhile. Satellite programs are expensive. They often require large short
term investments in order to gain uncertain, long term benefits that are difficult to measure. The
space leaders in any country need to work constantly to maintain political and financial support
in order to have continuity. Space programs need to train personnel in a setting that does not
have the required educational infrastructure. As new space actors seek to access space
technology, they have to navigate the complex geo-political realities that result from the historic
development of space as a dual use technology with military and civil applications. This implies
that countries with space technology are careful about how they share it.
In summary, there are emerging space countries that seek to build local capability to build and
operate satellites. Many of these countries choose a similar model for their early satellite
projects. They hire a foreign firm to build their satellite and train engineers at the firm's location
for months or years. This model of training has the potential to bring positive results as it did in
South Korea's case. Most countries that used this approach did not have South Korea's rapid
progress. Meanwhile, these projects face inherent challenges due to issues of incentives,
information, priorities and culture. They also face the larger scale challenges that are inherent in
applying space technology as part of a development solution. In response to all of these realities,
this dissertation pursues in-depth case studies of six collaborative satellite projects to understand
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what the challenges are and how four nations have sought to address them. The next section
formalizes some of these issues as part of the literature review.
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3 Perspectives from Literature on Collaborative Satellite
Projects
The literature review discusses how concepts from several areas of scholarship can inform the
analysis of the collaborative satellite projects by emerging space programs in developing
countries. The areas of literature are Technology Learning, Technology Transfer, Project
Delivery, and Systems Architecture.
3.1 Technological Learning
Space is not the only technical area in which developing countries use international partnerships
in their process of building technological capability. This process has been relevant in a variety
of technical areas since the post-World War II era. Starting in that period, many developing
countries were gaining independence from colonial leaders, especially in Asia and Africa. They
sought to establish new industries as part of their process of economic development. Some
countries wanted to be able to locally manufacture the modern appliances and tools that they
were importing from more developed countries (a strategy known as import substitution). Some
countries sought to build their economy by manufacturing exports that could be sold in the
wealthy markets of the US and Europe (an export oriented strategy). In both cases, there was an
effort to bring into the country a technological capability that had previously not existed. Often,
countries used political or commercial partnerships with foreigners to build local capability.
Since World War II, a number of experiments in technological capability building have been
executed throughout the developing world." " Scholars have examined and synthesized the
experiences of these countries. These scholars come from fields such as economics, political
economy, management, international development and urban planning. The commentary of these
scholars is diverse; there is not a unified interpretation among them. Rather there is spirited
debate about what has happened and what it means. One community of scholars focuses on
technological learning. They seek to understand what actions a less developed country can take
to improve their chances of successful technological capability building through external
relationships and through internal effort.
This literature on technological learning is dominated by a close-knit community of economists
and scholars of technology policy, many of whom know each other and collaborate on research.
Some of the prolific members of this community are Alice Amsden,x Paulo Figueriedod
Sanjaya Lallw" Linsu Kim,"' Giovanni Dosiliv Carl Dahlmanx"v and Larry Westphal.clvi
This community emphasizes the need for developing countries to engage in technological
learning - the process of increasing their capability to use technology effectively in economic or
government activity. They build on foundational concepts including Schumpeter's
Entrepreneur, Ai and Nelson & Winter's Evolutionary Economics."Vin Nelson and Winter
explain that the foundational unit of economic activity is the set of individual skills and
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organizational routines through which firms produce goods and services. Much of the knowledge
required to achieve these skills and routines is tacit and therefore difficult to describe in words,
formulas or instructions.'* Organizations learn and maintain routines by acting on them. The
environment in which organizations act changes unpredictably, especially because of new
technical inventions. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs bring innovation by using these inventions to
apply new techniques to create economic outputs. As new technology innovations emerge,
people and organizations need to update their skills and routines to incorporate the new
opportunities. Organizations that harness and apply innovations successfully are more successful
in a competitive marketplace.cl In parallel, countries that successfully harness new technology
can improve their national development. Within a country, there is a network of related firms,
research laboratories, government offices, educational institutions and non-governmental
organizations that must collaborate to create an effective National Innovation System that
facilitates successful technological learning.li''ii The technological learning scholars develop
theory and empirical evidence to craft prescriptions for how firms or organizations in developing
countries can increase their level of technological capability. Amsden documented the
experiences of countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil and Turkey as they
moved into manufacturing consumer goods and high technology products.cln Figuierdo provided
a detailed account of technological learning in two steel plants in Brazil.clv Hobday considered
progress in the electronics industry in Singapore.clv Kim wrote about experiences of Korean
firms in industries such as ship building and car manufacturing.lv' Ahmed and Humphreys
wrote about Malaysia's establishment of a national car industry.lvii
This review explores some of the concepts and frameworks that have been proposed by the
technological learning literature regarding the process of building capability via international
partnerships. Technology is a broad term used here to include both tangible objects - such as
capital equipment and products - as well as intangible resources - such as information, processes
and organizational approaches. The definition by Bozeman is helpful, which describes
technology as "knowledge-based assets that are applied to create value." CiV In the context of
this research, technology includes products, processes and knowledge. The term technological
capability means the "ability to make effective use of technology."cl" Technological learning,
then, is the process of increasing in technological capability. It is a very active word that
describes a conscious effort on the part of the learning individual or organization.
Some may argue that technological learning is not important for developing countries. Perhaps
they should leave the advanced technology to other countries and focus instead on exploiting
their local competitive advantage such as ample labor or abundant natural resources. To this,
authors such as Grievec* offer disagreement. Although development strategies may include such
resources as part of the portfolio, Grieve urges developing countries to also "achieve a firm grasp
of modern technology, learn from it, and on this basis, seek to develop innovation and
technological capabilities." Thus, firms and other organizations are advised to learn from the
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state of the art technology that is used in more advanced countries. In the parlance of this
literature, developing countries are "latecomers," meaning that they are working behind the
technological frontier." They are also isolated from the centers of technology production, such
as excellent universities and research laboratories.'xii The experience of technological learning
for latecomers is not necessarily a repeat of the experience of the more developed countries as
they discovered or invented today's technologies. Kim""" builds on work by Utterbackclx'v that
shows how latecomers may move through an innovation cycle. Utterback's seminal work shows
how inventions go through a period of high product innovation until standards set in and
innovation declines. Next, there is a period of active process innovation until a new product
becomes dominant. Utterback's model applies to advanced countries working at the
technological frontier. Kim proposes that developing countries - as latecomers - may follow a
reversed technology trajectory. They enter when a product is already mature and learn from
outside sources how to manufacture it. Gradually, they may be able to pursue first process
innovations and later product innovations. They work toward generating new technologies in that
field, after enhancing their skills by working on the mature technology. For the case of satellite
technology, such an experience could apply to a latecomer's work in the area of solar panels, for
example. It is a technology that is somewhat mature, but there is also room for innovation to
improve the efficiency of their performance. An organization from a developing country may
learn the well established techniques for manufacturing solar panels from an outside source.
They may then continue to work with those methods over time and start to make small
improvements in the manufacturing. Eventually, they may experiment with slightly different
materials and do tests to improve the performance of the panels. Ultimately, their hands-on
efforts may lead them to propose a new alloy for the solar panels. Such a transition could take
decades; it may be longer if the organization does not have a solid understanding of the physics
underlying the operation of the solar panels. Figure 3-1 provides a graphical description of the
ideas of Utterback and Kim.
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Figure 3-1: This graphic adapts work by Utterback and Abernathy and by Kim. It shows how technology trajectories
differ between developed and developing countries
What allows a latecomer organization in a developing country to successfully move through the
phases from manufacturer to process innovator to product innovator for a particular class of
technology? Some argue that it depends largely on the organization's absorptive capacity. This
concept refers to the organization's ability to take in and act on the new information about the
technology they are learning. Building on Cohen and Levinthal,l"v Kim argues that absorptive
capacity for an organization depends on prior knowledge and the intensity of effort applied to
understanding the technology.xvi In other words, an organization can better absorb and work
with a new technology if they have more relevant prior knowledge and if they work hard to learn
about it. These concepts place a great deal of responsibility on the technological learners.
What are the sources of technological information for latecomer organizations in developing
countries? Kim'l"ii provides a useful framework for dividing such sources. Generally, they
represent different kinds of relationships with outside organizations or information. There are
one-sided scenarios in which a latecomer organization pursues knowledge independently via
reverse engineering, literature, conferences, etc. There are formal relationships with well defined
contracts, such as licensing technology from foreign firms, buying turnkey products and hiring
technical consultants. In less formal interactions, organizations can learn when they buy from or
sell to a more advanced organization. Kim's work considers only commercial relationships of
this nature, but in the space arena, such relationships might also be political agreements between
governments. Figure 3-2 shows Kim's framework for technology sources; it is slightly adapted.
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Figure 3-2: Adapted from Kim's framework on foreign sources of technologyclh
The discussion thus far has addressed the process of building technological capability via
learning, the reversal of the traditional technology trajectory for latecomers, the importance of
absorptive capacity and potential sources of technology. What remains is to drill even deeper
into the practical issues surrounding technological learning. Such learning can happen along
various dimensions, but it ultimately begins with an individual learning something new. This
literature emphasizes the fact that technological knowledge can be tacit or explicit. Knowledge is
tacit when it is not well codified."' This may be because the knowledge is wrapped up in a
routine done by a skilled person. This person knows how to do the routine, but they cannot easily
explain it to someone else.' It is difficult to convey tacit knowledge from one person to
another. When tacit knowledge is made explicit - for example, by writing it down - learning can
happen. If much of the knowledge required to do a certain technological task is tacit, it will be
much harder for individuals working independently to learn about the technology. Thus,
approaches like those in Quadrants 2 and 4 above will be less effective (see Figure 3-2). In these
cases, it is very important for representatives from the developing country to learn directly from
people who are skilled in the technology during long term interaction. This can enable individual
learning, but that may not be enough.
Some technological activities, including many satellite projects, require intensive group
coordination. Individuals must understand how to achieve their own role, and the group must
understand how to work together to achieve the overall goal. This requires organizational
learning. Thus, organizational learning can also be an important part of technological progress
for a latecomer institution in a developing country. Organizational learning is not automatic, nor
is it well understood. Edmonsonl'Xs shows that when small groups work together on a complex
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task over time, they can naturally go through a process of organizational learning. They
gradually develop a mutual understanding of how their individual contributions combine to
achieve a goal. Nonaka describes four modes through which knowledge is created and shared in
organizations. cl'xii Through socialization or long term close interaction, individuals exchange
tacit knowledge through practice, imitation and observation. Through combination (structured,
formal interaction and discussion) individuals exchange explicit information. This can lead to
new knowledge as old knowledge is consciously organized and evaluated. Through
externalization, tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge when people use metaphors
to communicate ideas that are difficult to express. Through internalization, explicit knowledge is
converted to tacit knowledge when people put codified information into practice. Nonaka
proposes that during the learning process, people and organizations cycle through these four
modes repeatedly.
Kim developed a framework that brings together many of the ideas summarized above.l)ill The
framework incorporates the nature of technology as both tacit and explicit. Learning
organizations harness the new knew via technology transfer. The quality of the transfer depends
on their absorptive capacity due to prior knowledge and the intensity of their learning effort. The
intensity can be increased when the organization feels they are in a crisis. Crises can be created
by external events or they can be constructed by leaders, such as when they set ambitious goals.
Leaders encourage learning by using crisis to make the effort seem important. As the
organization takes in new technology, they may be in one of several learning orientations,
depending on where they fall in the technology lifecycle. The learning may focus on duplicating
an existing technology, creative imitation in which they improve an existing technology or
innovation of new technology. Throughout these processes, there is a need to foster both
individual and organizational learning. Kim incorporates Nonaka's cycles between the four
modes of socialization, externalization, internalization and combination.
Based on the discussion above, Table 3-1 provides examples of advice that can be extracted from
the Technological Learning literature for organizations that are learning new technology. The
advice is at three levels of application: organizations, groups and individuals.
Table 3-1: Summary of Guidance from Technological Learning Literature
Level Theoretical Guidance Example of Actionable Project SourceLevel______ TGImplementation Approach
- Key Leadership should set
Oz.ion Crisis Construction can high goals to produce an Nonaka 1994 and Kim
improve team performance atmosphere of crisis and 1999
inspire team to productivity
- Provide a mechanism for more
Groups and Both Individual and experienced engineers to teach Kim 1999, Nonaka
Individuals organizational learning less experience engineers 1994, Edmonson 2003
need to occur - Spread knowledge through
I organization via strategic job
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rotation
Learner initiative partly Provide individuals with a Cohen & Levinthal
Individual determines absorptive variety of experiences to help 1991, Kim 199, Nonaka
Level capacity them maintain creative 1994
thinking
Hierarchical organizational
structure is better for Early in project or in life of
Organizations combination (Explicit to team, use formal structure toO r os Explicit) and internalization allow people to learn new, Nonaka 1994
and Groups (Explicit to Tacit). This is explicit information from
better for exploitation of trainer and veterans.
information
Self organizing teams are - Later in project (or in life of
better for socialization team), use less formal
Organizations (Tacit to Tacit) and organizational structure to Nonaka 1994
and Groups externalization (Tacit to allow more experienced
Explicit). This is better for engineers room to be creative.
exploration of information. e I
Consider the scope of the issues addressed in the technological learning literature. The
collaborative satellite projects that are the focus of this study follow the process of space
organizations working toward mastery of a new technology. As Lall points out, mastery is just
the first step of a longer process of harnessing the technology as part of development. lxv After
mastering the techniques for the current technology, a learning organization can continue by
making changes to the technology to adapt it to local conditions and updating the technology to
improve its performance. The learning organization may also work in the area of diffusing the
technology in their local marketplace. This can take the form of creating links between local
suppliers for inputs to their technology or links with organizations later in the value chain. For
satellite systems, a key set of links is with the organizations that can use data products the system
produces. Diffusion includes setting up strong linkages with data users. In the long term, a
learner may grow to be able to independently develop and export the technology. The case
studies about collaborative satellite projects capture a narrow segment of this long term
progression, but the stories should be considered as part of this context.
The conclusions and prescriptions from the technological learning may not always apply directly
to the satellite context. Recall that the ideas were developed from research about other types of
technology. A first major difference between the satellite context and the case studies from
technological learning is the nature of the players. The literature on learning focuses almost
entirely on commercial firms. In these case studies, satellite projects may be executed by
commercial firms, by government agencies or by a combination of the two. The incentive
structure for a firm is driven largely by a desire for profit. This may be different in a government
context. Such a difference may influence the learning dynamics. Without the pressure of
maintaining a profit, how will incentives for learning in a government be different? Also the
research cited above is especially relevant to commodity products that are mass produced or
continuous flow products, such as steel. In these cases, the latecomer firm in a developing
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country can separate their learning about the manufacturing process from learning about the
actual product. A manufacturing plant can produce a product without the operators
understanding how to design or improve the product. Additionally, for commodity products,
there is little variation on the design across customers. These factors can be quite different in
satellite projects. The requirements are unique for each customer and each mission. Each product
is built over a long time period, without frequent repetition that would enable learning by
experience. Also, the manufacturing process is closely linked with the design, testing and
verification process. It would be difficult for an organization to build a satellite without an
understanding of how it works. These aspects illustrate some differences between the satellite
context and that of others in the technological learning literature.
There is a community of scholars - closely linked to the technological learning community - that
recognizes the need for different approaches to policy and management for technologies like
satellite systems. This community - led by researchers such as Hobday and Rush - has coined
the term Complex Product Systems or CoPS to describe technologies that are "high cost,
engineering and software intensive...produced in projects or small batches" with a customized
approach for the specific customer; the development process for CoPS requires strong emphasis
on "design, project management, systems engineering and systems integration." cl' The CoPS
literature is not only about technology learning; it covers the management and innovation in
these complex systems, which may include the learning process. Satellite systems fit into this
category, as do air-traffic control systems, large ships, infrastructure items such as dams and road
systems, sewage treatment plants, passenger aircraft, helicopters, integrated mail processing
systems, missile systems and telecommunication exchanges - to name a few identified by
Hobday and Rush. These authors go to explain that the development of CoPS often involves a
complex network of actors located in different organizations and societal sectors, including the
customer, end user, regulators, suppliers and other stakeholders. Often a specific firm plays the
role of systems integrator and coordinates activity among all these actors. The actors that come
together for a particular CoPS project must collaborate even as they may also compete for future
work opportunities. While CoPS are elaborate systems that are expensive to produce, it is often
hard to estimate the value they bring to the economy because their contributions do not align
with traditional accounting methods. Hobday and Rush also point out that the traditional model
of a project innovation lifecycle may not apply to CoPS because innovation at the product level
happens before and during the long-term design and deployment of CoPS. Figure 3-3 shows a
summary of how management challenges may occur in the production of CoPS that are less
likely for mass produced goods.'"" Elsewhere, Rush summarizes the three key challenges of
executed a CoPS project as defining requirements, coordinating information among the
networked team and with the customer, and developing effective processes that balance risk.clx"
The challenges shown here will be considered as the case studies of learning in collaborative
satellite projects are further explored.
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Contrasting Management Challenges of Complex Product Systems with those of Mass
Produced Commodity Goods
Challenges Mass produced goods Complex Product Systems
Management Well defined, consistent goals - Ill defined or competing goals
Objectives Focused and clear objectives - Unclear and multiple objectives
Production Task 'Manufacturing intensive - Design intensive
- Mass assembly driven - Systems integration driven
- Codified information - Uncodified, tacit information
- Routine Production - Non-routine production
Organization -Functionally-based - Project-based
- Hierarchical - Consensus based/team based
Learning 'Learning in functional departments - Learning in projects
- Learning is routine, systematic - Learning is sporadic, fragmented
- Knowledge is explicit, codified - Knowledge is implicit, tacit
Innovation Manufacturing intensive - Design intensive
Processes - Supplier driven - Customer driven
- Single-firm centered - Collaborative, network driven
- Market mediated - Negotiated
Management Tools - Off the shelf, proven tools - Few, mostly unproven tools
- Well established Information - Information Technology tools not
Technology tools well established
- Consistent with practice - Inconsistent with practice
Nature of Risk - Controllable - Hard to control, hidden
- Predictable - Unpredictable, emergent
- Short term, stable - Long term, unstable
Decision Making - Certain environment - Uncertain environment
' Complete information - Incomplete information
- Goal oriented - Learning oriented
Customer/Market -Arms length market transaction - Involved, professional customer
- Market price - Negotiated price
-Well defined market - Multiple stakeholder interests
- Requirements pre-defined - Requirements negotiated
Success/Failure - Efficiency, cost led - Flexibility, effectiveness led
Factors - Single success criteria ' Multiple success criteria
- Easily defined, measured - Hard to define, measure
'Departmental efficiency - Team performance, effectiveness
Figure 3-3: Summary of contrast between mass produced commodities and Complex Product Systems (Howard and Rush
19 99 )a..m
Moody and Dodgson provide a useful example by using the CoPS definition to study the
development of a small satellite program in Australia. Although Australia is a highly developed
country in many aspects, they do not have a strong local capability in satellite design and
manufacturing. The study explored their learning process and found that the project exhibited
many aspects of a CoPS system, although it was a relatively simple satellite.1mKix
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The next section discusses how the literature on Technology Transfer can be applied to the case
studies of collaborative satellite projects. For this study, the concept of technology transfer is
seen as one step in the overall process of technological learning. The technology transfer
literature takes a variety of perspectives, however, which makes the term difficult to use with
precision. For this research, the transfer process focuses on the interaction between a learning
organization and a technology source to move knowledge and physical elements of technology
into the control of the learning organization. This interaction is a small part of the effort that the
learning organization must exert to achieve capability. As Dahlman and Westphal point out, the
long term goal of capability building is technological mastery, which is "operational command
over technological knowledge, manifested in the ability to use this knowledge effectively." They
go on to say that "although knowledge can be transferred, the ability to make effective use of it
cannot be. This ability can only be acquired through indigenous technological effort..."c' The
concept of technological learning emphasizes this indigenous effort while technology transfer
emphasizes the partnership with a foreign technology source.
3.2 Technology Transfer
There is a broad and active literature about the concept of Technology Transfer. This literature
has useful input regarding collaborative satellite projects that are used to build technological
capability. The input must be considered with care, however, to account for the various
assumptions, definitions and contexts that exist with the technology transfer literature. The term
"technology transfer" is used loosely in scholarly literature to describe several types of activity.
In almost all cases, the activity involves two organizational units interacting in order to make a
technology controlled by one unit available to the second unit. The overall relationship between
the organizational units and the purpose for the transfer varies within the literature. Scholars of
technology transfer study the movement of technology from research to commercial
organizations within the same country; the movement of technology between units within a large
firm; and the movement of technology from a commercial organization in one country to a
separate commercial organization in another country. As an example of the breadth of the
literature, consider the Journal of Technology Transfer, which publishes articles that take a
management and strategy perspective on the topic. The journal recently featured articles about
the transfer of scientific results and technical inventions from universities to existing commercial
actors;cl" about new commercial firms that spin out of universities;''''" about collaboration on
research and development between firms;""" about technical knowledge moving between firms
based on worker mobility;Ixxmv about the role of government in supporting firms that develop
and commercialize new technology;'''X' and about the impact of intellectual property rights on
technology transfer.cxxxvi Clearly technology transfer literature has an extensive purview.
Some authors that use the phrase Technology Transfer as a key term in their work focus on
issues that are broader than those described above. The mainstream technology transfer literature
emphasizes either the perspective of multinational firms or their interaction with recipient firms
80
that receive their technology. Some authors go beyond this bilateral relationship to consider the
broad scope of policies and activities that recipient countries need to put in place in order to
advance their level of technological capability. These scholars write about technology transfer
but they are not just concerned with the adoption of a specific technology. They are concerned
with the complex process through which a country starts a process to "generate technical change
continuously" in order to become internationally competitive. For the purpose of this study,
such literature considers the wider issue of Technological Learning as discussed above, not
technology transfer.
Within the technology transfer literature, the sub-topic of International Technology Transfer
holds particular relevance to the collaborative satellites under study. This smaller set of literature
assumes that technology is moving across national borders and therefore considers the unique
management, policy, cultural, language and development issues that ensue. Much of the
International Technology Transfer literature builds on this classic scenario: a multinational firm
is headquartered in a more developed country and seeks opportunities to sell its product or
service in a less developed country via technology transfer. The firm may be motivated to
harness the foreign market for several reasons. For example, if the rate of technological progress
is high in their industry, they may sell more advanced variants of their product in domestic
markets and less advanced variants abroad. The competition or market size may also be
advantageous in a foreign market.cl""' Once a firm chooses to operate in a foreign market, it
faces the decision of how to enter the market. The firm can set up its own operations in the
foreign market or partner with existing firms that already operate in that market. Firms often
choose to partner with existing firms in order to benefit from their knowledge of the new market
and to avoid the cost of initiating a new organization. Regardless of whether the operator in the
new market is part of the original firm or an external partner, the original technology holder
needs to transfer the technology required to produce the product or service to a new setting. The
relationships between the original technology holder and the new operator may be of several
types; these types are sometimes divided based on the extent of control that the original
technology holder has over the operator in the new market. Approaches that bring a high degree
of control include the following: establishing a fully owned foreign branch of the firm; buying an
existing firm and converting it into a foreign branch; setting up a subsidiary; and creating an
affiliation with an existing firm. Approaches with a medium degree of control include
outsourcing a subset of the production or services; buying a minority stake in a firm from the
new market; or setting up a joint venture for a specific project. Approaches with a low degree of
control include partnering with a firm to co-market independent products; selling a license that
allows a firm to produce and sell the product or service; or selling a turnkey facility that allows a
firm to produce and sell. C XC Gross provides another broad list of possible partnership
arrangements including: Foreign direct investment, licensing, technical assistance, training,
turnkey contract, representation, exporting, franchising, management contract, research and
development contract, co-production agreement and subcontracting.cxci Variations and
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combinations of these approaches are possible. The International Technology Transfer literature
often focuses on the decisions made by the multinational firm as it considers how and when to
extend market access through these mechanisms. The literature also considers the potential
benefits to less developed countries that may accrue when a multinational firm injects new
technology into their marketplace. Ideally, this injection of new technology benefits the less
developed country; such benefit is not guaranteed however.'ii
The primary perspective of the International Technology Transfer literature focuses on the
challenges facing a multinational firm as it seeks to profit by extending operations to an
international market. Some authors also focus on the recipient firms. These perspectives are
different from the collaborative satellite projects examined here in several important ways. First,
in the collaborative satellite projects, the activity is initiated by the national space organizations
in the customer countries who buy satellites. The national space organizations choose to buy
these satellites via close relationships with suppliers who provide extensive training. This is
unlike the scenarios in International Technology Transfer literature in which firms from more
developed countries initiate a relationship with a less advanced firm in order to extend their
market access. It is true that the satellite supplier firms are seeking to extend their sales into new
markets like their counterparts in the literature. Unlike the firms in the International Technology
Transfer literature, however, these satellite suppliers are not moving toward a broad distribution
of their satellites via a foreign partnership. They are selling to an individual customer without a
commitment to long term interaction. Second, the collaborative satellite projects are part of a
long term strategy by the national space organizations to build their local technological
capability. The impetus for bringing the technology into the customer countries is internal to the
less developed country. In the International Technology Transfer literature, the impetus is often
external to the less developed country. Third, the firms that originally hold the technology in the
International Technology Transfer literature are generally assumed to be large enterprises. In the
collaborative satellite projects, two of the three supplier firms are small or medium sized. This
affects some of the firm's organizational dynamics. There are also some similarities between the
collaborative satellite projects and the archetypal scenario from the International Technology
Transfer literature. During the collaborative satellite projects, two or more organizations come
together to execute a technical activity. One of the organizations has the knowledge, procedures,
capabilities and intellectual property rights required to execute the activity and the other
organization does not. Furthermore, the organizations come from different countries that
potentially have different cultures, trade policies, intellectual property policies and project
management approaches. All of this also true in the International Technology Transfer literature.
This community of scholars has proposed some useful definitions, concepts and models to
inform such situations.
Contractor and Sagafi-Najed"c as well as Reddy and Zhaow provided reviews of the
International Technology Transfer literature in 1981 and 1989 respectively. Both reviews assume
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the multinational firm is the primary source and agent of technology transfer; also both reviews
explicitly consider the opportunities that technology transfer may provide for less developed
countries to enhance their technological base. Although International Technology Transfer
transactions are initiated due to a desire by multinational firms to extend their market access,
they have the potential to help firms in less developed countries harness new technology. Both
reviews discuss this issue and consider policy options for less developed countries to promote
local technology adoption. Contractor and Sagafi-Najed take an issue-based approach to
organizing their review. They begin by establishing that technology is a key ingredient for
economic development, but note that factors such as the nature of the technology transfer process
influence how technology contributes. They go on to explore how the technology transfer
process includes the sharing of a "bundle of information, rights and services" from a supplier
firm to a recipient during a long term relationship.*" Often the recipient is seeking to maximize
their opportunity for technical growth at a reasonable cost while the supplier is seeking to
balance the possibility for control with the opportunity to earn profit. The market for
international technology transfer was driven, as of the 1981 review, by an extreme concentration
of technology among a small number of firms and countries. Also, in this time period,
technology supplier firms tended to prefer technology transfer approaches with high degrees of
control such as moving technology to foreign affiliates. The issue of cost arises in this review,
with a particular focus on the concerns of less developed countries about the price they may pay
to access foreign technology. Contractor and Sagafi-Najed cite the concern that recipient firms
from less developed countries have low bargaining power and may be overcharged for
technology, but they also note that it is difficult to confirm this empirically. This review broadly
addresses the concept that technology transferred to a new country should be appropriate in
terms of issues such as the capital to labor ratio, the need for employment creation, and the need
for some regional distribution of technology in the recipient country. The final sections of the
review consider policy options for recipient governments, supplier firms and supplier
governments that seek to address the challenges above with varying success. In the 1970s, for
example, developing countries such as Japan, Mexico and India established instruments such as
laws and review boards that sought to monitor and manage the process of foreign technology
transfer. The goal of such instruments was to ensure that the technology transfers bring local
benefit.
In contrast to Contractor and Sagafi-Najed, Reddy and Zhao take a structural approach to
organizing their review by building around the actors and activities of a technology transfer
scenario.'"i This review address 1) issues for the supplier country and firms, 2) issues for the
recipient country and firms; and 3) issues related to the technology transfer transaction itself. For
the supplier country, researchers question whether exposing technology in international
partnerships is helpful or hurtful to a nation's global competitiveness. Reddy and Zhao
concluded that benefits from economic returns and technical exchange outweighed risks of
revealing technical information. A similar debate is captured about the benefit to recipient
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countries. The potential benefits include the opportunity to export new products while generating
foreign currency, creating employment and enhancing local skills. The concerns echo the
concepts mentioned by Contractor and Sagafi-Najed. The benefits to less developed countries
may be lost if the technology is inappropriate, too advanced, obsolete or tightly controlled.
Almost a decade after Contractor and Sagafi-Najed's review, Reddy and Zhao also note the high
concentration of technology among a small number of countries and firms. In discussing the
nature of the technology transfer transaction, this review explains that the goals of the supplier
and recipient may not be aligned and this creates a potential for conflict. The conflicts are likely
to arise over issues of pricing, ownership of the technology and the opportunities for recipients to
pursue their own technical development.
The collaborative satellite projects do interact with some of the issues highlighted in these
reviews. This is especially true for the issues at the level of the recipient and supplier
organizations. The supplier organizations do need to determine the appropriateness of the
technology for their context and an appropriate cost to pursue the technology. The supplier firm
needs to consider the costs and benefits of sharing their technologies with customers; they weigh
the opportunity for business with loss of exclusive control over their intellectual property. Both
supplier and recipient need to consider what mode of transfer will fit their needs. The national
level issues introduced by the reviews touch these case studies indirectly. The case studies
observe the recipient countries during a small segment of a long term attempt to boost national
technological capability and they capture the impact of trade policies by the supplier
government.
Most work in the International Technology Transfer Literature focuses on the manufacturing
sector. Consider for example, the book by Seurat that gives detailed advice on how to train a
team in a new organization to use new technical skills. ci' The level of detail is valuable for the
present study because Seurat considers practical steps that can be taken in daily training. Seurat,
however, assumes that the technology in developing countries is high volume manufacturing.
The manufacturing sector is not the strongest model for this study on collaborative satellite
projects because satellites are a craft product in which design, testing and operations share
importance with manufacturing. Also, much of the mainstream manufacturing sector focuses on
large scale production of similar products, whereas most satellites are built in small batches of
one or two. In addition, the collaborative satellite projects under study include the purchase of
both satellites as well as long term training for teams of engineers. The intended outcome of the
projects is to allow the customer to operate a satellite, produce information about their
environment and advance the skills of their personnel. These outcomes can be considered as a
combination of products and services. Even though the customers are purchasing physical
products, the suppliers are also giving training and advisory services. For these aspects of the
collaborative satellite projects, the literature on International Technology Transfer in the service
and infrastructure industries is relevant. Grosse provides an introduction to the issues of
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technology transfer in the service industries, such as banking, consulting, hospitality, marketing,
telecommunications, insurance and software. Grosse defines a service as an "intangible item that
depends to some extent on interaction between the buyer and seller for its provision."* '''" This
is in contrast with a product that can be accessed without direct interaction. Grosse interviewed
representatives of multinational firms in service industries that had operations in Latin America.
He found that the important enabling technologies in the services included knowledge,
experience, service methods and management skills. The technology suppliers in this study
tended to transfer technology to affiliates in Latin America via training, documentation, and
sending experts or employees from the home office for temporary or long term visits. Grosse's
work highlights the importance of intangible technologies that relate to tacit knowledge held by
people and built up over time in service industries.
Like the satellite industry, the construction industry offers a mix of services and products. While
the output of a construction project is a tangible building, construction industry professionals
provide many services to their clients along the way to producing the building. Ofori"x'
describes several features of the construction industry that impact technology transfer. Some of
the features are similar for the satellite industry. In both industries, the government is an
important client, especially for the initial investment in infrastructure. The demand is
inconsistent in both industries and business is structured around projects to produce one item at a
time normally. Suppliers compete for work through proposals in both industries and there may
not be continuity in suppliers or the technology they use over time. The price is a key driver for
customers when they are selecting among competing proposals. In both industries the
government of the customer country plays a strong role in regulating the way the activity is
pursued. The construction industry is not like the satellite industry in some ways. Generally, the
construction industry is much larger than the satellite industry in terms of people and financial
impact on the economy. The cost of construction is driven by location to a larger extent than in
satellites. Also, the technology used by the construction industry is generally more mature and
unprotected than for satellites. While there are advanced technical approaches, suppliers in the
construction industry often have the option of choosing a less advanced approach that is
affordable and familiar. Even so, Ofori notes that the demand for advanced construction
approaches is increasing in less developed countries. The techniques include both the practical
steps to implement the building and the management approaches. Ofori found that less developed
countries depend on external inputs in their construction projects. The technology is transferred
via joint ventures, training as part of equipment purchases and observation of foreign firms.
Ofori found several barriers to technology transfer in the construction industry: 1) The foreign
firms with advanced technology are hesitant to provide assistance that would make local firms
more competitive against them in the future; 2) Incorporating technology transfer into a project
bring the risk of increased cost, schedule delay and complexity; and 3) Each construction project
is unique and learners may not be able to apply knowledge across projects. Each of these barriers
may be relevant to the satellite industry to some extent. Waroonkun and Stewart' performed a
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study in which they surveyed 162 Thai construction professionals to learn their experiences and
opinions about technology transfer. The survey respondents included project managers, site
engineers, consulting engineers, construction managers and architects. These professionals share
some characteristics with roles in a satellite project. They are concerned with the high level
design, management and functioning of a project, not the detailed implementation. This is similar
for satellite engineers and project managers. A majority of the respondents had experience with
two or more projects in which technology was transferred from a foreign firm to their Thai firm.
In most cases, the relationship between the Thai firm and foreign firms were via joint venture,
turnkey contracts and management contracting. The Thai construction professionals reported
their opinions that it was helpful to work with supplier firms with "experience working with
foreigners, a strong knowledge base and [who] are willing to transfer their knowledge.""'
Within the International Technology Transfer literature, there is a sub-topic that focuses on the
impact of cultural differences in the transfer process. Several authors within the International
Technology Transfer literature contend that differences in national culture should be explored as
a potentially important factor. Kedia and Bhagat"' in 1988 as well as Bhagat et al'"" in 2002
build on Hofstede's"' cultural dimensions to propose relationships between culture and
technology transfer. Hofstede conducted a foundational study published in the early 1980s; the
study identifies four dimensions of national culture that are exhibited in the workplace.
Hofstede's team surveyed employees from one company with subsidiaries in about 67 countries.
The results showed that half the variance in employee responses could be explained by four
cultural dimensions: "power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, and
masculinity vs. femininity.""v In later revisions of the framework, the dimensions of long term
versus short term orientation"'i and indulgence versus restraint"' were added. These later
dimensions are not used here. The power distance dimension measures "the extent to which
members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unevenly."
The uncertainty avoidance dimension "is the degree to which the members of a society feel
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity." The individualism versus collectivism
dimension describes the "degree of interdependence a society maintains among individuals."
More masculine cultural traits include "achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material
success," whereas feminine cultural traits emphasize "relationships, modesty, caring for the weak
and the quality of life."'"i' Kedia and Bhagat's"'s 1988 work defines eight propositions based on
Hofstede's original four dimensions and Hall and Johnson's'* definition of technology as
embodied in either products, persons or processes. Among the propositions are expectations that
cultural differences are more important for transferring process and person-embodied technology
than product-embodied technology. Also, organizations with similar approaches to uncertainty
may make more effective transfer partners, and technologies that shift the power distribution are
unlikely to be transferred effectively. Masculine cultures are said to be better absorbers of
technology than feminine. Bhagat et al,"' qualifies some of these statements by considering the
nature of technology as defined by Garud and Nayyar, which describes technology along the
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three dimensions of "simple vs complex; explicit vs tacit and independent vs systemic.""Kii
Bhagat et al combine power distance with the individual/collective dimension and considers
"vertical individualism, horizontal individualism, vertical collectivism, and horizontal
collectivism.""ii Based on these definitions, individualistic culture is better preparation for
transferring or absorbing explicit and independent technology. Collectivistic cultures should be
stronger than individualists with absorbing tacit and systemic knowledge. If two organizations
differ in terms of both power distance and the individual/collective dimensions, their partnership
for technology transfer is expected to be less effective than the partnership of organizations with
similar orientations. The work by Bhagat et al and by Kedia and Bhagat was theoretical; they
proposed hypotheses to be tested by other researchers. As one example, Lin and Berg"
performed an empirical study tested some of these ideas. They surveyed senior engineers in large
Taiwanese manufacturing firms. They used a model that considered the nature of technology, the
level of international experience of the transferee and transferor of technology, cultural
differences and effectiveness of the transfer. Effectiveness in this case is based on learning by the
recipient firm and technical performance of the project. The study did not find a strong direct
influence of cultural difference on technology transfer effectiveness, whereas the maturity and
codification level of the technology did increase with effectiveness. The culture difference
variable did seem to interact with the technology characteristics, however; this warrants more
research. This study found, as they hypothesized, that supplier firms with more international
experience have more bargaining power and they are more savvy with protecting technology.
Meanwhile, recipient firms with more international experience are more effective in learning and
technical communication. Shore and Venkatachalam" studied the relationship between
technology transfer and culture specifically for information technology. This is relevant to the
collaborative satellite project case studies because satellites systems are a type of information
technology. Satellites deliver data that is harnessed by geographic information systems in order
to produce useful information. Shore and Venkatachalam also build on the definitions and
propositions of Hofstede""i as well as Kedia and Bhagat;"" 1 the study uses power distance and
uncertainty avoidance to define cultural differences. Shore and Venkatachalam develop a
framework that considers national cultures; the competitive environment and task congruency.
The latter factor defines the similarity or difference between the methods of the recipient
organization before and after transfer. Shore and Venkatachalam assume that task congruency
and the competitive environment combine to influence whether differences in national culture
create conflicts during technology transfer. For example, they expect that when both task
congruency and the competitive environment are high, there is little impact from cultural
differences. On the other hand, when both task congruency and the competitive environment are
low, differences in national culture are amplified during technology transfer. Shore and
Venkatachalam tentatively support these claims with three qualitative case studies about
technology transfer experiences of European firms. They conclude that research on information
technology transfer should consider their variables along with other potentially important
variables such as resistance to change by individuals.
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Chiou et alf"' researched the characteristics of technology transfer recipients using 303 surveys
distributed during a conference on mining that was held in China in 1990. The survey sought
information about technology transfer experiences of the respondents. The questions explored
issues such as the nature of the transfer project, the size of the recipient firm, the amount of
experience of the individual and the firm, cultural affinity and the benefit the recipient received
from the technology. This study builds on definitions from Hall and JohnsonoX as well as Kedia
and Bhagat." They hypothesize that organizations pursuing product and process embodied
technology (rather than person embodied) "are more likely to be in larger organizations and have
stayed longer with the organization than know-how technology pursuers.""'i Chiou et al also
expected that individuals and organizations that pursued person embodied technology or know-
how would have more experience with the technology than those pursuing product and process
technology. The level of cultural affinity should be higher for person embodied technology.
Also, product and process embodied technology is more valuable for addressing short term needs
whereas person embodied technology is related to a long term objective to make better quality
products. These hypotheses were largely confirmed by the empirical results.
Finally, Fredland"" 1 provides a high level reminder in his writing on public sector technology
transfer. He outlines three historical phases; each is defined by a specific philosophy of
technology transfer held by the more advanced countries. Before World War II, technology
transfer to developing countries was "inadvertent, incidental, uncoordinated, nonpolitical", but it
did assume a posture of encouraging dependency of developing countries on more developed
countries. From 1945 to 1989, Fredland claims that technology transfer became an instrument of
Cold War politics. Advanced countries gave low technology to developing countries but tied
their activities to political alliances. Starting around 1989, Fredland finds a third era in which
there is intentional transfer that is less politically driven and more related to the integration of a
global economy in which production occurs around the world. In all three phase, Fredland
accuses the high technology countries of seeking to create dependency by lower technology
countries. Fredland reminds readers that the development process and the technology that
supports it are laden with values defined by countries with more power and financial success.
Fredland encourages less developed countries to consider whether they agree with the values
defined by these countries before blinding adopting new technology. Suppliers of technology
sometimes pursue transfer in order to obtain political and economic influence in foreign states.
According to Fredland recipients may comply with the expectations of technology suppliers in
the short term but they will likely build resentment over time.
3.3 Project Delivery
The third perspective from literature is the project management perspective. The collaborative
satellite projects under study can be viewed as episodes of infrastructure procurement by a
government from a foreign firm. The literature on project management points out that there are a
number of contractual models through which these governments can hire such firms. Traditional
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models are named Prime Contractor, Multiple Primes, Turnkey, Build-Operate-Transfer, etc.
Authors argue that the chosen model has a key impact on project outcomes. They further argue
that most governments would benefit from thinking more strategically about which model to
choose. This literature uses the phrase "Project Delivery Method" to describe the nature of the
partnership agreement that connects the organizations involved.""" The choice of project
delivery method overlaps to some extent with the discussion about different modes of technology
transfer. The project delivery literature, however, provides a more complete discussion of the
project management aspects of procuring a major infrastructure system.
Gordon proposes an approach to selecting a project delivery method for major infrastructure
projects that aligns concerns from the market, the customer and the supplier. The course is taught
with a focus on real estate and civil construction, but the principles are relevant to many types of
infrastructure and CoPS projects. The project delivery method includes the approach to select
and evaluate suppliers, choose a contract type with the primary supplier and choose an
organizational relationship with the supplier that implies mutual responsibility and risk. For
many projects, there is a question of whether the role of financing, designing and implementing
the project are delegated to one organization or to several. Different project delivery methods
vary in areas such as the level of involvement required by the customer, the level of technical
sophistication the customer needs and the sharing of risk between the customer and primary
suppliers. Gordon specifically addresses six types of project delivery methods, namely, General
Contractor, Construction Manager, Multiple Primes, Design-Build, Turnkey and Build-Operate-
Transfer. These approaches can be used with various combinations of contract types (such as
lump sum, fixed price, cost plus) and aware processes (such as negotiation or bidding with
selection based on quality, schedule or price). Gordon proposes a six step process to evaluate the
project and choose an appropriate method. The first step considers characteristics of the project
such as time constraints and the need for flexibility. The second step considers characteristics of
the owner such as technical knowledge, risk aversion, and regulatory restrictions. The third step
considers the characteristics of the market regarding availability of project inputs and the
financial situation. In the fourth-sixth steps, the analyst combines these three factors and
considers whether the project is more like a commodity or complex product laden with service
aspects. Based on this synthesis, the ultimate decision is based on reasoned judgment. In most
cases, some project delivery methods are clearly inappropriate, but several may be
appropriate.""v The project delivery concepts offered a structured and a strategic approach to
the types of decisions facing any organization that procures a major infrastructure or CoPS
system. The goal is to manage risk by effectively designing the relationship between customer
and suppliers.
3.4 Systems Architecture
The literature discussed above comes out of communities that traditionally address issues facing
developing countries. The literature on technological learning, technology transfer and project
delivery uses concepts from economics, management and policy to describe challenges and
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prescribe approaches to meet them. Engineering is not a major tool for these scholars. These
areas of literature have generally not addressed space activity to a great extent, although there are
a few examples of case studies about space technology. The literature reviewed above is
generally written by scholars who are not specialists in space technology or any type of
engineering. The high level goal of this study is to understand the nature of collaborative satellite
projects as an opportunity for learning and problem solving. With that understanding, the next
step is to move toward developing prescriptive theory targeted to the decision makers in the
emerging space countries and to the supplier firms that partner with them.
Each of the three areas of literature reviewed above provides useful perspective and advice to
these audiences. Each area of literature also has some important gaps when viewed individually.
The technological learning literature provides insight into the long term growth process at a
national level. Prescription from the technological learning literature is written for national
policy makers as well as firm managers. The theoretical discussions in the technological learning
literature provide complete conceptual guidelines for how to move an organization forward in
technological capability. The concern is how to convert these concepts into practical approaches.
The literature tends to address this by recording case studies of successful firms in developing
countries who have achieved a new capability. The case studies are somewhat revealing,
however, they often gloss over key details that are necessary to understand the success. For
example, a case study may state that a firm used educational scholarships, consultants, crisis
construction and reverse engineering over several years to initiate a new technical activity.
Within each of these approaches there are many implementation issues that are often not covered
in case studies. For example, how does a firm select participants for a scholarship program and
retain them after studies are completed? What type of contractual relationship is effective when
engaging consultants? How can firm leadership balance crisis construction with overwhelming
employees? How much time and resource should be expended on reverse engineering for various
types of technology? What are the relationships between these various approaches? The
technology transfer literature has an obvious gap in that it focuses on the interaction between a
technology supplier and recipient despite the fact that many key issues relate to the independent
effort of the recipient. The project delivery literature is intentionally narrow; it only addresses the
formal project management issues related to procurement and managing suppliers. It does not
address issues of learning or capability building. In addition to these blind spots, none of these
three areas of literature explicitly links the process of technological learning with the process of
applying technology to meet national needs by designing and implementing a satellite program.
The national space organizations pursue collaborative satellite projects with two high level goals.
They seek to procure a satellite that will provide value through specific services while
contributing to a long term development of technological capability. The approaches and
concepts from the technological learning, technology transfer and project delivery literatures are
not appropriate to combine these issues in a unified analysis.
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The author proposes that a tool from the engineering community may help address this issue and
bring new insights about the collaborative satellite projects as vehicle for technological learning
and problem solving. The tool is Systems Architecture. This section presents the theoretical and
methodological concepts that will guide the use of Systems Architecture as a tool for data
collection and analysis. The aim is to achieve finely detailed case studies about the collaborative
satellite projects that integrate technical, management and policy aspects. Using systems
architecture, this study can retain the useful concepts from the technological learning, technology
transfer and project delivery literatures while seeking new insights. The new insights may come
from the conceptual approach that treats the collaborative satellite projects as systems that have
architecture which can be observed and analyzed. There has been very little academic study of
the series of collaborative satellite projects used by emerging space nations in Africa, Asia and
Latin America to initiate satellite projects. Thus, this work is new in terms of content. However,
many of the ideas from the literature discussed above certainly apply to these satellite projects.
The more important novelty is the attempt to integrate the issues of technology learning with the
issues of space engineering using systems architecture.
The term Systems Architecture is used here in a specific way as defined by scholars at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and within the Engineering Systems Division,wxm as
well as the text by Maier and Rechtin.x' A system is a related set of elements that together
generate a function or outcome which the elements do not generate individually. xiimox A
system is complex if it is made of a large number of elements related with many interfaces.xm
The architecture of a system describes its function, the structural relationships of its elements, the
technical rules government system performance and the operational approach over time.
Architecting is the process of defining the architecture of a system. Architecting is distinct from
engineering and design. Maier and Rechtin classify engineering as a deductive process that uses
analytical tools to achieve quantifiable system characteristics. Architecting is inductive and relies
on non-quantifiable guidelines learned by experience."""' Engineering applies scientific
principles to decide characteristics of a system to meet technical performance requirements.
Architecting on the other hand comes earlier in the lifecycle of a system and seeks to assign form
to function in order to bring value to a stakeholder. Form refers to elements of a system; forms
can include physical and informational items. Forms execute the functions that a system
performs; they are also the objects on which functions act. Ideally, a system executes functions
such that it brings value to a stakeholder. A stakeholder may be any person or organization that is
impacted by or affects a system, but generally there is a primary set of stakeholders that define
the purpose of a system. Value is defined by the primary stakeholder and refers to benefit at a
certain cost the stakeholder is willing to invest.
The architecting process often begins with a Stakeholder Analysis. Stakeholder Analysis is
desirable as part of the process of understanding the identities, interests and relationships of a
system. Stakeholder analysis "is an approach, a tool or set of tools for generating knowledge
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about actors - individuals and organization - so as to understand their behavior, intentions,
interrelations and interests.""""' Simply put, Stakeholder Analysis answers three questions: 1)
Who is involved with an issue? 2) What is their relationship to the issue? and 3) What is their
relationship to each other? Stakeholder Analysis has been used with different methods and for
many purposes in the fields of management, policy analysis and project evaluation. It is
commonly applied in topic areas such as natural resource management, health, and community
development. In the management tradition, Stakeholder Analysis has a particular focus on how
managers of firms respond to concerns from the many people that can affect or are affected by
the firm's activities. Stakeholder Analysis for firms may be "normative," and provide a guide to
managers about the stakeholders they should consider for ethical or legal reasons. Normative
work may be used to encourage firm managers to consider criteria such as environmental
preservation in decision making - criteria that go beyond profit maximization. Alternatively,
Stakeholder Analysis can be "instrumental," meaning that it strives to enable managers of firms
to manipulate stakeholders in order to reach objectives"". In the policy analysis or project
evaluation traditions, Stakeholder Analysis can be used before, during or after the
implementation of an initiative. It is a tool to extend participation in decision making and to find
areas of conflicting interests. It can potentially increase the effectiveness of an initiative by
forming new coalitions and leveraging opportunities for compromise. In all of these traditions,
Stakeholder Analysis can be an opportunity to give voice to stakeholders that may otherwise go
unrecognized, such as future generations, the natural environment, the poor and minorities"'.
For a system architect, stakeholder analysis is an approach to indentify the interaction between
the system of interest and related actors.
This work focuses on the functional aspects of system architecture, using a definition that an
architectural concept assigns function to a particular form. Given these concepts, the ideal
process to define the architecture of a proposed system is as follows: 1) Identify stakeholders and
determine their needs; 2) Determine the primary function that a system must execute to meet the
stakeholder needs as well as supporting functions; 3) Analyze the function by decomposing it
into progressively narrower functions that can be executed by individual system elements; 4)
Identify various options for the items of form that can execute the functions; 5) Choose specific
elements of form to each function and assign interrelationships among the forms. * The
choice of specific elements of form should be based on the needs of the stakeholder. It is this
choice that must be made based partly on unquantifiable concepts and heuristics.
The process defined above is effective when a system is being conceived but does not yet exist.
In these case studies of collaborative satellite projects, the process is used in reverse to identify
system functions and forms. This will be discussed more later. In practice, not all system
architectures are explicitly designed based on criteria driven by well defined stakeholder needs.
As stated by Crawley et al "architectures may arise in the process of deliberate de novo design of
a system; by evolution from previous designs with strong legacy constraints; by obeying
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regulations, standards, and protocols; by accretion of smaller systems with their own
architectures; or by exploration of form and behavioral requirements via dialogue between users
and architects, to name a few known mechanisms. " " When system architectures evolve from
past approaches or under the influence of multiple, decentralized decision makers, the functions
and characteristics of the system may not provide value to stakeholders consistently. Over time,
systems also exhibit lifecycle characteristics sometimes termed "ilities." These are aspects of the
system that are difficult to predict but are highly important to stakeholder concerns, such as
safety, reliability, flexibility, affordability, etc."'
It is not certain a priori what can be gained by defining the architecture of the collaborative
satellite projects. The aim is to elucidate features of the projects that are not captured by
traditional economic and management approaches, identify further detail then previous CoPS
case studies and link the technical and social elements of the projects. The technical elements
refer to the use of the satellite as an information system; the social elements revolve around the
technological learning process. Based on these aims, research questions are proposed in the next
section on research design.
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4 Research Design and Methods
This dissertation seeks to lay a foundation on which to inductively build theory about a poorly
understood phenomenon: collaborative satellite projects with learning and problem solving
goals. This is done through exploratory work that examines the nature of these collaborative
satellite projects. The research design is grounded in social science approaches to theory
building, although the use of systems architecture integrates a technical approach from system
design. The study uses qualitative, process data organized into case studies via in-situ field work.
Social science literature provides guidance about how to execute such research. The ideas
presented here are drawn heavily from the academic management community, especially from
those that study organizational dynamics. This research tradition is highly relevant to the
proposed thesis because it seeks to understand the dynamics of a technology project in a unique
organizational context. Some methodological guidance is the subject of debate; on other issues
social scientists generally agree. There is general agreement that theory building is an essential
goal of social science pursuit. Building theory means creating explanations for phenomena in the
social world that reveal how and why they occur. In some contexts, there is a desire to use such
explanations to enable prediction or manipulation of social systems. Applied social sciences such
as management work in this vein. More universally, however, social scientists seek
understanding of social life."""x In the context of research on Complex Product Systems, such
an understanding of social life can be used to improve the design, implementation and operation
of socio-technical systems. Secondly, most researchers accept that theory can be built
deductively or inductively. A deductive process begins with reflection on past work, personal
experience and logical reasoning. Deductively built theories are refined by testing them against
empirical findings. An inductive process may also begin by considering past work, but it is given
full form via empirical observation. For this reason, field work is a useful tool to develop theory
inductively. Thirdly, authors tend to accept general statements for what distinguishes a strong
theory. Such a theory includes a clear statement of what is involved - the variables or concepts
of interest. It next describes how these variables or concepts are related or how they behave.
Ideally, the theory will go on to explain why the variables or concepts behave as observed."' In
the end, the theory is most useful if it is accurate, parsimonious and general.X"I
Social science researchers differ on some key points with regard to theory building. First, there is
debate about what it means to explain phenomena and seek general theory. On one hand,
explanation can be conceived as the search for the mean causal effect of one variable on another
in a social system. This perspective uses a stochastic view of the world. It proposes that
empirical observations of the relationships between variables are a combination of a systematic
causal component and a random component. Here the goal of theory building is causal inference;
it seeks to approximate the systematic affect of one variable or a set of variables on an outcome.
This type of work aims to build highly general theories, sometimes called covering laws."I" On
the other hand, some researchers do not aim for such broad generality. A process and
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mechanisms approach begins by establishing the causal links in a specific empirical episode. The
goal is to establish the series of actions or activities that lead from a cause to an effect. Individual
actions or activities are named mechanisms; while the series of mechanisms are called processes.
One episode is explained when a logical chain of mechanisms can describe the process of
moving from cause to effect or from state A to state B. Generality can be sought by defining the
specific mechanisms of that episode as part of more generic classes of mechanisms or by finding
commonly occurring processes. Such an analysis does not assume that the same process always
moves from cause to effect or from state A to state B. Thus, this perspective does not seek to
build a covering law about what causes the effect. Rather, a process theorist seeks to understand
why common processes or combinations of mechanisms occur and how they impact the system
of interest.""" In this dissertation, a process and mechanisms approach is employed whenever
relationships are explored. This approach is more tenable than traditional causal inference for the
qualitative, theory building work. The process tracing perspective is at the center of another
distinction made within social science research. This issue centers on the difference between
qualitative research based on variables and research based on processes. Mohr wrote the seminal
work that distinguishes between a variable-based approach and a process-based approach to
organizational research"xiv Mohr argues for the separation of theories based on variables from
those based on theories. A process approach can be especially helpful for case studies because of
the importance of time as an organizing factor for the data. Yin's commonly cited textbook on
case study methods, generally assumes a variable-based approach. Yin, however, includes
process-based methods as part of the arsenal of analysis tools that can be applied to case study
data.x"" Meanwhile, Langley writes specifically about how to build theory from data collected
under a process approach. Langley encourages the use of both variables and process-based data,
but also provides guidance about the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.""' A third
area of debate in the literature is about how a researcher should use past literature when
beginning the process of inductive theory building. At one extreme are Glaser and Strauss,
whose method of grounded theory emphasizes that one should begin theory building with a blank
mind and only consider the empirical data."l" Farther along the spectrum is Eisenhardt with a
1989 paper about the process of building theory from case studies. Eisenhardt advises that
researchers use past research to define problems and define initial constructs that may need to be
measured in the field. When it comes to theory building, however, Eisenhardt advises minimal
use of previous literature. The line is drawn around defining specific relationships between
variables; this should be based on empirical data only. cIvii Even farther from grounded theory is
Parkhe's approach, which advocates using all available theory in the literature, while doing
inductive case studies. Parkhe suggests a constant iteration between theory and observation. CXfiX
At the end of the spectrum opposite Glaser and Strauss is Yin's case study guidance. Yin's work
writes from the perspective that most work is deductive and suggests developing theory before
data collection." This dissertation most closely follows Parkhe's approach.
99
Eisenhardt summarizes the process of building theory from case studies as follows: 1) define
research question; 2) selection cases through theoretical sampling; 3) craft data collection
instruments; 4) overlap data collection and analysis in the field; 5) analyze data within and across
cases; 6) shape initial hypotheses; 7) compare outcomes to existing literature; 8) reach closure
based on theoretical saturation."' Langley's work gives examples of how to do step 5 of
Eisenhardt's plan. Langley suggests seven strategies for making sense of process-based data.
One method is called alternative templates. This can be applied by using different theories or
frameworks to explain the empirical observations. The goal is to see where each theory has a
weakness and look for ways to synthesize their contributions. For this work, ideas from
technology transfer, project management and technological learning theories are applied to the
data, both within and across cases. A second analysis method is called visual mapping. This uses
graphics to summarize information, show time sequences of events or draw relationships among
the data. This dissertation will make use of graphics and tables to summarize information about
time and architectural approaches. Finally, Langley describes a synthetic strategy that blends
variable and process work. This path looks at processes as if they were variables and describes
them with characteristics. The goal is then to understand what factors influence the processes. As
advised by Langley, multiple strategies will be used to analyze the data, especially visual
mapping and viewing processes as variables."" Weick and Eisenhardt provide examples of some
of the results that are relevant to the exploratory nature of this work. There are the intermediate
products of the theory building process. Weick notes several items that he calls "approximations"
to theories. Assuming a variable-based approach, they include lists of variables, which show
what is important to an explanation; definitions of variables and concepts; and potential
relationships between concepts.""' Analogous concepts may be applied to the process approach.
Eisenhardt performed an inductive project with Bourgeois in which the results were initial
theoretical propositions and their corresponding testable hypotheses. At the end of this
qualitative project, Eisenhardt had defined hypotheses that could be operationalized and tested
with quantitative research."lv
4.1 Research Questions
A five part research question guides the analysis and synthesis of the dissertation.
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What are the Architectures of Collaborative Satellite Projects?
The answer to this question describes the collaborative satellite projects using an architectural
approach that captures both social and technical system aspects. This description identifies
specific practical decisions facing decision makers who lead collaborative satellite projects. It
further identifies the set of options from which decision makers can choose.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): How are the Architectures of Collaborative Projects Similar and
Different?
The answer to this question uses an architectural approach to do a structured comparison of the
collaborative satellite projects by identifying which elements of form are assigned to common
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project functions. This analysis contrasts the implementation approaches of the four emerging
space nations as they executed early satellite projects.
Research Question RQ3: What Capability Building Opportunities do Individuals Have?
The answer to this question uses definitions from the technological learning literature to define
capability building in the context of the collaborative satellite projects at the individual level.
Capability Building profiles are developed and analyzed for individual engineers.
Research Question RQ4: What Capability Building Achievements do Organizations Have?
The answer to this question uses definitions from the technological learning literature to define
capability building in the context of the collaborative satellite projects at the organizational level.
Capability Building profiles are developed and analyzed for national space organizations and
their partners. This analysis enables a comparison of the capability building achievements of the
four emerging space nations.
Research Question RQ5: What are potential relationships between architecture and capability
building?
As an exploratory step, this question inductively considers whether there are links between the
implementation approaches used by the four emerging space nations and the capability building
outcomes they achieve.
4.2 Research Methods
This research addresses the five research questions using a case study approach in order to study
recent and contemporary events over which the research has little control. The case study is an
effective tool because the phenomena of interest within the collaborative satellite projects are
likely to be highly driven by context. Yin provides all of these as appropriate reasons for
pursuing a case study approach. A case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon in depth within its real-life context....""' The research questions for
this study are given above. There are not specific propositions or hypotheses for the questions
because the research is exploratory. The implicit proposition underlying all of the questions is
that the use of architecture as an organizing factor in data collection and analysis will provide
new insights into the detailed implementation issues for the collaborative satellite projects. The
unit of analysis for each case study is a specific satellite project, during which one or more
satellites is procured by a national space organization from a foreign firm.
The research design uses a multi-case study approach. This creates the potential to find future
research directions based on similarities and differences in projects. Based on the foundational
analysis summarized in the introduction about national satellite programs, there may be about
twenty to thirty examples of collaborative satellite projects of the type studied here. Six projects
are chosen that have several key factors in common. Each is a collaborative satellite project
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executed by a national space organization and a foreign firm. Each project explicitly includes the
development of a satellite and training as objectives. For each project, engineers from the
customer country spend months or years working at the facility of the foreign firm while the firm
designs and builds a satellite for the national space organization. The firms explicitly offer a
training program as part of the contract to sell the satellite. Also the satellites from six projects
are similar in that they all carry optical, earth observation payloads as their primary purpose.
Another reason for selecting the six case study projects was the ability and willingness of the
national space organizations to host the research. This required an investment of time and
resources on the part of the host to make people and documentation available.
Three key factors are varied across the six case study projects; these factors are expected to lead
to observable differences in architecture and capability building. The first factor is the
combination of supplier and customer. The six satellite projects involve four nations and three
suppliers. One nation works with a single supplier for two projects; one nation works with two
different suppliers. Two suppliers work with two different nations in the case studies. The second
factor that varies across the projects is the technical approach of the suppliers. Two of the
suppliers use the emerging small satellite engineering philosophy, while one uses a traditional
technical approach. Third, the technical performance of the satellites varies between medium and
high resolution imagery. These variations may lead to patterns in the observed architecture and
capability building outcomes.
Table 4-1: Summary of Key Aspects of Case Study Projects; Names of nations and firms are coded for anonymity
Satellite AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat-R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-112
Projects R1 R2 BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R3 R1
Country Nation Alpha Nation Beta Nation Nation Delta1Gamma
Satellite
te Remote SensingType__________________ 
_
Satellite Medium High Medium High and High High
Performance Resolution Resolution Resolution Medium Resolution ResolutionPerformance Resolution Reluin esuto
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier Omega1 Supplier SupplierOmegal Taul 
_1 Taul Sigmal
Technical Traditional
Approach Small Satellite Philosophy Technical
I_ _ IApproach
This section explains methods for data collection and the early analysis steps. The specific steps
used to answer each research question are further explained in a later section.
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4.2.1 Data Collection
Data is primarily collected via field research within the countries that executed the collaborative
satellite projects as well as at the site of the supplier firms. Field research is necessary because
the facts about the satellite projects are generally not documented or available to the public. The
primary data collection methods include interviews, observation, and review of primary
documents. The author performed extensive interviews among stakeholders from the customer
countries and supplier firms. During these visits, the author interviewed engineers, managers and
policy makers that were involved in the projects of interest. Table 4-2 summarizes the data
collection via interviews and site visits. Four nations (Nation Alpha, Nation Beta, Nation Gamma
and Nation Delta) were visited because they executed collaborative satellite projects. Nations
Omega, Tau and Sigma were locations of supplier firms. Note that the interviews with the
representatives of Nation Sigma were done outside the country at a conference. The lengths of
the visits were determined by the ability of the organizations to host the researchers. During each
visit, data was collected via formal, hour long interviews; through informal meetings; through
observation and tours of the facilities and activities; and through documentation provided by the
customers and suppliers. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Upon completion of
the field work, the data from the interviews, research notes and stakeholder documentation was
catalogued.
Table 4-2: Summary of Field Data Collection
# Sites # of People Types of OrganizationsCountry Type Visited Interviewed Visited
- Industry
Nation Alpha Customer 3 11-20 
- National Government
Nation Beta Customer 1 21-30 - National Government
Nation Gamma Customer 1 6-10 - National Government
Nation Delta Customer 2 6-10 - National Government
Nation Omega Supplier 2 21-30 - Industry*Unive rsity
- Industry
Nation Tau Supplier 3 11-20 - University
- National Government
Nation Sigma Supplier 0 1-5 - Industry
The interview approach seeks to balance the types of personnel interviewed in each context. At
national space organizations, the goal is to interview engineers from a variety of subsystem
teams and technical specialties. In addition, interviews include managers and policy makers
when possible. At supplier firms, the goal is to also interview people from a variety of technical
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backgrounds and leadership levels who made direct contributions to the case study projects. At
each host organization a representative coordinated the interview schedule - mediating between
the researchers and the employees.
The interview questions are defined using inspiration from Systems Architecture as defined by
Crawleylvi and Enterprise Architecture as defined by Nightingale and Rhodes.ccv" Both topics
define the purview of a system architect broadly to include issues of policy, organizational
processes and structure, market factors, and knowledge management. The interview includes
questions on the following topics: the interviewee's professional position, duties, career path and
educational background; experience and role in the case study satellite projects; organizational,
management and training aspects of the case study projects; technical and operational approaches
for the projects; strategic project issues relating to partner selection and motivations; and
capability building achievements during the projects. One version of the interview instrument is
used suppliers and one for customers. These versions are adapted during each interview based on
the individual's position and experiences. Information about the individual's position and career
path, indicate which questions they are able to answer. When possible the interviewees received
a preview of the interview questions in advance. Appendix B: Interview Material contains
generic examples of interview questions for supplier firms and customers organizations.
4.2.2 Data Analysis
The data analysis process uses four steps to answer the research questions. At the end of the data
collection activities, the evidence included hundreds of interview transcripts, photographs from
site visits, research notes and documents provided by case study participants. The first step
organized the information from all the data sources into a consistent framework and created a
case study database that saved the evidence in a traceable manner. Using evidence from one case
study project, a series of project attributes were inductively defined to categorize the information
from the interviews. The list of attributes was refined as evidence from each case study was
coded. Evidence was sought from interviews as well as other sources to produce comparable data
about each case study. The final list of project attributes is summarized in outline form here. The
facts about each aspect of the project were recorded in Excel along with a note stating the source
of the fact. For each project attribute, multiple sources were available to confirm the information
or to indicate conflicting evidence.
Table 4-3: Project Attributes
Attributes that Describe the Collaborative Satellite Projects
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1. Contextual & Background Information on Satellite Space Program
2. Summary of Key Events (Timeline)
3. Motivations and Objectives for the Satellite Project
4. Initiation and Approval of Satellite Project
5. The Project Team
5.1. Relationship of Satellite Customer to Other Organizations
5.2. List of Team Members
5.3. Team Size
5.4. Selection of Engineers for Satellite Project
5.4. 1.Selection Process
5.4.2.Previous Affiliation
5.4.3.Available Pool of Talent and Experience Level of Hired Engineers
5.4.4.Perspective and Personality of Engineers
5.5. Selection of Foreign Contractors/Suppliers
5.5.1.Selection of Satellite Supplier and Trainer
5.5.2.Selection of Launch Provider
5.6. Team Location
5.7. Team Roles
6. Project Facilities
7. Training
7.1. Objectives & Expectations for Training
7.2. Preparation for Training
7.3. Transition to Training Location
7.4. Training Approaches & Relationship with Mentors
7.5. Examples of Training Projects
7.6. Technical Contributions of Trainees
8. Contracts and Agreements
9. Technical Product and Approach
9.1. Product
9.2. Approach
10. Management Approach
10.1. Review Process
10.2. Project Milestones
10.3. Management Priorities
11. Policy Issues
12. Cultural, Social and Regional Issues
After the facts about each case study project in the twelve dimensions listed above were captured
in a series of spreadsheets, the second step created narrative summaries of each case study. These
narratives combined the data from many sources to create consolidated stories of each case study
with high levels of detail. The narratives were sent to project participants to be reviewed for
accuracy. The third step was to convert the narratives about each case study into an architectural
analysis. This step provides the answers to Research Question 1 and 2. The approach is
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explained more in the section that answers these research questions. The mechanics of this step
involve building another Excel spreadsheet. In the first set of spreadsheets, the facts about each
case study are collected separately and multiple sources of evidence are used to explore each
fact. In this step, one spreadsheet is used to collect standardized facts about all the case study
satellite projects using the dimensions listed above. This creates a single document that facilitates
comparison of the architecture of each satellite project. The fourth analysis step was to observe
capability building for individuals and organizations. For individuals, this step used data from
the interviews with customer countries. Interviewees explained their educational experiences,
career path and roles during the satellite projects. The mechanics use an Excel spreadsheet to
record capability building experiences in a standardized template and color code them to show a
progression over time. For organizations, another set of tables were created to track capability
building achievements based on evidence from interviews and documents. The sections that
answer these research questions provide further explain the theoretical approach and methods to
observing capability building for individuals and organizations.
Finally, Yin advises on how to maintain validity and reliability during case study research.
Construct validity refers to the quality of operational approaches used to measure a concept. In
this work, the concepts that are measured or observed include architecture, individual capability
building experiences and organizational capability achievements. Validity is improved for this
study by using multiple sources of evidence (interviews, observation and documents), keeping
clear links between evidence and results (in the Excel databases and narratives), as well as by
having representatives from each case study review the case study narratives. With regard to
internal validity, this is most important for Research Question 5. The first four research questions
are descriptive; question 5 begins to explore potential causal links between architectural
approaches and capability building outcomes. Following Yin's advice, the approach looks for
patterns and rival explanations. External validity asks whether findings can be generalized. Yin
explains that each case study is like one of a series of experiments, not one of a statistical
sample. The generalization is at the level of theory, which may be replicated or updated in future
theories. Finally, this research uses several steps to maintain reliability that minimizes bias.
Producing and analyzing case study data via field research does require many decisions based on
researcher judgment, but the steps are clearly documented to maintain reliability. "lvii
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5 Case Studies of Collaborative Satellite Projects
This chapter provides summaries of the collaborative satellite project case studies. The chapter
opens by introducing the nomenclature used to describe the cases. Four countries are featured in
the case studies. For each country, the chapter provides background information, a timeline of
their satellite projects and a brief summary of project events. Longer project summaries are
provided in Appendix A: Detailed Summaries of Case Study Projects. The detailed summaries
are written as Analytical Narratives that present information about each satellite project using an
organization scheme based on Architectural Dimensions that were inductively defmed during
data analysis. The same set of Architectural Dimensions provides the foundation to answer
Research Questions 1 and 2.
Codes are used to describe the actors, locations and satellites for each project. Within each nation
that participates in the projects there may be various types of organizations - Suppliers,
Implementers, Overseers and Universities. Suppliers sell satellites and training services on a
commercial basis. Implementers are executing satellite projects and they seek services from the
suppliers. Overseers are from the same nation as the Implementers. They provide some
combination of funding, government policy guidance and oversight. Universities are academic
institutions engaged in teaching and research. Within each organization, there may be various
types of personnel - Engineers, Managers, Political Leaders and Professors. Engineers are
directly engaged in technical activities of satellite projects. Managers are supervisors of
engineers and they are engaged in other activities that may include, project management, quality
assurance, administrative activity, business development, compliance with regulatory guidelines
and interaction between organizations. Political Leaders are working at high levels of
government and defining policy strategy. The Professors category includes personnel in
academic positions in universities with duties of teaching and research. These categories are
summarized in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1: Guide to Dissertation Naming Convention
Generic Objects in Case Studies
Geographic Reference Nation
Supplier
Organizations ImplementerOverseer
University
Engineer
Personnel Manager
Political Leader
Professor
Satellites Remote Sensing
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Communication
In order to protect the identity of the participants in the case studies, codes are used to describe
the nations, organizations, personnel and satellites. Table 5-2 introduces the foundational codes
that are used for each of these elements. Each Nation is identified by a Greek Letter, such as
Alpha, Beta, Gamma, etc. The Organizations, Personnel and Satellites are associated with
specific countries and indexed with numbers. The italicized letters in Table 5-2 represent the
numerical indices. For example, the first Nation is Nation Alpha. The first Implementer from
Nation Alpha is Implementer Alphal. The first engineer from Nation Alpha is Engineer Alphal;
and the first remote sensing satellite from Nation Alpha is AlphaSat-R1.
Table 5-2: Guide to Dissertation Naming Convention
Specific Organizations
Supplier Alpha,i Supplier from Nation Alpha
Implementer Alpha,k Implementer,k from Nation Alpha
Overseer Alpha,m Overseer m from Nation Alpha
University Alpha,n Universityn from Nation Alpha
Specific Personnel
Engineer Alpha~p Engineer~p from Nation Alpha
Manager Alpha,q Manager,q from Nation Alpha
Leader Alpha,r Political Leader,r from Nation Alpha
Professor Alpha~s Professor,s from Nation Alpha
Specific Satellites
AlphaSat-R,t Remote Sensing Satellite,t from Nation Alpha
AlphaSat-C,u Communication Satellite,u from Nation Alpha
Table 5-3 summarizes the six case study satellite projects in which seven satellites were procured
by the four case study countries. The table describes their technology and the supplier that sold
them.
Table 5-3: Summary of Key Aspects of Case Study Projects
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Code for Specific Objects from Nation Alpha
Note: Names of nations and organizations are coded for anonymity
AlphaSat-R1 AlphaSat-R2 BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R21 GammaSat- DeltaSat-R2
Projects IIBetaSat-R3 RI
Nation
Country Nation Alpha Nation Beta Gamma Nation Delta
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier Omega1 Supplier SupplierOmegal Taul Taul Sigmal
Traditional
Technical Small Satellite Philosophy Technical
Approach Approach
5.1 Nation Alpha
The first Nation (known hereafter as Nation Alpha) pursued two collaborative projects with
remote sensing missions. The first satellite project (AlphaSat-RI) occurred during the decade of
the 1990s and involved a partnership with a Supplier Omegal. The second project (AlphaSat-R2)
occurred during the 2000s; here Nation Beta partnered with a Supplier from Nation Tau
(Supplier Taul). The sections below summarize key events of the AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2
projects.
The AlphaSat-R1 project was initiated because a communication services company from Nation
Alpha was procuring the AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2 satellites. These would be the first
domestically owned communication satellites for Nation Alpha. The communication company
entered negotiations with a foreign launch provider. As part of the negotiations, the launch
provider offered the free launch of a small satellite (weighing a few hundred kilograms) for
Nation Alpha. The small satellite was intended to ride to orbit on the same rocket as the larger
communication satellites. In response, the government space research office of Nation Alpha
formed a committee to discuss how to respond to the free launch offer. The committee proposed
a plan to the government of Nation Alpha for implementing a small satellite project. This plan
was approved and supported by government leadership and the project was gradually initiated
over several years. The government space research office that established the initial committee
took on leadership of the project as the direct Overseer organization (Overseer Alphal). In order
to implement the project, the space research office established a company (Implementer Alphal)
that would serve as the Implementing organization on behalf of the government. The space
research office (Overseer Alphal) decided to develop the small satellite by procuring it from a
foreign firm. They sought a firm that would sell the satellite and provide training for engineers
from Nation Alpha as part of the project. The government space office chose Supplier Omegal
to supply the satellite and training for a team of engineers from Nation Alpha. Implementer
Alphal and Supplier Omegal signed an agreement to implement the AlphaSat-R1 project in the
facilities of Supplier Omegal with a team that included engineers from both organizations. That
same year a team of engineers from Nation Alpha traveled to Nation Omega and started a
training program in the context of the AlphaSat-R1 project. The core team of 7 engineers from
Nation Alpha stayed at Supplier Omegal for about one year. Meanwhile, back in Nation Alpha,
the Implementer Alphal grew in personnel as new engineers were hired to focus on AlphaSat-R1
operations and on future missions. AlphaSat-R1 was proposed as a small satellite to be launched
with the larger communication satellites (AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2). The AlphaSat-R1
team missed the opportunity to launch with the AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2 satellites. The
project continued, however, and aimed for a new launch date. There were delays in securing a
new launch opportunity. The first launch attempt finally came about two years after the
manufacturing of AlphaSat-RI was completed. During the first launch attempt, there was an
engine malfunction and the launch was rescheduled. The AlphaSat-RI was finally launched a
few months later. A team of engineers from Nation Alpha learned how to operate the satellite
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using a ground station installed by Supplier Omegal. The ground station was located in a major
city within Nation Alpha.
AlphaSat-R2 was the second small satellite project in which Nation Alpha partnered with a
foreign company for both training and joint execution. Under the oversight of the government
space research office (Overseer Alphal), Implementer Alphal partnered with Supplier Taul to
build the satellite and payload. The collaboration between Implementer Alphal and Supplier
Taul actively started a few months before the launch of the first remote sensing satellite,
AlphaSat-R1. During a four year period, a set of engineers from Implementer Alphal lived and
worked in Nation Tau under the mentorship of the Supplier Taul team. The initial work was on
the payload system for AlphaSat-R2. Several Implementer Alphal engineers were sent to Nation
Tau to work on the satellite's development. After about one year, Implementer Alphal and
Supplier Taul extended their agreement from the payload project to include a satellite bus to
carry the payload. Implementer Alphal also developed new facilities in Nation Alpha during the
AlphaSat-R2 project. About 5 years into the project, Implementer Alphal completed an
Assembly, Integration and Test facility at their location; there they integrated the flight model of
AlphaSat-R2. For the following four years, AlphaSat-R2 was in Nation Alpha where it was
further tested and calibrated. Other important space events took place in during the AlphaSat-R2
project. The government space research office (Overseer Alphal) transition to become a full
government space agency around the second year of the project (the agency is coded as Overseer
Alpha2). Also the first astronaut program for Nation Alpha began around the third year of the
AlphaSat-R2 project. AlphaSat-R2 was launched about 9 years after the project was initiated.
5.1.1 Project Background
This section explains the context, technical requirements and capability building objectives for
Nation Alpha.
5.1.1.1 Context
When the AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2 projects took place in Nation Alpha, the country was
coming out of a forty year process of major social and economic transition. In the 1950s Nation
Alpha gained independence from a former colonial power. During the following decade Nation
Alpha gradually defined its borders and pursued political stability. In the thirty years from 1970
to 2000, Nation Alpha sought and achieved social and economic transformation in many ways.
The primary economic activity was gradually converted from agriculture to manufacturing. Prior
to this a few cash crops dominated the exports from Nation Alpha. Eventually manufacturing in
both lower technology areas such as textiles and higher technology areas such as electronics
dominated the export sales from Nation Alpha. The government was an active catalyst to this
transition. A government initiative for economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s emphasized
poverty alleviation and sought to lessen economic inequality. The government continued such
planning with a new initiative starting in the 1990s that focused on balanced national
development. The government set forth an aggressive national vision for achieving grand strides
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toward national development in the twenty-first century. As part of this process the government
set up state owned enterprises in key sectors of the economy where they sought strategic
activity- such as the energy and automotive industries. These enterprises blazed new trails and
created new national capabilities. The government encouraged interaction between national firms
and foreign or multinational firms. This was seen as an opportunity to absorb new technology
into the country. The government made large scale national investments in areas such as
architecture, energy and information technology. This included defining special zones to
encourage high technology industry. A series of new architectural landmarks displayed both
national prestige and technical achievement. These investments were also designed to invite
international participation in the emerging high technology community within Nation Alpha.
From a social perspective, Nation Alpha balanced a complex web of factors. The ethnic
demographics of the population were diverse, and there were traditional economic disparities
along ethnic lines. The development efforts of the government sought to redress such disparities,
especially for the traditionally disadvantaged majority. The concerns of minority communities -
especially indigenous people - were not always met, and this led to social and political tension.
These tensions gradually eased somewhat between 1970 and 2000. As part of the ethnic
divisions, there was competition within the country among various languages. Several dominant
international languages threatened the relevance of the local language in education and business.
The government pursued an evolving approach to both maintain the local language while
acknowledging the usefulness of international languages for business and education. Also during
this period, there was a transition for the role of woman in society. Many women entered the
workforce - in both the manufacturing sector and the civil service. Strong economic growth in
certain periods attracted foreign immigrants to job opportunities, adding to the already diverse
demographics. The country also sought to find balance in the area of religion. The government
both supported an official national religion while maintaining the right of other religions to co-
exist. Finally, society was affected by the dramatic environmental changes that were part of the
rapid economic transitions of the period. Traditional environmental practices and resources were
threatened by the economic growth, but the short term benefits were positive for many members
of the population, so environmental concern was inconsistent. Much of these social and
economic dynamics were driven by a key government leader who persisted in office through a
long tenure. This key government leader (Leader Alphal) lent personal vision and support to
many of the development projects and landmark architectural icons of the period. In the context
of these social and economic factors, the satellite projects and other space activity were a
consistent with the drive to harness information and communication technology, develop local
technical skills and foster national prestige.
Prior to the AlphaSat-R1 project, Nation Alpha had long been aware of the benefits of satellite
services. The first satellite communication receiving stations were installed in Nation Alpha
during the 1960s and a national remote sensing center was established in the 1980s to harness
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earth observation data. Meanwhile, the government of Nation Alpha took broad interest in space
in the late twentieth century. They appointed a government office to support national space
research (Overseer Alphal). It was based out of the central government. Part of the office's role
was to promote public awareness and outreach about space. The new office established a
national planetarium as a tool for space science education and research. A communication firm
(Implementer Alpha 2) took the lead with regard to owning and operating satellites in Nation
Alpha. Their business model was to own and operate communication satellites, but they did not
focus on satellite manufacturing. Implementer Alpha2 bought the first satellites owned by Nation
Alpha from a foreign satellite manufacturer. The procurement was a pair of small
communication satellites - AlphaSat-Cl and AlphaSat-C2. As part of the contract with the
supplier firm, a team of fourteen engineers from Nation Alpha went to the supplier firm's
location for a 6 month training experience. The AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2 projects
precipitated the inspiration for Nation Alpha's first small satellite project. Implementer Alpha2
approached a foreign launch provider to launch AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2. As part of the
negotiations for this launch, the provider offered to launch a small satellite for free as a
secondary payload on the same rocket with the communication satellites. This offer catalyzed the
first satellite project with major national participation.
A Manager (Manager Alphal) was leading Implementer firm Implementer Alphal and managing
the day to day aspects of the AlphaSat-R1 project. At the time when Implementer Alpha1 was
formed, it was designed to be a temporary organization with the sole purpose of providing
institutional infrastructure for the engineers hired to implement the small satellite project.
Manager Alphal challenged this assumption when the core team of engineers returned from
training at Supplier Omegal. He saw that Nation Alpha had made progress in learning to use
satellite technology. He promoted a vision to the government leaders that Nation Alpha could
also work toward becoming a producer of space technology. A key government leader (Leader
Alphal) who had given great political support to AlphaSat-R1 also championed the idea of
continuing Implementer Alphal as a government-linked, space technology company. While
Implementer Alphal did not receive regular government funding for operations, it would be the
government's primary contractor for satellite development projects.
The government space research office (Overseer Alphal) gradually evolved. Government Leader
Alpha2 played a key role in helping Nation Alpha define their approach during the AlphaSat-R1
project. She left Nation Alpha, however, for several years between the AlphaSat-R1 and
AlphaSat-R2 projects to pursue a different type of international leadership role. She returned for
a few years and oversaw the conversion of the government space office (Overseer Alphal) into
Nation Alpha's national space agency (Overseer Alpha2). The space agency became the new
government organization that served as Overseer to Implementer Alphal for satellite projects.
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The seeds of the AlphaSat-R2 project were planted during the AlphaSat-R1 project when Leader
Alpha2 met Professor Taul during an international conference. Professor Taul had done
pioneering work in Nation Tau to establish a satellite workforce using a series of small satellite
projects. During the conference, Professor Taul gave a presentation that described a vision for
how developing countries can begin work on space technology. Leader Alpha2 took note of the
presentation and began a long term dialog with Professor Taul about the possibility of Nations
Alpha and Tau partnering on a joint satellite development project. As the AlphaSat-R1 project
was nearing a close, Implementer Alphal transitioned to a long term organization and formulated
a proposal for a follow on satellite mission. Eventually, Implementer Alphal and Overseer
Alphal came together to make a proposal for a second small satellite that they could present to
the Nation Alpha government. The relevant government ministry (Overseer Alpha3) coordinated
with Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alphal to seek government approval and funding for
AlphaSat-R2. Once money was allocated, Implementer Alphal was contracted to build the new
satellite.
5.1.1.2 Technical Requirements
As Nation Alpha pursued the AlphaSat-R1 project they targeted a small spacecraft that could
potentially provide useful data related to fisheries, forestry, river pollution, oil exploration,
mapping and meteorology. Overall, however, the technical performance of the satellite was a
secondary objective compared to the desire to build capability in engineers from Nation Alpha.
The technical performance was largely driven by the capabilities and experience of Supplier
Omegal. The system was designed to provide optical imagery of medium and low resolution.
The satellite also carried a non-real time communication payload for the amateur radio
community.
The technical requirements for AlphaSat-Ri stand in contrast with AlphaSat-R2. The primary
goal during the AlphaSat-R1 project was for engineers from Nation Alpha to learn about satellite
technology; it was not pivotal that the satellite provide consistent, operational data to specific
end users. During the second project (AlphaSat-R2), this gradually changed. Over the life of the
project, the team made several decisions that showed a commitment to producing more useful,
operational data. The leadership of Overseer Alphal, especially Leader Alpha2, actively defined
that they wanted this second remote sensing satellite to provide operationally useful data. To
ensure that the data was useful, they insisted that the system be optically calibrated. The Nation
Alpha team emphasized the performance of the imager instrument when making decisions about
training, partnership, local facilities and procurement. Nation Alpha chose to partner with a
company that agreed to jointly develop a new earth observation imager. They selected specific
engineers to focus on learning and executing the imager technology. They also set up local
facilities to calibrate the imager payload before it was flown in space. All of these actions were
pursued as part of the motivation to make the second satellite project more operational and
useful. In addition to a high performance payload, Nation Alpha wanted to design the mission to
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meet the specific needs of their country, by using an orbit that suited their geographic location.
This decision was non-traditional, innovative and risky. Because the orbit was rare, this design
choice would give Nation Alpha both benefits through notoriety and costs due to technical and
logistical challenges. For this second mission, the Nation Alpha team (Overseer Alphal and
Implementer Alphal) drove the requirements definition rather than the satellite supplier.
AlphaSat-R2 was designed to carry a high resolution imager with high performance. Nation
Alpha sought to achieve a mission that would stand out internationally by making a technical
contribution to the global repertoire of satellite experience.
5.1.1.3 Capability Building Objectives
The long term objective of the AlphaSat-R1 project was to establish the capability for Nation
Alpha to domestically produce satellites. The Nation Alpha leadership recognized that in the
short term, these skills may not be acquired through a single project. As short term objectives,
Manager Alphal hoped that his engineers would have the opportunity participate in building,
testing and operate a satellite. This would enable them in the future to buy sophisticated satellite
technology and gradually build up expertise about satellites.
The Nation Alpha team continued to seek capability building for Implementer Alphal engineers
during the AlphaSat-R2 project. The trainee engineers were a new group that did not participate
in AlphaSat-R1 or attend the training with Supplier Omegal. For this second project, the Nation
Alpha team sought the opportunity for engineers to participate in more phases of the satellite
design. During the AlphaSat-R1 project, the Nation Alpha engineers were present at Supplier
Omegal only for the late stages of the development process - integration and test. For AlphaSat-
R2, one goal was for Nation Alpha engineers to experience the entire satellite development
lifecycle, starting with design. Another aspect of this was a goal for the Nation Alpha engineers
to experience the design of a new spacecraft rather than a spacecraft based on a previously used
design. These were seen as valuable steps toward reaching the long term goal of developing
satellites locally.
5.1.2 Project Timeline
Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 show the timelines for the AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2 projects. The
time is shown in Project Years instead of calendar years in order to protect identity. The
comments use labels generic to all the projects to categorize each event into one of five
categories: Facilitating Event, Project Initiation, Engineers at Supplier Location, System and
Facility Development, Satellite Launch. The timelines emphasize the development period of the
satellites up until launch. After that milestone the operational phase begins, which is important
for delivering products to the system end users. The operational phase is not the focus of this
analysis, however.
Table 5-4: Timeline for AlphaSat-Ri Project
Project AlphaSat-R1 Project Comment
115
Year~
Free launch offered with AlphaSat-C1 and
1 AlphaSat-C2 Project Facilitating Event
Overseer Alphal forms committee to planProject Initiation
satellite project
2 Formal ceremony initiates project Project Initiation
3
Implementer Alphal established Project Initiation
Contract signed between Implementer Alphal 
4 and Supplier Omegal Project Initiation
Nation Alpha Engineers arrive at Supplier Nation Alpha Engineers at Supplier
Omegal Location
AlphaSat-R1 development System and Facility Development
AlphaSat-R1 development System and Facility Development
5 Nation Alpha Engineers depart Supplier Omegal Nation Alpha Engineers at Supplier
Location
6
7 AlphaSat-R1 Launch Satellite Launch
The AlphaSat-R1 project occurred over a seven year period from facilitating event to launch.
Table 5-5: Timeline for AlphaSat-R2 Project
Year AlphaSat-R2 Project Comment
1 Leader Alpha2 met Professor Taul Facilitating Event
2
3
Project Initiation Project Initiation
4 First set of Nation Alpha Engineers arrive in Nation Alpha Engineers at Supplier
Nation Tau Location
Payload development started System and Facility Development
5
6 Nation Alpha Engineers at Supplier Taul Nation Alpha Engineers 
at Supplier
Satellite development Location System and Facility
7 Development
8
9 Satellite assembled in Implementer Alphal System and Facility Development
10 Satellite tested and calibrated in Nation Alpha System and Facility Development
11 Satellite tested and calibrated in Nation Alpha System and Facility Development
12 Satellite tested and calibrated in Nation Alpha System and Facility Development
13 AlphaSat-R2 Launched Satellite Launch
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The AlphaSat-R2 project occurred over a nine year period from initiation to launch. Table 5-6
shows the relationship between the timelines of the two projects.
Table 5-6: Joint Timeline for AlphaSat-Ri and AlphaSat-R2 Projects
Project Year - AlphaSat-R1 Project Project Year - AlphaSat-R2 Project
AlphaSat-R1 AlphaSat-R2
Project Initiation
Project Initiation
4 Nation Alpha Engineers 1 Facilitating Event
at Supplier Location
System and Facility
Development
System and Facility
5 Development 2Nation Alpha Engineers
at Supplier Location
6 3
Project Initiation
Nation Alpha Engineers
7 Satellite Launch 4 at Supplier Location
System and Facility
Development
5.1.3 Observations
Several observations about Nation Alpha's satellite projects stand out.
* Nation Alpha started their first national satellite project based on an external stimulus, but
the timing aligned well with national priorities to invest in science and technology.
* Nation Alpha had a clear priority definition in each project of how the objectives of
capability building and technical performance were balanced.
* The Implementer in Nation Alpha was a quasi-commercial, government linked company.
This model is unique to Nation Alpha among the case study countries. The Implementer
Alphal also worked in non-space technology fields in parallel with their satellite projects.
* The leadership in Nation Alpha carefully pursued their relationship with their suppliers
for both satellites and launch services. In these two satellite projects, Nation Alpha
worked with newly established suppliers and sought to find mutual benefit with them.
* Between the AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2 projects, Implementer Alphal changed their
hiring strategy. For the first project the core group of trainees was primarily experienced
professionals hired temporarily. For the second project, Implementer Alphal hired young
professionals for long term training.
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5.2 Nation Beta
Nation Beta pursued two remote sensing satellite projects during which they procured three
satellites. During the first project, Implementer Beta bought BetaSat-R1 from Supplier Omegal.
During the second project, Implementer Beta bought BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 from Supplier
Omegal. BetaSat-R2 was bought as the primary product to provide high quality data for Nation
Beta. BetaSat-R3 was a training project that allowed engineers from Nation Beta to work more
autonomously on the satellite development. Both BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 were launched.
The BetaSat-R1 project was the initiation of Nation Beta's national satellite program. Nation
Beta's space agency was created in the late 1990s; the agency began a process of establishing six
specialized centers to pursue various aspects of research and operations in space technology and
it applications. The Nation Beta central government formally approved the space agency a few
months after it opened. Implementer Beta served as the implementing organization for the
BetaSat-R1 project. The formation of Implementer Beta was a facilitating event that marked
Project Year 1 for the BetaSat-RI project. Implementer Beta chose to pursue a small satellite
project for their first national procurement of a spacecraft. Overseer Beta was the ministry in
Nation Beta that provided oversight to Implementer Beta. In Project Year 2 Overseer Beta signed
an agreement with Supplier Omegal to provide a remote sensing satellite and to train a team of
Nation Beta engineers. The Nation Beta government placed the satellite project into a larger
national program by approving a national space policy document in Project Year 3. Fifteen
young men from all over Nation Beta were chosen to participate in the training under Supplier
Omegal. The engineers that were trained at Supplier Omegal left Nation Beta in Project Year 3
to move to Nation Omega. These trainees remained in Nation Omega until the middle of Project
Year 5. They joined the Supplier Omegal team for the development of the BetaSat-RI
spacecraft. While in Nation Omega, the trainees were assigned roles within the Supplier Omegal
engineering team. They worked with subsystem groups including imaging, Attitude
Determination and Control, Propulsion, Structures, Ground Station Operations, Power, On-Board
Data Handling and Communication. The purpose of the training was to prepare Nation Beta to
one day build satellites independent of foreign assistance. In Project Year 5, after a new
presidential administration was formed in Nation Beta, the central government approved the
launch of BetaSat-R1, the installation of the BetaSat-R1 ground control station, and the long
term establishment of a permanent location for Implementer Beta with improved facilities.
Starting in early Project Year 5, the ground control station for BetaSat-RI was built and
commissioned in Nation Beta's capital city. It was completed just in time for the launch of
BetaSat-R1 in Project Year 5.
For Nation Beta's second remote sensing satellite project, they again partnered with Supplier
Omegal. Two spacecraft were procured: BetaSat-R2 was a high performance satellite designed
to produce excellent imagery; BetaSat-R3 was a training satellite for the Nation Beta engineers
to learn from. The project was implemented by Nation Beta's national space agency
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(Implementer Beta) under a relevant ministry (Overseer Beta). The satellite project was initiated
as Nation Beta was in preparing an agreement with several other countries in the region to create
a collaborative satellite constellation. This constellation agreement was signed in Project Year 1.
In Project Year 2, Overseer Beta signed a contract with Supplier Omegal for the BetaSat-R2 &
R3 project on behalf of Nation Beta. The national leader of Nation Beta approved the contract
soon after. A few months before the contract was formally signed the first of two cohorts of
Nation Beta engineers traveled to Nation Omega to work with Supplier Omegal. The training
continued through Project Year 5. Both Supplier Omegal and Implementer Beta celebrated new
facilities during this project. Supplier Omegal opened it's a new corporate headquarters in
Project Year 2. Implementer Beta commissioned a new campus in Project Year 3, moving into a
permanent, dedicated facility for the first time. Between Project Year 3 and Project Year 5, the
two spacecraft - BetaSat-R2 & R3 - went through all the major project milestones. In the midst
of this progress, Implementer Beta transitioned to a new leader in Project Year 4. In Project Year
5, Implementer Beta held a special event to commemorate a major anniversary. Supplier
Omegal expected the BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellites to launch in Project Year 6, but launch delays
plagued the project. The satellites were both launched in Project Year 7.
5.2.1 Project Background
This section explains the context, technical requirements and capability building requirements
for Nation Beta.
5.2.1.1 Context
The BetaSat-RI project, and the initiation of Nation Beta's national space program, came as the
culmination of internal and external processes that shaped the pioneering space activities. Prior
to the founding of a national space agency and the first satellite project, there were several strains
of space-related activity in Nation Beta. These included academic research in astronomy and
space science, participation in international initiatives related to space services, a series of policy
proposals promoting space activity in the country and a gradual process by the government to
establish science policy infrastructure. Universities in Nation Beta were involved in astronomy
and space science research for decades before the BetaSat-R1 project. Several universities had
science departments or research centers dedicated to space. Some of these universities formed
international partnerships with foreign universities. There early attempts to set up scientific
equipment such as telescopes, although these projects were often not sustained. Nation Beta took
steps to participate in the international space community, starting in the 1970s and 1980s through
fora such as the United Nations and INMARSAT. Nation Beta also sought partnerships with
governments that operated satellites to access environmental remote sensing data.
Over several decades, a number of proposals were written by academic and government
representatives that called for a national space program in Nation Beta. Some of these proposals
had support and input from multilateral agencies. The reports varied in scope. Some proposed
general space activity; some wrote specifically about national needs for remote sensing data; and
119
others proposed space investment as part of a larger effort in science and technology. One of
these proposals led to the formation of a national remote sensing agency. This series of reports
coincided with a gradual build up in science policy infrastructure within the national
government. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Nation Beta slowly defined the organizations and
mechanisms by which they would manage national science and technology investment. There
were several precursor organizations before a formal ministry was established to specifically
address science and technology. Once established, the ministry went through a series of
transitions in leadership and focus that paralleled the transitions in national leadership.
Eventually, two key ministers of science and technology were able to formulate and execute
visions for increasing national investment in science and technology, including space. An
incubating agency was formed to strengthen the national infrastructure for science and
technology research. This incubator birthed several new specialty agencies, including the
national space agency. The new agencies started off as units within the incubator. Later, some of
the personnel from the larger agency split off to form the new agency with a specialized mission.
This was the process for forming Nation Beta's national space agency.
In Project Year 1 for BetaSat-R1, Implementer Beta was formed as the national space agency
and Nation Beta committed itself to the local design and development of satellites. A national
space policy document was officially approved; it formally documented the motivation to use
space technology for development. In terms of external influences, Nation Beta's aspirations
coincided with Supplier Omegal's idea to coordinate a group of countries for collaboration in a
satellite constellation. The first leader of Implementer Beta, met representatives from Supplier
Omegal at a conference and learned about their offerings and methods.
Nation Beta's motivation to pursue the BetaSat-R2 project can be described from four
perspectives - national development, national pride, personnel training and continuity with the
BetaSat-RI project. The first two areas are discussed here. The capability building and technical
motivations are discussed later. Both the official documents and the words of government leaders
expressed the idea that Nation Beta viewed the satellite program as part of the national
development process. The National Space Policy and Programmes document attributed a direct
link between national space activity and national development saying, "No nation [can] call itself
developed in the 21st century that does not have indigenous critical mass of trained space
scientists and engineers who contribute actively to the solution of the nation's problems." The
policy also argued that Nation Beta's national development process will be enhanced by
pursuing space activity and local expertise in the topic. The space policy mentions specific areas
in which Nation Beta can apply space to development challenges, including agriculture, forestry,
communication, transportation, tourism, education, health care, energy, safety and security.
Publications from Implementer Beta, the national space agency, followed the same theme.
Implementer Beta stated that Nation Beta is investing in satellite technology in order to apply
space services to social needs as part of the national development process. During a ceremony to
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commemorate the opening of Implementer Beta's permanent facility, the president of Nation
Beta made a speech. He talked about how national development motivated Nation Beta's space
activity. He said that space would help Nation Beta achieve the Millennium Development Goals
and a national development strategy. The key areas of need that he highlighted were poverty,
food security, infrastructure, energy, health, housing and disasters. The Nation Beta President
saw the potential for benefit from space assets that would provide guaranteed access to data and
lead to geospatial information. This idea that satellites would contribute to development also had
regional implications. Nation Beta made an agreement with several other countries in their
region to pursue a collaborative satellite constellation. BetaSat-R2 was the country's contribution
to this constellation of satellites that would collect and share environmental data about the
region.
Along with a belief that satellites projects contribute to development, Nation Beta leaders
expressed a sense that the space activity contributed to national pride and prestige. After the
BetaSat-R2 contract was signed but before major project milestones had been reached, both the
Nation Beta president and the leader of Implementer Beta spoke in a language evoking national
pride about the projects. The president highlighted the pioneering achievements of Nation Beta
in owning an earth observation satellite and establishing a space agency with a research center.
The leader of Implementer Beta spoke of the political benefits for the nation through the space
program, saying that Implementer Beta's work had "transformed Nation Beta into the position of
key player in the global space industry" allowing Nation Beta to "join the league" of space
players. He expected their progress in space technology to lead to geopolitical changes: "When
you have these types of technology with you, you are respected." He stated that the launch of
BetaSat-RI was important because it countered the "myth some people have.. .that Nation Beta
cannot do high tech."
5.2.1.2 Technical Requirements
For BetaSat-RI, the supplier had great influence in defining the technical specifications because
the project was done in the context of a multi-country, collaborative constellation. Supplier
Omegal developed the concept for the constellation and proposed it to potential customers -
inviting them to become collaborators. As the supplier envisioned, each constellation
collaborator would purchase and operate a satellite as part of a fleet. Each of the satellites in the
fleet would be identical and use compatible ground control stations. By participating in the
collaborative constellation, the Nation Beta team accepted the technical specifications proposed
for the satellite fleet. As a group, the constellation pursued medium resolution imagery in the
optical spectrum; the imagery would provide wide views with mid-level detail. The constellation
also sought to produce images of high enough quality to sell commercially. They planned a fleet
of satellites weighing 100kg or less that could be launched together and operated in a
coordinated constellation. The capability building goals were determined within the context of
the training and technology approaches of the constellation.
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The political motivations for BetaSat-R2 are discussed above. From a technical standpoint, the
purpose included providing continuity after the BetaSat-R1 project and procuring a satellite with
increased technical performance. The Nation Beta team took more initiative in defining the
specifications for BetaSat-R2 than they did with BetaSat-R1. BetaSat-RI was designed for
medium spatial resolution, and its technology was based on a previous satellite from Supplier
Omegal. BetaSat-R2 was a new product designed to achieve high resolution performance and
produce detailed images. In order to reach the goal of improving technical performance while
continuing the data stream of BetaSat-R1, BetaSat-R2 carried multiple imaging systems. The
satellite included one imager system with similar performance to BetaSat-R1 as well as a second
imager with high quality, detailed images. BetaSat-R2 was also planned to produce images of
commercial quality. As part of the same project, Implementer Beta purchased BetaSat-R3. This
was a secondary, training project on which Implementer Beta engineers did the majority of the
hands on work. The technical performance of BetaSat-R3 was similar to that of BetaSat-R1. Just
after the BetaSat-R2 & R3 contract was signed, Implementer Beta documented specific
objectives for how they would use the new satellites. For operations, a new Mission Control
Center was to be established at the planned permanent location for Implementer Beta in Abuja.
BetaSat-R2 was to produce optical data that could support information products such as digital
maps, topographic databases, administrative boundaries, cadastral databases, transportation
databases, hydrographic databases, land use databases, geological data and demographics data.
The high resolution data from BetaSat-R2 would be useful for urban mapping, detection of oil
spills and security monitoring. Other proposed applications included hydrology, crop mapping,
forest monitoring, structure mapping, development of roads, rails and pipelines, and detection of
illegal mining or fires. Implementer Beta also had the objective of building on their geospatial
infrastructure to organize the BetaSat-R2 data using information management systems and to
define a data sharing policy. The capability building objectives for the BetaSat-R2 project were
balanced with the technical objectives, as described below.
5.2.1.3 Capability Building Objectives
Implementer Beta pursued the long term goal of achieving local capability to design and
manufacture satellites. As one Implementer Beta official interprets, "[The] main thrust of the
National Space Policy is to acquire competency and capability in space technology development
through appropriate human resources development and capacity building." The same official
spoke to the Nation Beta trainee engineers before they left for Supplier Omegal and said that the
goal of the training was to achieve "indigenization of this technology" because Nation Beta
would not always rely on foreign partners. The training experiences for Implementer Beta
engineers during the BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R2 projects contributed to this long term goal. In
the short term, Implementer Beta hoped that the experience with BetaSat-R1 would enable the
Nation Beta engineers to build satellites "with only minimal supervision." Implementer Beta saw
BetaSat-R2 as a continuation of their training activities. The specific training approach for the
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BetaSat-R2 project was to send twenty-five engineers and scientists to Supplier Omegal for
about 30 months. They would work on building a training satellite model that was based on
flight standards. This training satellite became BetaSat-R3. A portion of the twenty-five would
also pursue graduate degrees related to space technology and earn Master of Science degrees.
For all three satellites - BetaSat-RI, BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 - the training focused primarily
on satellite engineering rather than on operations or payload development. Only a small subset of
the Nation Beta engineers focused on operations or payloads.
5.2.2 Project Timeline
Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 show the project timelines for the BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R2 & R3
projects. The time is shown in Project Years instead of calendar years in order to protect identity.
The comments use labels generic to all the projects to categorize each event into one of five
categories: Facilitating Event, Project Initiation, Engineers at Supplier Location, System and
Facility Development, Satellite Launch. The timelines emphasize the development period of the
satellites up until launch. After that milestone the operational phase begins, which is important
for delivering products to the system end users. The operational phase is not the focus of this
analysis, however.
Table 5-7: Timeline for the BetaSat-R1 Project
Project BetaSat-R1 Project Comment
Implementer Beta established Facilitating Event
BetaSat-R1 project approved Project Initiation
(2) Contract signed with Supplier Omegal Project Initiation
Nation Beta national space policy approved Facilitating Event
(3) Nation Beta trainees arrive in Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
(3) dSystem and Facility
BetaSat-R1 development Development
Nation Beta trainees in Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
(4) System and Facility
BetaSat-R1 development Development
New president re-approves BetaSat-R1 project Project Initiation
Nation Beta trainees depart Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
(5) System and Facility
BetaSat-R1 development Development
BetaSat-R1 launch Satellite Launch
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Table 5-8: Timeline for the BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 Projects
Proje BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 Projects CommentYear
(1) Regional collaboration agreement signed Facilitating Event
Contract with Supplier Omegal signed Project Initiation
Nation Beta president approved project Project Initiation
(2) Cohort 1 trainees arrive at Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
Supplier Omegal Opens New Facility System and Facility
Development
Cohort 1 trainees at Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellite development System and Facility(3) Development
Implementer Beta opens new campus System and Facility
Development
Cohort 1 trainees at Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
(4) Cohort 2 trainees arrive at Supplier Omegal Trainees at Supplier Location
BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellite development System and Facility
Development
Cohort I and Cohort 2 Trainees depart Trainees at Supplier Location
(5) Supplier Omegal
BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellite development System and Facility
completed Development
Launch Delay Launch
(6) Implementer Beta Operations Team receives Trainees at Supplier Location
one month training at Supplier Omega 1
(7) BetaSat-R2 & R3 Satellites Launch Launch
5.2.3 Observations
Several observations about Nation Beta's satellite projects stand out.
* Nation Beta transitioned from a first project with little training structure on a medium
performance satellite to a second project with highly structured training and two
satellites. They explicitly pursued a high performance satellite and a "high autonomy"
satellite.
* The time gap between the BetaSat-Rl and BetaSat-R2 & R3 programs caused some
challenges. Some of the BetaSat-Ri engineers did not stay as Implementer Beta
employees or continue working on the next generation program. The majority of the
BetaSat-R2 & R3 engineers were new hires. Thus, it may be that the organization
benefitted more than the individuals from the series of projects. The organization was
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able to pursue a more advanced project during the second generation even though the
many of the individuals were inexperienced.
* There was little coordination or overlap between the training in on BetaSat-C1 and the
remote sensing series of projects. One specific engineer was drawn from the
communication program and sent to train at Supplier Omegal. He saw benefit from the
BetaSat-C1 training as he worked on BetaSat-RI. He felt he gained a strong theoretical
foundation during the communication program and he had more opportunities for hands
on work during the remote sensing program.
* A few key individuals helped design and initiate the space program in Nation Beta.
Leaders at the level of president, minister and their close advisors played important roles.
" The space program was created as part of a larger policy to enhance the infrastructure for
government funded science and engineering organizations.
" Supplier Omegal became more formal in several dimensions during the sequence of
projects described here. They first worked with Nation Alpha on AlphaSat-RI. Later they
worked with Nation Beta for two satellite programs. During this series of project,
Supplier Omegal grew in terms of personnel, facilities, and formality of processes. They
formalized their system engineering and project management approaches. They also
formalized their training structure and the role of the training manager.
5.3 Nation Gamma
Implementer Gammal was formed as a new research center in Nation Gamma in the 2000s.
Implementer Gammal was formed by a small team of young engineers working under a director.
The purpose of Implementer Gammal was to equip young professionals of Nation Gamma with
advanced skills in science and technology. One of the early priority areas for Implementer
Gammal was space technology. The newly formed organization decided to procure a small
remote sensing satellite to facilitate environmental monitoring of their region. Implementer
Gammal considered multiple suppliers for this mission, and ultimately selected Supplier Taul
based in Nation Tau. Soon after the founding of Implementer Gammal, they started working
with Supplier Taul on the GammaSat-Ri project. A team of engineers from Implementer
Gammal went to Nation Tau to live and work alongside the Supplier Taul engineers. They
learned about satellite engineering and contributed to the GammaSat-Ri project. The satellite
was delivered by Supplier Taul to Implementer Gammal two years later, as scheduled. The aim
was to launch later that year. There were delays in executing the launch, however. The satellite
was not launched until the following year. Before GammaSat-RI was launched, Implementer
Gammal had already begun work with Supplier Taul on a second remote sensing satellite for
Nation Gamma (GammaSat-R2). More young engineers from Nation Gamma were hired and
sent to Nation Tau for training.
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5.3.1 Project Background
This section explains the context, technical requirements and capability building objectives for
Nation Gamma.
5.3.1.1 Context
In the 2000s, several young engineers from Nation Gamma were hired to join a burgeoning
project. They were among the first employees of a new research organization, Implementer
Gammal. Some of the engineers were hired before the formal opening of Implementer Gammal.
For months before the institute was officially established, the small team "worked together to
form the vision for the organization." They addressed questions such as the name, logo and
administrative procedures of the new institute. They also considered what they could learn from
foreign models of similar research organizations. The initial leadership of Implementer Gammal
determined that the institute would be multidisciplinary and seek activity in a variety of fields
such as environment, energy and astronomy. They also decided to begin their work with a
project related to space technology. The young engineers, who did not have training in space
technology, started doing independent study on the topic. "We spent about 8 months reading
books. Sitting in the office and reading about space." A later step was to learn about the
companies that could sell Implementer Gammal an appropriate satellite. The Implementer
Gammal team wanted to buy both a satellite and pay for training for their engineers. After the
months of preparation and background study, the small Implementer Gammal team made a
proposal to Nation Gamma government for their initial activities. They received funding and
formal status as a government department in Project Year 2. GammaSat-RI was the first earth
observation satellite project on behalf of Nation Gamma, and it was Implementer Gammal's first
major initiative. GammaSat-R1 was part of Implementer Gammal's goal of "inspiring scientific
innovation and fostering technological advancement in Nation Gamma." Later, Implementer
Gammal also began activities in areas such as alternative energy sources and the energy
applications of nanotechnology. Implementer Gammal sought to develop an organization that
produced practical research, rather than being primarily theoretical. One element that helped
them pursue this was the design of their human resource policies. Implementer Gammal created
a promotion scheme to reward performance by giving awards for activities such as presentations
or achievements. They also created a management and technical track so that people could be
promoted along either path. Before Implementer Gammal pursued the GammaSat-R1 project,
there was a user base in Nation Gamma for geo-referenced information - such as that produced
by satellites. Users were generally more familiar with the benefits of high resolution, visible data
than the other parts of the spectrum. They were also not specifically aware of the capabilities of
satellite data. The new Implementer Gammal team worked to promote the use of satellite data.
Implementer Gammal worked toward building a relationship with the government and
demonstrating that they could provide useful satellite-based tools. They worked to build
awareness by doing project with specific ministries. They also tried to raise awareness within
universities by having students do projects using satellite data. The universities benefitted from
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working with Implementer Gammal and receiving additional data. Implementer Gammal chose
the firm Supplier Taul as their partner to provide GammaSat-RI and a training program in
satellite engineering. Supplier Taul was a medium sized firm of about 100 employees. They
marketed internationally, especially to customers in the Middle East, Asia and Europe.
5.3.1.2 Technical Requirements
The Implementer Gammal team sought a first satellite project that balanced both capability
building opportunities and technical performance. They procured a satellite with high resolution
optical imagery; this offered high performance for the size and cost of the spacecraft. Some of
the applications they proposed to use the satellite for included infrastructure planning,
environmental monitoring, land degradation, agricultural mapping, land use monitoring and
water quality.
5.3.1.3 Capability Building Objectives
In the area of capability building through the GammaSat-RI project, Implementer Gammal
sought to build organizational capability in satellite technology and contribute to national
development in the long term. Implementer Gammal explicitly valued the technology training
aspects of GammaSat-RI because they saw technical advancement as key to the country's
development process. "They wanted to work in a field that would grow Nation Gamma national
skills and grow scientists....Space became a way to go into a field we had not been in and we
wanted to take young engineers to develop them through technology transfer." Previously,
industries such as construction, aviation and tourism were growing quickly, "but foreigners were
doing the work." Implementer Gammal chose to work closely with a foreign satellite company
because they saw it was a way to build local knowledge and help uplift their national
capabilities. At the organizational level, Implementer Gammal defined long term objectives for
capability in satellite technology. They sought to develop a long term satellite program with
continuity. Implementer Gammal signed the contract to do a second remote sensing satellite
with Supplier Taul before the GammaSat-RI was finished. Thus Implementer Gammal valued
the first project for the learning opportunity, not only for the data results. They sought to reach a
dual goal of demonstrating local capability (with one satellite) and generating revenue with a
highly capable instrument on a second satellite. Implementer Gammal pursued the GammaSat-
RI project with the long term goal of developing organizational capability to design and
manufacture satellites. They set goals for a progression of technical capability over a series of
projects. The progressing capability was defined by the level of involvement Implementer
Gammal engineers could have in the project. They hoped to learn enough during GammaSat-RI
that they would be capable of contributing to a second satellite at a level of 50%.
5.3.2 Project Timeline
Table 5-9 shows the project timeline for the GammaSat-RI project. Project Years are used as the
unit of time instead of calendar years in order to maintain anonymity of the organizations.
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Table 5-9: Timeline for the GammaSat-R1 Project
Project Year GAMMASAT-RJ Comnent
(1) Implementer Gammal team forms to plan Facilitating Event
Implementer Gammal officially established Facilitating Event
GammaSat-RI project initiated Project Initiation and
Approval
(2) Implementer Gammal engineers in Nation Tau Trainees in Supplier
Location
GammaSat-R1 development System and Facility
Development
(3) Trainees in Supplier
Implementer Gammal engineers in Nation Tau Location
(4) GammaSat-RI development System and Facility
Development
Trainees in SupplierImplementer Gammal engineers in Nation Tau;
(5) GammaSat-RI launch Location
Launch
5.3.3 Observations
Several observations about Nation Gamma's satellite project stand out.
e Nation Gamma pursued the GammaSat-RI project, not just to participate in space, but to
build their national technological capability in many areas. The space project was to be a
catalyst for overall growth. Implementer Gammal was not formed as a space agency, but
a general research organization.
* The GammaSat-RI project was highly impacted by the AlphaSat-R2 project. Nation
Gamma worked with the same supplier - Supplier Taul - and they built a similar
satellite.
e The Nation Gamma team invited a group of young engineers to play a key role in the
national technology institution when they founded Implementer Gammal. The young
professionals were given both the resources and authority to pioneer a new area for the
country.
5.4 Nation Delta
Nation Delta bought its first national, remote sensing satellite from Supplier Sigmal of Nation
Sigma. This project, DeltaSat-R2, was actually the second remote sensing satellite for the
country following another university project, DeltaSat-RI. The implementing organization was
Implementer Deltal, the national remote sensing agency. Implementer Deltal and Supplier
Sigmal signed an agreement to pursue the satellite project in the mid-2000s. The agreement
appointed Supplier Sigmal as the prime contractor in the DeltaSat-R2 project. In this role,
Supplier Sigmal was responsible for providing the spacecraft, ground control segment, launch
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services and training of Nation Delta engineers. A team of twenty engineers from Nation Delta
went to Nation Sigma for a two year training program. When the Nation Delta trainees arrived in
Nation Sigma, the DeltaSat-R2 project was in the preliminary design phase. The first phase of
training was an academic curriculum in which the Nation Delta engineers received about nine
months of basic and advanced courses on satellite engineering and space project management.
After the course work, the trainee engineers worked on a group satellite design project to apply
the knowledge from the classes. The next stage of training focused on tasked-based practice in
specific disciplinary areas. Each trainee was assigned to a mentor on a specific disciplinary team;
they worked with that mentor to learn skills related to satellite engineering. The final phase of
training in Nation Sigma focused on operations. Before the Nation Delta engineers returned
home, work began in Nation Delta to establish the ground-based infrastructure for control and
data reception for DeltaSat-R2. About one year passed between the return of the Nation Delta
trainees from Nation Sigma and the launch. During this time, the trainees assumed new roles as
the operations team focused on both routine operation (sending commands and mission plans)
and operation support (monitoring satellite status and addressing anomalies). The original
timeline called for a three year lifecycle to achieve satellite design, development and launch.
Early on, the launch was scheduled for Project Year 4, but some complications led to a change of
launcher. The satellite was finally launched in Project Year 5. The Supplier Sigmal team had
worked closely with the Implementer Deltal operation team in Nation Delta starting in early
Project Year 4 to lead pre-launch activities. These activities included installation of the ground
control equipment, qualification of the system and certification of the operation team. For the
first few months after launch, the Supplier Sigmal team worked closely with the Nation Delta
satellite operators to support them through Early Operations and In-Orbit Tests. By the end of
Project Year 4, the Nation Delta team was able to take over primary operational responsibility
for DeltaSat-R2 and the system was handed over to Nation Delta.
5.4.1 Project Background
This section explains the context, technical requirements and capability building objectives for
Nation Delta.
5.4.1.1 Context
Nation Delta entered the DeltaSat-R2 project after decades of utilizing satellite earth observation
data produced by other countries. Several key partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s helped
establish their national infrastructure for earth observation. Early in this period, Nation Delta
worked with several foreign partners to set up a ground receiving station and learn how to apply
the data. At the time of the DeltaSat-R2 project, Nation Delta was receiving earth observation
data from many foreign sources. Nation Delta has traditionally produced many agricultural
exports. The government recognized satellite imagery as helpful to support the management and
monitoring of these crops. Government agencies have been the major users of satellite data in
Nation Delta. Nation Delta was also an early adopter of satellite communication technology in
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the 1960s. Later a local Nation Delta company began to operate communication satellites for the
regional market.
The implementing organization for the DeltaSat-R2 project was Implementer Deltal, the Nation
Delta national remote sensing agency. Going into the DeltaSat-R2 project, Implementer Deltal
was divided into four main organizations that contributed to different parts of the satellite data
value chain. The DeltaSat-R2 project was concerned with upstream procurement of a spacecraft
and ground control system as well as human resource development for satellite operators. A
second section operated satellite receiving stations to capture satellite data from both domestic
and foreign satellites. The data was passed on to a third section for early processing of the
satellite data into a useful format. A fourth section did the final processing to create satellite data
products with analysis and interpretation. During the period of the DeltaSat-R2 project,
Implementer Deltal was transitioning from an organization that produced satellite data or
imagery to an organization that produced information and analysis based on satellite data.
DeltaSat-R2 was the second remote sensing satellite project, but the first at the national level.
The university from Nation Delta partnered with a foreign university to build and operate a small
satellite that carried a camera and a communication payload. This small satellite was launched in
the late 1990s. In another satellite hardware project, a Nation Delta ministry collaborated with a
foreign country on a communications project by providing a payload. The DeltaSat-R2 project
was not directly affiliated with the previous satellite projects, nor was there deliberate transfer of
knowledge or personnel between the projects. DeltaSat-R2 was the first satellite project for
Implementer Deltal.
5.4.1.2 Technical Requirements
Even though Nation Delta had operational access to satellite earth observation data from many
foreign sources, leadership in Implementer Deltal saw a need for control over a national satellite
to ensure access to specific data. The capability would support natural resource monitoring and
management, which were high priorities. Implementer Deltal had found that the data they
required was not always available with the timing or characteristics they needed. DeltaSat-R2
was to improve the situation by producing data from any part of Nation Delta with days.
Implementer Deltal sought the capability of controlling their own satellite and repeating
measurements if necessary to answer questions of national importance. Other applications that
motivated the project include creating elevation maps using stereo images; establishing a mosaic
map of the whole country; and monitoring potential drought conditions. Implementer Deltal had
three operational objectives with the DeltaSat-R2 mission. One was to apply the data produced
by DeltaSat-R2 to national needs as described above; the second was to generate revenue by
charging a fee to supply data to users outside of Nation Delta. Users could request data or work
with Implementer Deltal to set up a compatible ground station to receive DeltaSat-R2 data
directly. Implementer Deltal did not expect to recoup the cost of the entire project in data
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revenue, but they did hope to see some return. Third, Implementer Deltal sought to become one
of the main satellite data providers in their region. Based on these needs and objectives,
Implementer Deltal procured a satellite that had high performance in terms of image quality and
operational flexibility. The satellite featured high and medium resolution imagers. The satellite
was based on designs used previously by Supplier Sigmal. This meant that the project used low-
risk, proven technology, and produced data with quality similar to other commercial and
government satellite operators. Nation Delta's strategy emphasized technical performance of the
satellite in the short term and they sought capability building for the engineers in the long term.
5.4.1.3 Capability Building Objectives
Nation Delta leadership acted out of a long term vision to develop a workforce capable of
designing and manufacturing satellites when they planned the DeltaSat-R2 project. In the short
term, however, the training and facilities they invested in did not focus on that goal. The Nation
Delta trainee engineers moved into full time operations roles after returning from Nation Sigma;
and Nation Delta leadership did not build local satellite fabrication facilities. There are no
immediate plans to build satellites locally because the infrastructure required for assembly,
integration and testing were very expensive. Engineers from Implementer Deltal were the only
people qualified to do operations, but this fact also prevented them from focusing on satellite
engineering. The training experience was also shaped by the fact that the trainee engineers
represented their government and reviewed the work of Supplier Sigmal before milestones were
accepted.
5.4.2 Project Timeline
Table 5-10 summarizes the project timeline for the DeltaSat-R2 project.
Table 5-10: Timeline for the DeltaSat-R2 Project
Project Year DeltaSat-R2 Project Comment
Implementer Deltal signs contract
(1) with Supplier Sigmal Project Initiation
Nation Delta Trainees arrive at Trainees at Supplier
Supplier Sigmal Location
System and Facility
(2) DeltaSat-R2 development Development
Nation Delta Trainees at Supplier Trainees at Supplier
Sigmal Location
System and Facility
(3) DeltaSat-R2 development Development
Nation Delta Trainees depart Trainees at Supplier
Supplier Sigmal Location
System and Facility
(4) DeltaSat-R2 development Development
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Two Ground Stations Set up at System and Facility
Implementer Deltal Development
(5) DeltaSat-R2 launch Satellite Launch
5.4.3 Observations
Several observations about Nation Delta's satellite project stand out.
e Nation Delta stands out among these satellite projects because their satellite was procured
from a more traditional supplier than those of the other nations. It was larger and more
expensive than the other satellites.
e The training approach of Supplier Sigmal with the Implementer Deltal team was very
structured. The training program provided explicit guidance to the Nation Delta engineers
about what to do or expect in each phase. They had courses, a team project, OJT,
operations training at Supplier Sigmal, operations training in Nation Delta and then they
started doing full time operations work. The structure did not require much initiative from
individuals, although some individuals took initiative and found extra activities within the
structure. Also, a few leaders had to solve challenges when there were unexpected issues,
such as the launch vehicle delays.
e The Nation Delta experience points out that having multiple projects does not guarantee
progressive learning. The Implementer Deltal team did not directly benefit from the
DeltaSat-RI project at University Deltal, based on available data.
e The Nation Delta training emphasized design and analysis aspects more than assembly,
integration and testing for the overall group. A few individuals did get to participate in
the AIT. The courses, design project and many of the OJT projects were more related to
design and analysis.
e Implementer Deltal is unique for making some of their engineers responsible as technical
monitors of the supplier. This was a potentially useful way to engage the trainee
engineers in an active way with the technical material produced by the supplier. Even if
the Nation Delta engineers did not do much of the design, they had to ask themselves
whether the design met their expectations and requirements. Thus, the Nation Delta
engineers did not present at reviews (except during the team design project), but they
worked at each review to respond to the material produced by Supplier Sigmal.
e Language is an issue for the Implementer Deltal partnership with Supplier Sigmal, as it
was for Nation Tau working with Nation Alpha and Nation Gamma.
e Implementer Deltal sought to buy a satellite that would produce data that was high
quality enough to sell commercially. This objective is different from the other three
countries.
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6 Addressing the Research Questions
The previous chapter told the stories of the collaborative satellite projects. This chapter analyzes
these stories by defining the architecture of the projects and measuring capability building of
individuals and organizations. With this foundation, the chapter also takes initial steps to seek
connections between architecture and capability building. This discussion is guided by the five
part research question below:
" Research Question 1: What are the Architectures of Collaborative Satellite Projects?
" Research Question 2: How are the Architectures of Collaborative Projects Similar and
Different?
" Research Question 3: What Capability Building Opportunities do Individuals Have?
" Research Question 4: What Capability Building Achievements do Organizations Have?
* Research Question 5: What are potential relationships between architecture and capability
building?
6.1 Observations in Project Architecture
This section addresses Research Questions 1 and 2, which focus on the architecture of the
collaborative satellite projects. These questions build on the analysis approach of defining the
projects as social and technical systems made of components which are related by specific
structure and functional assignments. Describing the architecture of a system answers the key
questions required to understand that system. These are questions such as who is involved, what
does the system accomplish, why is the system created, when do major milestones occur, where
are the system components, how is the system objective achieved and how many resources does
the system consume and produce?
The architecture of an existing system can be defined via the following steps. First, identify the
primary stakeholders for which the system is designed to produce value. Second, identify the
constraints/opportunities, requirements and objectives of the stakeholders. Third, define the set
of functions that are executed to achieve the objectives and requirements while staying within the
constraints. Fourth, identify the generic objects of form that execute the functions. Fifth, identify
the set of alternatives for specific forms that could potentially be used to execute the functions.
The combination of a function, generic forms and specific alternative forms is called a
dimension. Each dimension represents a potential decision point for stakeholders. The sixth step
is to group the dimensions into categories that represent stakeholder views of the system. The
seventh step is to outline how the system changed over time using a timeline of major events.
The information required to complete each of these steps is drawn from the narratives of each
satellite project that were summarized above. This section uses a structured approach to handling
the same data in order to draw out comparisons.
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The first steps are to identify the primary stakeholders and their constraints, requirements and
objectives. The primary stakeholders for each collaborative satellite project are the Implementing
Organizations, Overseer Organizations and Suppliers. The objectives, requirements and
constraints are defined by considering these organizations and the context in which they operate.
The model in Figure 6-1 highlights the approach to understand each of these areas.
Opportunities & Constraints Cn abilitv Bu"ildin Obijrtivc
Tehnica performance
requiremnents
Autonomy
Complexity
Topic
Figure 6-1: Contextual Opportunities and Constraints, Technical Performance Requirements and Capability Building
Objectives are all important contextual factors
The constraints and opportunities faced by a system are defined by its context. In Figure 6-1, the
Contextual Constraints and Opportunities are represented by a target-shaped diagram showing
concentric circles. This represents the reality that context is nested. The satellite project takes
place within a particular organization, nation and set of international relationships. There are
contextual factors at these and other levels such as individual, small team, large team,
organizational network, societal sector, disciplinary sectors, nation, region and world. The
factors at the various levels influence each other. Contextual constraints at the level of the
implementing organization may be in areas such as personnel, budget, technical heritage,
facilities and objectives. A broader contextual level may be the national network of organizations
that are stakeholders of the satellite project. The network may include government ministries,
national research organizations, firms and academic institutions. Such a network of organizations
is impacted by organizational inter-dependencies, communication channels, lines of authority
and regulatory issues. Constraints at the level of the national organizational network may also
shape constraints at the level of the executing organization. At a higher level, there may be
constraints related to the international context. Broad national realities related to foreign policy
and trade may influence the satellite project. Historical relationships between countries can come
into play, for example. Contextual levels may be defined in other ways as well. A contextual
level can be defined as the bilateral relationship between the Implementing Organization and
Supplier. Contextual levels may also be defined within an organization, perhaps at the level of a
disciplinary team or division.
The requirements for the system are defined here in terms of the technical performance sought
by the stakeholders from the project system. For this research, all of the customers purchased a
134
technical package that included at least one optical remote sensing satellite, a new or upgraded
ground system for satellite control and image processing as well as some amount of support
during launch. Ultimately, the satellite and ground support systems are expected to fulfil a
function for earth observation with certain specifications. The mission technical specifications
are driven by the characteristics of the data such as spatial resolution, temporal frequency,
spectral coverage, volume, processing level and storage approach. The technical performance
requirements are represented in the model by a table. Tables of this style are often used to
summarize the specifications of satellite systems. The technical performance requirements for
the project system relate closely to several stakeholder concerns. First, they identify if there are
any needs for information based on societal or scientific questions. Second, they establish the
relative importance of technical system performance as compared to capability building goals.
Some stakeholders define vague or limited technical performance for their satellite project
because they view the capability building aspects as more important. Third, the technical
performance requirements place the satellite system in relation to the state of the art.
Stakeholders may seek performance near the technical frontier or choose a more conservative
technical approach. The requirements also determine whether the system will use existing
technology or require development of new technology. In some projects, stakeholders prioritize
the development and proving of new technology more than overall system performance.
The objectives are defined as the goals for capability building of people, teams and organizations
during the satellite project. A set of axes is used to represent the objectives as a reminder that
capability building through the process of technological learning happens in multiple
dimensions. The topics that trainees learn during satellite projects may vary from highly
technical to managerial to social. The progress may be through advances in complexity or
advances in autonomy.
After stakeholders are defined and their contextual constraints/opportunities, technical
requirements and capability building objectives are identified, the next step in establishing the
architecture of a system is to define the set of functions the project system achieves. Each
function is executed by an object of form. At a high level, there is a generic or solution neutral
object of form. In each specific instance of a project, a different specific object of form may be
chosen. Forms may be physical objects, people, organizations, systems or organizational
processes. A project dimensions is the combination of a system function paired with generic and
specific forms. The dimensions are categorized into architectural views that that represent key
stakeholder concerns. Examples of architectural views include training approaches, timing of the
project, technical approaches, facilities and personnel assignments. Within each view there is a
series of related dimensions (function-form pairs) of the project. For each dimension, a decision
maker selects a particular instance of form from among a broad set of options. These options
may be discrete or continuous.
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The next sections apply these steps and definitions to answering Research Questions 1 by
describing the overall architecture of the collaborative satellite projects under study. The answer
to RQ1 shows which architectural views, dimensions, functions and options for form are
common to all projects. Research Question 2 considers specific architectural views and compares
the approaches that nations used to assign form to function.
6.1.1 Research Question 1: What are the Architectures of Collaborative
Satellite Projects?
The first research question asks, "What are the architectures of the collaborative satellite
projects?" The approach to answering this question applies the seven steps described above to
the group of satellite projects in order to find a common definition of architecture that applies to
all of them. This section demonstrates what it means to apply the seven steps to a generic
satellite project by applying constraints, requirements, objectives, architectural views and project
dimensions to the entire group of projects. The next section answers Research Question 2 by
examining examples of the similarities and differences between the project architectures as seen
in their contextual factors and architectural dimensions.
6.1.1.1 Architectural Definition Steps One and Two
As discussed above, context is a nested reality that is experienced at multiple levels. Table 6-1
gives examples of constraints and opportunities that impact some or all of the collaborative
satellite projects in this study. This set of contextual constraints and opportunities focus on the
national level of analysis. In the table, the set of contextual factors are shown that emerged from
the case studies. For each factor, three levels of impact are defined, ranging from low to high.
The wording for the extent of impact of that factor is modified to fit each factor. The table here
shows the generic definition of the constraints and opportunities. They will be applied to the case
studies in a later section.
Table 6-1: Examples of Contextual Constraints and Opportunities
Contextual Constraints and Opportunities
Prior use of remote sensing services on sometimes
national level
Prior use of communication satellite service by sometimes
national organizations
National Space Space (during time of project) partia
Past domestic satellite projects few
Major space event: Partnership opportunity partial
Major space event: Policy or facility established partial
Key Leader: Overseer Organization partial
Key Leader: Implementing Organization partial
Ntional Vision: Space as part of developmentpatl
process
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National Vision: Accomplishment in space tech partialye
Level of Political Support mediumhgh-+
National Space Policy Infrastructure growing
The first contextual factors address the extent to which satellite services of remote sensing and
communication were used in the nation before the collaborative satellite project began. This
factor is included because it gives an indication of the nation's experience and capability with
harnessing the products of a satellite system. The use of satellite services might mean that the
nation accessed remote sensing data from foreign satellites, operated domestic communication
satellites or regulated the offering of communication service by foreign firms. In order to
effectively apply satellite remote sensing data, the nation needs to access a relevant data source,
analyze the data to convert it to useful information, combine the satellite-based information with
other types of information, present the results in a manner relevant to a decision maker and
distribute the information effectively. If these activities are established in a country before they
procure a remote sensing satellite, the same infrastructure and knowledge can be applied to
harness the data from the new satellite. If the infrastructure and knowledge to harness satellite
data are weak, that will impact the process of applying data from the new satellite. At the same
time, the technical expertise required to design, manufacture and launch satellites is distinct from
that required to harness and apply satellite services. The people and organizations that have
experience with satellite services may understand the capabilities of satellites, but not have the
technical knowledge to build them. For the first two contextual factors, a range of never,
sometimes and often is used to distinguish between levels of prior use of satellite services.
The next factor considers whether a country has established a national space office during the
time of the collaborative satellite project. The term "space office" is purposely chosen to be
generic. It refers to any national level, government office that plays a coordinating role related to
space research or projects. The office may be a research funding unit, a formal space agency or a
committee. The key characteristic of a national space office is that it is established with a focus
on the nation's national space policy and programs. Table 6-1 considers three levels of
achievement: No, Partial and Yes. Partial implies that the office is forming during the time of the
collaborative satellite project.
The contextual analysis captures experience with past domestic satellite projects. This factor
tracks whether countries have procured or built satellites domestically. This includes both
government and commercial projects, and it is indicated by levels of none, few or many. Also
relevant are the occurrence of major events that catalyze space activity. Examples include an
invitation from a foreign firm or nation to partner on a space project. Collaborative satellite
projects are sometimes initiated in response to such invitations. Another type of catalyzing space
event is the establishment of a government policy related to space or the opening of a new
facility. Table 6-1 highlights whether such facilitating events occurred before the collaborative
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satellite project. The national space context is also influenced by the presence of key leaders in
both Overseer and Implementer Organizations. Such leaders often play a key role in defining and
motivating collaborative satellite projects. A well defined national vision can also influence
satellite projects. Leaders within both space organizations and the national government can cast
vision that places the space activity as part of larger national progress. A National Vision may
also define a goal for the technical accomplishment the country seeks in the area of space
technology. Articulating how the space program contributes to a positive national vision is part
of the pursuit of political support that is required secure funding for space projects. The level of
political support is another key contextual factor that influences satellite projects. Because
satellite remote sensing projects require high upfront investment and bring an uncertain return,
the level of political support is key to initiated and sustaining satellite programs. Satellite
projects can also be high visible to the public, especially during the launch phase of the project.
A success or failure in the operations phase can receive intense media coverage and scrutiny
from public officials and citizens.
The final contextual factor is the National Space Policy Infrastructure. The policy infrastructure
refers to the set of legal, policy or regulatory documents that govern space activity in the nation.
The policy infrastructure should specify the responsibility of various government organizations
to handle legal and regulatory issues that emerge from space activity. The infrastructure also
designates the channels for proposing, approving and funding a satellite project. Potentially
relevant documents include the following: 1) a national space policy; 2) a document instituting
the national space office; 3) documentation that outlines the respective responsibilities of various
government organizations with respect to space activities; 4) national legislation that adopts
international space treaties; 5) regulation specifying the responsibilities of the government and
private parties with respect to government activity. It is difficult for a nation to operate a satellite
without minimal space policy infrastructure. As part of the operation process, a particular
government organization needs to be designated as the nation's representative within the
International Telecommunication Union in order to process the frequency filing for the satellite.
This is true whether the satellite is implemented by the government or a private entity. As part of
the launch process, there are liabilities that must be considered and accounted for. The United
Nations has drafted several treaties that propose legal approaches to handling liability due to the
launch, operation and disposal of satellites. If a nation has ratified these treaties, they have a
stronger policy infrastructure to respond to potential liabilities. At times, during a nation's first
satellite project, the policies and documents are not in place to specify many of these processes
and legal relationships. In such a case many of these issues need to be determined as part of the
project. These include issues such as designating the government agency responsible for
ensuring compliance with international coordination issues. In this framework of contextual
factors, the national space policy infrastructure is shown as weak, growing or strong.
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In addition to Contextual Constraints and Opportunities, another defining factor for collaborative
satellite projects is the set of technical requirements that the stakeholders (Implementers,
Overseers and Suppliers) hope to achieve. Several potential technical requirements that emerged
in the case studies are shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: Technical Requirements for Satellite Projects
Technical Requirements
Timing Objective:
Fast-paced project partial
Maintain data continuity partial
Technical Performance objectives:
Medium resolution optical imagery partial
high resolution optical imagery partial
operational imagery partial
commercially viable imagery partial
In some cases, the technical rements are driven by a timing objective. For reasons driven by
context, there may be a benefit to have a face-paced project that is operated quickly. There may
be political and training benefits from a short development cycle for a satellite. Designing,
building and launching a small remote sensing satellite typically takes one or several years. The
timing of the project is heavily driven by the technical approach used. If the satellite design is
based on previously used components, the time can be decreased. If the design of the satellite or
the payload is new, the time increases. If the Implementing or Overseeing Organizations
prioritize a fast-paced project, they are likely to pursue a satellite design based on previously
used technology. Even if the Supplier pursues a fast-paced project based on the Implementer's
desire, there are factors beyond the control of the Implementer and Supplier that can delay the
project. The main factor is the timing of the launch. For any launch, the technical process is
complex and there are many potential problems that can cause delays. Launches can also be
delayed due to regulatory or legal concerns. Launching is dangerous and has a liability of
damage to third parties. If there is doubt about the approach to addressing such liability, the
launch can be delayed. Small remote satellites are often launched along with other
satellites. They may be launched in a group of small satellites in which every satellite has equal
priority. They may also be launched in as a secondary payload with a primary satellite. In the
latter case, the primary satellite has clear priority. Depending on the agreement the launch
provider has with each satellite owner on a shared launch, there may be interdependencies
between the satellites. If a primary satellite has a delay, this can cause delays for all the
secondary satellites. If a fast-paced project may be a goal of the primary stakeholders, it has
many technical implications. There are also many technical factors that can negate the goal.
Timing may also be important due to a requirement to maintain data continuity. This is
especially relevant if a country has operated one satellite in the past or received data from a
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particular source. Satellites are designed for a certain lifetime. Many satellites exceed their
design life, but their performance gradually degrades due to the harsh space environment. The
Implementer and Overseer Organizations report to customers that rely on a particular stream of
remote sensing data for regular observation of a phenomenon. The initiation or schedule for a
project may be driven by the need to maintain the continuity of a data set.
For individual remote sensing satellites, the technical performance is often summarized by a
primary figure of merit - the spatial resolution of the images that the satellite can capture. Spatial
resolution measures the level of detail that the satellite image provides. It literally refers to the
size of the object that can be distinguished from another object. The smaller the size of an object,
the better the spatial resolution of the satellite imagery is. Thus, high spatial resolution is
captured in small numbers. During the past five decades of space activity, the spatial resolution
of civilian optical remote sensing satellite images has gradually improved from measures on the
order of kilometers to tens of meters to less than one meter. The spatial resolution of satellite
imagery is driven by the type and size of imager the satellite carries and the orbital altitude of the
satellite. The spatial resolution of small remote sensing satellites that weighed less than 500
kilograms has gradually improved. In the 1990s it was impressive to achieve "medium"
resolution imagery on the order of tens of kilometers. In the 2000s, the resolution has improved
to the range of a few meters. There are other technical measures that describe the satellites
performance. One is pointing accuracy - measuring the degree to which the satellite can
maintain a desired angle with respect to the earth. The pointing accuracy of the satellite is
determined by the design of the attitude control system (ACS). The ACS is a set of sensors,
actuators and processors that estimate and correct the angle of the satellite with respect to the
earth. This is a challenging problem to solve on small satellites because they are highly mass
constrained. There is a fundamental tradeoff between including the most effective sensors and
actuators and maintaining low cost and mass of the satellite. The pointing accuracy performance
is closely related to geolocation capability, which describes how accurately the satellite can
define the location on earth to which it points. This capability is valuable when the information is
later geographically referenced as part of a geographic information system. Finally, the
performance of a satellite for an end user is strongly influenced by the amount of data it can store
and transmit to earth. Table 6-2 highlights the requirements to achieve medium resolution
imagery (on the order of tens of meters) or high resolution imagery (on the order of meters).
Another aspect of the technical requirements refers to the intended audience. The end user of
data from a small remote sensing satellite may be the Implementing Organization, academic
researchers, government ministries, firms, individuals or others. Often satellites are designed
with a primary end user in mind. If an Implementing Organization plans to be the primary user of
data, they may have different standards for the data quality than if they plan to make the data
widely available. Two potential scenarios are to seek operational or commercially viable data.
Operational data in this case means that the data will be consistent in its technical specifications
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such that it can be used for routine tasks. This requirement is more attainable if the pointing
accuracy, geolocation and resolution are well known and consistently attained. In such a case,
the Implementer can supply data to resource managers such as Ministries for Agriculture,
Forests, Water Management, Transportation and Urban Planning. The Implementer can
guarantee a certain quality of the data and the resource managers can confidently apply the data
in their models and maps. Because of their low cost and mass limitations, small satellites are not
always designed to provide operational data. Another requirement is to produce commercially
viable data that is both high quality and marketable to a wide variety of users. To be
commercially viable, data must be produced with high quality and time consistency. The satellite
should also take imagery of locations that are in high demand. The technical performance of a
satellite may be driven by a desire for particular performance in terms of resolution or a
particular target consumer. In some cases, however the technical requirement of a satellite are
focused more on the performance of the satellite itself than the payload. Satellites are sometimes
flown to demonstrate the performance of a component or provide the engineers with the
opportunity to experience the satellite lifecycle. One of the factors that influenced the
collaborative satellites in these case studies was the relative importance of the satellite's
technical performance versus the capability building objectives. Issues relating to capability
building are discussed next.
Table 6-3: Capability Building Objectives are driven by Context
Capability Building Objectives I
Key long term objectives:
Establish national capability to design and
manufacture satellites independently
Create local high technology work opportunities
for the country
Key short term objectives:
Learn to procure satellite system
Engineers participate in building, testing
operating mission
Engineers experience lifecycle from design to
operations
Train engineers enough so they can build
satellites with support in future
Train engineers to effectively operate satellite
Training Focus Area:
Satellite Engineering focused
Operations focused
Payload Engineering focused
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
medium
141
Focus on academic training via university
degrees
Table 6-3 addresses several capability building objectives that could shape collaborative satellite
projects. These examples emerged from the case studies. The objectives are divided into three
categories - long term, short term and training focus areas. The long term objectives describe a
nation's ultimate goal for their satellite program, with the understanding that it may not be
achieved through one satellite project. It is the capability or activity they seek over a series of
satellite projects. The short term objectives describe the outcomes they seek for a specific
satellite project. The training focus area refers to the type of activity that Implementer, Overseer
or Supplier organizations desire to assign to the engineers from the Implementer during the
project in pursuit of long and short term objectives. Ideally, the short term objectives and training
focus are driven by the long term objectives. The table shows three level of priority that might be
placed on particular objectives or focus areas. The priority levels range from low to high.
The long term objectives put forth by nations in this study included establishing national
capability to design and manufacture satellites and creating opportunities for local companies to
work in high technology areas. These objectives potentially impact both the space community
and a broader innovation system. The long term goal to have capability to design and
manufacture satellites independently implies several layers of achievement, including training
individuals, achieving new organizational capability and establishing physical infrastructure to
support the activity. Highly specific infrastructure is required to manufacture and test satellites.
The process also requires a diverse team that includes diverse roles and skills. The team includes
several disciplines of engineering such as optical, electronic, mechanical, thermal, electronic and
software. It also requires managers and technicians with specialized knowledge. The countries
explored in the case studies began their journeys with few or no organizations that had
experience in satellite design and manufacture. The long term objective to establish satellite
design and manufacture capability was thus a significant undertaking. The concept of creating
opportunities for local companies to work in high technology areas covers several potential long
term strategies. In one scenario, a government organization could serve as the Overseer and
contract with a commercial firm as the Implementer. That provides business in satellite
engineering for the commercial sector. There is also the opportunity for local firms to serve as
suppliers to the satellite activity. Several barriers potentially challenge such a goal. The
electronic and structural components used for satellites are often made in small, specialized
batches. The required quality level is high and the space environment dictates special
approaches. In a country with a small level of satellite manufacturing, it is potentially difficult to
establish a flourishing supply chain for local firms to produce electronic or structural
components. The small batch levels may discourage suppliers from investing in the specialized
techniques. The quality levels may also be outside the normal operating conditions of the
manufacturers. A third scenario that could bring opportunities for high technology work in the
country is stimulating research in space technology. University researchers may partner with
Implementing Organizations or serve as Implementing Organizations. Scientists within
universities may be particularly interested in proposing research based on the data collected by
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satellites or in designing scientific instruments to fly as payloads. Engineers within universities
may contribute to research or development on satellite technology. All of these are examples of
means to reach the long term goal of creating high technology work activity via a satellite
program.
The key short term objectives are outcomes that could be achieved within a single satellite
project. The most fundamental objective is to learn the process of procuring a satellite system.
Procurement includes defining the technical requirements, selecting a Supplier, defining the
contract and accepting the technical product. In a pure procurement, the customer may not do
any of the design, development or manufacturing, but they still need to exercise some knowledge
of the product and its capability. For a nation that has not operated a satellite previously, there
are many challenges in the procurement process. Defining the technical requirements requires an
understanding of the capabilities of satellites and the relationship between performance
improvements and the needs of the end user. Procurement also involves defining the operational
procedures, ground system and launch process with the help of the Supplier. As part of procuring
a launch the customer must consider issues such as insurance. The objective of learning how to
procure a satellite system that meets national needs is not a trivial achievement. The next two
short term objectives focus on the type of training experience the Implementer engineers have
while working with the Supplier. These objectives are "Engineers participate in building, testing
operating mission" and "Engineers experience lifecycle from design to operations." These are
two similar but subtly different objectives. One is for the Implementer Engineers to participate in
the late lifecycle stages of building, testing and operating of a satellite. The second is for the
engineers to experience the entire satellite lifecycle starting with design. The key difference here
is the emphasis on design. The skills required for each phase of the satellite lifecycle - design,
manufacture, test and operate - are distinct. In large satellite companies, personnel tend to
specialize in one of these areas. A training experience may also be structured to emphasize
particular stage in the satellite lifecycle. In the cases under study, these were to stated goals of
different Implementer Organizations. Another stated goal was to train engineers to equip them to
build satellites in the future with support from a partner. This is an intermediate goal between a
full training project and a fully independent project. It could be realized in several ways. An
Implementer could partner with a Supplier to build a satellite in the Supplier's facility, or an
Implementer could build a satellite in their own facility with technical assistance from the
Supplier. The final example of a short term objective that emerged from the case studies was that
of training engineers to effectively operate a satellite. This objective could be combined with
other objectives as well. The operations team could be a subset of the engineers who are training
in other areas or they could be a specialized team that only does operations.
This distinction leads into the last set of potential objectives related to Training Focus Area. Here
four potential focus areas observed that could be combined in a variety of ways. The areas
include satellite engineering, operation, payload engineering and academic training. A training
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focused on satellite engineering emphasizes the design, manufacture and test of the satellite bus.
Operations focus specializes in the use of the ground system to receive information about the
state of the satellite, to receive data from the satellite and to send commands. The operations
team requires a basic understanding of how each part of the satellite functions so that they can
detect and respond to operational anomalies. Payload engineering focuses on the specialized
physics and engineering skills to design, manufacture and test payloads. In this study the primary
payloads were optical remote sensing imagers. The payload system included an imager,
supporting electronics, supporting mechanical structure and optical assembly. A focus on
academic training via university degrees may cover a variety of topics related to satellites,
operations and payloads. A satellite training program may emphasize one of these focus areas for
the whole team or assign parts of the team to focus in one specific area. That decision may be
made by the Implementer or Supplier. The level of priority placed on a particular objective is
ranked from low to high.
This section has explored contextual factors that shape the architecture of collaborative satellite
projects, including constraints & opportunities, technical requirements and capability building
objectives. It has discussed generic definitions and descriptions of these factors. The actual
decisions made by nations in this study will be explored in a later section. The next section
continues through the steps to define the architecture of a collaborative satellite project by
defining the set of functions executed to achieve the objectives and requirements, identifying
generic objects of form that execute these functions, identifying alternatives for specific objects
of form and combining them with functions to define dimensions, and grouping the dimensions
into categories called architectural views.
6.1.1.2 Architectural Definition Steps Three through Six
The discussion above addressed Steps One and Two of defining the architecture of the
collaborative satellite projects. The next discussion will show the outcomes of Steps Three
through Six. Note that the order of Steps Three through Six is flexible and the process is
iterative. In some cases it may be easier or logical to define the stakeholder views before
defining the dimensions as sets of functions with relevant forms. Once a set of views is proposed,
the dimensions are reviewed to look for additional views that may be relevant. The following
discussion shows the outcome of this iterative procedure and explains the rationale and definition
of the architectural views, dimensions, functions and forms. Here the dimensions and views are
defined inductively by moving from interview data to the structured narratives to tabular
summaries that capture consistent information about each project. The set of views is based on
the project attributes introduced in the Table 4-3. The original interview questions were defined
based on the generic features of systems as described by the Theory of Systems Architecture.
Organizational View
144
Table 6-4: Dimensions within the Organizational Architectural View
Generic Forms Function Examples of Forms from Existing Projects
Organizational View
Government- NationNational National
Implementer Implementing lned National Space Remote enc
Organization Satellite Project Company Agency Sensing Agency
Agency
Overseer Overseeing Satellite Government National Space
Organization Project Ministry Agency
Funding Funding Satellite Government
Organization Project Ministry
Supplier Supplying satellite Small,
and training university Medium Firm Large Firm
Organization spinoff firm
Coordinating Government National NationalNational Space ational Space Research National Space Remote Research
Organization atial Office Agency Sensing AgencyActivity OfieAgency
National Space Leading National Former Former
University Government
Leader Space office Professor Bureaucrat
Defining number of
Implementer people in 50 to 100 > 100 people
Organization Size Implementing people
Organization
Defining number of
Implementer people that visit 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 30
Visiting Team Size Supplierfrom people people people
Implementer
Providing Launch Launch Launch serviceLaunch Provider vehicle .
Opportunity manufiactumr provider
Technical Providing Technical University Commercial
Consultant Consultation Professor Firm
Constellation Contributing to
Collaborative Nation Firm
Constellation
Launch Customers Sharing launch Nation Firm (Primary) (Secondary)
vehicle
Ground Station Delivering Ground Ground System
Integrator
Supplier Support System System Firm Irm
Customer Local Working on Local mary Satellite Ground ManagementOperations Station
Team Project Aspects Team Facility Team Faiy Team
_________ 
I_ I_______ Team________ Facility Team ____
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The first view of the project is the Organizational as seen in Table 6-4. This view primarily
identifies major functions executed by organizations. It assigns a generic title to the
organizations that execute those functions and considers the range of possible organizations that
were seen to execute those functions in the case study projects. As defined above, the
Implementer Organization performs the function of Implementing the Satellite Project on behalf
the nation that commissions it. The generic term Implementer is used through this thesis to
describe this role, but several types of organizations play this role in the case studies, including
government linked companies, national space agencies, national remote sensing agencies and
national research agencies. Each of these specific instances of an Implementer Organization has
distinct features. The government linked company stands out as being the only Implementer that
operates under a commercial business model. The National Space Agency fills the role described
above as the national space office that coordinates national space activity. A space agency may
be involved with many types of space activity including research, engineering, outreach and
policy development. The National Remote Sensing Agency is concerned specifically with the
acquisition and application of earth observation data for the purpose of meeting the data needs of
government researchers, universities and potential customers. Remote sensing agencies may not
rely on satellite data exclusively. Earth observation data can be collected from satellites, planes
and balloons. The stakeholders of a national remote sensing agency are often the government
agencies that routinely use geographically referenced maps in their work. A National Research
Agency is not necessarily focused exclusively on space activity. The satellite project may be one
in a series of research activities that cover a spectrum of projects. Each of these specific
instances of an Implementer Organization has a different reason for existing based on their title.
Companies exist to generate profit and employment; national space agencies are political
organizations that execute government mandates in many areas of space; remote sensing
agencies have a specific goal to generate information from data for operational users; research
agencies are driven to generate academic or theoretical contributions that may not be driven by
profit, policy or operational needs. These contrasts are summarized in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5: Different categories of implementer Organizations may have different characteristics
Characteristics of Implementer Organizations
Characteristics Government National Space National Remote National Research
Linked Company Agency Sensing Agency Agency
Follow Policy Generate academic,
Generate Profit ad Mandates and Generate theoretical andRaison d'Stre Emplo ent Coordinate information for data practical research
Government Space users practirs
Activity contributions
The next dimension in Table 6-4 includes the function of Overseeing the Satellite Project. This is
done generically by an Overseer Organization. In these case studies, the specific organizations
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that filled the Overseer role included government ministries and national space agencies. In some
cases there was more than one Overseer for a single project. The role of the Overseer
Organization varies for each nation. In some cases they serve as the ultimate customer of the
satellite, while the Implementer acts on their behalf. In other cases, the Implementer is the
customer and the Overseer serves only as the liaison between the Implementer and the national
government. In all cases the Overseer plays a role in the funding process of the satellite projects.
The role of Funding Organization in these cases was always played by a government ministry.
The ministry represented the Implementer in the national funding allocation process and argued
for the funding to be awarded for the satellite.
The Supplier Organization executes the function of supplying the satellite and training program
to the Implementer Organization. It is significant that in all the case study projects, both the
satellite system and the training program were explicitly included in the request of the
Implementer to the Supplier. In these collaborative satellite projects, the Suppliers can be divided
into three categories: Small university, spinoff firms; Medium Firms; and Large Firms. The
categories are significant because they imply several dynamics regarding the size, work
environment, technology approach and business models of the firms. In these case studies, the
small firms had recently spun out of universities. They were small in terms of personnel, with
employees numbering a few hundred or less. When the firms started their work, they shared
facilities with the university from which they spun. The firms were begun due to
commercialization of the research efforts of space engineering teams. They pursued new
approaches to satellite engineering compared to more established firms. They also leveraged
their relationship with the universities to hire, pursue joint research and stay involved with
recently developed technology. The work culture in the small firms is highly flexible and does
not rely heavily on documentation. The small firms tend to work frequently with inexperienced
customers and purse high risk projects that are technology experiments. Since the customers are
inexperienced, the training components of the contracts are highly important. Later in their
evolution, these small spinoff firms became more established medium sized firms. In this stage,
the firms have large numbers of employees, numbering several hundred. The work environment
gradually grows more structured and documentation is standardized to enable effective
communication among the larger team. The projects are a mix of experimental and operational
projects that demonstrate both the ingenuity and reliability of the Supplier. The customer base
also changes to be more balanced among experienced and inexperienced clients. The training is
still important, but its share of the activities diminishes. The medium firms are still connected to
university for research and hiring, but they distinguish themselves by establishing their own
facilities and activities. In the case studies, there is one large firm that represents the typical
aerospace supplier which if commonly found in countries with long histories of space activity.
The Large Firm has thousands of employees; managing this large team requires a highly
structured environment with highly standardized documentation. The large firm focuses on low
risk projects with mature technology for much of its business. They place a medium level of
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priority on training. Their customer based is a mix of experienced and inexperienced clients. The
large firm operates in a series of well established, customized facilities that allow them to take on
many projects simultaneously. The characteristics of the three types of Suppliers are summarized
in Table 6-6. Note that as the size increases from medium to large, some characteristics such as
customer base and training emphasis do not seem to change greatly.
Table 6-6: Differences among Categories Supplier Organizations
Characteristics of Supplier Organizations
Characteristics Small, University Spinoff Medium Firm Large FirmFirm
Size employe ornles A few hundred or more Thousands of Employees
Flexible, Non-Structured, Medium level of structure High Structure andWork Environment Losl ouetdand increasing DcmneLoosely Documented dumnainDocumented
documentation
Experimental and High Mix of experimental and Primarily low risk projects
Technology Approach Risk Projects; Minimal routine projects; Medium with mature technology;
Outsourcing Outsourcing High outsourcing
Customer Based Inexperienced Customers Mix of experienced and Mix of experienced and
inexperienced inexperienced
Training Emphasis High Medium Medium
University Relationship Highly Important Medium Importance Low Importance
Facilities Shared with University or Developing Well established,
Temporary customized
Returning to Table 6-4 which shows the organizational views, the next few dimensions address
potential forms that execute the function of coordinating national space activity and leading the
national space office. In some situations, the role of national space organization is played by a
national space agency, but in these case studies it is also played by entities that include the
government research office, national remote sensing agency and national research agency. The
key difference between a government research office and national research agency is scope of
activities. The office focuses on funding and coordinating research while the agency executes
research in dedicated facilities. Several types of people lead the national space office in these
case studies, including former university professors and government bureaucrats who move from
another government job to take on this role.
The size of the teams within the Implementers varied over three categories. The entire
organization ranged from less than 50 to greater than 100 people. The size of the teams that the
Implementers sent as visiting engineers to the Supplier firm fit into ranges from 6 to 30 people.
Other key organizations that executed functions in the collaborative satellite project are
described in Table 6-4. The Launch provider role was sometimes played by the actual
manufacturer of the launch vehicle and in other cases played by a third party launch service
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provider. In this case, the service provider is the interface between the Supplier and Implementer
on one hand and the Launch Vehicle Manufacturer and Operator on the other. In some cases a
Technical Consultant provided consultation to the Implementers and Overseers. Both university
professors and commercial firms provided this function. In several projects, the Implementer
joined additional nations and firms to form a constellation of satellites with common
characteristics. In these cases, the role of Constellation Collaborator was relevant. Most of the
satellite shared a launch vehicle with other small satellites in order to save money. The other
Launch Customers interacted with the Implementers as part of the launch process. In some cases,
the Suppliers did not manufacture ground stations and separate firms played the role of Ground
Station Supplier. These firms or the Suppliers sent representatives to participate in the
installation of the Ground Station in the Implementer's nation. Finally, this analysis emphasizes
the role of the Implementer team that works at the site of the Supplier during the satellite
development process. There is also a team of Implementer engineers and managers that works
primarily at the site of the Implementer. They work on local projects aspects, including preparing
for operations and harnessing the satellite data. There are several potential versions of Customer
Local teams that focus on operations, facilities or management.
This concludes the discussion of the Organizational View of the collaborative satellite projects.
Specific attention was given to the differences in specific forms for the Implementer and
Supplier Organizations. These differences will be relevant to later discussion.
Project Initiation View
Table 6-7: Dimensions within Project Initiation Architectural View
Project Initiation andApproval View
Prjet Leader Appointing New Leader Existing
OJCC Project Leader Leader
Appointing Founding Appointing Founding Appointing
Organizational Implementing new existing new existing
Appointment ganization n government company company
_____________ Organization_ organization organization ________ ___ ___
This view explores key functions that facilitated the initiation of the collaborative satellite
projects. One function was appointing a leader for the satellite project, who may sit within the
Implementer or Overseer Organization. Two modes were found in the case studies - either
appointing a new leader or the continued presence of an existing leader. Similarly, the initiation
of some projects involved establishing new organizations, either in the government or
commercial sectors.
Personnel Management View
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Table 6-8: Dimensions within Personnel Management Architectural View
The Personnel Management View, like the Organizational View, has a large collection of
dimensions. These functions determine the policies used by the Implementer to recruit,
evaluation, select and hire engineers that were part of the team sent to work at the Supplier
location. The first dimension specifies which organization plays the role of Engineer Selection.
In some cases the Implementer performs this alone; in other cases the Supplier is also involved.
The next dimension defines the target population from which the Selection Organization seeks
candidates for the selection process. Potential populations include experienced professionals in
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the military, academia or industry or recent graduates and young working professionals. There
may also be a citizenship requirement for the candidates. The third dimension defines the process
by which the training opportunity is announced to potential engineers. This Engineer
Recruitment Process took the form of networking with universities, coordinating with the
military, advertising with media, using personal networks and recruiting among the expatriate
community. Clearly, the choice of target population influences the type of recruitment process.
After recruitment comes the function of evaluating the engineers to select the appropriate group
for the training experience. The evaluation tools included applications, interviews and tests. The
Implementer Organizations hired engineers for different time horizons and with different
purposes. One scenario was to only hire for the duration of the project; a second was to hire for
the purpose of the project with the assumption that the engineer would continue employment
with the Implementer after the project; a third scenario was to hire outside the context of the
project and select from among long term employees to find engineers for the training experience.
Once the engineers are hired in the Implementer Organization, there is another selection process
to define what technical specialty each engineer will focus on during the training. The function
of Selecting Training Roles was implemented by some combination of the Implementer and the
Satellite Supplier. The role assignment was done according to a Role Assignment Philosophy.
One philosophy sought to cover many areas by assigning each person to multiple topics. A
second philosophy sought to assign each person to one, focused area; in this case the number of
topics was limited by the size of the team. A third philosophy chose a few strategically important
topic areas to cover and only assigned people to these areas. In this case, the number of topics
covered may be less than the number of people in the team.
The final function of the Personnel Management dimensions is to assign engineers to a role after
their training when they return to their home nation. The engineers may not continue in the exact
activity they worked on in the Supplier site if the Implementer does not have facilities or projects
to support this. If the Hiring Time Horizon is defined as the duration of the project, the engineer
may return to the pre-project organization after completing training with the Supplier. If the
Hiring Time Horizon is for long term employment with the Implementer, they may return
immediately to that site. Other potential post-training assignments include studying at a
university in the country of the Supplier, continuing at the Supplier for a new project on behalf of
the Implementer or pursuing a position in a new organization. The approach taken by the
Implementer to define the Post-Training Assignment of their engineers is critical to the process
of long term building organizational capability. Each potential post-training assignment has a
different impact on the organizational capability of the Implementer. If the engineer returns to
their pre-project organization, they may not directly contribute to the Implementer's work, but
they can spread the knowledge they learned in their home organization. This is especially
relevant if the home organization has a mechanism to harness the training that the engineer
received through relevant projects or academic instruction. If the engineer continues their study
at a university and remains part of the Implementer team, they may be able to deepen their
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individual knowledge in a particular discipline and use that in future projects with the
Implementer. If the engineer continues in a new project at the Supplier Organization, the
advantage is that they will build immediately on what they learned in the previous project and
continue to fine tune their skills. This will ideally lead to an increased level of responsibility and
autonomy in the engineer's work. Finally, if an engineer moves to a new position outside the
Implementer Organization their skills and training is lost the Implementer. They may be able to
contribute to another relevant organization in the same nation, but their impact on organizational
capability building is lost in the short term. In the long term, if they return to the Implementer
Organization with skills sharpened by other work environments, they could be an even stronger
engineer and contribute greatly. The decision makers who define the Personnel Management
approaches for the Implementer face challenges in finding appropriate policies and incentives to
guide each step of the process. They need to attract appropriate candidates, select the best among
the pool and assign people to roles where they can thrive. After training, they need to find
incentives for the engineers to remain in the Implementer Organization and build it up. Often, in
early projects, the Implementer Organization is not well established and their work portfolio is
uncertain. This situation sometimes leads engineers to pursue opportunities outside the
Implementer Organization after their training at the Supplier is complete.
Supplier Selection View
Table 6-9: Dimensions within Supplier Selection Architectural View
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Supplier Selection View
Supplier Choosing Choose Join Call for Hire Open Call Travel to
Selection satellite personal invitation for selective Consultant for tour
Process supplier acquaintance collaboration Tendering to Review Proposals suppiers
Priority Differentiating Technical
Supplier among performance Training Space Prix University Schedule
and package heritage Relationship
Attributes suppliers flexibility
Competing Competingfor Government Small Medium Large State
Compleg Supplier Space Commercial Commercial Commercial OwnedSuppliers Contract Agencies Firm Firm Firm Enterprise
Launch Selecting Satellite
Provider Launch Customer * Consultant
Selector Provider
Competing Competingfor Government Established Start up
Launch Launch Space Commercial Commercial
Providers Contract Agency Firm Firm
Priority Differentiating Technical Multi- Implementer New
Launcher among launch constraints Price Geography satellite Familiarity Launch
Attributes providers and Capacity with Supplier
I Performance I I Supplier I
The Supplier Selection View includes six dimensions that capture the functions by which the
Implementer and Overseer Organizations choose partners from whom to procure the satellite and
launch services. The first three dimensions in the Supplier Selection View determine which
Supplier is selected to provide the satellite system and the training services. The choice of
Supplier depends on the set of Competing Suppliers, the Priority Supplier Attributes and the
Supplier Selection Process. Potential approaches that are used in these case studies to select
suppliers include choosing a supplier represented by a close personal acquaintance of a leader
from the Implementer team; responding to an invitation from the supplier for collaboration on a
project; inviting specific suppliers to prepare proposals in a selective tender; holding an open call
for proposals; and traveling to tour the facilities of suppliers in many countries. As part of any of
these strategies, the Implementer may also hire a consultant to review the potential suppliers and
their proposals. Within these options some are highly structured and formalized (call for
selective tendering, open call for proposals, international tour of suppliers); others rely more on
informal, personal relationships. What might determine the process that is used to select the
Supplier? Sometimes there are contextual opportunities or constraints that lead to a particular
Supplier Selection Process. The political climate surrounding the satellite project, the experience
and perspective of key leaders in the Implementer and Overseer Organizations, the space policy
infrastructure and the national vision may all shape the Supplier Selection Process. A formal,
structured process might be used in a context characterized by ample space policy infrastructure
and a political climate that treats space projects with the same priority level as other national
infrastructure projects. In such a scenario, leaders may find it important to hold a selection
process that exhibits rigor, lack of personal bias and due diligence. The selection process may
also need to follow guidance put forth in space policy documents. Such a formal process is easier
to achieve when the Implementer has experience that helps them structure the process or when
they work with a consultant that can help structure the process. When an Implementer holds a
call for selective tendering or an open call for proposals, they need to generate appropriate
Requests for Proposals. This process requires some technical understanding of the requirements
and operations concept for the satellite system. An informal Supplier Selection Process - such as
choosing based on personal relationships or responding to an invitation for collaboration - may
be preferred in other cases. If the political climate is highly supportive, if there is limited
guidance from space policy documentation, or if key decision makers have little experience, an
informal relationship may be pursued. The political support coupled with the limited policy
guidance implies that there are not strict constraints directing leaders to follow a particular
Supplier Selection Process. The lack of experience for the decision makers implies that they will
need to choose a Supplier that they trust to provide helpful advice and technical support during
the satellite procurement and training process.
The function of Differentiating among Suppliers is performed generically by the Priority
Supplier Attributes. In addition to choosing a process by which to select the suppliers, decision
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makers choose reasons for preferring one supplier over another. This preference may be
exercised explicitly or implicitly. In a formal selection process based on calls for proposals, it is
more likely that decision makers representing the Implementer formally define the attributes they
value in a potential supplier. If an informal selection process based on personal relationships or
an invitation for collaboration, there may be no documentation or definition of specific supplier
attributes that are valued. After the fact, decision makers from the case studies identified several
attributes that they valued in their Suppliers. These included the technical performance of their
products; the level of technical flexibility of the Suppliers; the training package; the space
heritage or experience of the suppliers; price; the relationship between the supplier and a
university; and the proposed project schedule. Several of these attributes are explained further.
The concept of technical flexibility refers to the set of technical options the Supplier offered and
their willingness to develop new technology as part of the satellite project. A Supplier with low
technical flexibility would propose to use technology that they had previously developed and
tested in space; such a strategy reduces the risk of technical failure. Low flexibility may also
mean that the Supplier has a pre-defined menu of combinations of satellite buses and payload.
They develop new missions by mixing and matching among this menu, but they are hesitant to
go beyond this range. A Supplier with high technical flexibility may also have a menu of
commonly used technologies and combinations of satellites with payload. If they are flexible,
however, they are willing to develop new technology and make alterations to their existing
technical approaches. Such flexibility often increases the price and technical risk of the project.
The term "space heritage" is used in the aerospace community to describe the level of spaceflight
experience for organizations and technology. In the case study projects, the space heritage of the
potential suppliers had two meanings. On one hand, it could refer to the overall experience of the
firm with satellite projects of any kind. On the other hand, some Implementers were interested in
the heritage of the Suppliers specifically with small satellite projects that were built with a non-
traditional engineering philosophy. For Implementers that emphasized the relationship between
the Supplier and a university, the concern related to either the opportunity for academic training
from the university or to the research collaboration between the firm and university.
The Priority Supplier Attributes were applied either implicitly or explicitly to select from the set
of potential suppliers - indicated here as Competing Suppliers that are seeking the Supplier
Contract. In the case studies, the types of organizations that Implementers considered as
Suppliers included government space agencies, small commercial firms, medium commercial
firms, large commercial firms and state owned enterprises. The marketplace of organizations that
sell small remote sensing satellites is small enough that it is feasible for an Implementer to give
consideration to virtually all potential suppliers that have experience. The Competing Suppliers
are located in the North America, Europe, Africa, Western Asia, Central Asia and East Asia. As
discussed above in the section on the Organizational View, the different types of suppliers have
different operational and business models depending on their context.
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The last three dimensions within the Supplier Selection View focus on choosing a launch
provider. The first function is to select a launch provider; this is done by various actors including
the Implementer/Overseer (as Customer), the Satellite Supplier and the Consultant that supports
the Implementer. The set of potential launch providers is also small and well known among the
space community. Launch vehicles are manufactured and operated by a few government
agencies and a few firms around the world. In some cases a Launch Service Provider acts as a
liaison between the customer and the launch system operator. In these case studies, the
Competing Launch Providers included government space agencies, more established commercial
firms and a start up commercial firm. The appearance of start up space companies is a relatively
recent phenomenon in the space marketplace. They play a similar role in the launch market that
university spinoff firms play in the satellite market. There is a new community of launch vehicle
manufacturers that seek to lower the cost of launching objects and people into space. Some of
these new companies are founded and sponsored by independently wealthy entrepreneurs. This is
in contrast to traditional launch vehicle manufacturers who had all their initial funding from
governments. The new launch vehicle firms question traditional engineering approaches and seek
to engage new markets while continuing to address government needs. The final dimension
refers the function of differentiating among the competing launch providers which represent
three different types of organizations. In these case studies, Implementers were concerned with
the following attributes: technical constraints, technical performance, price, geography, multi-
satellite launch capacity, familiarity and the newness of the supplier. Several of these warrant
further discussion. The technical constraints of the launch provider refer to the requirements to
integrate the satellite into the vehicle. Each rocket has a unique mechanical and electrical
interface with the satellites it carries. Each rocket also has a unique set of hazards to the satellite
in the form of vibrations and acoustic impact during launch. The intense sound and structural
vibrations generated during can damage satellites if they are not build and tested to withstand
them. The technical performance of the launch vehicle refers to the amount of mass the rocket
can carry into space as well as the reliability of the rocket. Launching satellites into space
remains a highly technical process with a high chance of failure. Some Implementers may value
a potential launch provider with a long history that demonstrated their reliability record. The
geography of the launch provider's facility is important due to the dynamics of satellite orbits
around the earth and safety concerns. Some locations on earth are convenient for particular
orbits. Most small remote sensing satellites fly in a polar orbit that takes them over the North and
South Poles many times each day. Another potential orbit for a small satellite is to fly over the
equator. The geography of the launch facility strongly impacts the amount of fuel and energy that
is required to put a satellite into orbit. The launch process is generally tightly constrained in
terms of having enough energy to lift the mass of the satellites into space. In order to launch a
satellite into a polar orbit, it is convenient to be relatively far north or south of the equator. In
order to launch into any equatorial orbit, it is convenient to launch close to the equator. The
specific terrain near a launch facility is also important. For safety reasons, it is preferable to
launch over water or over a large area of uninhabited land. In the case of an accident, the goal is
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to reduce the possibility that parts of the rocket damage property or injure people. Thus
geography is a key consideration as part of launch provider selection. Another attribute is multi-
satellite capacity. This refers to the ability of the launch vehicle to carry multiple satellites
simultaneously and deliver them to the relevant orbits. When small remote sensing satellites are
launched, Implementers often seek to save on the launch costs by sharing a launch. Also, if a
group of satellite owners choose to operate their satellites in a collaborative constellation, it may
be convenient to purchase launch services together on a multi-satellite vehicle. If a launch
vehicle was originally designed to carry one large satellite, technical modifications may be
required to adapt it to carry multiple smaller satellites. In another scenario, a launch vehicle may
carry one large satellite and be adapted to also carry one or more small satellites.
Facility View
Table 6-10: Dimensions within Facility Architectural View
Generic Form7 Fnetioh T Examples of Forntmfrom Existing Prjects!
Facility View
Supplier Facility Defining Supplier Temporary Transitional Purpose-Built
Status Facility State
Implementer Defining
Implet r SImplementer Temporary Transitional Purpose-Built
Facility Status Facility State
EnbigSatellite OtaImplementer Facility Enabling Data Satellite Integration and
TypeImplementer Reception Operations teLaboratory
Activity Test
Satellite Control Controlling Satellite Implementing Overseer Satellite
System Operator Organization Organization Supplier
National
Satellite Reception Receiving Satellite Implementing Se te Satellite Comeial
System Operator Data Organization Sensing Center Supplier Farm(non- Fr
implementer)
Satellite Hosting Satellite Government .
Environmental Test Environmental Satelie Research Commercial
Facilities Tests Organization Irm
The Facility View includes the project functions that relate to the evolution and operation of
facilities. Facilities that provide infrastructure for design, manufacture, test and operation of
satellite systems are vital to project success. The first dimension relates to the status of the
Supplier's facility during the time of the project. As discussed above, the Suppliers were in
various stages of organizational evolution and their level of facility infrastructure reflected this.
This was paralleled by the experience of the Implementers. Early in their existence both
Suppliers and Implementers worked in Temporary Facilities. These were work spaces that were
not designed for the specific needs of the organizations; they were small and had little or no
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hardware laboratory work space. The temporary facilities were sometimes shared with other
organizations or rented. Later, both Implementers and Suppliers moved to Transitional Status. In
this phase they started to establish their own facilities in a gradual process. They pursued the
process of defining their facility needs, raising funds, hiring partners and implementing the new
buildings. After this process, they arrive in the status of having Purpose-Built facilities. These
are facilities in which the size, equipment, work areas and location are designed to meet the
needs of the organization. The three status options are used to represent the condition of facilities
for the majority of the time during a given satellite project.
The Implementers in the case studies established different types of facilities to enable their
activity. The potential facilities included data reception systems to accept imagery data delivered
by the satellites; operations facilities to send commends and receive status data about the
satellite; satellite integration and test facilities to work on components of the satellite; and an
optical laboratory to test and calibrate an imager system. Calibration is particularly important if
the Implementer has the goal of producing operational data.
The next three dimensions under the facility view specify which project actor takes on the role of
controlling the satellite and receiving data and hosting satellite environmental tests. Each of these
functions is required in every satellite project. The functions can be executed by one or more
organizations. Also, each function requires installation and operation of appropriate facilities.
The facilities for controlling a satellite include an antenna and computer system with relevant
specifications matched to the satellite. Satellite control facilities are sometimes co-located with
facilities that receive the satellite data. The characteristics of the antenna that receive data from
the satellite are sometimes different from the antenna that send and receive control information.
The function of controlling the satellite requires sending commands that tell the spacecraft when
to take images and that make adjustments to the satellites operations. Controlling also includes
receiving information about the operational status of the satellite to ensure that it is functionally
properly or to diagnose problems. The amount of information that is sent and received for
controlling is much smaller than the amount that is received as imagery data. For this reason, the
specifications of the control antenna are often different from those of the data reception antenna.
The data reception antenna typically needs a higher data bandwidth or reception rate. The
reception function is only a one way transmission whereas the control function is two way. There
are many options of how to configure the control and data reception stations. There are also
options with regard to what type of organization plays the role of Satellite Control Systems
Operator or Satellite Reception System Operator. In these case studies, the Control System
Operator role was played by the Implementing Organization, Overseer Organization and Satellite
Supplier. If the Supplier has access to control the satellite, they remain a close partner with the
Implementer beyond delivery of the satellite into orbit. The organizations that play the role of
Satellite Reception System Operator include the Implementer, National Remote Sensing Center
(which was not the Implementer), Satellite Supplier and Commercial Antenna Farm. The
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commercial antenna farm refers to companies that offer the service of hosting antennas that are
in a favorable geographic location and provide additional opportunities to send or receive data to
satellites. Most small remote sensing satellites are flown in polar orbits. The nations that bought
these satellites are all located far from the polar regions. These nations can only communicate
with their satellites when the spacecraft pass directly over their stations several times per day.
The satellites in polar orbit pass over commercial antenna farms located near the north and south
pole many times per day. The business model of the commercial antenna farms is to serve many
customers by allowing them to send and receive data when their satellites pass the poles. They
transmit the information from the satellites to the Implementers electronically. This greatly
increases the opportunity to download data, which opens more space in the satellite's limited
data storage.
The function of hosting satellite environmental tests implies owning and operating specialized
equipment that simulates the environment that a satellite experiences in earth orbit. Satellite test
facilities include special machines to expose the spacecraft to intense temperature extremes, low
pressure, high noise levels, vibrations and heavy force loadings. Other tests might be done to
determine the specific structural characteristics of the satellite, such as the location of the center
of mass, and to ensure that there is no electromagnetic interference among satellite components.
In some cases, Implementers and Suppliers do not maintain all of these specialized facilities in
their own locations, especially when they are in the temporary facility status. The test facilities
can be sized to accommodate entire spacecraft or components. In these case studies, the test
facilities were owned and operated by Satellite Suppliers, Government Research Organizations
(in the Supplier nations) and commercial firms (that were not the primary Suppliers). Some of
the satellites in these cases were tested in multiple environmental test facilities.
The Facility Architectural captures a key aspect of satellite projects because such facilities are
necessary to decrease risk of technical failure, however they are very expensive to install and
maintain. The facilities also required specially train technicians to operate.
Training View
Table 6-11: Dimensions within Training Architectural View
Training View
Defining time
Training Preparation engineers spent at Weeks Months Years
Time Implementer before
going to Supplier
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preparation I I 1 1
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Within the Training Architectural View are several categories of related dimensions; together
this view characterizes the training experience of engineers from the Implementer Organization
while they work at the Supplier Organization. The first set of dimensions addresses the functions
related to the transition from the Implementer Organization to the Supplier Organization for
training. Before engineers from the Implementer Organization are sent for training at the
Supplier Organization, they may spend time in preparation at the Implementer Organization. The
Implementer Organization in some cases creates a structured preparation experience. The length
of time that engineers spend in the Implementer Site is often influenced by the Hiring Time
Horizon dimension. If engineers are employees of the Implementers and they have already been
working, they may have years of experience before going to the Supplier site. If engineers are
hired specifically for the project, they may only work at the Implementer site for weeks or
months before transitioning for the training. This is captured in the Training Preparation Time
dimension. The next function defines the level of coordination that characterizes the time
between hiring and departure for training. The training preparation approach may be highly
individualized or coordinated. A coordinated approach might arrange group training or
enrichment activities, whereas individual situations leave the engineers to define their own
preparation plan. Some of the Training Preparation activities that Implementer Organizations
provided in the cases include lectures on satellite technology, lectures on other technical topics,
assigning mentors for the engineers from the Implementer and promoting independent study. The
study topics were diverse. In some cases, the engineers could study technical documents from
previous or current Implementer projects. In other cases, they focused on theoretical material
such as textbooks. The engineers did not always know beforehand the satellite engineering
specialty in which they would receive training. When they had this knowledge, it could guide
their independent study. Finally the Training Transition Team Size defines the number of
engineers that transition to the Supplier together. Implementers executed this function in various
ways, sometimes sending individuals, small groups or the entire training group. The arrival order
and team size tended to influence the type of reception provided by the Suppliers. If a large team
arrived at once, the Suppliers planned a formal, structured welcome. If individuals or small
group arrived in a staggered fashion, the Suppliers tended to have less orientation activities
because it was harder to repeat them for each arrival.
The second set of related Training dimensions includes two functions that define how long the
engineers are at the Supplier location and the phase of the project that the engineers experience.
The Training Schedule dimension defines the time that the Implementer Engineers spend
working at the Supplier site for training. The main engineering teams spend months or years in
order to experience the majority of the work on their satellite. In a few cases, engineers that are
generally stationed at the Implementer site spend a few weeks at the Supplier site for short term
training. The Training Project Phase defines which part of the satellite project lifecycle the
Implementer engineers experience. The options are labeled as phases of NASA's generic satellite
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lifecycle, which can be applied to most satellite projects. NASA Phase A is the conceptual
design phase in which the needs of the customer are identified and translated into technical
requirements that will drive the design. Based on these requirements an overall concept for the
mission is proposed. Phase A also determines the feasibility of the project and finds whether new
technology needs to be developed to achieve it. NASA Phase B is the preliminary design phase
during which an initial detailed design is developed. NASA Phase C is the detailed design and
fabrication stage in which the subsystems are fully designed and manufactured. NASA Phase D
includes System Assembly, Integration, Test and Launch. The subsystems that were
manufactured in Phase C are assembled into the complete satellite. The interfaces of the full
satellite system including spacecraft, payload and ground station are integrated. The satellite is
tested to ensure it can survive launch and the orbital environment. Finally, it is launched. The
Training Project Phase Dimensions defines which of these experiences the Implementer
engineers share while at the Supplier location or launch facility.
The third set of training dimensions capture the activities that are implemented by the Supplier to
provide theoretical, practical and on-the-job training. These three categories are defined to be
compatible with later discussions on individual capability building experiences. Theoretical
Training includes satellite lectures, university degree programs, a license to access technical
documentation, non-technical lectures and attendance at conferences. These are theoretical in the
sense that they provide knowledge about satellite engineer but are not applied activities. The
non-technical lectures include enrichment presentations provided by some Suppliers in areas
such as leadership, communication and time management. Practical training allowed engineers to
apply knowledge to specific tasks. The practical activities include a Group Mission Design
Exercise, Skill-based training courses, technical demonstrations and Language Classes. The
Group Mission Design Exercise is a tool used by several Suppliers to give the group of
Implementer Engineers a challenging opportunity to practice satellite engineering. Each
engineering team is given the task to design a satellite mission based on a set of requirements as
if they are a Supplier. The skill-based training courses are counted as applied because they
emphasize the practical aspects of executing a task such as soldering electrical components or
using a software tool. Technical demonstrations are applied because they involve explanations of
how to use hardware or facilities to accomplish tasks. In some case studies, language classes
were relevant because the Suppliers and Implementers did not speak the same first language. In
such a case the language could be a highly relevant skill to apply as part of the training
experience. On the Jon Training (OJT) includes all the activities that the engineers participate in
to directly execute satellite engineering tasks. Some of this training is done as assignments
working for or with a mentor. The OJT experience also includes building a training satellite for
some Implementer teams.
The fourth set of training dimensions highlight the types of organizations and individuals from
outside the Supplier Organization that provide academic and professional training. The Supplier
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Organizations provide the majority of the training, especially the On the Job aspects. For some of
the academic and skill-based training courses, however, Suppliers hired specialists. They
partnered with Academic trainers from universities, either by making an agreement with an
engineering department or by inviting individual professors. Some Suppliers also hired
Certification Providers to execute courses in areas such as soldering where there are industry
standards for training. Both universities and individuals played the role of Certification
Providers.
The fifth set of training dimensions characterizes the relationships between the Implementer
Engineers and their mentors from the Supplier Organization. In all the case studies, the Suppliers
followed a model of assigning each Implementer Engineer to work under the guidance one
specific mentor. The Suppliers varied, however, in how they defined the Mentor-Trainee
Relationship. The Mentor-Trainee Meeting Approach defined the formality of the meeting
schedule. Most mentors met with their trainees regularly, but some established a formal schedule
whereas others talked whenever issues arose. The Mentor-Trainee Accountability System
defined the level of formality that the Supplier Organization encouraged mentors to use to guide
their trainees. As indicated in the final dimension, some Suppliers encouraged highly formal
systems with documentation of goals, milestones and assignments. Other Suppliers provided no
guidance or encouraged an informal system for accountability. A similar pattern is seen in the
function of the Mentor Work Plan. These covered three categories: 1) informal work assignments
that were decided gradually; 2) a well defined plan based primarily on practical and on the job
training; and 3) a work plan that was based on assigning the engineer to work on deliverables
required to complete the project.
The Training Project Phase, the Mentor Work Plan and the three types of training activities
specified above (Theoretical, Practical and On the Job) show the range of training experiences
provided by the Suppliers to the Implementer Engineers. During each phase of the satellite
project lifecycle very different activities take place. To the extent that the training is driven by
the satellite project, the phase has a strong impact on the training activities. The three types of
training all lead to different experiences, and the mentor approach will also play a strong role.
Individual engineers, even from within the same Implementer team, may have different
experiences based on the combination of training factors they experience with regard to Phase,
Mentor Approach and Training Activity Types. This is demonstrated later in the discussion on
Capability Building.
Contract View
Table 6-12: Dimensions within Contract Architectural View
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The Contract View provides a limited set of information about the contract used by the
Implementer to define their relationships with the satellite Supplier and Launch Provider. The
Supplier Contract Contents defines what is included in the contract between Implementer or
Overseer and Supplier. The potential items that may be included are the procurement of the
satellite system, a training package, the ground support system (including hardware
infrastructure and software), launch services (to negotiate and interface with a launch provider),
a license for access to intellectual property and access to data similar to what the Implementer
satellite will produce before launch. The decision of whether to include a license for access to
intellectual property depends on the Supplier's posture toward their proprietary technology. The
license can be crafted in different ways. Some licenses grant access for the customer to view and
use the technology for internal activities, but not to pursue any external or business activities.
Other licenses grant full use to appropriate the technology. Examples of both scenarios occur in
these case studies. The Launch Provider Contract Contents may include an exclusive satellite
launch or a shared satellite launch. Many of the small remote sensing satellites developed in
these case studies share a launch, which reduces cost. The advantage of being the exclusive
customer is having control over the schedule and reducing the risk of technical challenges from
the other satellites. The choice of pursuing an exclusive satellite launch or shared launch is
influenced by the desired orbital destination and the type of launch provider. The Contract
Signatory signs the contract on behalf of the Implementing nation. In the cases this role was
played by the government linked company (as Implementer), the government ministry (as
Overseer), the National Space Agency (as Implementer) and the National Research Agency (as
Implementer).
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One dimension that is not included here due to lack of consistent data is an indication of the type
of contract used by the Implementers. One Supplier, for example, prefers to use fixed price
contracts, which put risk on the Supplier to maintain the product and schedule once the price is
agreed upon. Traditional aerospace suppliers use contract types that place more risk on the
customer, such as cost-plus. A cost-plus contract pays the Supplier for any costs they incur plus a
fixed percentage of profit. The type of contract certainly influences the incentives for Suppliers
as they management cost, schedule and technical risk throughout the project. Future research can
investigate this in more detail.
Technical Product View
Table 6-13: Dimensions within Technical Product Architectural View
G eneric Fortm Function Examples of Fornvvjrom Existing Projects ___
Technical Product View
Satellite Mass Defining mass of Less than 100 100 to 300 301 to 800
satellite kilograms kilograms kilograms
Satellite Defining design 5 y 7 years
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service payload of meters) imager (0os imager
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Inclination stlie ______ _____ _____ ____
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Defining Hexagonal HeptagonalSatellite Shape PrismnPrism Cub I
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The Technical Product Architectural View captures the technical performance of the satellite and
key characteristics. The first three dimensions capture satellite features that are useful proxy
indicators for the satellite's cost and complexity. These indicators are satellite mass, design life
and payload. Satellites with small mass, short design life and a small number of payloads are
relatively low cost and low in complexity. As the mass, design life and number of payloads
increases, so does the cost and complexity. In these case studies, the Implementers and Suppliers
pursued satellites with low cost and complexity compared to the overall satellite market. The
mass remained under 800 kilograms, which is low compared to the large geosynchronous and
scientific satellites that are the size of buses and weigh thousands of kilograms. Some of the
satellites weighed less than 100 kilograms. The Design Life of a satellite is the length of time the
Supplier claims the satellite will operate at full functional capacity. The satellite engineering
process is rigorous and satellites often operate for longer than their design life. The Supplier
assesses their risk when they define the design life; they tend to promise conservative lifetime
performance. The contract may include penalties if the satellite does not last the full design life,
further increasing the Supplier's risk aversion. The payload of the satellite is the component that
delivers the service which is desired by the Implementer or customer. In this sense, the payload
is the most important part of the satellite; all other components exist to support the payload in
doing its function. The primary service for the remote sensing satellites in these case studies was
to take optical images of specific locations on earth, identify to location and send the images and
corresponding location data to ground stations on earth. The Payload dimension gives examples
of all the instruments carried on the satellites in these case studies. The imager systems were in
three categories of capability (low, medium and high resolution). Some satellites also carried
secondary payloads for communication and science experiments. The communication payload
mentioned here is a store and forward devise that can receive a message sent by an operator in
one part of earth, store it and deliver it later to another location. This operational sequence is
necessary because of the orbit; it does not allow real-time communication. In contrast,
commercial communication satellites are ideal for real-time communication. Commercial
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communication satellites are located in geosynchronous orbit where they rotate around the earth
at the same rate as the earth rotates around its axis. In this configuration, geosynchronous
satellites always access the same part of the earth and one satellite is accessible to about one
third of the planet. The store and forward payload included on some of the case study satellites
did not cater to commercial communication. Instead it met the needs of the global amateur radio
operator community. Around the world, individuals learn how to communicate using radio
frequencies. They often leverage satellites with communication payload in the amateur frequency
to send messages to each other.
The next five dimensions in the Technical Product View define specifications of the satellite.
These are examples of the technical requirements that are defined in NASA Phase A. They
further establish the performance and design approach of the satellite. The Data Downlink Band
and Rate describe the speed at which imagery data is transferred from satellite to ground
receiving stations on earth. The speed is important because the window of opportunity to deliver
the data is limited. As small remote sensing satellites orbit the earth, they pass over their ground
receive stations for a period of about 5 to 10 minutes. This may occur several times per day.
Often careful coordination is required to ensure that all desired data is transferred from the
satellite to the ground station during this short interval. A high data downlink rate is a valuable
performance attribute. The different types of radio frequency communication systems are
described by standard terminology using the bands. Each band covers a particular set of radio
frequencies with specific characteristics. A system that operates on Ultra High Frequency band is
relatively slow compared to S-band and X-band options. The Power Capacity dimension defines
the amount of electrical power that the satellite can generate using solar panels while orbiting the
earth. This number limits the amount of electrical power that the payload, computers, sensors
and actuators can use. The Onboard Storage value defines the amount of data the satellite can
store. The satellites in these cases ranged from 64 megabytes to 128 gigabytes. These values
were on the same order of magnitude as personal computers from the same era; the values
increased over time as electronics evolved in all industries. Together the Onboard Storage and
Data Downlink Band/Rate define the amount of data the satellite can collect, store and deliver.
Thus, they are key performance indicators. The Pointing Error dimension defines the level of
error the satellite has in pointing to a specific location on earth. As pointing error decreases, the
confidence that the satellite is pointing to the intended target for an image increases. The Orbital
Altitude and Inclination define where the satellite flies as it goes around the earth. Altitude
measure the height of the satellite above the earth. All the satellites in this study were relatively
close to the earth in an area known as Low Earth Orbit. They all flew at a height between 600
and 800 kilometers. They used similar heights because of their similar mission. At these heights,
their imager payloads operate effectively and their communication systems have enough power
to send the information down to earth. The Orbital inclination defines the angle of the orbit with
respect to the equator. A Polar orbiting satellite flies perpendicular to the equator, while an
equatorial satellite flies parallel with the equator. Both types of inclination are used in these
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cases. Polar orbits are generally more common for remote sensing satellites. As a satellite flies in
a polar orbit, the earth rotates below it. Gradually, the satellite flies over every location on earth
in the course of a few days. Satellites that fly in equatorial orbits fly only over the countries that
are near the equator. A satellite can only take images or send communications when it is flying
over a particular location on earth.
The last five Technical Dimensions give further examples of technical specifications of the
satellite. The Satellite Shape dimension defines the structural geometry of the spacecraft - such
as a cube, hexagonal prism or heptagonal prism. The Structural Arrangement dimension
describes how the sections of the satellite are arranged within the overall shape in order to
support the subsystems and payload. Several arrangements are proposed, including stacking a
series of trays and arranging all the subsystems along the inside of the external walls. The
structural engineers that choose the arrangement seek a design that provides enough strength to
withstand an intense launch while keeping the mass low. The Attitude Control Actuators are
subsystems that adjust the direction the satellite points. These are the actuators that determine the
pointing error. Items such as gravity gradient booms, electromagnets, reaction wheels,
magnetorquers and gyros can be used to adjust the angle of the satellite with respect to the earth.
The Solar Panels and Batteries provide the functions of generating and storing power from the
sun. For the small remote sensing satellites in this study, this is the only source of electrical
power available. The table gives some examples of the types of batteries used in these projects.
The Solar Panels are listed as either body mounted or deployable. This decision is significant
because it is an element that also impacts project complexity. Body mounted solar panels are
attached to the outside of the external walls of the satellite. They do not move. As the satellite
orbits the earth, it receives the sun's energy from different directions. Solar panels are most
effective when they are directly aligned with the sun. Body mounted solar panels cannot adjust to
the angle of the sun at any time. If they are pointed slightly away from the sun, they simply
generate less power. Deployable solar panels are designed to counter this problem. They are
attached to beams that are folded close to the satellite during launch. Once in space, the beams
deploy to extend the solar panels. Some deployable solar panels can adjust to receive more direct
sunlight as the satellite moves relative to the sun. This can improve the overall level of power the
satellite can generate. It also increases the risk of technical failure because the solar panels may
not deploy successfully. Deployment of mechanical structures in the micro-gravity orbital
environment is inherently risky because it is difficult to test in the presence of earth's gravity.
This section has provided examples of the types of technical decisions that Suppliers and
Implementers face as part of designing remote sensing satellites.
Technical Approach View
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Table 6-14: Dimensions within Technical Approach Architectural View
Technical Approach View
Heritage
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Approach Approach
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Sbytmfrsourcing Space CommercialSubsystem for sorig qualified off the shelf
component source subsystem components components
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Defining whetherConstellation mii is part of Part of Single satellite
Participation mission is part of constellation mission
constellation
Subsystem Manufacturing Satellite External
manufacturer Subsystems Supplier Suppliers
The Technical Approach view highlights several aspects of the decisions by the Supplier
regarding their satellite engineer techniques. The Satellite Platform Approach defines whether
the satellite is based on an old or new platform. The platform of the satellite, as in other
industries, is the high level design of the spacecraft, excluding the payload. Satellite suppliers
often use similar designs for the satellite bus or platform; they make small adaptations for new
payloads. This is a risk reduction approach. The more satellites that are flown with a common
platform, the more confidence a Supplier and customer have in its performance. In these case
studies, some of the satellites use new platforms or platforms with only one previous flight. They
are willing to accept the risk of a new platform in order to gain an increase in performance
compared to old platforms. Other projects used designs based on a platform with heritage from
multiple flights. The Suppliers fall into two categories with their overall Satellite Engineering
Approach. One set uses the Small Satellite Approach, which is characterized by designs based on
focused requirements, low mass, limited management overhead, and low cost due to the purchase
of products that were not originally designed for space. This is in contrast with the traditional
satellite engineer approach that evolved among the early space innovators. The traditional
approach has gradually led. to complex requirements, high mass, large management overhead and
high cost due to methods and parts that are designed specifically for space. The complex
requirements and high mass often result from the desire to make each satellite with as many
functions as possible. The large management overhead is a result of the risk averse culture that
seeks to use documentation and accountability to reduce the uncertainty related to space activity.
The traditional approach to procuring electronic and structural components for satellites is to buy
parts that are specially designed to withstand the launch and orbital environments. In addition,
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parts for satellites are tracked carefully as they pass through the supply chain to allow decision
makers to be confident of their quality and history. All of this has reduced the risk of space
operations to some extent, but it has greatly increased the cost. Those that adopt the small
satellite approach seek to challenge the traditional techniques in order to develop satellites at
lower cost. The small satellite approach was pioneered by researchers in several universities as
well as several entrepreneurs. The Subsystem Component Source dimension follows from the
previous discussion and notes whether the Supplier purchases special "space qualified"
components or other components known as "commercial off the shelf," which were designed for
general use. The dimension of Subsystem manufacturer also relates to Satellite Engineering
Approach. The Small Satellite Approach often includes manufacturing the subsystems of a
satellite by the Supplier. Traditional Suppliers have moved to serving more as System
Integrators. They normally contract with external supplier to manufacture subsystems. The
integrator brings all the subsystems together to assemble and test them. The Constellation
Participation dimension captures another Technical Approach. Several satellites in these cases
are commissioned as part of a collaborative constellation. A constellation of satellites is a group
that orbits in a coordinated fashion. In these case studies, the constellations are made of satellites
that are built to have similar technical characteristics and to interact in their operations. Thus, the
decision to operate in a constellation impacts several technical dimensions, especially the orbital
characteristics.
Management View
Table 6-15: Dimensions within Management Architectural View
Management View
Project Milestones Monitoringproject Project SatelliteProject Milestones progress Reviews Models
Supplier and Supplier Supplier Trainee
trainee engineers engineers did engineers
Defining role of engineers presented; primary did primary
Review Strategy supplier and trainee presented to trainees and presentations; presentations
during reviews customer customer customer to customer
management management management management
together reviewed reviewed
Prioritizing Technical
Priorities mentSchedule Cost Risk Performance
The Management Architectural View captures several of the approaches used by the Supplier for
project management. The Project Milestones dimension shows which types of goals were used to
monitor project progress and move through the design process. The two options are project
reviews and satellite models. Both can be used together. Project Reviews are events during
which the Supplier and possible engineers from the Implementer Organization make
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presentations to representatives of the customers to show project progress and address concerns.
There is a fairly standard set of reviews used in the aerospace industry. The names may vary
across organizations, but the purpose is similar. The review cycle parallels the project phase
cycle, such as NASA's Phase A through D. Common reviews include the System Requirements
Review, Mission Design Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review,
Manufacturing Readiness Review, Test Readiness Review, Flight Readiness Review and Launch
Readiness Review. Each review signifies the completion of one project phase and transition to
the next. Suppliers used several strategies in terms of how they defined the role of the trainees
during the reviews. The trainees were in an intermediate position with respect to the review
audience. The main audience was the set of management and decision makers and perhaps
consultants that represented the interests of the Implementer and Overseer. The Supplier had the
role to demonstrate that they were delivering the expected service for the satellite and training.
The trainee engineers could either partner with the Supplier to give the review; observe the
review or partner with Implementer management to critique the Supplier. The other option was
for Trainees to give parts of the review alone if they completed a portion of the work alone.
The Management Priorities for each project are high level goals that the Supplier and
Implementer sought throughout the project. These priorities were generally driven by the
Implementer and adopted by the Supplier. The priorities included controlling schedule, cost, risk
and maintaining technical performance. Most Implementers had a clear preference of a particular
priority that mattered greatly to them. As in any project management setting, there are constant
tradeoffs among these four areas. The schedule was highly important to some Implementers, as
introduced in the section on Technical Requirements. The Supplier could control their own
efforts to develop the satellite within a set schedule; however the launch schedule was out of
their control. Satellite launches are notorious for being delayed due to technical and legal issues.
Policy View
Table 6-16: Dimensions in Policy Architectural View
Policy View
Project Political Generating National Head National National Head
Champion Political Support of Government Minister of Statefor Project
Project Approval Defining steps for Ministerial Regional Presidential
Process government Cabinet review Review Government Review
approval ofproject Review
Adding ru
Policy Challenges programmatic risk Frequency Export Control Immigration
due to policy Filing
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The Policy Architectural View captures three areas through which policy impacted the satellite
project. In some cases there is a Project Political Champion that generates political support
within the Implementer Nation. This champion role is played by the National Head of
Government, National Minister or National Head of State. When such a champion is active, it
has a strong impact on the project. If the political support is high, the funding support also tends
to be high. This can influence the management priorities, technical requirements, technology
strategy and posture toward risk taking. The level of political support can also influence the
Project Approval Process dimension, which defines the steps for gaining approval from the
government in the Implementer nation to fund the project. This dimension relates the level of
space policy infrastructure in the nation. If there is limited infrastructure, the approval process
may also be undefined. Alternatively, the approval process may mirror other types of
government infrastructure. The satellite project proposal may compete with proposals for roads,
dams and other areas of public investment. Examples of Project Approval Processes in these
cases include Cabinet Review, Ministerial Review, Regional Government Review and
Presidential Review. The final Policy Dimension is the set of Policy Challenges that add
programmatic risk. Whereas the above dimensions relate to policy factors within the
Implementer Nation, there are also policy challenges related to the international community. In
these cases, there were policy issues related to Frequency Filing with the International
Telecommunication Union, Export Control and Immigration. In order for some Suppliers to sell
the satellite to the Implementers and to host engineers from the Implementers, they need to apply
for licenses from their governments. The approval and timeliness is not guaranteed; this
introduces risk into the schedule.
Cultural and Social View
Table 6-17: Dimensions in Cultural and Social Architectural View
Cultural and Social View
Defining Local Local
Educational educational University University Foreign Local
Background of Degrees Degrees University Technical
Trainee Engineers preparation of (National (International Degrees Degrees
trainee engineers System) System)
Adding Transition
programmatic Work Culture National to livingCultural Challenges challenge due to Language Culture toward Pie i
chaleng du toculure Authority Supplier
culture I I Country
The final Architectural View captures examples of dimensions that relate to Culture and Social
aspects of the satellite projects. The Educational Background of Trainee Engineers defined the
preparation of the trainee engineers to some extent. Engineers came from a variety of educational
experiences, including Local Universities, International Universities and Local Technical
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Training. Among local universities, some used a domestic system from the Implementer Nation
while others used an international system. The engineers' exposure to the different educational
programs impacted their familiarity with foreign languages, cultures and teaching styles. When
the Implementer Engineers went to live in the nation of the Supplier, they faced Cultural
Challenges as they adapted to the new setting. These challenges were in areas such as language,
work culture in the Supplier site, the culture toward authority and the logistical transitions of
living in a new country with unusual food and customs. Finally, for some Implementer
Engineers, national pride was a key motivation to participate in the project and it impacted their
view of the effort.
6.1.1.3 Architectural Definition Step Seven
Table 6-18: Template for Generic Project Timeline
Project Year Project Events Generic Events
1 Facilitating Event
2 Project Initiation and Approval
3 Engineers at Supplier Location
4 System and Facility Development
5 Satellite Launch
The final step of the Architectural Definition process is to capture the time dynamics of the
project. Here a generic timeline is introduced that shows the key events that occurred in all the
satellite projects. In the next section, the actual timelines of each project will be presented
according to these conventions. The Project Year replaces absolute time in order to maintain
anonymity of the projects. In each project there is at least one event to facilitate the project, and
initiate and approve the Project. The timeline also captures the years during which Implementer
Engineers are at the Supplier Location and the system or facilities are in development. The
facilities may be in the Supplier or Implementer site. The last generic event is the satellite
launch. This template is used as the foundation for specific project timelines.
6.1.2 Research Question 2: How are the Architectures of Collaborative
Projects Similar and Different?
This section continues to draw from the seven steps to define the architecture of a system. These
steps are as follows: 1) Identify primary stakeholders, 2) Identify Constraints, Opportunities,
Requirements and Objectives, 3) Define system function, 4) Identify Generic Forms, 5) Identify
alternative specific forms to form dimensions, 6) Group dimensions into categories of
Architectural Views, and 7) Create timeline of major events. In the section above, these seven
steps were applied to the entire set of case study projects. The forms, functions, dimensions and
views that emerged for this set of projects were introduced and the implications of selecting
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specific instances of forms were discussed. The coming section answers Research Question 2 by
comparing the specific architectural approaches used in the various collaborative satellite
projects. The section begins by comparing the context for each of the case study projects. It
continues by considering several dimensions from each architectural view and showing the
specific instances of form used in each case. The results are shown for six satellite projects
executed by four countries and procured from three suppliers. Note that the BetaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R3 satellites were purchased as part of a single project, thus their results are shown
together. Table 6-19 summarizes the main characteristics of the six satellite projects. All the
projects are optical remote sensing missions. They vary in terms of the technical specifications of
the imagery they produce.
Table 6-19: Summary of Key Project Characteristics
Satellite AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat-R1 Beta at-R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-R2
Projects RI R2 BetaSat-R3 R1
Country Nation Alpha Nation Beta Nation Nation DeltaGamma Nto et
Satellite Remote Sensing
Type
Satellite Medium High Medium High and High High
Imagery Resolution Resolution Resolution Medium Resolution Resolution
Performance Resolution
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier
Supplier Omegal Taul Supplier Omega1 Taul Sigmal
The discussion about Research Question 1 explored the issues that drive decisions to apply
specific instances of form to project functions. Many of these issues are potentially relevant
across a variety of collaborative satellite projects. This section focuses on the specific factors,
decisions and approaches that emerge from the experiences of Nations Alpha, Beta, Gamma and
Delta.
6.1.2.1 Architectural Definition Steps One and Two
The first steps of the Architectural Definition Process are to identify primary stakeholders and
explore their contextual constraints, opportunities, requirements and objectives. In these projects,
the primary stakeholders are the Implementer, Overseer and Supplier Organizations. The specific
institutions that played those roles in each country will be further discussed in Step Three.
Table 6-20: Contextual Opportunities and Constraints for Satellite Projects
AlphaSat AlphaSat- BetaSat BetaSat- GammaS DeltaSat
-R1 R2 -RI R at-R1 -R2Context BetaSat-R3
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Prior use of remote
sensing services on
national level
Prior use of
communication satellite
service by national
organizations
National Space Office
(during time of project) partial partial
Past domestic satellite
projects few few
Major space event:
partnership opportunity
Major space event: Policy
or facility established
Key Leader: Overseer
Organization partial
Key Leader: Implementing
Organization
National Vision: Space as
part of development
process
National Vision:
Accomplishment in space
tech
Table 6-20 considers the contextual factors that were introduced above and shows the extent to
which they affected the six satellite projects. The first two factors consider the level of activity
using satellite remote sensing and communication services before the project in question. The
table indicates that both types of services were used often in almost all cases. Nation Gamma is
the only exception where the use of remote sensing is shown at a medium level. In the area of
remote sensing, the service is generally harnessed to address national concerns through the work
of government agencies. In each of the four nations there were offices within the national
government with the responsibility to acquire satellite data from foreign sources, convert the data
into decision tools such as maps and distribute the data to other government agencies. In the area
of satellite communication, the service was provided by both foreign and domestic commercial
companies. In Nation Alpha, Nation Gamma and Nation Delta domestic, commercial companies
started buying and operating (but not manufacturing) communication satellites before the first
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remote sensing satellite was purchased. In Nation Beta, the Implementer Organization pursued a
domestic communication satellite project between BetaSat-R1 and the BetaSat-R2/R3 project.
All of the nations had some level of experience harnessing satellite services before they sought
their first domestic satellite manufacturing project.
The next two factors indicate the level of space activity during and before the satellite projects.
One row indicates whether a national space office was established in the country during the time
of the project. Most of the countries are labeled as "partial" because the national space office was
in transition during the project. For Nation Alpha, an initial office was forming with a focus on
research during the AlphaSat-RI project. Due to the project, this office expanded into a
coordinator of satellite projects. During AlphaSat-R2, the same office evolved again and was
reopened as a space agency. The initiation of BetaSat-RI happened simultaneously with the
formation of the space agency in Nation Beta. By the time of the BetaSat-R2/R3 project, the
Nation Beta space agency was operational. In GammaSat-RI, the national research office that
served as a central space office was formed in conjunction with planning the GammaSat-R1
project. In Nation Delta, the national remote -sensing agency expanded to include satellite
technology and take on more responsibility of a national space coordinator because of the
DeltaSat-R2 satellite. Most of these early satellite projects also involved the evolution of the
national space office. With regard to previous experience with domestic space projects, only
Nation Beta stands out with no earlier satellites. As mentioned above, commercial firms in the
other three countries operated communication satellites before these remote sensing missions.
In all of the countries there was a major space event or opportunity that facilitated the initiation
of the remote sensing satellite project. One facilitating element was the development of a
relationship or an opportunity to form a relationship. Nation Alpha received an offer for a free
launch of a small satellite, which triggered AlphaSat-R1. They pursued AlphaSat-R2 with
Supplier Taul in part because the two teams saw a mutually beneficial partnership opportunity.
Nation Beta pursued BetaSat-Ri in part because of the invitation to collaborate in a constellation
from Supplier Omegal. When Nation Beta continued with their second generation of remote
sensing satellites, they had invitations for collaboration from both Supplier Omegal and from
countries in their region. As Nation Gamma considered their GammaSat-Ri project, they
observed the example of the collaboration between Nation Alpha and Supplier Taul; they found
it attractive. Finally, as Nation Delta defined their DeltaSat-R2 satellite project with Supplier
Sigmal, the government of Nation Sigma supported the project by seeking opportunities for
favorable trade agreements between the two countries. Projects were also facilitated by the
establishment of new policies or facilities. As discussed above, the initiation of these projects
coincided with the establishment of new space offices in Nations Alpha, Beta and Gamma. Also,
in Nation Beta and Gamma there were formal policies that informed investment in space or
science and technology research activity.
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The role of key leaders in the Overseer and Implementer Organizations emerged as important
contextual factors in most of the countries. The label partial is used to show that the leader
transitioned to a new position during the timeframe of the project. In Nations Alpha, Beta and
Gamma there were individuals within the Overseer and Implementing organizations that made
strong, personal contributions to defining the satellite projects, selecting the suppliers and
leading the teams. Each of these individuals demonstrated a personal believe in the value of the
project to their country. These key leaders believed in the visions for how space could contribute
to their national development process or how their country could achieve technical
accomplishments in space, as shown in the next two rows of Table 6-20. These national visions
were often defined under the guidance of national level leaders such as heads of state or
ministers. The leaders at the level of the Overseer and Implementer Organizations took the broad
national visions and defined explicitly how their satellite project would contribute. In Nation
Alpha and Nation Beta, national level leaders defined specific milestones for their country to
achieve a particular level of development. Key leaders in the satellite projects latched onto these
national milestones and claimed that fostering of satellite engineering capability was a step
toward the goal. During Nation Beta's second satellite project, they specifically set a vision for
accomplishing a space technology milestone that had not been attempted even by more
experienced space countries. They sought the opportunity for Nation Beta to stand out for their
space achievements.
The level of political support varied across the six satellite projects. For both Nation Alpha and
Nation Beta, support was high for their first satellite project, but slowed for their second project.
In Nation Alpha, a key national leader that nurtured the first satellite project transitioned during
the second satellite project, which reduced the political momentum. In Nation Beta, the
dampened support manifested itself in several years of delay to secure funding for the second
satellite project. For Nation Delta, the government did support the project because previous
natural disasters had demonstrated the need for better geo-referenced information; but the
Implementer felt the need to demonstrate the usefulness of the project in order to maintain
political support. All six of these satellite projects were government funded, thus the level of
political support was key to their existence.
The final contextual factor is the maturity of national space policy infrastructure. For three
projects, the policy status is low. In Nation Alpha and Nation Delta, there are few legal,
regulatory or policy documents to coordinate space activity, assign responsibility or propose a
national strategy. Nation Alpha worked on developing a national space policy document during
projects AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2. Nation Beta created a national space policy and a
proposed long term project timeline at the beginning of project BetaSat-R1 as part of establishing
the national space agency. Nation Gamma had a similar experience, but it was not limited to
space. As they founded Implementer Gammal, they were crafting a vision to harness space and
other advanced technologies to improve the research infrastructure in their country. Three of
176
these projects were completed with limited space policy infrastructure, while in three cases the
project activity helped foster the formation of space policy.
The discussion above showed how the six projects were similar and different in terms of several
contextual factors that led to opportunities or constraints. The countries were similar regarding
their past use of satellite service and previous satellite projects (except Nation Beta). Most
countries developed a new or evolved space office as part of these projects, and most countries
responded to an external stimulus that enabled or inspired their satellite project. There were also
similarities in the importance of key space leaders and national vision, although the specifics of
the vision differed. A potential trend was that early projects have higher political support, but it
may waiver later. This was not the case for Nation Gamma, which was approved for funding of
their second satellite before the launch of their first. Finally, the projects were complete with and
without formal space policy infrastructure that outlined government regulations and coordination
procedures for satellite projects.
Table 6-21: Technical Requirements for Satellite Projects
BetaSat-
AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Technical RI R2 RI BetaSat- RI R2
Requirements R3
Timingi Objective
Fast-paced project partial
Maintain data continuity
Technical
Performance
objectives:
Medium resolution
optical imagery
high resolution optical
imagery
operational imagery
commercially viable
imagery
Table 6-21 discusses the Technical Requirements sought by each project. First, the table
indicates whether timing was a key requirement for the Implementer and Overseer. The issue of
timing is highlighted because satellite projects are historically challenged by schedule. New and
complex satellite projects are often delayed by unexpected technology problems. Schedule also
becomes a risk during the launch phase when many external factors can cause delays. The
satellites procured in these six projects were relatively simple and were expected to have short
design and manufacturing schedules on the order of several years. For the AlphaSat-R1 project,
the Implementer and Overseer sought a faced-paced project because they hoped to make use of a
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imina Obiective
free launch slot and the national government leader encouraged fast project results. During
AlphaSat-R2, the country initially sought a fast paced project, but this satellite was technically
complex and new for the supplier. As they realized the level of technical challenge, the
Implementer relaxed the goal of finishing quickly. The BetaSat-RI project had an incentive for a
short design and manufacturing that was driven by participation in a constellation. The schedule
for the launch was defined by the group of constellation contributors. This was not the case in
Nation Beta's second project; they launched separately from constellation contributors and set
their own schedule. There was urgency for BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3, however, because they
sought to maintain the continuity of data from BetaSat-RI, which had reached the end of its
design life. Nation Gamma sought a fast-paced project because that satisfied their political
stakeholder who sought short term results from their research investments.
Table 6-21 also shows which the level of technical performance that each project sought from
the data their satellite produced. The options include the highest level of imagery as well as the
type of product they planned to produce, which may be primarily experimental, operational or
commercially viable. Over time, the countries moved toward expecting high resolution imagery
at a quality that was suitable for operational decision support by their government and for
commercial sale. This progression partly reflects the natural maturity of the technology over
time. When AlphaSat-RI was launched with a medium resolution imager, its performance was
good relative to the size and cost of the satellite. The BetaSat-R3 satellite was only slightly larger
and more expensive, but showed a marked improvement in performance. This series of projects
happened during a time period during which small satellites transitioned from being seen as
experimental research projects to commercial tools. The requirements from the customers
became more demanding because the technology became more capable while the price of small
satellites remained much lower than traditional satellites. For the countries that sought
commercially viable imagery, there was an expectation that they could sell the images to an
international market of data consumers. For Nation Beta, the sale was done in the context of the
constellation. For Nation Delta, the sale was done individually and through bilateral agreements
with foreign firms and governments. In general, the sale of imagery was not necessarily expected
to recoup the cost of the satellite.
Table 6-22: Capability Building Objectives for Satellite Projects
BetaSat-
AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Capability Building R1 R2 R1 BetaSat- RI R2
Objectives R3
Key long term
objectives:
Establish national
capability to design and
manufacture satellites
independently
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Create local high
technology work
opportunities for the
country medium
Key short term
system
Engineers participate in
building, testing operating
mission
Engineers experience
lifecycle from design to zI
operations
Train engineers enough
so they can build
satellites wth support in
future
Train engineers to
effectively operate
satellite nediun mediurn medu medium medium
Training Focus Area:
Satellite Engineering
focused hg ih-mdi
Operations focused medium medium medium medium
Payload Engineering J
focused gmedium
Focus on academic
training via university 9
degrees (4.ihEnmedium
Table 6-22 compares the objectives set by each country for building capability in the people and
organizations that were involved with satellites. For all six projects and all four nations, the long
term goal was stated as achieving national capability to design and manufacture satellites
independently. The case study projects were chosen because they shared this goal. For several of
the Nations, especially Alpha, Beta and Gamma, there was also a developing goal to create high
technology work in their country. For Nation Alpha, this goal later manifested in manufacturing
several components of AlphaSat-R2 within their country. Nation Gamma saw the satellite
projects as the flag ship in a series of initiatives that would enable its people to practice advanced
technology.
All the nations realized that the long term goal would only be achieved over a series of satellite
projects. The next section of Table 6-22 shows examples of the short term objectives that were
applied to each project. Nation Alpha started off with modest goals for their first remote sensing
satellite. They wanted to understand the procurement process and expose their engineers to the
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late phases of satellite manufacturing and testing. For the second Nation Beta satellite, the goals
were more aggressive; the leaders from the Implementer and Overseer Organizations wanted the
engineers to experience and entire satellite lifecycle. This implied working closely with the
Supplier on a fresh satellite design, rather than a previously used platform. Nation Beta also
increased their capability building goals from the first to second project. They conceived of the
first project as an introduction that would prepare the engineers to later participate in a
supervised project. For the second project, they sought to ensure that the engineers were exposed
to the full satellite lifecycle. The final short term objective refers to learning operations. While
all of the teams expected to learn to operate their satellite, Nation Delta put a higher priority on
this. For other nations, a specialized team focused on operations while others learned the satellite
engineering techniques. For Nation Delta, a team was trained first in satellite engineering and in
operations. When they returned to Nation Delta, their work was primarily in operations. This
reality is also demonstrated in the last section of Table 6-22 which shows the Training Focus
Area for each project. The DeltaSat-RI project is the only one that is highly operations focused
for the entire team. The other projects focused more on the overall satellite engineering process
and included operations as one of the disciplines. A few projects emphasized the design and
manufacture of payloads for a subset of the Implementer Engineer team. For the BetaSat-R2 and
DeltaSat-R2 projects, academic training was a high focus area, compared to other projects.
The analysis of capability building goals shows that four countries started with the objective of
reaching the same long term destination. They plotted slightly different courses to achieve that
destination over a series of satellite projects by setting priorities for what the engineers would
learn at each stage. There is also an effect that the decision makers who set capability building
goals for their first project have limited experience. They are not experts in the types of training
or disciplinary specialties that could be included as part of a satellite project. After Nation Alpha
and Nation Beta completed their first projects, they set goals for their second projects based on
what they saw as lacking in the first. For AlphaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R1, the Implementer
engineers were more involved in the later stages of the satellite lifecycle because the design was
based on previous missions. Thus, both Nation Alpha and Nation Beta set a goal for their
engineers to experience the design phase on a new satellite during their second mission. With
their increased level of understanding of the satellite design process, they could specify more
precise capability building goals.
6.1.2.2 Architectural Definition Steps Three to Six
The section above outlined contextual factors, technical requirements and capability building
objectives. That discussion serves as a foundation for considering differences in the architectural
dimensions among the satellite projects. In this section, each architectural view is revisited and
several dimensions are examined to learn how countries were similar and different with regard to
the specific instances of form that were implemented. For the sake of brevity and to emphasize
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more striking differences among projects, only a few dimensions from each Architectural View
are discussed in the text. The rest of the dimensions are included in the Appendix.
Organizational View
Table 6-23: Selected Dimensions from Organizational View
Generic Form Function Exanles of Forms from Existing Projects
Organizational View
Government- National National National
Implementer Implementing linked National Space Remote Research
Organization Satellite Project Company Agency Sensing Agency
Agency
National National
Overseer Overseeing Satellite Government National Space Remote Research
Organization Project Ministry Agency Sensing Agency
Agency
Supplier Supplying satellite Small,Supplir and training university Medium Firm Large Firm
Organization spinoff firm
Defining number of
Implementer people that visit 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 30
Visiting Team Size Supplier from people people people
Implementer I I I I _ I
As before, the first Architectural View is Organizational. Four dimensions are highlighted from
this view; they are the Implementer Organization, Overseer Organization, Supplier Organization
and Implementer Visiting Team Size.
Table 6-24: Implementing Organization Dimension
Each nation appointed a different type of organization as their Implementer for the satellite
project. The motivation for each model is related to the national vision, history of space activity
and the socio-economic context of the nation. For Nation Alpha, the Implementer Organization
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was a government-linked company for both satellite projects. The company was formed as part
of the AlphaSat-RI project. This choice to place the responsibility for practical implementation
of the satellite project in a commercial setting is parallel to other aspects of Nation Alpha's
context. At the start of the AlphaSat-Rl project, Nation Alpha was in a period of industrial
growth with new businesses and industries sprouting. There was growth in the high technology
manufacturing sector. Other national technology initiatives were implemented by establishing
quasi-commercial state owned enterprises. These blends of public and private effort drew their
visions from government policy but their operational approach from private industry. This
strategy by Nation Alpha indicates an assumption that the strength of government is to
coordinate and foster technical activity, but the private industry has strength in executing
technical tasks. For Nation Alpha, it was also logical to place a firm as the Implementer because
there was an existing firm that offered satellite communication services. In a similar way, the
strategy by Nation Beta to establish a National Space Agency as the Implementer also reflects
the national context. The domestic economy was strongly driven by export of natural resources,
and the role of private sector, domestic industry was not well established in advanced
technology. The National Space Agency was established as part of a larger initiative to create
government science and technology infrastructure for research and development. Nation Beta
combined the role of coordinating space research, fostering space technology development and
implementing projects in one government organization. This approach is also similar to that
taken by other countries in Nation Beta's region, where the role of the public sector is strong
relative to the domestic private sector. For Nation Gamma, the choice of creating a National
Research Agency as the Implementer of the satellite project was driven by a vision that was not
limited to the space sector. For Nation Gamma, the satellite projects were part of a larger
emphasis on building science and technology capacity in their country. Nation Gamma had a
strong economy, but they sought to rebalance the impact of foreign and domestic technology
experts. In order to pursue long term socio-economic stability, they needed a research
organization that would foster local expertise in many advanced technology areas. Unlike in
Nation Alpha and Nation Beta, the concerns of the space program were not the primary factors
that dictated the nature of the Implementer Organization. The Nation Gamma Implementer was
created to execute satellite projects as well as other types of technology projects; although
satellites were emphasized first. For Nation Delta, the Implementer Organization was appointed
by evolving an existing organization that had experience in one aspect of the satellites to expand
it to include the rest of the satellite lifecycle. In Nation Alpha, the National Remote Sensing
Agency remained a partner to the new space agency, but did not participate in the BetaSat-RI
and BetaSat-R2 projects. In Nation Beta, the national remote sensing agency, which existed
before the space agency, was gathered in as one of several field centers for the national space
agency. Among these countries, only in Nation Delta did the national remote sensing agency
convert itself into the national space agency by procuring a satellite.
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Table 6-25: Overseer Organization Dimension
In all four nations, a government ministry or similar department played the role of Overseer
Agency. The satellite projects were all approved, funded and monitored by these government
bureaucracies. Nation Alpha had both a government linked company as an Implementer and a
National Space Office that evolved into a full Agency. This created two layers of oversight. The
National Space Agency was the official customer for the satellite projects and they contracted,
non-competitively with the government linked company to implement. The company in turn
contracted with the Supplier. Again, the blend of public and private action is unique to Nation
Alpha. It reflects the growing contributions of the private sector of their economy as well as the
close relationship between the public and private sector in technology initiatives.
Table 6-26: Summary of Suppliers and Supplier Status for each Satellite Project
Satellite AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R21 GammaSat- DeltaSat-R2Projects RI R2 BetaSat-R3 RI
Country Nation Nation Nation Beta Nation Beta Nation Nation DeltaAlpha Alpha Gamma Nto et
. Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier SupplierSuppher Omegal Taul Omegal Omegal Taul Sigmal
Small, Small, Small, Medium MediumFirm Status university university university Firm Firm Large Firm
spinout firm spinout firm spinout firm F Firm
The six satellite projects in these case studies were supplied by three firms. This is an artifact of
the research design. The projects were chosen because they allowed interesting comparisons of
countries as they worked with different firms. Two of the firms were in the status of "Small,
University Spinout Firm" during the early projects and progressed to the status of "Medium
Firm" for later projects. The status of the firms for each project is summarized in both Table 6-26
and Table 6-27. Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul are considered "Small, university spinout
firms" when they employed less than a few hundred people, shared extensive facilities with their
home university and had informal organizational processes. Nations Alpha and Beta worked with
Supplier Omegal during this season, and Nation Beta worked with Supplier Taul while they
were in such a season. Soon after, both Suppliers grew to be Medium firms because they
increased their employment, established dedicated facilities outside the university and formalized
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their organizational processes to some extent. Even as Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul grew
to be Medium firms, they remained much smaller and less formal than Supplier Sigmal. In
contrast with the other firms, Supplier Sigmal is a large aerospace firm that formed through
mergers and acquisitions of other large aerospace firms. It is a multinational firm with locations
and employees in many countries and well established infrastructure. The medium and small
firms are at the opposite end of the aerospace market spectrum from Supplier Sigmal.
Table 6-27: Satellite Supplier Organization Dimension
BetaSat-
SatllteSupler AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-R2SaelieSppir R1 R2 R1 BetaSat- R1
Organization R3%
Small, university E 19
spinout firm 9
Medium firm
By focusing on the types of firms selected by the nations, Table 6-27 shows trends. Nation Alpha
worked only with small, university spinout firms for their two early satellite projects. One key
leader in the Overseer Organization who was instrumental in selecting the Supplier firms talked
about being comfortable with the firms because of their close association with universities. This
key leader was also a former university professor, as was the leader of the government linked
company that served as Implementer. Even as Nation Alpha increased in their level of
understanding of satellite technology and set ambitious technology goals for themselves, they
preferred to work with new, unproven firms. Nation Alpha was the first major customer for
Supplier Taul. They took the same approach when selecting a launch provider for AlphaSat-R2.
They worked with a new, small launch vehicle manufacturer (Supplier Lambdal) as their first
satellite payload for a new rocket. While Nation Alpha chose to work with three emerging
suppliers, Nation Alpha chose to work consistently with one supplier. Nation Alpha created their
first project based on the invitation from Supplier Omegal to collaborate. As will be discussed in
the section on Supplier Selection, Nation Alpha did consider other Suppliers for their second
generation project, but Supplier Omegal won the competition. Both Supplier Omegal and
Nation Alpha had the opportunity to refine their relationship over time and learn how to work
effectively together. Nation Gamma worked with Supplier Taul as a medium sized firm. They
joined Nation Alpha and Nation Beta in pursuing non-traditional space suppliers while Nation
Delta worked with a highly reputable Supplier (Supplier Sigmal) with many successful projects
in the traditional space market.
Table 6-28: Implementer Visiting Team Size at Supplier Dimension
Implementer AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat- GammaSat- DeltaSat-R2
Visiting R1 R2 R1 R2/ R1
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The last dimension that is highlighted in the Organizational View is the size of the team of
Implementer engineers that visits the Supplier. This dimension is introduced here because it
relates to several other dimensions such as the approach to assigning team roles, the process for
sending engineers from the Implementer Nation to the Supplier Nation and the level of
coordination for training and mentoring. The AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-R1 and GammaSat-R1 (all
first national projects) tended to have smaller teams of less than 15 people. The AlphaSat-R2,
BetaSat-R2 and DeltaSat-R2 teams were larger (16-30 people). Both Nation Alpha and Nation
Beta reflected on their small team sizes from the first project and realized that the small teams
did not include enough people to cover all the topics included in satellite engineering. During
AlphaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R1, engineers were assigned to learn multiple roles in order to cover
as many topics as possible. With their larger teams during AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2, each
engineer was assigned to focus their learning on one topic within satellite engineering. When
Nation Gamma sent a small team to train for their GammaSat-RI, they faced the same challenge
of not being able to learn all the topics. The philosophy followed by Implementer Alphal and
Supplier Taul to address this issue was to explicitly not cover a lot of topics. Supplier Taul
advised Implementer Alphal to choose a small set of topic on which to focus. These were topics
that were challenging in satellite engineering and that required internal capability in a satellite
Supplier. They de-emphasized aspects of the satellite engineering process that could be
effectively outsourced. Two of the larger teams (for BetaSat-R2/R3 and DeltaSat-R2) also stand
out for having more formal work plans assigned by the Supplier mentors to the Implementer
engineers. This will be discussed more in the Training Architectural View. These two larger
teams also had a more structured transition to the Supplier Site, highly formalized academic
lectures and a team orientation. The AlphaSat-R2 project also had a large team, but they worked
with a newer organization and defined the team and the project as they went. Team size is linked
to many dimensions.
Project Initiation and Approval View
Table 6-29: Select Dimensions from Project Initiation and Approval View
Project Initiation and Approval View
Project Leader Appointing New Leader ExistingProject Leader Leader
Organizational Appointing Founding Appointing Founding Appointing
185
Appointment Implementing new existing new existing
Organization government government company company
organization organization
Within the Project Initiation and Approval Architectural View, two dimensions are highlighted.
The Project Leader dimension shows whether a new leader was appointed as part of establishing
the satellite project. The Organizational Appointment shows whether a new or existing
organization was appointed as Implementing Organization.
Table 6-30: Project Leader and Organizational Appointment Dimensions
It is helpful to discuss the two dimensions together because they are related. Several projects
started with both the founding of a new organization and the assignment of a new leader to head
the organization. For the first remote sensing satellite projects in Nations Alpha, Beta and
Gamma, this was the case. Nation Delta did not open a new organization or appoint a new leader
for DeltaSat-R2 because the Implementer was an existing remote sensing agency. In Nation
Alpha, the government Overseer and its leader were closely involved with the AlphaSat-Rl and
AlphaSat-R2 projects. Their participation is captured as the continuation of the existing leader
and appointing the existing government organization.
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Personnel Management View
Table 6-31: Select Dimensions from Personnel Management View
Genric
Fun E e fF orm fm Existing ProjectsFoirms
Personnel Management View
Engineer Selecting Implementing Implementer
Selection Engineers for Organization and Supplier
Organization Training
Engineer Experienced Recent
engineer Defining Experienced Military Ind Graduates & National
Recruitment Selection Pool Academics Representatives Professials Young Citizens
Source Professionals
Engineer Announcing Recruit
Network with Coordinate Advertise with Use personal among
Recruitment Training universities with Military media networks expatriate
Process Opportunity community
Engineer Evaluating
Evaluation Engineersfor Application Interviews Tests
Process Training
Table 6-31 shows four dimensions from the Personnel Management Architectural View:
Engineer Selection Organization, Engineer Recruitment Source, Engineer Recruitment Process
and the Engineer Evaluation Process.
Table 6-32: Engineer Selection Organization Dimension
BetaSat-
Engineer AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-R12
Selection R1 R2 R1 BetaSat- R1
Organization R3
Implementer
Organization
Supplier
Organization Medium Medium
The first dimension captures the role of the Implementer and Supplier Organizations in selecting
engineers to participate in the satellite project. For all the projects, the Implementer was
involved; the projects differed regarding the role of the Supplier. For AlphaSat-R1 and DeltaSat-
R2, the Supplier had representatives that sat on the panel to interview candidates. This is
considered a high level of involvement because the Supplier had the opportunity to directly
comment on the qualifications of candidate engineers before they were hired. During AlphaSat-
R2 and BetaSat-R1, the Supplier had a medium level of involvement. They primarily gave
advice to the Implementer about what education and professional background the engineers
should have. For the remaining projects, the Suppler had a limited role in engineer selection.
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Table 6-33: Engineer Recruitment Source Dimension
The first step for Implementer Organizations when they pursued the hiring process was to define
a target population from which to recruit. As shown in Table 6-33, most of the projects targeted
recent graduates and young professionals primarily. The AlphaSat-RI project was different
because they did not hire people for long term employment. They worked with universities, the
military and industry to select experienced professionals to work temporarily on the satellite
project. The DeltaSat-R2 project did hire people for long term employment under the
Implementer, but they drew from a wider population range than the other projects. The leaders
within the Implementers discussed their perceived tradeoffs when considering whom to hire. If
they hired recent graduates and young professionals, they found the engineers to be open to
training and molding, although their work ethic was immature. If they hired experienced
professions with more seasoned overall professional skills, they found it to be harder to train and
influence the engineers. When these projects started in all four Nations, there were very few
engineers who had specific training or experience related to satellites. The purpose of defining
the recruitment target population was not to find people that had the desired skills, but to find
people that had the potential to learn the relevant skills.
Table 6-34: Engineer Recruitment Process Dimension
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After determining the target population for recruitment, the Implementers used various means to
spread the word about the opportunity to join the satellite project, including networking with
universities, asking the military to recommend candidates, advertising in public media, using
personal networks and recruiting among engineers from the nation that were studying or working
abroad. The use of personal networks emerged as a strong factor in all but one project. Most of
the Implementers also advertised with the media; the two exceptions are easily explained. For the
AlphaSat-R1 project, they did not use a large scale advertisement using news channels because
the Implementer and Overseer worked directly with stakeholder organizations (universities and
the military) to ask for nominations to the trainee team. For the GammaSat-R project, the
Implementer preferred informal networks as a means to find talented engineers that shared the
vision of the organization. It was a vision to harness technology and science research in order to
advance the country.
Table 6-35: Engineer Evaluation Process Dimension
ProessR
The four nations did not differ much in their evaluation process for the candidate engineers. All
used applications and interviews, even when they recruited via information methods. In Nation
Beta, there was the unique use of tests. Several Nation Beta engineers mentioned in interviews
that testing job applicants is common when recruiting for government positions. The tests for
Nation Beta focused on math from a secondary school level, communication and analytical
skills. The test provided a filter before the applications were review or interview invitations were
made. According to some in Nation Beta, the testing is important for employers because
unemployment is relatively high and there are many people pursuing each job opening.
Supplier Selection View
Table 6-36: Selected Dimensions from Supplier Selection View
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Supplier Selection View
Supplier Choosing Choose Join Call for Hire Open Call Travel to
Selection satellite personal invitation for selective Consultant for tour
Process supplier acquaintance collaboration Tendering to Review Proposals suppliers
Priority Differentiating Technical
Supplier among performano Training Spax Price University Schedule
upplier s and package heritage RelationshipAttributes suppliers flexibility , I I I 
_ I
Two dimensions are highlighted that show contrasts in how the six projects selected a Supplier to
provide training and the satellite. Only two projects overlap in their Supplier Selection Process,
although there is much more overlap in the attributes that Implementers and Overseers sought
when selecting their supplier.
Table 6-37: Supplier Selection Process and Priority Supplier Attributes Dimensions
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Table 6-37 shows the approaches used by each project for Supplier Selection. The approaches
can be divided between those that are more formal and exhaustive and those that are less formal
and rely on personal interaction. The information methods are listed first - choosing a personal
acquaintance and joining a Supplier based on an invitation to collaborate (AlphaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-RI projects). The more formal approaches include an open call for proposals, selective
tendering (inviting a few Suppliers for proposals), traveling to visit multiple suppliers and hiring
a consultant to review potential offers. These tools were used for the AlphaSat-R1, GammaSat-
RI, BetaSat-R2/R3 and DeltaSat-R2 projects. Nation Alpha used both formal and informal
methods. They started with a more formal approach to review many suppliers, but changed to an
informal approach for their second project. Nation Beta went the opposite direction. They used a
more informal approach in the first project, then formalized for their second project. This is an
interesting dichotomy because in some ways the more formal approach requires more technology
knowledge or the support of consultant. A formal approach implies that the Implementer is
evaluating a broad range of Suppliers and comparing the technical and cost characteristics. This
is a challenging task; one might expect nations to start informally and become more formal over
time. Nation Gamma used a formal, exhaustive process for their first project and sought to
evaluate the offerings from most small satellite suppliers in the market. They chose to continue
with the same supplier for their second remote sensing satellite through a more informal process.
As Implementers and Overseers reviewed the characteristics and project proposals of potential
suppliers, they placed high priority on several attributes. Four or more projects highlighted
technology performance, the nature of the training package and heritage in small satellites as key
issues. The Implementers sought high technology relative to the time period and the cost, so that
was a moving target over time and across suppliers. For the AlphaSat-R2 and GammaSat-RI
projects, technology flexibility was a key reason that Nation Alpha and Nation Gamma chose to
work with Supplier Taul. They found this supplier, with relatively little experience as a firm, to
be willing to make changes to their technology to suit the customer. These two satellite projects
were the Supplier's first sales of full satellite systems. The GammaSat-Ri project highly valued
schedule as part of the selection process. The DeltaSat-R2 project stands out for choosing a
Supplier with strong space heritage but less experience in small satellites. The satellite the
Supplier Sigmal sold to Nation Delta was small compared to their other satellites, but much
larger than the other satellites in these case studies. Supplier Sigmal was not focused on the
small satellite market.
Facility View
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Table 6-38: Selected Dimensions from Facility Architectural View
Generic Forms Functn? Examples of Formfrom Existing Projects
Facility View
Supplier Facility Defining Supplier Temporary Transitional Purpose-Built
Status Facility State
Implementer Defining
Implemte Implementer Temporary Transitional Purpose-Built
Facility Status Facility State III
These two dimensions from the Facility Architectural View show the status of the Supplier and
Implementer Facilities as either temporary (early in organization's history and not designed for
their needs); transitional (changing from temporary to purpose built); or purpose-built (designed
for needs of organization).
Table 6-39: Supplier Facility Status and Implementer Facility Status Dimensions
Table 6-39 shows how Supplier and Implementer Facility status evolved during the projects. As
described above, two of the suppliers (Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul) transitioned from
being small, university spinoff firms to medium sized firms. Part of that transition included
moving from temporary to transitional to purpose-built phases in their facilities. Supplier
Omegal worked with Nation Alpha (AlphaSat-R1) and Nation Beta (BetaSat-RI) in a temporary
facility, and then they worked with Nation Beta (BetaSat-R2/R3) in a time of facility transition
while establishing new purpose built facilities. Soon after the completion of BetaSat-R2 & R3,
Supplier Omegal completed a major facility transition into dedicated facilities. Supplier Taul
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worked with Nation Alpha in a transitional facility status then with GammaSat-R1 in a purpose-
built facility. As the well established firm, Supplier Sigmal was not making facility transitions
during the DeltaSat-R2 project.
All of the Implementers made some level of facility change during their satellite projects, which
adds to the complexity of executing the projects. Between the AlphaSat-R1 and AlphaSat-R2
projects, the Nation Alpha Implementer transitioned several times to gradually improve the
facility they had in order to do hardware work. They eventually set up a satellite integration and
testing facility that enabled them to do some integration work for AlphaSat-R2 at the
Implementer Site. This facility included electronics and optical labs as well as clean room space
and a crane for lifting the satellite. During the BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R2 projects, Nation Beta
also made major facility transitions. They started in rented office buildings with no hardware
work space. During the BetaSat-R2 project, they inaugurated a new campus to house the national
space agency headquarters and a center focused on satellite engineering. They gradually worked
toward installing hardware laboratories. During GammaSat-R1, Implementer Gammal was in an
early facility that had primarily office space and little hardware space. They added a ground
control and data receiving system, but also made plans for a dedicated building that would
include hardware workspace. Nation Delta is shown as making partial transitions because the
core part of Implementer Deltal did not change due to the satellite project, they were already in a
purpose-built facility. A new facility was established for the satellite operations team, however,
at a location which was several hours drive from the main office.
Training View
Table 6-40: Selected Dimensions from Training View
Training View
Defining project NASA Phase NASA Phase NASA Phase NASA
Training Project Phase phase that trainees A B C Phase D
experience
Non-
Providing Technical U.r License to technical
Theoretical Training theoretical training satellite Deres Technical training
to Engineers lectures Documentation lectures and
conferences
Providing Practical Group Mission Skill-based Technical Language
Practical Training Training to Design training demos classes
Engineers Exercise courses
Providing On the On the job Building a
On the Job Training Job training to tasks under training
Engineers mentor satellite
Mentor-Trainee Defining level of Informal Formal System
Accountability System formalityfor System
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mentor-trainee
accountability
Table 6-40 shows five dimensions from the Training Architectural View. The first highlights the
time dimension of the training experience for the Implementer engineers. The next three show
what elements of training that engineers received in three distinct categories - theoretical,
practical and On the Job. The final dimension provides a glimpse into the mentoring system for
each project.
Table 6-41: Training Project Phase Dimension
Training Project AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat-R2/ GamnmaSat- DeltaSat-
Phase R1 R2 R1 BetaSat-R3 R1 R2
NASA Phase A
Mission and
Requirements
Definition Partial
NASA Phase B
Preliminary
Design Partial Partia
NASA Phase C
Detailed Design
NASA Phase D ctoda
Assembly/
integration/Test &
Launch
The Training Phase is emphasized as an important factor influencing t training experience
because each Phase of the satellite lifecycle requires different skills. The NASA Phases are used
as a convenient summary of four segments in the middle of the satellite lifecycle - Mission &
Requirements Definition, Preliminary Design, Detailed Design, and Assembly/Integration/Test
& Launch. All the trainee engineers experienced the later phases of the project (Phase C and D).
The projects varied in terms of how the engineers participated in Phases A and B. In some cases,
the engineers arrived at the Supplier site later than expected. They were supposed to participate
in Phase A and B, but their arrival was delayed by logistical or regulatory issues such as visa.
Few engineers experienced all of NASA Phase A because that phase emphasizes the early design
of a satellite. For all of the satellites except AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2, the satellite was based
on a previously used design. The work for Phase A on a project that builds on a previously used
design is greatly decreased compared to the Phase A work for a new design. During BetaSat-R2
the satellite was based on a new design. The visiting engineers from Nation Beta arrived at
Supplier Omegal in two groups. One group experienced Phase A and B of the BetaSat-R2
project. The second group primarily experienced Phase B of the BetaSat-R3 satellite and Phases
C and D for both satellites. By identifying the satellite lifecycle phases that engineers experience,
one can learn which skills they spent most of their time practicing. This is further explored in the
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section on capability building where the skills related to different parts of the satellite lifecycle
are discussed. Table 6-41 shows that fewer engineers gained experience in the early design
phases of a mission; more engineers from all projects gained experience in the later phases. In
some projects, this reality was increased because people were hired gradually throughout the
project and started to work at different phases. This was true for GammaSat-Ri, for example.
Table 6-42: Theoretical Training, Practical Training and On the Job Training Dimensions
The next three dimensions are combined because they are three parts of a whole. Together they
define all the training experiences that the Suppliers provided for the visiting engineers from the
Implementer team. Theoretical training aspects include lectures, university degrees and
conferences. For all the projects, the training included introductory lectures about satellites and
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the satellite engineering process. These lectures were generally given to the group of visiting
Implementer engineers when they arrived at the Supplier facility. In a few situations, engineers
arrived at the Supplier facility in small groups or as individuals; this sometimes led to the
lectures being held later in the visit. In only two projects, university degrees were pursued by
part of the teams during the training at the Supplier location. The university was the same in both
cases - University Omegal which partnered with Supplier Omegal to offer part time programs
for the trainees. In the AlphaSat-R1 project, the Implementer engineers ultimately decided that
there was not enough time to complete degrees and pursue the technical work at Supplier
Omegal. During a longer stay at Supplier Omegal, about a dozen engineers from Nation Alpha
did complete Master of Science degrees at University Omegal. They worked part time at the
university and part time at Supplier Omegal over a two year period. For about half of the
projects, the contract between Supplier and Implementer included access to technical
documentation about the satellite. This is included as theoretical training because it provides
access to explicitly documented knowledge, but such documentation may not include the
practical tacit information required to apply it. The blank box under GammaSat-R1 indicates that
the data is uncertain as to whether a license was provided. The BetaSat-R2 and DeltaSat-R2
projects are shown as having partial access to the documentation because the license was limited
to certain topics. For the BetaSat-R2/R3 project, for example, the Implementer received more
information about the training satellite BetaSat-R3 than the newly designed BetaSat-R2. For the
GammaSat-R1, Supplier Taul instituted a unique practice of providing lectures in non-technical
areas such as time management, cultural sensitivity and leadership. Supplier Taul also stands out
as the main partner that encouraged the visiting engineers to attend multiple conferences as
observers and presenters. Engineers from both Nation Alpha and Nation Gamma attended
conferences during their training period.
Ideally, the theoretical training laid a foundation that allowed the engineers to understand the
physics and mathematical principles behind the practical and on the job training. Few of the
engineers that received training with the Suppliers had previous theoretical training specific to
satellite engineering. Suppliers offered several types of practical training that emphasized
specific skills. The projects with Supplier Omegal and Supplier Sigmal all included a Group
Mission Design Exercise during which the trainers gave the visiting engineers the assignment to
conduct the early design of a mission. As mentioned above, the engineers were often not present
for the early design phase of their own satellite, so the opportunity to do a practice design was
significant in that light. Supplier Taul did not use the Group Design Exercise, in part because
their overall training approach emphasized technical assignments related to completing the
satellite task more than assignments related to practicing satellite engineering principles. All
projects included some opportunities for learning specific skills, however. Most projects are
shown as partial. This indicates that individual members of the Implementer engineer team
pursued courses in areas such as programming, soldering or the use of a software modeling tool.
These courses were defined based on their disciplinary specialty within the satellite engineering
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team, so each engineer needed different training. For the BetaSat-R2/R3 project, Supplier
Omegal provided a few skill-based courses to every visiting engineer in the areas of soldering
and modeling satellite orbits. Similarly, Supplier Omegal made an effort to expose all the
BetaSat-R2 engineers to several types of technical demonstrations designed to instruct them in
how to operate within satellite hardware laboratories. Other Suppliers exposed individual
engineers to practical demonstrations related to their disciplines. In three of the projects language
classes were an integral part of the training because the Suppliers and Implementers did not
speak the same first language. This was true for the Nation Alpha working with Supplier Taul;
for Nation Gamma working with Supplier Taul and for Nation Delta working with Supplier
Sigmal.
Throughout all the satellite projects, the Suppliers also provided On the Job Training. This was
the primary opportunity for the visiting engineers to learn how satellite engineering is done in
practice. In two projects under Supplier Omegal, the OJT was supplemented by the visiting
engineers working on a training satellite. During BetaSat-Ri, they worked on a model but did
not bring it to a flight quality status. During the BetaSat-R2/R3 project, the BetaSat-R3 satellite
started as a training model that was not designed to be launched. As the project progressed, the
decision was made to fly BetaSat-R3 and it transitioned from being a training model to a full
satellite project. This had both advantages and disadvantages from a training perspective. The
advantage was that the Nation Beta engineers were not closely involved in a project for a flight
satellite. They were still assigned to take on the primary responsibilities of building, integrating
and testing the satellite. They worked in Supplier Omegal's facilities under supervision of
supplier engineers. The decision to fly the satellite increased the urgency to do work of excellent
quality. The decision also changed the risk profile for the Supplier. Although BetaSat-R3 was
designed to be a practice model on which Nation Beta engineers could learn about satellite
engineering, Supplier Omegal wanted to ensure the success of the satellite since it was built
under their name. After deciding to launch the BetaSat-R3 satellite, Supplier Omegal increased
the amount of oversight and guidance they provided to the Nation Beta engineers. The decision
to launch created a tension between the need to have a successful satellite and the need to ensure
that the Nation Beta engineers had a useful learning experience.
Table 6-43: Mentor-Trainee Accountability System Dimension
BetaSat-
Mentor-Trainee AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat-R1 R.2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Accountability R1 R2 BetaSat- R1 R2
System R3
Iformal System
FornaI Syster PartialNE R
The final dimension from the Training View gives one example of the style of mentoring that
dominated each project. The mentoring relationship was a major aspect of the training
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experience for each project. The Suppliers assigned individual mentors to each engineer. The
mentors had great influence on the training experience because they defined the engineer's area
of specialization, their daily work tasks and the level of formality or accountability that the
engineer experienced. The term Formal Mentoring system is used here to mean that there was a
common structure that defined for all trainees how they documented interaction with their
advisor and work progress. For informal systems, there was no common structure and mentors
defined their own ad hoc communication and documentation patterns. As on overall trend, most
projects involved an informal relationship between the Supplier mentors and visiting engineers.
During BetaSat-R2/R3, this was different because a newly hired training manager at Supplier
Omegal provided specific guidance to encourage consistent communication channels between
mentors and visiting engineers. The training manager design templates for regular evaluations
and encouraged mentors to write their expectations for the performance of the engineers in work
plans. During the BetaSat-RI project, there was a partially formal system because some mentors
naturally chose to structure their mentoring approach by documenting tasks and meeting
outcomes. The DeltaSat-R2 project is shown as a combination of formal and informal. The large
Supplier Sigmal did have a formal schedule for the overall training activities of the engineers. In
the personal relationships between the engineers and mentors, there was a combination of formal
and formal accountability patterns. In all the projects, there was some mechanism for the
Suppliers to send feedback to decision makers at the Implementer Organization about the
progress of the visiting engineers. It is not immediately clear which approach to mentoring is
more effective to provide opportunities for capability building. A less formal mentoring
relationship can be effective in a setting in which the visiting engineer is integrated into the
Supplier team and working alongside Supplier engineers on project tasks. There may not be
explicit meetings for the mentor to give the engineer feedback as a trainer, but there are natural
opportunities for feedback through the normal project management process. A formal mentoring
relationship may be more valuable when a visiting engineer is not naturally engaged with the
same tasks as the mentor. Perhaps the visiting engineer is focused on a training satellite, on
practical learning exercises to understand a programming or modeling technique, or on a part of
the satellite project that is decoupled from the work by the mentor. In all these cases, a formal
mentoring system may be needed to ensure regular communication between the mentor and
trainee. This dynamic is proposed in Table 6-44.
Table 6-44: Potential relationship scenarios that align well with Informal and Formal Mentoring
Informal Mentoring Formal Mentoring
High Integration - visiting
engineers work closely with Potentially More Effective Potentially less effective
supplier engineers on joint
tasks for satellite project
Low Integration - visiting
engineers work separately Potentially less effective Potentially More Effective
from supplier engineers on
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learning tasks and decoupled
satellite project tasks
Contract View
Table 6-45: Select Dimension from Contract View
Genteric 2
~\A,.~wtesF or - romExistiP jct
Contract View
Defining
Contract
Supplier between Ground Launch Intellectual Pre-
Contract Implementer Satellite Trainig System Services Property launch
Contents License Data
Overseer andSupplier
One dimension is featured from the Contract View to explore how the contents of contracts
between Suppliers and Implementers were similar and different. As shown in Table 6-46, all of
the contracts included a commitment by the Supplier to produce a satellite and provide training.
The Implementers and Overseers in these projects explicitly sought Suppliers that could offer
training. The training, however, was a secondary product from the perspective of the Supplier.
For all the Suppliers, their primary business model focused on the design and delivery of
satellites to customers. The engineers that worked in the Supplier firms were hired based on their
skills in satellite engineering, not in training budding engineers. The Suppliers accepted a major
challenge by contractually committing to provide training during a business satellite lifecycle.
All the suppliers were at least partially responsible for providing the ground system and launch
services for the satellite. These suppliers specialized in satellites, but they also viewed
themselves as providing complete systems to their customers if desired. This meant they would
interface between the customer and the company that provided the ground system and launch
vehicle, if the contract included such services. The satellites in all cases were built in the
Supplier facility (with the main exception being that AlphaSat-R2 was partially integrated in
Nation Beta). The ground system needed to be set up in the Implementer nation in order to
facilitate independent operations by the Implementer team. Either the satellite Supplier or
representatives of the ground system supplier went to the Implementer Nation site to assist in
setting up the equipment. As discussed above, some contracts included access to intellectual
property. The training dimension emphasized the knowledge that engineers could gain from
reading the documentation. The contract also defined how the Implementers could use the
intellectual property after the project. Some contracts allowed the Implementers to have full use
of the technology - even for future profit making activity. Other contracts allowed only internal
use of the IP. The DeltaSat-R2 had one additional contractual perk. DeltaSat-R1 was based on a
series of similar satellites. Before DeltaSat-RI was complete, Supplier Sigmal provided data
from these similar satellites in order to start an early archive of the type of data that would be
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generated by DeltaSat-R2. Thus, Nation Delta received some benefit from the satellite even
before it was launched.
Table 6-46: Supplier Contract Contents Dimension
Technical Product View
Table 6-47: Selected Dimensions from Technical Product View
Technical Product View
Satellite Mass Defining mass of Less than 100 100 to 300 301 to 800
satellite kilograms kilograms kilograms
Satellite Defining design 3 years 5 years 7 years
Design Life life of satellite
Low resolution Medium High Science
Payload Delivery satellite Communication imager (100s resolution resolution Payload
service payload ofmeters) imager(10s imager
of mtr Iof meters) (meters)
Three dimensions from the Technical Product Architectural View are emphasized here because
together they provide an indication of the complexity level of each satellite. Using the values for
the three Technical Product dimensions, the seven satellites can be grouped into two categories
of higher and lower complexity. The complexity of a satellite generally increases with higher
mass, longer design life and a higher performance payload. Design life is the estimated lifetime
that Supplier proposes for the satellite. In order to increase design life, a Supplier will use design
approaches that increase the amount of consumables, increase the confidence in the electronic
components and locate the satellite in a longer lived orbit. The primary payloads for the seven
satellites in these projects were optical imagers. The performance of an optical imager increases
as the spatial resolution of its images increases. The measure of spatial resolution is the ground
sampling distance or the smallest object that can be distinguished in an image. Thus a better
spatial resolution has a smaller value.
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Table 6-48: Mass, Design Life and Payload Dimensions
AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat- GammaSat- DeltaSat-Mass R1 R2 R1 BeaR3 R1 R2
Less than 100 kg
100 to 300 kg
301 to 800 kg
AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat- GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Design Life R1 R2 R1 t b F RI R2BetaSat-R3
3 years es
5 years
AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat- GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Payload RI R2 R1 6-3 R1 R2BetaSat-R3
Communication
Payload
Low resolution
imager
(100s of meters)
Medium resolution
imager BetaSat-R3
(10s of meters)
High resolution ;!!I::RBetaSat-R12
imager (meters)
Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3 plot the three technical characteristics of the seven satellites. Each
bubble represents a satellite, where the size of the bubble in Figure 6-2 shows the satellites'
design life. The size of the bubble in Figure 6-3 shows the mass of the satellites. From both
figures it is clear that there are two groups of satellites. The more complex satellites are
AlphaSat-R2, GammaSat-R1, BetaSat-R2 and DeltaSat-R2. All of them have performance
payloads and medium to high mass. In Figure 6-3 these four satellites are grouped in a circle.
The three less complex satellites are also grouped together in Figure 6-3; they are AlphaSat-R1,
BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R3. Five of the seven satellites have design lifetimes of five years. The
shorter lifetime estimate for AlphaSat-R2 is understandable because it was a new design from a
new Supplier in a new orbit. The Supplier provided a conservative estimate. The graph in Figure
6-2 is partly displaying the overall time trend of the performance improvement of satellites with
a mass under 1000 kilograms. The satellites based on earlier designs are generally the less
complex, lower performing satellites (AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R3). The satellites
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based on later designs are more complex and powerful. As the performance of systems in the
small satellite class improved, customers demanded the best of each generation.
Satellite Technical Characteristics
Spatial Resolution vs Satellite Mass, size of sphere proportional
to Satellite Lifetime
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Figure 6-2: Graph of Spatial Resolution Vs Satellite Mass Shows Comparative Complexity
Satellite Technical Characteristics
Satellite Design Life versus Spatial Resolution, size of sphere
proportional to Satellite Mass
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Figure 6-3: Graph of Satellite Design Life versus Spatial Resolution Compares Satellite Complexity
Technical Approach View
Table 6-49: Selected Dimensions from Technical Approach View
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Technical Approach View
Heritage
Satellite Platform Defining heritage of Platform with Her with New Platform
Approach satellite platform Multiple One Flight
Flights
Satellite Defining Satellite
. .Small Satellite Traditional
Engineering Engineering Approach Approach
Approach Approach
Two dimensions summarize the Technical Approach Architectural View. The Satellite Platform
approach defines the number of times the core design for a satellite was used before the project.
The satellite platform is the design of the satellite bus (spacecraft excluding payload) that can be
repeated across missions. The platform includes a combination of subsystems that can
accommodate a certain range of payloads. The Satellite Engineering Approach describes the
overall philosophy of the satellite Supplier.
Table 6-50: Satellite Platform Approach and Satellite Engineering Approach Dimensions
There is an almost even split among the seven satellites into the three categories. Three of the
satellites - AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-R3 and DeltaSat-R2 - were designed based on a platform that
was previously used on multiple flights. The Supplier had experience observing how the
components and materials for the satellite operated in space. The risk of a satellite mission is
reduced by using a platform with the heritage of multiple flights. Two of the satellites - BetaSat-
RI and GammaSat-RI - were based on platform designs that had been flown just once before.
The other two satellites were new platforms and original designs. The AlphaSat-R2 new platform
was the basis for GammaSat-RI - both delivered by Supplier Taul. For a customer who chooses
a satellite, long platform heritage reduces risk but may also reduce technical performance. Both
Nation Alpha and Nation Beta chose to accept the risk of a new platform in their second satellite
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projects in order to have further control over the specifications and to allow their engineers to
participate in a fresh design.
The second dimension shows which satellites were built with a small satellite versus a traditional
satellite engineering approach. All the projects were built by Suppliers who follow the small
satellite philosophy except for DeltaSat-R2 working with Supplier Taul. This is not
representative of the satellite market. Again, it is a result of the case study selection and the
strong relationships within the space community. The core leadership of Supplier Taul learned
satellite engineering from Supplier Omegal and University Omegal. They continued with the
same design philosophy that Supplier Omegal taught. Both Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul
seek to build relatively small, focused satellites that are affordable and use the latest electronic
components. These electronic components were not necessarily designed to operate in space, but
they are capable of better performance than many space qualified components because they are
newer. The small satellite approach also includes working with small, closely knit teams. The
program management aspects are designed to reduce overhead and avoid unnecessary formality
or documentation.
Management View
Table 6-51: Select Dimension from Management View
Management View
Supplier and Supplier Supplier Trainee
trainee engineers engineers did engineers
Defining role of engineers presented; primary einr
Review Strategy supplier and trainee presented to trainees and presentations; pdri natis
during reviews customer customer customer to customer
management management management management
together reviewed reviewed
One major difference between the satellite projects was the division of labor during project
reviews. Project reviews are a management tool to monitor and communicate progress. For
satellite projects there are industry wide patterns of reviews that are designed to ensure each
phase of the satellite lifecycle is complete before proceeding. Generally, the Supplier is
responsible for presenting review material to their customer to demonstrate their effort. Because
the visiting engineers from the Implementer Organization worked alongside the Supplier on the
satellites, their role in the reviews was ambiguous. Different satellite projects defined roles in
several ways. The two projects with Supplier Taul were AlphaSat-R2 and GammaSat-RI. For
these projects, the Supplier and trainee engineers presented to the customer management
together. This aligns with other aspects of the Supplier Taul training approach. They integrated
the visitors closely into their teams. For the BetaSat-Ri and DeltaSat-R2 projects, the Supplier
engineers did the review presentations and the trainees joined the customer management to
review the work. The task of presenting and the task of reviewing are both technically
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challenging. In either case, the goal is to ensure that no problems are overlooked. The BetaSat-
R2 and BetaSat-R3 satellite projects were procured together, but the visiting Implementer
engineers from Nation Beta had different roles in the two projects. BetaSat-R2 was primarily the
responsibility of the Supplier engineers. The visiting Nation Beta engineers shadowed the
supplier engineers to learn their process. The Nation Beta engineers had more responsibility to
work on BetaSat-R3. Thus they had more responsibility in the BetaSat-R3 reviews. The Nation
Beta engineers presented to their own management with the coaching of the Supplier team to
demonstrate the progress of BetaSat-R3. The review process provides an opportunity for trainee
engineers to demonstrate their knowledge by either presenting or reviewing the work of the
supplier. Reviews are often high pressure events where engineers give a presentation and answer
questions by external reviewers or high level management. The review creates an environment
that tests the knowledge of the trainee engineers, especially when they are given responsibility.
Table 6-52: Review Strategy Dimension
BetaSat-
AlphaSat- |AlphaSat- |BetaSat- | R2/ |GammaSat- |DeltaSat-
R1 | R2 | R1I BetaSat- | R1 | R2
Review Strategy R
Supplier and trainee
engineers presented to
customer management
together
Supplier engineers
presented; trainees and
customer management
reviewed
Supplier engineers did
primary presentations;
customer management BetaSat-
reviewed R2
Trainee engineers did
primary presentations
to customer BetaSat
management R3
Policy View
Table 6-53: Select Dimension from Policy View
Policy View
Project Political Generating National Head National National Head
Champion Political Support of Govemment Minister of Statefor Project
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Table 6-54: Project Political Champion Dimension
BetaSat-
AlphaSat- |AlphaSat- |BetaSat- | R2/ |GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Project Political R1 | R2 | R1 |BetaSat- R1 R2
Champion ||| R3
National Head of
Govemnment Partial N/A
National Minister N/A
National Head of
State .... .... N/A
As discussed in the section on Contextual Opportunities and Constraints, all of the satellites in
these case studies were funded by governments. The role of a high level political champion to
initiate and maintain political support and funding was important in each project. This champion
role was played by people in different positions, especially the head of state, head of government
or a national minister. In Table 6-54 the label partial indicates that the political champion left
office during the timeframe of the project. The impact of the political champion can be especially
high at the very beginning and ends of projects. At the beginning, it may be necessary to
convince the nation or key decision makers that pursuing a satellite project is a good idea. At the
end of a project, several of these satellites experienced launch delays. The political champion
worked to help keep public support of the satellite projects despite disappointing delays and
uncertainty about the resolution. This was important for AlphaSat-R2, BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-
R3. Political Champions and their team members sometimes have to address policy challenges
and barriers by coordinating and negotiating with other nations. There was not one obvious
political champion for the DeltaSat-R2 project, but there were policy challenges that the Nation
Delta government had to resolve with their partners. (The table shows N/A because the data was
not applicable in this case study.) One negotiation brought together representative of the Supplier
Nation, the Implementer Nation, the launching nation and a neighbor of the launching nation to
resolve a dispute that delayed the launch. When Nation Alpha worked with Supplier Lambdal
for launch, there were policy challenges that required careful coordination with Nation Lambda.
The Project Political Champion thus plays the role of both support and problem solver in these
projects.
Cultural and Social View
Table 6-55: Select Dimension from Cultural and Social View
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trainee engineers System) System)
The final architectural view considers Cultural and Social aspects of the satellite projects. Here
the key example of social issues is the variation in types of educational training. The data
captures the type of university that engineers from the projects attended. Little was available on
this topic for AlphaSat-Rl (thus table is labeled N/A), but note that the engineers were farther
along in their careers than those from other cases. Many had already worked as professors or
professionals in industry.
Table 6-56: Education Background of Trainee Engineers Dimension
BetaSat-
Educational AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- R2/ GammaSat- DeltaSat-
Background of Trainee R1 R2 RI BetaSat- RI R2
Engineers R3
Local university N/A
degrees (national
system) Some Some Some
Local university N/A
degrees (international
system) Some
Foreign university N/A
degrees Some Some
Local technical N/A
diplomas Some
For the remaining projects, there is a blend of engineers with various backgrounds. The Nation
Beta engineers were generally educated within their own country. Some attended universities
and received their Bachelor of Engineering; others attended polytechnics and received technical
diplomas. The training for technical diplomas emphasizes practical knowledge over theoretical
aspects. The group that had this type of training was largely in the second group of trainees that
visited Supplier Omegal and worked on BetaSat-R3. They arrived during the last phases of
BetaSat-R3. In this way, their training in technology fit their assignment to work on the assembly
and integration of BetaSat-R3. The engineers from GammaSat-R1 had diverse backgrounds, in
part because the universities located in Nation Gamma are a mix of local and international
institutions. Several international systems are available within Nation Gamma. The type of
system influences the language of instruction and the curricular offerings. Several engineers took
advantage of nation programs to sponsor studies toward a Bachelors degree at a foreign
university. This was true for several engineers from Nation Delta and Nation Gamma. The
engineers that studied abroad before traveling to the Supplier site for satellite training had the
advantage of being more accustomed to living in a new location and potentially using a second
language in a working environment.
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6.1.2.3 Architectural Definition Step Seven
The timeline in Table 6-57 shows the major events for all six satellite projects in the case studies.
Five generic events are shown for each project: Facilitating Events, Project Initiation and
Approval, Trainees at Supplier Location, System and Facility Development and Satellite Launch.
The projects are displayed to give accurate relative dates, although the absolute dates are hidden
to preserve anonymity. The project duration is defined based on the years from initiation to
launch, although the project continued in an operational phase after launch. The first project to
start was AlphaSat-R1. The period from project initiation to launch was six years. The next
project was BetaSat-R1, which lasted for years. The project for AlphaSat-R2 started around the
same time as BetaSat-R1 and lasted nine years from initiation to launch. The DeltaSat-R2 project
lasted four years. The BetaSat-R2 project lasted five years; The GammaSat-RI project started
around the same time and launched within three years. The project timing is highly influenced by
the launch. The actual time to design and build these satellites at the Supplier site is between 2
and 5 years. Both of Nation Alpha's satellites faced multiyear launch delays. For various
reasons, the Implementer and Overseer Organizations took responsibility for arranging the
launches and it was a complex and time consuming process. Finding the launch for AlphaSat-R2
was even more complex because of the requirement to go to an uncommon orbit. During project
years 12 to 15, AlphaSat-R2 was essentially complete, but the Nation Alpha team continued to
work on it and improve it while they sought a launch.
The timelines also show how long engineers from the Implementer teams spent visiting and
working at the Supplier sites. These training periods range from one to four years. For projects
AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-RI and DeltaSat-R2 one large team spent the entire period with the
supplier. For projects AlphaSat-R2, BetaSat-R2, BetaSat-R3 and GammaSat-R1, the transitions
between the home nation and Supplier nation were more fluid or the teams arrived in groups.
The most fluid living situation was that of the GammaSat-RI team. The Nation Gamma
engineers traveled frequently between Nation Gamma and Nation Tau in order to maintain
responsibilities in both places while being primarily based in Nation Tau with Supplier Taul.
These projects occurred over a period of about two decades. During this time, the small satellite
technology transitioned from being the realm of university research to being used for commercial
data production.
Table 6-57: Joint Timeline for Six Satellite Projects
Project Year AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R21 GammaSat- DeltaSatR2RI R2 BetaSat-R3 RI
Facilitating
Event;
2
3
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6.1.3 Reflections on Project Architecture
The discussion above defmed a seven step process by which to describe the architecture of an
existing system. This section reflects on the approach as well as the implications of the
architectural descriptions of the six collaborative satellite projects.
Critique of Definition of Architecture
There are some weaknesses in the seven step process used here to describe the architecture of an
existing system. The seven steps are as follows: 1) Identify Primary Stakeholders for which the
system is designed to produce value; 2) Identify the constraints/opportunities, requirements and
objectives of the stakeholders; 3) Define the functions required to achieve Part 2; 4) Identify the
generic objects of form that execute the functions; 5) Identify the set of alternatives for specific
forms; 6) Group the dimensions (combinations of function, form and generic forms) into
categories that represent stakeholder views; and 7) Summarize how the system changed over
time. The weaknesses of these seven steps relate to their handling of stakeholders, project
structure, the interactions between elements of form, and the set of potential forms. The first step
for architectural definition is to define stakeholders. The description above focuses only on the
primary stakeholders of the Implementer and Overseer Organizations. These are certainly
important stakeholders, but a much richer description of stakeholder objectives and concerns can
increase understanding of the system. The second area of weakness is the treatment of project
structure. System structure is an aspect of architecture that describes the arrangement of system
elements in physical space or the relationships between elements of form. A deeper exploration
of stakeholder relationships is one aspect of describing system structure, but structure can also be
considered in terms of relationships between other forms such as individuals and technology.
The third weakness of the view above is that it does not provide a convenient way to consider the
interactions between elements of form in the project systems. The assignment of a specific
instance of form to a particular function in one Architectural View may impact the opportunity to
assign form to a function in another Architectural View. The fourth weakness is that the
discussion above is limited by the data from six collaborative satellite projects. It shows potential
options for forms that can be assigned to functions based on the set of forms used by the six
projects. In general, there may be additional examples of form that are valid options. These
additional options are not presented above. Each of these weaknesses is discussed further below.
Stakeholders
The discussion on system context identified the Implementer and Overseer Organizations as the
Primary Stakeholders of the collaborative satellite projects. This is a useful first step; it allows a
definition of the project requirements and objectives based on a narrow set of organizations. In
general, however, a stakeholder is any organization that is impacted by or that impacts a system.
The actual list of stakeholders for collaborative satellite projects is much longer. Some of the
generic categories of stakeholders that might be involved in any of the six collaborative satellite
projects include the following: Satellite Data End Users, Citizens in the Implementer Country,
National Government of the Implementer Country, Government Funding Bodies in Implementer
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Country, Government Regulatory Bodies in Implementer Country; Complementary Firms in
Implementer Country; Competitor to Implementer; Implementer and Overseer Employees;
Launch Provider; Launch Vehicle Manufacturer; Launch Facility Operator; Supplier, Supplier
Subcontractor, Supplier Competitor; Supplier Employees; Supplier Government Regulator;
Supplier Community. Depending on the context, some of these categories may overlap in various
ways. The purpose of a stakeholder analysis is to examine the nature of the relationship between
actors in a system in order to better understand how their needs are aligned or misaligned. The
Implementer is the central stakeholder in the collaborative satellite projects. They interact with
many of the other stakeholders, but the analysis can also consider non-central interactions that do
not involved the Implementer.
Figure 6-4 provides a starting point to extending the consideration of stakeholder relationships
and needs in collaborative satellite projects. The figure is a Stakeholder Value Network for a
generic collaborative satellite project similar to those described in this thesis. A Stakeholder
Value Network is a tool to show the flow of value in the form of exchanges by actors in a
system. Value is a benefit that comes at a particular cost to a stakeholder. There are four types of
value flows in a Stakeholder Network; they are political, information, goods & services and
financial. These four types of value cover a broad range of interactions. Figure 6-4 shows many
of the generic stakeholder categories introduced above. The stakeholders are shown in boxes that
are color coded to identify their countries. Each stakeholder is associated with the Implementer,
Launch Provider or Supplier. In general, some of the stakeholders, such as subcontractors to the
supplier, may be from additional countries. The value flows in the network are color coded to
indicate whether they are can be described as political, information, goods/services or financial
flows. The Implementer is placed at the center of the network. The Implementer works closely
with the Implementer Employees, Overseer, Supplier and Launch Provider to pursue the project.
In some cases, the Implementer interacts with other parts of the national government and
regulators by way of the Overseer. The Overseer is usually a government organization that
represents the Implementer in matters of funding, regulation and aligning activity with the
national vision. Part of the Implementer's purpose is to provide benefit to the General Public in
their country by delivering information about the state of the environment in the Implementer's
country. In some cases, the Implementer does not interact directly with the general public; there
are government data users that receive information from the Implementer and convert that into
services that more directly impact the general public. For example, if the Implementer operates a
satellite that captures images of an area with risk of flooding, they may send those images to a
government office concerned with emergency management. This emergency management office
will process the information and combine it with other types of data to produce a
recommendation to the government and to citizens about how to reduce their risk. They may
issue a warning that some citizens should temporarily relocate. Through such a process, there is
value flow from the Implementer to the General Public. The value loop is completed if the Public
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returns political support to the Government Data Users, and they return political support to the
Implementer.
Key:
- Political -
- Information -
- Goods/Service
- Financial -
Implementer Country
Supplier Country I
Supplier Govemment Viss Launch Provider Country
Launch Provider
Launch ehicle Launch Facility Access
1
Launch Vehicle Launch Facility
Manufacturer Operator
Figure 6-4: Preliminary Stakeholder Value Network for Generic Satellite Project
The Supplier and Launch Service Provider each exist in their own context with a set of close
stakeholders. There are a few examples of value flowing across country contexts. One value loop
relates to the process of getting visas that allow engineers from the Implementer Organization to
spend months working at the Supplier Organization. In this value loop, the Supplier submits
requests for visas to the Immigration Regulator in their country. The Immigration Regulator
grants visas to the Implementer Employees. The Employees provide skills and work effort to the
Implementer who provides payment to the Supplier. A stakeholder analysis, using a tool such as
a Stakeholder Value Network, is one way to broaden the description of the architecture of a
system. There are other frameworks to analyze stakeholders. Some consider issues such as power
instead of value flows. Future work can collect data for the specific collaborative satellite
projects to see how their stakeholder interactions are similar and different.
Structural Aspects of Project Architecture
The Stakeholder Value Network is one way to explore the structure of the satellite project
architecture. There are many other aspects of system structure as well. The structure of a system
defines the relationship between elements of system form. The structure may show a literal
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relationship, such as the layout of objects in physical space. Structure can also show figurative
relationships, such as the relationships between teams in an organizational hierarchy. The
approach presented above has limited discussion of structure. This is partly due to the available
data and partly due to the focus on the functional aspects of the architecture. There are five major
categories of form in the collaborative satellite projects: Individuals, Organization, Technical
Products, Technical Equipment and Facilities. A description of structure could elucidate
relationships within and between these categories. Individuals have relationships with each other
both within and across organizations. In these projects, most individuals work within small teams
that are defined based on function. The functional teams sometimes need to work closely with
other functional teams to achieve their goals. One potentially useful description of structure
would be to show how individuals on different small teams interacted. For example, while an
Implementer Engineer was working at the Supplier on the Operations Team, which other
engineers from the Supplier Organization did he work closely with? In addition, which engineers
who were based at the Implementer Organization did he work closely with? The structure of
these team interactions could reveal examples of who had common learning opportunities. Each
of the three Suppliers had different Organizational Structures. For two of the Suppliers, they
began as small, university out firms and grew into medium sized, independent firms. As they
grew, their organizational structure evolved. Nation Beta worked with Supplier Taul at two
stages of their organizational evolution. A structural description could explore potential impacts
of the change on the Implementer engineers. The major technology products in these projects are
the satellites. Each satellite has particular structural architecture that is defined by the needs to
withstand the operational environment and launch. There is also a structure that defines the way
the satellite interacts with other aspects of the larger technical system - including the launch
vehicle, ground station, image processing system and data customers. Finally, satellite projects
take place in the context of technical equipment and facilities. These also have a structure that
may be described. Some of the equipment and facilities are generic - such as the desks and
offices where engineers work. Some of the equipment and facilities are highly specialize to
satellite engineering. The physical arrangement of equipment and facilities may impact the
project participants. For example, the arrangement of desks and office space may influence
interaction patterns between engineers and the size of work facilities may influence the number
of people that participate in specific engineering activities. There is potential to learn from
further descriptions of structure in future work.
Interactions between Forms
The third weakness of the architectural definition is that it does not indicate potential interactions
between elements of form. The architecture is divided into Views. Each view is composed of
various dimensions. A dimension includes one instance of a function, a generic object of form
that executes that function and a set of specific objects of form that may be assigned to the
function. The process of architecting a system means assigning a specific object of form to each
function. The Views and Dimensions are one convenient way to introduce the functions and set
of decisions. The functions are listed in tables as if each decision of a specific form is
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independent of other decisions. In reality, there is the potential for dependencies between
different dimensions. Choosing a particular object of form in one dimension may influence or
constrain the choice of form in another dimension. The data generated in this study gives initial
indications of some of these relationships, but future work is needed to confirm and clarify them.
Table 6-58 gives some examples of the relationships identified between dimensions in different
architectural views or between contextual factors and architectural dimensions. This is not an
exhaustive list, but it illustrates the types of reasoning that underlie this discussion. The first
example considers how the choice of Supplier Organization influences the Role Assignment
Philosophy through which engineers from the Implementer Organization are appointed to
specific technical responsibilities during their visit to the Supplier. Once a Supplier is chosen,
several characteristics of the organization influence the potential role assignments for visiting
engineers. The team structure is often the basis for matching engineers to mentors. The satellite
lifecycle influences the choice because it determines the specific activities that Supplier
engineers pursue as they develop a satellite. The procurement approach determines the types of
technology that Suppliers buy and their level of interaction with subcontractors. All of this
influences the nature of responsibilities for engineers working in the Supplier context. Further
examples are explained in the table.
Table 6-58: Examples of Relationships between Project Dimensions
Influencing Influenced
Architectural Dimension Architectural Dimension Description
View View
The Approach to assigning roles for
the engineers during training is
influenced by the choice of Supplier
organization. Characteristics of the
Supplier Personnel Role Supplier such as their 
team
Organizational Assignment structure, project management
Organization Management Philosophy approach, satellite lifecycle,
technology development or
procurement approach all influence
the potential roles that engineers can
take during training.
The size of team of engineers that
visits the Supplier influences the
Implementer Role Role Assignment Philosophy. With
Organizational Visiting Assignment fewer team members, Implementers
TeamSize Management Philosophy may prioritize which roles they want
engineers to have or give them
multiple roles.
Organizational Supplier Supplier Supplier Several dimensions of the Supplier
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Selection Selection Organization Selection View come together to
Process, determine which Supplier
Priority Organization is chosen. The
Supplier Supplier organization selection is a
Attributes, function of the set of competing
Competing suppliers, the priority attributes and
Suppliers the selection process.
Constellations are a group of
satellites that fly in a coordinated
Technical Constellation Technical Orbital orbit, thus choosing to join a
Approach Participation Product View Characteristics constellation influences the orbital
characteristics of altitude and
inclination.
The satellite engineering approach
influences all the technical product
Satellite MassT i dimensions, especially mass,Technical Engineering Payload, payload and lifetime. The small sat
Approach Approach Product Lifetime, etc approach tends toward smaller, less
complex satellites. They trade cost
for reliability and performance to
some extent.
Project Contextual Level of If there is high policy infrastructure,
Policy View Approval Constraint and Space policy the approval process is likely to be
Process Opportunity infrastructure more structured.
Set of Potential Forms
A final critique of the architectural definition used to answer the research questions is that it only
includes the set of potential forms for each function that were used in case study projects. This
was done purposely, in part to provide scope. The forms were also limited because they represent
the set of examples for which there is concrete evidence. In general, however, it is possible for
other potential forms to be included. As a caveat to the reader, the set of options proposed for the
Implementer Organizations, Supplier Organizations, Supplier Selection Process, Engineering
Evaluation Process and other dimensions may be larger in theory than presented above. Future
work could consider more examples from other projects or propose examples that have not yet
been used.
Reflection on the Similarities and Differences of the Project Architectures
One of the benefits of defining and exploring the architectures of the six collaborative satellite
projects is that the architectural analysis highlights specific ways in which the projects are
similar and different. At a high level, the six collaborative projects are very similar. In each case,
the countries chose to pursue long term capability to build satellites locally by procuring a small,
remote sensing satellite and paying for training. These same countries could have chosen other
methods to reach the same goal. Based on the examples of other countries, here are a few
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alternative approaches: 1) Send engineers from the country to study at foreign universities. When
they return, have these graduates start a local satellite project and lead local students. 2) Start
satellite activities with a very simple university project that can be built with minimal outside
support, such as a CubeSat. 3) Start a government satellite project and hire external consultants
to work alongside government engineers in local facilities. 4) Buy a satellite to operate but do
not pay for satellite engineering training. The four countries did not pursue any of these
alternatives, thus they appear on the surface to be very similar. The detailed architectural
analysis, however, reveal many differences that may have significance in impacting their project
outcomes.
Table 6-59 presents some of the Architectural Dimensions in which Nations showed variation or
similarity as they assigned forms to functions. This is not an exhaustive list, but it illustrates an
overall trend that the countries made different choices more often than similar choices. In some
cases the variation is subtle. For example, in the dimension of Engineer Selection Organization,
all Implementers played that role, but they varied in how the Supplier Organization partnered
with them in that role. Other dimensions are much more distinct. The types of implementer
organizations, supplier organizations, team sizes, supplier selection processes, approaches to
theoretical and practical training - all of these dimensions represent significant variation among
the case study projects.
Literature in the Technological Learning community has not generally explored the many
options facing learning organizations as they pursue foreign technology sources to help them
gain new capabilities. The dimensions in both columns of Table 6-59 show that there are many
decisions to be made as part of interacting with a foreign technology source. Within each
decision there are several options. Technological learning literature does not provide empirical
examples or theoretical guidance about which options to consider. Other types of literature may
provide helpful guidance, however. This will be explored further in a later section.
Table 6-59: Examples of Architectural Dimensions that showed more and less variation among projects
Examples of Architectural Dimensions with Examples of Architectural Dimensions with
Variation Among Projects Similarity Across Projects
1. Implementing Organization 1. Overseer organization
2. Supplier Organization 2. Role of Implementer as Engineer Selection
3. Implementer Visiting Team Size At Supplier Organization
4. Role Of Supplier As Engineer Selection 3. Engineer Recruitment source
Organization for Implementer Engineers 4. Engineer evaluation process
5. Implementer Engineer Recruitment Process 5. Priority supplier attributes
6. Supplier Selection Process 6. Implementer facility status
7. Training Project Phase (that visiting 7. Supplier facility status
engineers experienced at supplier) 8. On the Job Training Approach
8. Theoretical training I
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9. Practical training
10. Mentor-trainee accountability system
11. Complexity of Technical Product
12. Satellite Platform Heritage
13. Satellite Engineering Approach
14. Role of Implementer Engineers in Reviews
15. Educational Background of Implementer
Engineers
Collaborative Satellite Projects as Complex, Socio-Technical Systems
As a final reflection on the architectural analysis, the answers to Research Questions 1 and 2 are
helpful in demonstrating the nature of the collaborative satellite projects as complex, socio-
technical systems. The list of Architectural Views and Dimensions clearly displays the social and
technical components of the systems and their functions. The analysis also shows that the
projects are complex even though their time scale and the number of people directly involved is
small compared to some complex systems such as a large corporation. The complexity of the
collaborative satellite projects is increased by the participation of organizations and individuals
from several organizations, located in several countries with several types of nationality, work
culture and educational backgrounds. These collaborative satellite projects provide a compelling
laboratory for studying the architecture of complex, socio-technical systems. They are complex
enough to be interesting, but not so complex that it is difficult to document their architectures.
6.2 Observations in Capability Building
The next two research questions explore the evidence regarding capability building from the
collaborative satellite projects. Research Question 3 asks, "What capability building experiences
do individuals have?" while Research Question 4 considers capability building achievements at
the organizational level. In preparing for answering the research questions, this section identifies
the relevant capabilities that individuals and organizations may build in the context of
collaborative satellite projects and defines capability building.
6.2.1 Technological Capabilities in Satellite Engineering
Technological Capability for both individuals and organizations refers to the ability to effectively
apply technology (products, processes and knowledge) to productive activity. The capabilities
required to participate in a certain technical area include applying the skills and mastering the
knowledge required to achieve the goals of that discipline. In the general area of satellite
engineering, there are many distinct skills and knowledge sets that make up the relevant
capabilities. These capabilities can be categorized using three axes: topic, level of application
and level of codification. The topic defines the discipline within satellite engineering to which a
capability relates. In satellite engineering the spectrum of topics includes those based on
technical principles and those related to project and program management. Level of applications
describes whether a capability is more theoretical or more applied. Theory is general and outside
the context of particular system. Application customizes general theory according the context of
218
a specific scenario. Level of codification describes whether a capability is based more on tacit or
explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is difficult to express in words, whereas explicit knowledge
is well documented or easy to document. A given topic may include elements which vary along
the spectrum of application level and codification level. The three axes of topic, level of
codification and level of application are shown graphically in Figure 6-5.
Capabilities for satellite Level of Codification
engineering may vary More Explicit
along
these three dimensions More Managerial
Knowledge: More Theoretical Skills: More Applied
Level of
Application
More Technical
Topic
More Tacit
Figure 6-5: Three axes of satellite engineering capabilities are topic, codification and application
An illustrative example that shows how a single topic can include multifaceted aspects is the
topic of requirements management. This is one of the early steps of the satellite development
process; it involves defining the technical performance requirements that will satisfy the needs of
the customer or stakeholder. After the definition of requirements, the management continues by
documenting requirements, specifying them at increasing levels of detail, managing changes and
verifying that requirements are met. Referring to the application axis in Figure 6-5, there are both
theoretical and applied aspects of requirements management. Referring to the codification axis,
there are both tacit and explicit aspects of requirements management. Examples of these
variations are given in Table 6-60. The table is created by choosing a specific point along the
Topic Axis and exploring the plane that varies along the application and codification axes.
Table 6-60: Example showing how the topics of Requirements Management have elements along codification and application
axes
Topic: Requirements Application Axis
Management Theoretical Applied
0 Understanding physics e Applying physics
principles that govern system principles to define a
Codification Explicit performance feasible requirement
Axis E Understanding the e Writing requirements with
documented guidance to write one actor applying one
requirements with one actor, action to one object
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one action and one object
* Understanding the process of 0 Using the documentation
documenting requirement process to update a
changes requirement
* Understanding the concepts * Writing clear,
that characterize unambiguous
Tacit requirements that effectively requirements
capture and communicate 0 Translating stakeholder
stakeholder needs goals into technical
s nrequirements
Table 6-60 explores various facets of the work to generate, document and manage changes in
requirements for a satellite system. The table is divided into quadrants that represent different
combinations of codification and application. Examples of tasks are placed into quadrants
according to their nature. In each row examples are paired to show how a particular task is
multifaceted. The top row shows two sides of the capability to ensure that a requirement for a
satellite system is feasible because it is based on sound physics principles. On one hand, this
capability is theoretical because it includes having knowledge of the general physics principles
that govern the system performance. On the other hand, this capability is applied because the
physics knowledge is used in the context of a specific requirement and system. This capability
straddles two sides of the application axis, but it is only on one side of the codification axis. The
knowledge that this capability is based on is explicit. The physics principles that govern the
system performance are well documented. This is true unless the system is attempting a truly
novel activity that is not yet defined by science, but that scenario is ignored here. The guidance
that requirements should consider physics principles to write feasible requirements is also well
documented. Thus, this capability is explicit, theoretical and applied. Similar explanations can be
made for the next two rows. There are both theoretical and applied aspects to writing
requirements with the correct scope of one actor, action and object and to using a documentation
process to update a requirement. The knowledge on which both of these capabilities is based is
explicit. In contrast, the last row of Table 6-60 gives an example of a capability within the topic
of requirements management that is theoretical, applied and tacit. The applied task is to write
clear requirements that translate stakeholder goals into technical needs. This task is based on a
theoretical understanding of the concepts that describe effective requirements. The pair of
capabilities is described as tacit because the concepts that describe effective requirements are not
well documented or easy to document. Defining what makes a clear, unambiguous requirement
relies on intuition and an understanding of human information processing. The process of
translating stakeholder goals into technical requirements relies on a creative process that happens
within an engineer based on their experience and training. There is not a clear set of steps to
guide that creative process. Engineers improve in this skill through experience. Thus, this pair of
capabilities is tacit. Requirements management, as one topic within satellite engineering,
includes multiple levels of codification and application. The same can be said for the other
capabilities within satellite engineering that are introduced below.
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In order to observe capability building within the case studies, the items included in the Topic
Axis from Figure 6-5 are defined at both the individual and organizational level. At the level of
individual capability for the Implementer engineers, one convenient way to divide the topics for
satellite engineering is based on the skills and applied knowledge required to achieve each step
of the satellite lifecycle. This is done in Table 6-61. The lifecycle includes defining the project,
defining and managing requirements, applying software tools to design the satellite system,
manufacturing the satellite hardware and developing software, testing hardware and software,
and launching and operating the satellite. Throughout the lifecycle there are activities that apply
management tools to monitor and control the project. In each lifecycle phase, specific topics
within satellite engineer are evoked, as shown in Table 6-61. Each topic includes one or more
activities that further specify the capabilities.
Table 6-61: Overview of individual Capabilities
Capabilities for Individual Implementer Engineers divided by Topic
i EActivities Within Satellite EngineeringSatellite Engineering Topics Topics
Project Proposal And Approval
Technology Evaluation And Development
Training Program Definition
Project Definition Organizational Establishment
Supplier Selection
Requirements Generation
Launcher Selection
Requirements Gathering And
Requremets Mnage r tManagement
Software Tools Discipline Software Application
System Modeling
Functional Design
Physical Design
Designnalsi
Process Planning
Operations Planning
Material Selection And Planning
Material Procurement
Procurement, Manufacture, Assembly, Integration Sytmanufacurin
Subsystem Integration, Including Software
Software Development
Functional Subsystem Testing
Functional System Testing
Environmental Testing
Verification + Validation_
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Risk Assessment + Management
Stakeholder Communication
Anomaly Management
Management & Documentation Schedule Management
Financial Management
Personnel Management
Launch Launch Campaign Execution
Operations Operations And Ground StationMaintenance
At the level of organizations, a similar capability framework is defmed that captures activities
achieved by the group. This framework is designed to parallel work done in other technical
areas, therefore it builds on ideas by Dahlman and Westphal. This framework emphasizes
Production Capability, Investment, and Innovation Capability"" as core skills within technology
enterprises in many industries. Because of the unique features of the satellite industry, the
framework is altered to address the space lifecycle. Satellites have a dual nature compared to
many consumer products. Satellites can be thought of both as products and as infrastructure that
produces a product. A satellite is the product of a government or commercial organization that
manufactures satellites. Some organizations have the business model of operating satellites and
producing useful services and information products. In this view, satellites are a production
facility for data or communication service. Thus, the idea of "production capability" is used to
refer both to the production of satellites and the production of information services by using
satellites.
The proposed framework also considers role of production, investment and capability at two
levels. One is at the level of an individual satellite project. The second is at the level of the
operation of a satellite development organization. There are aspects of these three areas
(production, investment and innovation) at both levels. During a single project, the production
capabilities are demonstrated by operating the satellite as a production facility for information.
This is a technically challenging task. If the satellite exhibits unexpected behavior, the operations
team must work with whatever information the satellite sends to determine and correct the
problem. They cannot access the satellite directly; instead they rely on a limited set of status
updates from the satellite. Production capability is also demonstrated by the process of
manufacturing, assembling and testing a satellite. This process utilizes a set of specialized
equipment and facilities. For each satellite project, there is a need to exercise investment
capability in order to define the project, interact with a potential customer or end user to gain
project approval and to design the system. During the project approval and definition process,
initial designs for the satellite and operations approach are proposed in order to prove the
feasibility and estimate the cost of the end product. Once the project is approved, a full, detailed
system design is done. This harnesses all the technical specialists in the satellite subsystems.
Innovation, in the context of a single satellite project, refers to inventions and innovations related
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to developing new products. Inventions refer to the development of new technology, while
innovations refer to applying the invention in an economic context. Innovation during a project
implies that a technical product is developed, such as a specific camera or subsystem component.
There may also be scientific research that supports the long term invention of such products.
At the level of operating a satellite development organization over the long term, there are also
aspects of production capability, investment capability and innovation capability to acquire. A
satellite development organization may be a government or commercial entity. In the case
studies there are examples of both. Production capability at the organizational level refers to
operation of the complex and specialized infrastructure required to facilitate a series of satellite
projects. Some of the infrastructure is for specific subsystem teams; some is for testing and
assembling the entire satellite system. At the level of a satellite organization, investment
capability includes establishing infrastructure, defining a series of projects and working for
business development or government approval of a series of projects. Here a satellite program
refers to a series of related projects that moves the organization or customer toward an overall
goal. For example, a new satellite owner may plan to buy a series of satellites, each of which has
increasing performance and complexity. Investment skills at the organizational or program level
are similar to that of a single project, but require longer term planning and strategy. Also, the
establishment of infrastructure for satellite assembly and testing is a unique skill set. This
involves defining requirements for the infrastructure, selecting equipment suppliers and
managing the procurement and commissioning process. Innovation capability at the
organizational level refers to process inventions and innovations. In the satellite context, this
could refer to the satellite manufacturing and test process or to other organizational processes,
such as managing technical risks, addresses unexpected problems or organizing personnel. The
framework distinguishes between incremental and major inventions or innovations. The
incremental changes build on what was previously done, while the major changes bring a radical
new approach.
Table 6-62: Overview of Organizational Capability Categories
Individual Satellite Project Satellite Development Organizations
Production Satellite System Operation - Satellite Infrastructure Operation
Capability Satellite System Manufacture, and MaintenanceAssembly, Test
- Satellite Program Business
- Satellite Project Business Development or Approval
Investment Development or Approval - Satellite Program (Multiple
Capability - Satellite Project Definition Projects) Definition
- Satellite System Design - Satellite Infrastructure
Establishment
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- Incremental Product invention 
- Incremental Process invention(creation) 
-creation)
Innovation - Incremental Product innovation Incremental Process innovation
Capability (implementation) (implementation)
- Major Product Invention 
- Major Process Invention
- Major Product Innovation 
- Major Process Innovation
- Scientific Research
Within the high level titles shown in Table 6-62 are more precisely defined activities. Table 6-63
and Table 6-64 provide more detailed definitions of what skills are implied in each of the
activities introduced in Table 6-62 for the individual satellite project and for the satellite
development organization.
Table 6-63: Detailed Definition of Activities within Organizational Capabilities for a Satellite Project
Individual Satellite Project Detailed Definitions
- Operation Management: Mission
Planning, Anomaly Resolution,
Satellite System Operation Information Management
- Operation Engineering: Apply
Subsystem Expertise to Mission
Planning and Anomaly Resolution
- Materials Selection and
Procurement
Production - Component Selection and
Capability Procurement
- Manufacturer (external) selection
Satellite System Manufacture, and contracting
Assembly, Test - Manufacturing (internal)
- Subsystem Functional Testing
- Subsystem Environmental Testing
- System Assembly and Integration
- System Functional Testing
- System Environmental Testing
- Development of feasibility studies
Satellite Project Business Development and funding proposals
or Approval - Stakeholder needs evaluation and
communication
- Supplier elicitation, review and
selection
Satellite Project Definition - Contracting with System Supplier
Investment - Development of project
Capability requirements and preliminary
system concept
- System modeling
- Functional and physical design
- System analysis
Satellite System Design - Process Planning
- Systems Budget Management
- Application of system design
software
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Incremental/Major Product invention
(creation)
- Application of scientific principles to
technology development
- Application of technology to mission
Incremental/Major Product innovation requirement
(implementation) - Risk Management
- Evaluation of Technical Maturity
Scientific Research
- Evaluation of current state of
scientific and technical
understanding
* Proposal and Design of scientific
investigation
- Scientific experimentation, data
collection and analysis
- Inference and reporting of results
Table 6-64: Detailed Definition of Activities within Capabilities for a Satellite Development Organization
Satellite Development Organizations Detailed Definitions
- Test programming and execution
Production Satellite Infrastructure Operation and using equipment
Capailit Maitenace Repair and maintenance of physical
capital required for satellite
operation, assembly and test
- Development of feasibility studies
Satellite Program Business and proposals
Development or Approval - Stakeholder needs evaluation and
communication
- Development of program proposal
Satellite Program (Multiple Projects) and program architecture
Definition - Evaluating infrastructure and
Investment personnel needs for program
Capability - Feasibility studies
- Implementation project
management
Satellite Infrastructure Establishment s Procurement of equipment0 Soliciting and selecting bids
- Contracting and oversight
- Hiring and training of personnel
- Start up of Operations
- Application of scientific,
management or social science
Incremental/Major Process invention principles to define new satellite
(creation) engineering process, testing
Innovation techniques, or management
Capability approaches
- Implementation of new satellite
Incremental/Major Process innovation engineering process, testing
(implementation) techniques, or management
approaches
The discussion above provided detailed definitions of the Topics Axis that defines what
capabilities are relevant to satellite engineering. These topics are defined with the understanding
225
Innovation
Capability
that most activities in Table 6-63 and Table 6-64 have aspects that map to several parts of the
Codification and Application Axes. They are both tacit and explicit; they are both applied and
theoretical.
6.2.2 Capability Building in Satellite Engineering
The next task of this section is to define capability building and how it will be observed using the
case study data. To answer Research Questions 3 and 4, capability building will be defined and
observed at both the individual and organizational levels.
Advances in technological capability can be identified by three types of achievements. The first
is learning a new topic (moving to a new location on the Topic Axis); the second is completing a
task at a new level of autonomy; the third is completing a task at a new level of complexity.
Autonomy refers to the level of independence an individual or organization has when
accomplishing a task or learning a concept. Complexity refers to the technical nature of the
activity. It is driven by the technical complexity of the system on which individuals and
organizations work. As defined in the section on architecture above, remote sensing satellites can
be considered more complex as they increase in mass, payload performance and design life - for
example. Some capability building advances happen as an increase in two or three of these axes
at the same time, but the only requirement for capability building is an increase in at least one
factor. The graphic in Figure 6-6 shows these three axes of capability building, the graph is
analogous to Figure 6-5. Both graphics begin with defining the set of topics and noting that these
topics range from more managerial to more technical. The first set of axes in Figure 6-6
emphasized the nature of these topics with regard to the level of application or codification. This
set of axes emphasizes that capabilities within specific topics can be achieved at different levels
of autonomy and complexity. Capability building happens when more topics are learned at high
levels of autonomy and complexity.
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Capability Building Autonomy
can happen when an More Independent
individual or organization
experiences a new topic, a
new level of autonomy or a More Managerial
new level of complexity.
Less Complex More Complex
Complexity
More Technical
Topic
Less independent
Figure 6-6: Three axes of satellite engineering capability building are topic, autonomy and complexity
Individuals and organizations can build capability when they have the opportunity to work in
new topics or at new levels of autonomy and complexity. In these case studies, some of the
opportunities for individual capability building came through theoretical training, practical
training and on the job experience. The opportunity to learn through training or experience does
not guarantee that capability building will effectively occur. A full definition of capability
building considers both the opportunity to experience a topic through training or experience, as
well as, the quality of the learning from that experience.
The quality of capability building captures the level of proficiency an individual or organization
achieves in completing a task. In the context of this research, observing the level of proficiency
gained in various topics is difficult. The difficulty is due to the low level of control the
researchers had over the research setting; the research methods that used exploratory interviews;
and the research perspective of collecting data after satellite project is completed. The current
research claims to observe only opportunities for capability building rather than observing the
quality of capability building for the individuals. At the organizational level, capability is seen as
a binary variable. If an organization has not completed a particular task, it is defined to not have
that capability. If an organization has completed a task, it is defined as having that capability for
at least the short term. In the long term, the capability may erode due to loss of personnel or
memory.
Based on these definitions, scales are defined to consider different capability levels for both
individuals and organizations. The scale for various levels of opportunities for individual
capability building combines two aspects of capability: the level of application and the level
autonomy. The level of application is used to distinguish between the different types of training
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and job experience, which may be practical or theoretical. The job experience may be supervised
by the Supplier or done independently within the Implementer organization. These divisions lead
to seven levels of autonomy for activities done by individuals, as summarized in Table 6-65. The
row for Related Practical Experience accounts for work experience that engineers had in other
fields outside satellite engineer that may prepare them for some aspect of their satellite work.
The row labeled "Awareness" refers to experiences that do not provide direct training or detailed
explanations about satellite technology, but that provide information about the nature and
capabilities of satellites. A caveat to the list of opportunities for capability building is that it
emphasizes experiences that are facilitated by a trainer or supervisor. Some of the rows can be
drive by either a trainer or the learning engineer or both. For example, practical training can be
led by an instructor or by an individual practicing a new skill such as the use of a software tool.
Table 6-65: Introducing the scale long which individuals build capability
Scale of Opportunities for Individual Capability Building
Independent On the Job Experience
Supervised On the Job Experience
Practical Training
Related Practical Experience
Theoretical Training
Related Theoretical Training
Awareness
A second scale defines the achievements that indicate capabilities for organizations. This scale
emphasizes levels of autonomy. It can be used in combination with the list of organizational
level capabilities defined in the section above to capture the topic and level of autonomy for
activities done by the Implementer Organizations. By considering the changes in an
organization's autonomy over time, the scale in Table 6-66 provides a means by which to
compare their capabilities. Note that is version of the scale does not explicitly show the level of
complexity. That axis will be addressed in the text as it becomes relevant. The bottom level of
autonomy is to execute an achievement in the context of training under a Supplier Organization.
The next three levels may be in the context of formal training or other types of partnerships with
external organizations. Achieving an activity with support in an external facility implies that the
Implementer is both sharing an partner's facility and receiving guidance on how to complete
their task. The level for "achieved locally with external assistance" captures the case when an
Implementer executes a task in their home facility but they rely on the technical guidance of the
Supplier or other consultant. The mutual partner in the fourth autonomy level is distinct. It is not
a training relationship. A mutual partnership implies that the Implementer works on an equal
basis with a partner; the two organizations have similar technical capability in the area they
pursue together. The final level is to achieve a task independently. The Implementer may still
contract with suppliers or manufacturers, but they are in full control of the outcome of the
activity.
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Table 6-66: Introducing the levels at which organizations achieve capabilities
Levels of Autonomy for Organizational Achievements
Achieved Independently
Achieved with mutual partner
Achieved locally with external assistance
Achieved with support in external facility
Achieved during Training
By combining these two scales for individual and organizational capability building with the
frameworks that defme specific capabilities in satellite engineering, an operational method
emerges that allows analysis. Table 6-67 shows the tool to observe individual opportunities for
capability building.
Table 6-67: Introducing Framework used to Observe Individual Capability Building
Framework for Observing Opportunities for Individual Capability Building
Scale of
Capability
Building
Opportuni
ties
Independe
nt On the
Job Exp.
Supervised
On the Job
Exp.
Practical
Training
Related
Practical
Exp.
Theore-
tical
Training
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Related
Theore-
tical
Training
Awareness
Topics in 0
Satellite 
-
Engineeri d 0
ng C
Cr Cn
The approach to answer Research Question 3 is to review the evidence from interview data with
Implementer engineers and populate Table 6-67 with the opportunities for capability building
that the engineer experienced. Such an analysis is possible because the interview questions
probed each interviewee to learn their professional background, educational training, the
activities they pursued during the training at the Supplier site and other relevant experience. This
method does not measure the quality of the learning by the engineer, but it does measure a
necessary pre-cursor - exposure to learning opportunities. No assumption is made about the
quality of learning by the engineers based on this analysis, but a general reflection is provided in
a later section based on impressions gained during field work.
The process to complete the table for the engineers is as follows. The first step is to review the
original interview text and identify opportunities for capability building. For each opportunity, it
is associated with a particular topic from satellite engineering. The full definition for each topic,
as described in Table 6-61, guides the matching process between capability building
opportunities and satellite engineering topics. In some cases, the connection is obvious because
the opportunity was during a satellite project. In other cases, it is less obvious, especially the
opportunities for related theoretical training and related practical experience. For these examples,
the goal is to capture training and job experience that were indirectly related to satellite
engineering. The analysis seeks to assign these non-satellite activities to the satellite engineering
topic that is most closely related. All the engineers have educational experience at the university
level; for most of them it is not specifically on the topic of satellite engineering. This education is
generally shown as "Related Theoretical Experience" and associated with the Design aspect of
satellite engineering. It is matched to design because the academic knowledge for most
engineering majors is most helpful in preparing engineers for design work that is based on
physics principles. University training is often less relevant to topics such as manufacturing,
testing and operations. There is a time element to the analysis as well. Part of the motivation for
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the analysis is to explore the capability building benefits that the Implementers received by
working with the Suppliers. For this reason, the interview data and these analysis tables capture
experiences from three time periods that are defined with respect the satellite project: 1) Before
visiting the Supplier; 2) During the visit to the Supplier; and 3) After the visit to the Supplier.
The opportunities are coded to refer to each time period.
Data is available about capability building experiences for a selection of the engineers from each
Implementer Organization. The research process did not permit interviewing each individual
engineer. This gap was ameliorated, however, by learning about the relevant divisions among the
engineers and sampling across the groups when possible. Each project had unique circumstances
that created groupings within the engineering team that were relevant to the capability building
opportunities. Few engineers were interviewed from the AlphaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R1 projects.
These were the earliest projects and many of the engineers that participated in them were not
available for interviews. For the AlphaSat-R2 project between Nation Beta and Supplier Taul,
the Implementer created a team with two groups of engineers. One group focused on the imager
payload; they arrived at Supplier Taul about a year earlier than the rest of the team. The second
group focused on the spacecraft bus. Interviews were held with representatives of both groups;
the interviews spanned all available engineers that were still with the organization. For the
BetaSat-R2/R3 project between Nation Beta and Supplier Omegal, the Implementer created a
team of two distinct Cohorts. Cohort 1 was selected first and spent three years with Supplier
Omegal. This group studied for graduate degrees, and they were present for early lifecycle
phases of the satellites. The second cohort spent about one year with Supplier Omegal. They did
not study for graduate degrees and they participated in later satellite lifecycle phases. Interviews
were held with several representatives of both cohorts. The GammaSat-R1 project with Supplier
Taul included two natural divisions. One group of veterans was hired early in the project. They
helped define the Implementer Organization and the satellite project before going to visit
Supplier Taul. A later group of engineers was hired to focus on technical work. Representatives
of both groups were interviewed. Nation Delta partnered with Supplier Sigmal on the DeltaSat-
R2 satellite project. There was only one large group of engineers that spent time in Nation
Sigma. Here the natural divisions related to the specialty areas to which the engineers were
assigned. The interviews sampled across various specialties and various levels of overall
professional experience by the engineers.
An analogous process is used to analyze Organizational Capability Achievements by combining
the Levels of Autonomy with the list of organizational capabilities in satellite engineering. This
is done in Table 6-68 and Table 6-69. There are two versions of the Organizational analysis
because the capabilities can be defined at the level of a single satellite project or the level of a
satellite development organization. In the cases under study, there are space agencies, national
research organizations or government linked companies that are seeking to build some or all of
these capabilities listed in the tables. The data from the case studies captures whether or not the
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countries achieved these various capabilities. It also indicates the level of autonomy with which
they achieved them. Table 6-68 and Table 6-69 provide a template to answer Research Question
4 by showing the achievements and levels of autonomy for each country.
Table 6-68: Introducing Framework used to Observe Organizational Capability Building for a Satellite Project
Achieved Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Satellite Achied with support locally with with Achieved
Project during in external external mutual IndependentlyTraiing facility assistance partner
Satellite System
Operation
Satellite System
Manufacture,
Assembly, Test
Satellite Project
Business
Development or
Approval
Satellite Project
Definition
Satellite System
Design
Incremental/Major
Product invention
(creation)
Incremental/Major
Product innovation
(implementation)
Table 6-69: Introducing Framework used to Observe Organizational Capability Building for a Satellite Program
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Satellite Development Adhied supot in locally with with Andee
Organizations during eptern external mutual denTraining external assistance partner dently
facility
Satellite Infrastructure
Operation and
Maintenance
Satellite Program
Business Development
or Approval
Satellite Program
(Multiple Projects)
Definition
Satellite Infrastructure
Establishment
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6.2.3 Research Question 3: What Capability Building Opportunities do
Individuals Have?
The capability building opportunities for every engineer that was interviewed are compiled in
tables based on Table 6-67. In this section, a selection of these tables are introduced and
discussed. Several individual examples as well as some summary tables are presented from the
satellite projects. The individual examples span the group divisions that were explained in the
previous section in order to show variety. In the tables, the experiences are color coded to show
the passage of time over several periods. Each table covers three or four time periods. The first
time period is shown in blue, second in green, third in red and fourth - if relevant - is shown in
orange. The time-based color codes provide visual evidence that the engineers are experiencing
new topics areas at higher levels of autonomy over time.
Nation Alpha: AlphaSat-Ri
The hiring strategy for AlphaSat-R1 involved selecting a core team of engineers to participate in
the training with Supplier Omegal. Other engineers were gradually hired to work at Implementer
Alpha1. The engineers hired for the core trainee team were drawn from existing positions in
academia, the military and industry. The plan was to hire these engineers temporarily and then
return them to their original positions. Most engineers trained at Supplier Omegal during
AlphaSat-R1 followed that plan. One engineer continued to work at Implementer Alphal where
he gradually rose to a senior management position. Table 6-70 and Table 6-71 show some of the
capability building experiences of this engineer. As the color key indicates, blue writing
indicates experiences before joining Implementer Alphal and training at Supplier Omegal;
green text indicates experiences while training at Supplier Omegal, and red text indicates
experiences after returning to work at Implementer Alphal. For this example, the text that
describes each capability building experience is shown in order to illustrate the types of data that
were collected in the interviews. Later tables use the same color scheme but do not included
descriptions of the experiences. The table showing the experiences of this engineer/manager is
very large. It is divided into two sections for presentation and discussion. The first section
includes early activities in the satellite lifecycle - Project Definition, Requirements Management,
Software Tools and Design. The second section of the table (Table 6-71) shows the later satellite
activities.
Table 6-70: First part of Capability Building Profile for Nation Alpha Engineer
Blue = Before Training at Supplier Omegal
Green = During Training at Supplier Omegal
Color Key Red = After Training at Supplier Omegal
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Incremental/Major
Process invention
(creation)
Incremental/Major
Process innovation
(implementation) (implementation) __ I __ __ _ I _
Part of
committee to
develop national
space policy;
Leadership for
project definition
and proposal -
AlphaSat-R2
and successor
mission
Mission level
requirement
management for
AlphaSat-R2
Project for Attitude
Mission study of Control; Mission
satellite like study of satellite
AlphaSat-R2; like AlphaSat-R2;
Design Design
modifications for modifications for
AlphaSat-R1 AlphaSat-R1:
Experimental Experimental
payload for payload for
AlphaSat-R1 AlphaSat-R1
Training for
AlphaSat-R1 at
Supplier Omegal
on Attitude Control
Work at foreign
government
aerospace
laboratory;
University Lecturer in
research on aeronautics in
solar cars Nation Alpha;
(Technology University
Evaluation and research on solar
Development) cars
Space related
classes in
Bachelors degree;
Satellite
engineering
lectures at
Supplier Omegal
BE and MS in
Aerospace from
Before this engineer came to work at Implementer Alphal, he had several capability building
experiences that provided related theoretical training and related practical experience. He studied
aerospace engineering at the undergraduate and graduate level in a foreign university. He took
several space related courses during his first degree. He had the opportunity to work briefly in a
foreign aerospace laboratory to gain experience in both design aspects as well as the satellite
testing phase. When he returned to Nation Alpha, he worked as a university lecturer for
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aeronautics. He did research related to solar cars that provided experience in both technology
evaluation and design. This engineer also participated in a committee that worked to develop the
national space policy for Nation Alpha before he participated in the AlphaSat-R1 project.
The engineer was selected to join the core trainee team that went to work at Supplier Omegal
during the AlphaSat-R1 project. His time at Supplier Omegal started with theoretical training via
lectures about satellite engineering. He was assigned to focus on the attitude control subsystem.
He had practical training related to design, manufacturing, assembly, integration and testing for
that subsystem. While working at Supplier Omegal he also did several activities that gave him
"supervised on the job experience" to implement focused projects. He did an independent project
related to attitude control, worked on designing the mission for Nation Alpha's next satellite,
performed analysis in response to changes in the launch vehicle and worked with a team to
develop an experimental science payload for AlphaSat-RI.
After the AlphaSat-Rl project was over, the engineer continued to work at Implementer Alphal
for many years. As a manager within Implementer Alphal, he worked across the various satellite
topics. He was in leadership during the project definition of AlphaSat-R2; he helped identify the
requirements, managed the installation of new assembly and integration facilities at Implementer
Alphal, led the team during the integration of AlphaSat-R2 at the new facility, provided
leadership during the AlphaSat-R2 launch preparation and campaign. As a high level manager he
was also generally responsible for work such as stakeholder communication, personnel
management and technical reviews.
Table 6-71: Second part of Capability Building Profile for Nation Alpha Engineer
Senior Manager
of Implementer
Alphal -
stakeholder
communication,
personnel
Management management,
for Flight oversees
model Leadership design reviews; Leadership Leadership
integration of for camera Project for for
AlphaSat-R2 calibration leadership for AlphaSat- AlphaSat-R2
and installation for AlphaSat- AlphaSat-R2 R2 launch launch Independent
of AIT facilities R2 and Cubesats activities activities Implementation
Project for Project for
Attitude Attitude
Control; Control;
Participate in Participate in
AlphaSat-R1 AlphaSat-R1 Project for
manufacturing; testing; Attitude
Experimental Experimental Control - Supervised On
payload for payload for demonstrate the Job
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As the colors indicate, this engineer progressed through increasingly autonomous experiences.
He began with theoretical training and related experience in a narrow set of topics and ended
with responsibilities across the spectrum of satellite engineering topics. As a manager within
Implementer Alphal he moved beyond training to independent implementation of the strategies
that defined the AlphaSat-R2 project and other activities within the firm. In each time period, his
scope of activities increased along with his level of responsibility. This is strong evidence of
capability building.
AlphaSat-R2
The capability building data from several engineers that were hired for AlphaSat-RI are
presented here. For AlphaSat-R2, Implementer Alphal hired people for long term employment in
contrast to the approach from the AlphaSat-R1 project. Most of the engineers were young
professionals or recent university graduates. Engineers were hired both to travel to work with
Supplier Taul and to stay at Implementer Alphal in order to build up the local team and
facilities. Three examples of individual capability building are presented here. They are chosen
to show the diversity of technical assignments among the engineers. The first engineer worked
on the imager payload team. This team started to work at Supplier Taul about one year earlier
than the rest of the AlphaSat-R2 team from Nation Alpha. The second example is an engineer
that worked on the satellite bus in the communication subsystem team. The third engineer did not
spend substantial time training at Supplier Taul. His responsibility was to set up the new
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assembly and integration facilities at the Implementer Alphal site. His level of autonomy stands
out as much higher than the other engineers because the tasks were not done in the context of a
training program. He was simply working for Implementer Alphal. The final table for AlphaSat-
R2 shows a summary of the group results.
Table 6-72: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from AlphaSat-R2 Project (1)
Blue =Before Training at Supplier Tau1
Green =During Training at Supplier Tau1
Color Key Red =After AlphaS t-R2 Project
Independent
Implementation
Superisd On
Practical
Training
Related Practical
Experience
Theoretical
Theoretical
0 6
Ln <. 0
Table 6-72 describes some of the capability building opportunities that one of the engineers on
Implementer Alphal's payload team experienced. Before going to Nation Tau to train during the
AlphaSat-R2 project, this engineer prepared with theoretical training. He pursued a Bachelors
Degree in aerospace engineering from a dual program with universities in both Nation Alpha and
abroad. His classes included some preparation for the software tool he would later use in his
work on AlphaSat-R2. After being hired to work at Implementer Alphal, he had some practical
training before leaving for Supplier Taul. He worked with various teams at Implementer Alphal
and learned from more experienced engineers. He worked on learning the design and analysis
tools that were used at Implementer Alphal for mechanical design. He was selected to move to
Nation Tau and work on the imager payload team for AlphaSat-R2. At Supplier Taul he had
more practical training and on the job experience in topics ranging from requirements to testing.
Early on for practical training, he learned the specific design and analysis tools that were used at
Supplier Taul and did several modeling tasks to demonstrate he was ready to participate in the
project work. His on the job experience focused on the mechanical design for the structures that
supported the imager payload. He worked on tasks such as defining requirements for the
structures, using software to design the structure, analyzing the design to ensure it was sound,
procuring materials to build the structure, assembling the structure and testing it. He worked
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closely with the Supplier Taul team through the lifecycle tasks of the payload mechanical team.
After the AlphaSat-R2 project was completed when the engineer was working at Implementer
Alphal, one of his independent responsibilities was to work as the lead mechanical engineer for
the payload section of a proposed remote sensing aircraft. He worked on activities such as
project definition and design for this system.
This engineer's capability profile as shown in Table 6-72 indicates that much of the time spent at
the Supplier facility focused on supervised on the job experience more than theoretical or
practical training.
Table 6-73: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from AlphaSat-R2 Project (2)
Blue Before AlphaSat-R2 Project
(reen = During AlphaSat-.R2 Project
Color Key Red = After AlphaSat-R2 Pr' et
Independent
Table 6-73 shows the capability building profile for an engineer that worked on the satellite bus
team during the AlphaSat-R2 project. This engineer changed roles during the long AlphaSat-R2
project. He started off as a communication engineer and later worked as the System Engineer for
AlphaSat-R2 after the team and the satellite moved to Nation Alpha. The System Engineer
coordinates the technical team and ensures that all the subsystems function together. Before
going to Supplier Taul for training, this engineer had both experience relating to multiple levels
and topics. He received his theoretical training from both Nation Alpha and foreign universities.
When he first started working at Implementer Alphal, he had theoretical and practical training
by learning from the materials about the AlphaSat-R1 project. He also worked on a project to
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understand one specific satellite component for attitude control. He was hired before AlphaSat-
R1 launched. He briefly visited Supplier Omegal and observed testing for AlphaSat-R1. He was
also present at Implementer Alphal for the commissioning and operation of AlphaSat-R1.
Before going to work at Supplier Taul, this engineer was sent to a different country to work on
another project. Implementer Alphal had formed a design partnership with an aerospace firm
that was separate from the relationship with Supplier Taul. This engineer worked with the team
at this aerospace firm on the preliminary design of a space vehicle that was to support AlphaSat-
R2. This experience gave the engineer practice in both design and management because he
presented in reviews. That project was terminated before the design was matured and the
engineer went to Nation Tau to work on AlphaSat-R2 with Supplier Taul. While in Nation Tau,
the engineer worked had practical training and on the job experience related to the
communication subsystem for AlphaSat-R2. He learned and applied software tools for analysis;
designed a specific communication component; manufactured his component by selecting
components, materials and manually soldering it; testing his component and presenting during
project reviews that were hosted by the Supplier Taul team. During his on the job experience he
had a well defined responsibility to execute the lifecycle for a specific piece of hardware.
AlphaSat-R2 was designed in Nation Tau, integrated in Nation Alpha and tested in Nation Tau.
During the integration and testing phase, this engineer became the system engineer for the
project. In this role he had more supervised experience and independent experience related to
assembly, testing, management and launch. His role gradually became more independent as the
Supplier Taul team handed over responsibility to the Implementer Alphal team. After AlphaSat-
R2 was tested in Nation Tau, it spent several years in Nation Alpha preparing for launch. This
engineer was a key technical leader during this period. The work he helped lead included
calibrating the imager, interfacing with the supplier and launch provider and preparing the
satellite for launch. Through this experience the engineer transitioned from a trainee working
under the Supplier's supervision to a technical leader working independently within Implementer
Alphal. As the capability profile shows, he had experiences at many topics and levels before
going to work with Supplier Taul.
Table 6-74: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from AlphaSat-R2 Project (3)
Blue =Before AlphaSat-R2 Project
Green =During AlphaSat-R'2 Project
Coo eRed =After AlphaSat-RPret
Independent
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Supervised On
the Job
Expenience
Practical
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Related
Practical
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Table 6-74 profiles the capability building experiences of an engineer that did not go for training
at Supplier Taul. He was hired to work at Implementer Alphal and his role focused on
establishing and using new facilities for the integration and testing of AlphaSat-R2 in Nation
Alpha. This engineer came to work at Implementer Alphal after doing a Bachelor's Degree in
electrical engineering in a foreign university. He worked briefly in a audiovisual company doing
research and development. He was hired to work at Implementer Alphal just before the launch
of AlphaSat-R1. He participated in the launch campaign for AlphaSat-R1 and contributed as an
electrical engineer. During the AlphaSat-R2 project, he worked on the definition, design and
development of satellite integration facilities in Implementer Alphal. He covered virtually the
entire spectrum of satellite engineering topics at a high level of autonomy. He was not supervised
by the Supplier for this task; he was only supervised by the Implementer Alphal management,
such as the senior manager introduced earlier in this section. In the project definition area, he
worked on proposing the project, selecting suppliers and generating requirements. He continued
to define and manage those requirements as they prepared tender documents to send to potential
contractors. He received and reviewed contractor proposals. He worked on the design of the
Assembly, Integration and Test (AIT) facility with support of contractors. During the
implementation he monitored the construction work and procured materials. Once the facility
was completed he also worked as a team leader during the fabrication and integration of the
satellite in the new facility. He helped with functional testing of AlphaSat-R2. Throughout these
tasks he had management and documentation responsibilities to monitor personnel, finances and
schedule. This AIT facility project allowed him to work independently of a trainer to experience
a full project lifecycle.
Group summary for AlphaSat-R2
Table 6-75 summarizes capability building trends for all the engineers that were interviewed who
followed the pattern of training with Supplier Taul and returning to work at Implementer
Alphal. The three sections of the table capture three time periods. The first section shows
capability building activities before training with Supplier Taul. The second is for during the
training and the final table shows activities since the training. The intensity of the colors in Table
6-75 shows volume of people. Each person is counted once in a box if they had any examples of
activities in their individual table. The darker boxes show activities that had more engineers
represented. These summary tables include data from seven engineers, so the maximum number
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for any square is seven. The first part of the table shows that the majority of the activity before
going to Supplier Taul was in the area of Related Theoretical Training that pertained to design.
There is also a broad scattering of experiences throughout the rest of the table before working
with Supplier Taul.
During the Supplier Taul visit, there is a clear concentration of experiences at the level of
supervised on the job training in the middle project lifecycle phases. The time with Supplier
Taul did not focus on project definition and launch. It was focused on the design, manufacture
and testing of the satellite and imager. As a trainer, Supplier Taul emphasized on the job
experience more than practical training that did not directly contribute to completing the project.
They did provide some theoretical training to all of the visiting engineers. In the last section of
Table 6-75, the dark boxes at the top show that the group of engineers has moved into a high
level of autonomy by working on all the satellite topics. The overall movement of dark boxes
from lower to higher in the table is an indication of capability building for these individuals.
They all transitioned from theoretical training to practical experience to on the job experience
and started to work independently after the AlphaSat-R2 project. The time period represented by
this table is on the order of a decade.
Table 6-75: Group Summary of Capability Building Profiles for AlphaSat-R2 Project
Before TraininL at Sunlier Taul
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Nation Beta - BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project
Implementer Betal created a two part team for the BetaSat-R2/R3 project. For both teams, the
Architectural Dimensions of Hiring Time Horizon and Recruitment Source were similar.
Implementer Betal created the teams by assigning some engineers from the previous BetaSat-Ri
and BetaSat-CI projects. The majority of the engineers were hired freshly into Implementer
Betal in order to participate in the BetaSat-R2/R3 project. The engineers were generally recent
graduates or young professionals, with a few seasoned professionals. The total team of engineers
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sent from Implementer Betal to work at Supplier Omegal numbered in the mid-twenties. This
large group was divided into two sections that had different experiences. The first section, known
as Cohort 1, was gathered at the beginning of the satellite project. They were a combination of
new hires and a few veterans. They spent three years at Supplier Omegal. Most members of the
second Cohort were hired after the BetaSat-R2/R3 project started. They spent about one year at
Supplier Omegal later in the satellite lifecycle. Capability building profiles are presented here
for five engineers from the BetaSat-R2/R3 project. These were chosen because they span both
Cohorts and the engineers have a variety of professional backgrounds. Eleven engineers were
interviewed and their capability building profiles are combined in a group summary. The
Capability Building template for the Implementer Betal engineers is customized to reflect their
experiences as of the time of the interviews. The columns for Project Definition and Launch
Campaign experience were not found to be as relevant; they are removed for ease of
presentation. The time period covered by the set of tables below is different for each engineer
because they have different professional backgrounds.
Table 6-76: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project (1)
Color Key
Blue =tBefore visit to Supplier Omegala
Green = During visit to Supplier Omega
Red =After visit to Su >liermOmetal
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This engineer described in Table 6-76 pursued theoretical training before joining Implementer
Betal, earning a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from a university in Nation Beta.
He continued studies on information technology in Nation Beta during the first year of his
employment with Implementer Betal. He was selected to travel to Supplier Omegal as part of
Cohort 1. At Supplier Omegal, he pursued theoretical training focused on satellite engineering a
university in Nation Omega while working with the Supplier. He earned a graduate degree and
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had short courses and technical lectures from the Supplier team. Early in his time at Supplier
Omegal he had practical training in areas such as software tools and a hands-on research project
as part of his graduate degree. He had opportunities for supervised on the job experience in all
the satellite lifecycle phases from requirements to operations planning. His team assignment was
to work as the systems engineer for the Implementer Betal team. He was a technical coordinator,
especially for BetaSat-R3 which the Implementer Betal engineers worked on. After the satellite
development for BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 was completed, the Implementer Betal team
moved on from Supplier Omegal. This engineer remained in Nation Omega to pursue a further
studies related to satellite engineering at the Master's and Doctoral level. He also took a
coordinating role in a burgeoning small satellite project at Implementer Betal. The Implementer
organization hired a set of new engineers that were not trained abroad. This team worked with
some veterans to begin the initial design and requirements definition for a local small satellite
project.
Table 6-77: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project (2)
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The engineer in Table 6-77 has a very similar capability building profile to the first example
from Nation Beta. This engineer was also part of the first Cohort of engineers sent from
Implementer Betal to Supplier Omegal to work in the BetaSat-R2/R3 satellites. Like the
engineer above he did a Bachelors Degree in Electrical Engineering in Nation Beta. He worked
within Implementer Betal for several years before going to Supplier Omegal. During this early
work experience he had exposure to operations for BetaSat-R1 and to requirements. He worked
to help defmne requirements for the future BetaSat-R2 as the project was being defmed. When he
went to Supplier Omnegal he was assigned to a role related to the software and computer system
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that handle data on the satellite. He had practical training in software tools. While he was
working with Supplier Omegal, he studied for a graduate degree at the university in Nation
Omega as the previous engineer did. Some of his practical training was through a hands-on
research project during his graduate studies. He had the responsibility to ensure the completion
the subsystem related to data handling on BetaSat-R3. This responsibility gave him supervised
on the job experience in all the lifecycle phase from requirements to management and
documentation. After the Implementer Betal team left Supplier Omegal, this engineer also
pursued further graduate education related to satellite engineering in a university in Nation
Omega. He worked briefly on the requirements definition phase of a small satellite project within
Implementer Betal.
To summarize both examples from Cohort 1 engineers, both of these stories have strong
examples of theoretical training at the undergraduate and graduate level. They also had a broad
range of practical training and on the job experience that covered many satellite life cycle phases
while at Supplier Omegal. Both of these engineers took on technical leadership roles within their
team for the work on satellite BetaSat-R3. Both also contributed to early lifecycle phases at the
independent implementation level in a satellite project at Implementer Betal. A final similarity is
that both had limited practical experience outside of their work at Implementer Betal and
Supplier Omegal. The next two engineers have more examples of Related Practical Experience
in other industries.
Table 6-78: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project (3)
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The engineer whose profile is summarized in Table 6-78 was part of the second Cohort to visit
Supplier Omegal from Implementer Betal. Before spending time at Supplier Omegal, this
engineer had both theoretical and practical training in several organizations. He earned his
Bachelor's and Master's Degrees in Mechanical Engineering from two universities in Nation
Beta. Before going to work for Implementer Betal, the worked in the oil industry as a sales
engineer. He also spent several years teaching math and physics at the secondary school level.
When he first joined Implementer Betal, he was appointed to a team of engineers that was being
sent for training as part of the procurement of the BetaSat-C1 communications satellite from an
international partner. About fifty Implementer Betal engineers were sent to the site of the
manufacturer for BetaSat-C1. During this project experience, the engineer was working on the
structural and mechanical subsystem team. He had months of theoretical training and exams
about all the technical specialties in satellite engineering. He had practical training related to the
use of software tools for modeling the structural design of space system. He also learned design
techniques for the structures team and applied them to a satellite design project. The
communication satellite project was an opportunity to build awareness about the entire satellite
lifecycle. This was partly done via site visits to satellite engineering facilities in the host country.
After returning to Implementer Betal, this engineer was sent to Supplier Omegal as part of the
second Cohort of visiting engineers. He worked on the structural and thermal aspects of the
satellite. His training at Supplier Omegal began with theoretical lectures on an overview of
satellite technology. Later he had practical training in the skill of soldering electronics for space
applications and structural testing for satellites. He had supervised on the job experience across a
wide range of satellite lifecycle phases from requirements to management and documentation.
He learned and applied new software modeling and analysis tools. He contributed to the
Manufacturing, Assembly, Integration and Testing of the BetaSat-R3 satellite. He gave
presentations during project reviews. This engineer summarized his two training programs by
saying that the first project gave him a strong theoretical foundation and the second gave him
more opportunities for hands on work. After returning to Implementer Betal, this engineer
started building up independent implementation experience across several lifecycle phases. He
worked with a team to begin the requirements analysis and early design of a small satellite to be
built by Implementer Betal. He applied the software tools for the structural discipline and
participated in the project reviews at Implementer Betal.
Table 6-79: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project (4)
Color Key
Blue Before visit to Supplier Omega1
Green =During visit to Supplier Omegal
Red =After visit to Su 1ie Om gal
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Table 6-79 describes the capability building profile of another engineer that went to Supplier
Omegal as part of Cohort 2. This engineer pursued related theoretical training via a Bachelor's
degree in Electrical Engineering in Nation Beta. He was hired to Implementer Betal as part of a
wave of recruitment to select the second Cohort for visiting Supplier Omegal. Before he was
hired to Implementer Betal, this engineer spent about nine years working on power plants. As he
summarized, this first major phase of his career involved high voltage systems; then he
transitioned to very low voltage systems when he started working on satellites. The related
practical experience on power plants was relevant to design, procurement, assembly, integration
as well as management and documentation. Right after he was hired to Implementer Betal, he
had several opportunities for theoretical and practical training in preparation for the visit to
Supplier Omegal. He spent about nine months at Implementer Betal before departing for Nation
Omega. The training included satellite lectures from veteran Implementer Betal engineers and
practical lessons related to general computer tools. When he went to Supplier Omegal, the firm
and related university provided short courses and technical lectures; this continued the theoretical
training. The engineer joined the Implementer Betal engineers who were working on the power
system for BetaSat-R3. He had practical training related to the design of BetaSat-R3. He also
had practical training in techniques such as space quality soldering, solar cell manufacturing and
battery testing. His on the job experience concentrated on the later satellite lifecycle phases such
as manufacturing, procurement, assembly, integration, test and management. He presented on the
BetaSat-R3 power system in several project reviews while at Supplier Omegal. Upon returning
to Implementer Betal his main responsibilities were in maintenance of the systems in the ground
station that was designated to operate the remote sensing satellites. They were already operating
BetaSat-RI, and they prepared to operate BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 with new antennas and
computer equipment. This engineer was concerned with the power system and mechanical
aspects of the ground station. He also provided mentorship to the team working on the small
satellite project on an ad hoc basis. These work assignments gave him independent
implementation experience in the areas of design, procurement, assembly and operations.
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Table 6-80: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project (5)
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The previous two examples showed the capability building profiles for engineers with 4 to 9
years of professional experience before joining Implementer Betal. Table 6-80 shows the path
for an engineer in Cohort 2 that starting working at Implementer Betal as a fresh graduate. He
earned his Bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering in a university in Nation Beta. After
being hired to Implementer Betal he had initial theoretical training on satellite engineering from
veteran engineers for several months. When he arrived at Supplier Omegal the theoretical
lectures continued from the firm and university engineers. This engineer was working on the
camera payload aspects of the satellite. He spent time in a separate facility under Supplier
Omegal that specializes in imager payload systems. There he had practical training in software
tools that are used to design and analyze the structural aspects of imagery payload systems. He
practiced design and manufacture during a project to create a lens. Other practical training
introduced techniques to operation in clean rooms on optical equipment for assembly, integration
and test. He had further exposure to testing during tests of the fully assembled BetaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R3. He also had some practical training related to management when he contributed to
preparations for project review presentations. This engineer's activities at Supplier Omegal are
driven more by practical training than supervised on the job experience. The reason for this is the
topic area to which he was assigned. He was on the team that worked on the imager payload.
This topic is a highly specialized and technically different from other topics in satellite
engineering. The core disciplines that are required to build satellite buses are electronics and
mechanics. The core discipline required to build an imagery payload system are mechanics and
optics. The required knowledge in optics to work in the area of supervised on the job experience
is deep, and it was a new topic for this engineer. Also, Supplier Omegal historically focused
their effort on the design and implementation of the spacecraft bus rather than imager payloads.
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They had recently acquired the organization that specialized in imager payloads where this
engineer worked. This topic area was outside the historical strengths of this engineer and
Supplier Omegal. When this engineer returned to Implementer Betal he applied the software
tools for structural design of imager payloads to the small satellite project.
Table 6-81: Group Summary of Capability Building Profiles for BetaSat-R2/R3 Satellite Project
Before Training at Supplier Omegal
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Table 6-81 provides a group summary for the Nation Beta team that worked on BetaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R3 by combining the capability building profiles of eleven out of the twenty six
engineers. In each section of the table, the darker boxes show higher number of engineers with
experience in particular area. The first stage of the three part table shows capability building
opportunities before engineers went to Supplier Omegal for training. As expected, the highest
concentration of experience before the BetaSat-R2/R3 projects is related theoretical training.
Most of the engineers studied at universities in Nation Beta in a general engineering discipline.
They did not pursue majors directly focused on satellite engineering, but they studied majors that
are part of the core set of knowledge for building satellites - especially mechanical and electrical
engineering. Their training was a combination of university engineering degrees and polytechnic
degrees. Before leaving for Nation Omega, most engineers had theoretical training and practical
training via instruction from veteran Implementer Betal engineers or individual study on
previous projects. A smaller number has related practical experience outside of Implementer
Betal. In Nation Beta, young graduates are required to work for a year of service in either a
government or commercial entity; it is like an internship. This mandatory service year is not
reflected in Table 6-81.
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The second stage of the group capability building profile shows a high concentration of practical
training and supervised on the job experience across the satellite lifecycle topics. There is a dark
area for theoretical training related to design. This reflects the introductory satellite engineering
lectures that Supplier Omegal provided to most engineers when they first arrived. There are
slightly higher numbers for the on the job and practical experience in the later satellite lifecycle
phases, starting with procurement/manufacture and continuing to management and
documentation. This reflects the fact that Cohort 2 was present for the later project phases of
both BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3. For both Cohorts, their most autonomous activities related to
the implementation of BetaSat-R3, although Cohort 1 also participated in the design aspects.
The third stage of group capability mapping shows a split between independent implementation
and theoretical training. Some engineers returned to Implementer Betal and worked on small
satellite projects in Implementer Betal or on the ground station. Others continued their studies.
Overall, there is a progression in terms of autonomy. The group moved from primarily
theoretical training and related practical experience to supervised on the job experience and
finally to independent implementation. The time element is important to interpreting the
graphics. The time period before visiting Supplier Omegal varies for each individual depending
on their professional experience. At the time of data collection, it was too early to observe the
outcomes of the independent implementation activities to develop small satellites locally at
Implementer Betal. The teams were in early project phases. Another aspect to consider is the
level of complexity of the technology. Those engineers that continued theoretical training after
training at Supplier Omegal have the opportunity to advance in the complexity of their work
even though autonomy is decreasing. They started doctoral programs that will give them a
theoretical foundation for satellite missions that are more complex than those previously pursued
by Implementer Betal.
Nation Gamma - GammaSat-RJ Project
Implementer Gammal was in its formational stage as it began the GammaSat-RI project. The
hiring process populated both the organization and the team slots. An early group of about five
engineers was hired to help define and initiate the organization. They were also the part of the
pioneering set of engineers that went to work with Supplier Taul. Implementer Gammal
continued to hire engineers for long term employment throughout the GammaSat-Ri project. If
the engineers were willing and able to live abroad for long periods, they were sent to participate
in GammaSat-RI development at Supplier Taul. The target population for engineers hired to
Implementer Gammal was recent graduates with majors relevant to satellite engineering. Two
examples of capability building profiles are given below. Table 6-82 summarizes experiences for
one of the engineers that was hired as part of the pioneering team that both defined the
Implementer Gammal organization and initiated the GammaSat-RI project. Table 6-83
summarizes the story of a later hire that joined during the GammaSat-R1 project. The tables are
divided into three time periods. First, it shows the experiences of engineers before they go to
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work with Supplier Taul in blue. The second time period shows work on the GammaSat-R1
project in green. The third time period shows work on the next remote sensing satellite project -
GammaSat-R2 - in red. The GammaSat-R2 project started before the launch of GammaSat-R1,
so the capability building experiences continued almost without interruption. Compared to other
implementers, the timing of visits to Supplier Taul was less defined for Implementer Gammal
engineers. Rather than going and staying for a set period, engineers from Nation Gamma traveled
frequently back and forth to Supplier Taul and stayed for several months each time.
Table 6-82: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from GammaSat-R1 Project (1)
Color Key
Blue = Before visit to Supplier 'aul
Green = During GamniaSat-RI Project
Red = During GnammaSat-R2 Project
The engineer profiled in Table 6-82 earned a Bachelor's degree in electronics at an foreign
university. He was hired by Implementer Gammal before it was formally opened. This gave him
opportunities for independent implementation in the area of project definition for both the
IMPLEMENTER GAMMA1 organization and the GammaSat-R1 project. He participated in
selecting the supplier, defining the training package by the supplier and selecting a launch
provider. During the GammaSat-R1 project, he had theoretical training via lectures from the
Supplier engineers on satellite engineering. He also started to learn the theoretical background he
would need for his assignment in the area of attitude control for the satellites. The attitude
control team is concerned with measuring and correcting the orientation of the satellite with
respect to the earth. This engineer did independent study early in his time at Supplier Taul to
understand new theoretical topics on stochastic feedback control. In the earlier satellite lifecycle
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phases of GammaSat-RI he participated in practical training activities. Later in the project life he
was able to work at the level of supervised on the job training. The practical training included
learning to use the software for his discipline in attitude control and for modeling orbits. There
was also on the job experience in the areas of design and functional testing. He joined Supplier
Taul engineers as they tested sensors that help measure the satellite's orientation. His on the job
experience continued in the launch phase. He went to the launch location and worked with the
Supplier and Launch provider while leading the team of engineers from Implementer Gammal
who were present. During GammaSat-R2, this engineer had experiences at higher levels of
autonomy and across a broader range of satellite lifecycle phases. He worked at the level of
independent implementation to join the Implementer Gammal team to define the GammaSat-R2
project and training package. They once again selected Supplier Taul. This engineer took on a
new role as system engineering and leader for the software team among the Implementer
Gammal engineers. This gave him on the job experience in requirements, software tools, design,
implementation and management during the first part of the GanmaSat-R2 project.
Table 6-83: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from GammaSat-R1 Project (2)
Color Key
Blue = Before Visit to Supplier Taul
Green = During GanmaSat-R1 Project
Red = During GammaSat-R2 Proiect
The engineer profiled in Table 6-83 joined Implementer Gammal after the GammaSat-RI
project started. He studied for a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science initially in an
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international school, but he finished in a university within Nation Gamma that uses an
international system. He had related practical experience that helped him prepare for working on
flight software for GammaSat-RI and GammaSat-R2. He had been writing computer programs
as a hobby for years. When he first joined Implementer Gammal, his theoretical training started
with independent study about approaches to software for space systems. He continued theoretical
training when he first moved to Nation Tau and received introductory lectures from Supplier
Taul. During the GammaSat-RI project, he had practical training across several satellite
lifecycle phases as he learned about requirements, tools, design, testing and management as they
related to the software for the satellite's main on-board computer. He transitioned to supervised
on the job experience as he began to create independent software designs and join the team in
solving software problems facing the project. He was at the ground station in Nation Gamma
during the launch of GammaSat-Ri. He returned to Supplier Taul and worked on GammaSat-R2
at the level of supervised on the job experience. He had independent experience at Implementer
Gammal during visits to Nation Gamma. He worked with newly hired engineers to train them on
the topic of software for space systems.
Table 6-84: Group Summary of Capability Building Profiles for GammaSat-R1 Project
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Table 6-84 shows a group summary for seven engineers from Implementer Gammal. For
consistency the table only shows data for engineers that worked on both GammaSat-R1 and
GammaSat-R2. As was the case with the other countries, before working with the Supplier
Organization, the main capability building experiences were in the areas of related theoretical
training and a limited amount of related practical experience. Most engineers were hired directly
after their first university degree and some of these practical experiences were short term
internships. The core team of pioneering engineers from Implementer Gammal did have unique
Independent Implementation experience in Project Definition, however. The middle section of
Table 6-84 shows that most engineers had theoretical training, practical training and on the job
experience during the GammaSat-R1 project. This was their first exposure to applying their
engineering training to satellite development. For GammaSat-R2, those engineers that started
during GammaSat-RI have uniformly transitioned from practical training to supervised on the
job experience. This means they spent less time learning the skills for their assignments and
more time contributing as part of the joint team led by Supplier Taul.
Nation Delta - Satellite DeltaSat-R2
Implementer Deltal hired engineers for both the DeltaSat-R1 project and for long term
employment in the organization. Almost all of the engineers that went to visit Supplier Sigmal
were new hires that were brought in around the same time. The engineers had a mixed
background with regard to previous experience; some were fresh graduates from their first
university degrees. Many had further studies or professional experience. Three examples are
summarized below. One is an engineer with strong academic training; the other is an engineer
that came with more professional training. The third example follows the path of an engineer the
moved to a new organization in Nation Delta after training with Supplier Sigmal. There is no
group summary for the Implementer Deltal engineers because not enough engineers were
interviewed.
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Table 6-85: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from DeltaSat-R1 Project (1)
Color Key:
Before visit to Supplier Sigmac
During Visit to Supplier Signeal
After visit to Su Mslier Si al igt
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Practcal
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Related
Practical
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_Training
Related
Theoretical
Traiing.
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aspects of the satellite within the larger earth observation system that also included the ground
system for control and image reception. In this leadership role he had both practical training and
supervised on the job experience in several satellite lifecycle phases. He applied software tools
and worked on tests related to mechanical analysis as part of "on the job" tasks. As part of his
leadership role he was concerned with monitoring the tasks of other Nation Delta engineers that
worked on aspects of the spacecraft. This gave him an opportunity for personnel and schedule
management experience. He also participated in interactions between Supplier Sigmal,
Implementer Deltal and the Launch Provider. He was concerned with the interfaces between the
satellite and launch vehicle. The final stage of practical training at Supplier Sigmal focused on
operations. All the engineers participated in that. Throughout the time at Supplier Sigmal this
engineer worked on the level of independent implementation in the areas of requirements and
management/documentation. He served on a committee that worked on behalf of the leadership
of Implementer Deltal. Part of his role was to ensure that requirements were achieved by
Supplier Sigmal and to provide oversight at accept the Supplier's progress at each milestone.
After completing the formal training phase at Supplier Sigmal, the engineer's capability building
experiences continued to cover several levels of autonomy, as shown in the red boxes of Table
6-85. As the Implementer Deltal team prepared for the launch of DeltaSat-R2, the Supplier
Sigmal team sent trainers to certify the Nation Delta engineers as satellite operators. This
engineer had practical training in operations, and then supervised on the job experience. He later
worked on operations independently. He continued as a technical leader, leading the daily
operations activities. Before launch he also visited the Launch Provider with the Supplier in
order to review a change in launch plans. In the operational phase, his continued to have
responsibilities related to personnel management. As Implementer Deltal began envisioning
their next satellite project, he also began to work on project definition at the independent
implementation level with a focus on technology evaluation. He had an additional opportunity
for practical training outside the context of the DeltaSat-RI project. He spent one month in
training on small satellite technology at the site of a foreign partner. The capability building
profile for this engineer shows increases and decreases in autonomy over time. During the visit
to Supplier Sigmal the engineer has some high levels of autonomy due to his role as a customer
representative on behalf of Implementer Deltal. He was not just receiving mentorship from the
Supplier; he was also evaluating their project outputs and documents. He and his committee
made recommendations to the leadership about technical concerns with the project. Another
choice led to lower levels of autonomy after going from Nation Sigma to Nation Delta. The
Supplier Sigmal team went to Nation Delta and taught the engineers there new skills that were
not their primary activity while in Nation Sigma. This means they returned to the level of
practical training temporarily but gradually moved up to independent implementation in
operations.
Table 6-86: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from DeltaSat-R1 Project (2)
Color Key:
Before visit to Supplier Sigmal
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During Visit to Supplier Sigmal
After visit to Supplier Sig mal
Independent
Imnplementation
Supervsed On
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Table 6-86 shows the capability building profile for another engineer from Implementer Deltal.
This engineer studied telecommunications engineering at a university in Nation Delta. He later
studied the same topic at the Master's level at a university in Nation Sigma. Thus he had
exposure to the host country before going to visit Supplier Sigmal. Before working for
Implementer Deltal, this engineer worked for another part of the Nation Delta government. It
was the government authority for communication. In this position, he had related practical
experience in the areas of management and operations. He did planning for the ground segments
that were part of satellite communication systems. He also served on a national committee that
planned a previous national small satellite payload project with a foreign partner. This engineer
was hired into Implementer Deltal as part of the team that was sent to visit Supplier Sigmal.
Like the engineer described above, he spent about nine months doing theoretical training with
satellite engineering courses from Supplier Sigmal. He was later assigned to the role of
managing the ground segment aspects for the Implementer Deltal team of engineers. He
participated in the team design project and work on the ground segment requirements and design.
He had practical training on the software that Supplier Sigmal uses for ground stations. He
learned about procurement, manufacturing and assembly of satellites via visits to clean rooms
and practical training tasks related to assembly. His primary responsibility was to learn to lead
the ground station team for DeltaSat-Ri once they returned to Nation Delta. While in Nation
Sigma, he had practical training and supervised experience as the leader of the ground segment
team. When he returned to Nation Delta he worked at the independent implementation level in
this role. His work included harnessing specialized operations software and addressing personnel
and facility management for operations.
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Table 6-87: Capability Building Profile for Engineer from DeltaSat-R1 Project (3)
Color Key:
Before Visit To Supplier Sigma1
During Visit'[o Supplier Signial
After Visit To Supplier Sigma 1
In New Position After Leaving Implem enter Dell l
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Table 6-87 profiles the capability building experiences of an engineer that worked for
Implementer Deltal during the DeltaSat-RI project. He moved to a new position sometime after
returning from the visit to Supplier Sigma1. This engineer studied for his Bachelor's and
Master's degrees in Mechanical Engineering at a foreign university. He briefly held a job related
to management in the automotive industry before starting to work at Implementer Deltal. He
was sent to Supplier Sigmal where he started with the same nine months of theoretical training
as his team mates. This covered design and management issues. He was assigned to the structural
team of DeltaSat-R1. He had practical training on satellite structures during the team design
project in areas of requirements, design and management. He also had practical training in a
different topic via a course on software engineering for telecommunications. This was outside his
core topic. As part of the work on the structures aspects of DeltaSat-RI, he had practical and on
the job experience related to design, manufacturing and procurement, testing and launch
planning. Some of his on the job experience included participating in the assembly of the
spacecraft bus to the imager payload. He helped to write a structural test plan and analyze results.
He also participated in meetings with the launch provided and did structural analysis in response
to changes in launch plans. This engineer served as a customer representative and played an
oversight role to the Supplier, gaining experience in requirements and management at the level
of independent implementation. After returning to Nation Delta from Nation Sigma, this
engineer participated in the practical training and on the job experience to become certified to
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operate DeltaSat-RI. He participated in the independent implementation of the operations
activity. He took on a technical leadership role among the subsystem specialists before moving
to a new position in a commercial company that operates communication satellites in Nation
Delta. In his new position, he worked especially in the areas of management and operations.
The three examples of engineers profiled from Nation Delta are all cases of team leaders within
the Implementer Deltal organizational structure. The group of visiting engineers was large
relative to other case studies (about 20 engineers). They worked with a Supplier Organization
that is extremely large. The Implementer Deltal engineering team applied a team structure
inspired by their Supplier. They separated the engineers focused on the spacecraft, ground
segment and overall system into different subteams and assigned leaders to each smaller team.
The three engineers profiled above held leadership roles in this subteam structure while at
Supplier Sigmal and they took on great responsibility when they returned to Nation Delta. There
is not enough data available for a helpful team summary, but the three examples do start to imply
a general progression toward autonomy. The ground segment lead engineer focused more on
operations and has fewer examples broad coverage of the satellite subsystems. The other two
engineers show both breadth of satellite lifecycle phase and several examples of independent
implementation.
6.2.4 Research Question 4: What Capability Building Achievements do
Organizations Have?
Two frameworks are introduced at the beginning of this section that address organizational
capabilities. The frameworks capture organizational capabilities related to satellite engineering in
the context of a single satellite project and in the context of operating a satellite development
organization. As defined above, capability building may come through achievements that feature
new topics areas in satellite engineering, new levels of autonomy or new levels of technical
complexity. The frameworks include five levels of autonomy and a broad range of topics at the
organizational level. The discussion below shows the performance of the case study countries as
defined by these frameworks. The aspect of complexity is included by indicating the technical
complexity of each satellite project. As shown in Figure 6-3 in the discussion on the technical
characteristics of the seven satellites, four can be classified as more complex (AlphaSat-R2,
BetaSat-R2, GammaSat-RI, DeltaSat-R2) and three are less complex (AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-R1,
BetaSat-R3). This is based on their mass and the spatial resolution their imager can achieve. A
series of tables below (Table 6-88 to Table 6-94) shows the achievements of countries during
specific projects. The more complex projects are shown in bolder, larger font in order to account
for technical differences in the satellites. Further, the project names (i.e. AlphaSat-R1) indicate
the order of the project for each country. By combining complexity, project order or timing,
levels of autonomy and topics, these tables address four dimensions that describe the process of
capability building.
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Table 6-88: Satellite System Operation Achievements during Satellite Projects
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Satellite Achieved with support locally with with Achieved
Project during Training in external external mutual Independently
facility assistance partner
Satellite System AlphaSat-R1
Operation:
- Operation AlphaSat-R2
Management:
Mission Planning, BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R1
Anomaly Resolution, BetaSat-
Information R2 BetaSat-R2
Management
- Operation BetaSat-R3 BetaSat-R3
Engineering: Apply
Subsystem GammaSat-
Expertise to Mission R1
Planning and
Anomaly Resolution DeltaSatR2
Table 6-88 describes the level of autonomy with which case study projects achieved satellite
system operation. In this case all the countries ultimately achieved the same level. For all seven
satellite projects, the Implementers eventually took over responsibility from the Suppliers for
operations of their satellites. The Suppliers worked closely with the Implementers to operate the
satellites during an initial check out phase for several months after launch. In most cases the
Suppliers remained available for emergency assistance or long term maintenance. The contracts
between the Implementers/Overseers and Suppliers specified the level of support that the
Supplier was to provide in the operational phase. Each Implementer achieved day to day
independence in operating their satellite system. The Implementers managed facilities that
included transmitting and receiving antennas; computer systems that send commands and receive
satellite status; computer systems that receive, archive and process satellite data; as well as
support elements such as backup power supplies, connecting cables and mechanical equipment.
As Table 6-88 specifies, the topic of satellite system operation includes operation management
and operation engineering. As part of the mission planning aspect of operation management, the
Implementers were at the interface between the satellite system and potential end users for the
satellite data. They each defined a process by which other organizations, especially from within
their government, could request images from the satellite. Operation engineering means using
knowledge about the design of satellite subsystems to respond to anomalies or perform mission
planning. The operation engineering team receives status updates about each satellite subsystem;
together these updates describe the health of the satellite. The individuals who perform Operation
Management may or may not be the same as those who perform Operation Engineering. For
example, the operations team from Implementer Betal, included one group that focused on
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converting requests for images into satellite schedules and another group that monitored the
health of the satellite and responded to anomalous behavior. Implementer Gammal divided their
ground station team between those focused on satellite operations and those focused on
processing images.
Although the countries all achieved independent operations eventually, they reached this level in
different ways. Nation Delta worked closely with Supplier Sigmal during an extended period
after the Implementer Deltal engineers left Supplier Sigmal. Several representatives from
Supplier Sigmal spent about one year in Nation Delta providing training and ensuring that the
computer systems and antenna were working properly. For the BetaSat-R2/R3 satellite projects,
the ground station was provided by a subcontractor to Supplier Omegal from a different country.
Operations engineers from Supplier Omegal and engineers from the subcontractor went to
Nation Beta several times for shorter visits for launch. During these visits, they worked with the
Implementer Betal engineers and did trouble shooting on the equipment. A joint team of
engineers from Supplier Omegal and Implementer Betal worked to monitor the satellites during
launch and then to test and calibrate them for weeks after launch. Implementer Gammal pursued
GammaSat-RI with Supplier Taul. The ground system was included in their contract with
Supplier Taul, but the Implementer worked closely with the subcontractor that provided their
ground station. The ground station subcontractor was also from a different country than the
Supplier in this project. Before the ground system arrived in Nation Gamma, about four
engineers from Implementer Gammal visited the site of their ground station subcontractor to
learn about their systems and receive initial training. Two engineers from the subcontractor went
to Nation Gamma for the installation and start up of the ground systems at Implementer
Gammal. Those engineers from Nation Gamma that were working in Nation Tau returned home
to participate in setting up the ground system. Implementer Gammal hired local worker to do the
hands-on construction, but the engineers were also actively involved. Supplier Taul played the
role of consultant as Implementer Gammal interacted with their ground system subcontractor.
Implementer Gammal leased capacity from a company that operated a farm of satellite ground
antennas near the North Pole. The company's business model is to offer ground station service to
satellite operators in convenient geographic locations. Through this relationship, the Implementer
Gammal ground station became a node in this company's global network of ground stations and
generated revenue by supporting the satellites of other operators.
The Nation Beta satellite projects are shown in two columns because they had two strategies for
satellite operation. At one level, they operated the satellite independently for data collection
about Nation Beta and the surrounding region. The three satellites for Nation Beta were also part
of a cooperative satellite constellation led by Supplier Omegal. This Supplier coordinated
satellites owned by several customers to do joint imaging campaigns for commercial customers.
Thus, the Supplier also had access to task and interact with Nation Beta's satellites when they
were not being used to image over Nation Beta. With regard to autonomy, this arrangement is
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labeled in Table 6-88 as "Achieved with a mutual Partner." In this case, the complexity of the
satellite and the time progression from a country's first to their second satellite did not
differentiate between the performance of the Implementers.
Table 6-89: Satellite System Manufacturing, Assembly and Test Achievements during Satellite Projects
Achieved Achieved
Individual Satellite Achieved with support locally with Achieved with Achieved
Project during Training in external external mutual partner Independently
facility assistance
Satellite System
Manufacture, Assembly, AlphaSat-R1
Test
- Materials Selection AlphaSat- AlphaSat-
and Procurement R2 R2
- Component
Selection and
Procurement BetaSat-R1
- Manufacturer
(external) selection
and contracting BetaSat-R2
- Manufacturing
(internal)
- Subsystem BetaSat-R3
Functional Testing.
- Subsystem
Environmental GammaSat-
Testing R1
- System Assembly
and Integration
- System Functional
Testing DeltaSat-R2
- System
Environmental
Testing
Table 6-89 shows the achievements of the Implementer Organizations with regard to Satellite
System Manufacture, Assembly and Test. The table includes many examples of activities that are
included in that broad category such as selecting and procuring materials and components;
selecting and contracting with external manufacturers and so on. The satellite manufacturing
process is a mix of internal and external effort. The tendency to manufacture within the
Supplier's facility varies with both subsystem and with the nature of the Supplier. Some
subsystem elements lend themselves to in-house manufacturing because their success is highly
critical, which gives the Supplier incentive to control their production. They also require well
defined infrastructure to manufacture. The electronics boards that are part of almost every
subsystem fall into this category. Several of the Suppliers in these case studies maintain a staff of
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specially trained technicians who are certified to solder and implement electronics boards for
spacecraft by hand. The facility for such work must be operated in a particular manner to avoid
electro-static discharge that could damage the electronics. Once such a facility is established, it
can be used for a wide variety of projects because the components are small and similar across
satellites. A subsystem that lends itself to external manufacturing is the mechanical and structural
area. One approach to satellite design is to house the electronic components for each subsystem
in a box made aluminum or other strong and light material. The engineers design these boxes and
their arrangement to withstand the rigors of launch and operation in space. It is often convenient
and low risk to have such structural components manufactured externally. Other subsystems such
as propulsion and electric power involved hazardous materials in the propellant and batteries.
Suppliers must consider whether they have the safety protocols in place to manufacture with
such materials; it is often advantageous to work with external vendors.
For most of the case study satellite projects, the Implementers achieved these activities at the
level of autonomy labeled "Achieved during training." In each project, engineers from the
Implementer teams participated in these activities, but they were generally done under the
guidance and supervision of the Suppliers. During BetaSat-R3, the Implementer made specific
arrangements to create an opportunity for the Nation Beta engineers to take on primary
responsibility for this project activity. Thus, BetaSat-R3 is the lone project appearing in the
column "Achieved with support in external facility." BetaSat-R3 was completely manufactured,
assembled and tested in Nation Omega, but engineers from Nation Beta had leadership roles in
the process. For the AlphaSat-R2 project, Implementer Alphal achieved two levels of
organizational capability. They created an opportunity to work on assembly of the satellite in
Nation Alpha. AlphaSat-R2 was built through a series of prototype models. The early models
were manufactured, assembled and tested in Nation Tau at the Supplier Taul facility or with
their subcontractors. During the project, Implementer Alphal was gradually developing facilities
to assemble and test the final model of the satellite. The facilities included a clean room where
satellite components could be handled without contamination as well as an electronics lab with
the proper set up to avoid electrostatic discharge. Implementer Alphal also pursued opportunities
to manufacture some components of AlphaSat-R2 in Nation Alpha. The found local
subcontractors that could build several parts based on the designs generated by the Implementer
Alphal and Supplier Taul teams. After assembly, AlphaSat-R2 was returned to Nation Tau for
testing. This activity was achieved at a mix of levels for the AlphaSat-R2 project. Both Nation
Alpha and Nation Beta created somewhat artificial opportunities to enhance their skills in
satellite assembly, manufacture and test. Implementer Alphal invested the logistical effort and
expense to ship the satellite internationally in the middle of its assembly and test process.
Implementer Betal bought an extra satellite that was more helpful for training than for data.
The AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 projects stand out in this area of performance. AlphaSat-R2 is
more complex than BetaSat-R3, but the overall BetaSat-R2/R3 project was similar in scale to
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AlphaSat-R2. With regard to time, they are both part of the second satellite project for the
Implementer. Both Implementers specifically sought an opportunity to move beyond their level
of autonomy in this activity as compared with their first project.
Table 6-90: Satellite Project Business Development or Approval Achievements
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Achieved with support locally with with Achieved
Satellite Project during Training in external external mutual independently
facility assistance partner
AlphaSat-R1
Satellite Project AlphaSat-R2Business Development
or Approval BetaSat-R1
- Development of
feasibility studies BetaSat-R2
and funding BetaSat-R3
proposals
- Stakeholder needs GammaSat-
evaluation and RI
communication
DeltaSat-R2
The first two topic areas involved capabilities labeled as "production capabilities" on the level of
a single satellite project. These are the steps required to implement and operate a system. The
next two topic areas relate to "Investment Capabilities," which are required to initiate, conceive
and design a system. The first Investment Capability is Satellite Project Business Development
or Approval. These are the activities through which the Implementers secure funding and
approval from funders to execute the satellite project. In this context, the capability refers to the
interaction between the Implementer Organization, their Overseer Organizations and the funding
organizations within their government. As part of winning funding and approval from their
government, Implementers often create an initial proposal or feasibility study that begins to
define the satellite project and explains the benefits it will bring. They may also work to define
what stakeholders in the nation are impacted by the project. One major stakeholder category is
the group of data end users, but there may be others such as current and potential employees and
complementary firms. Before the AlphaSat-Rl and BetaSat-R1 projects, Implementer and
Overseer Organizations formed committees to think through these early issues. The committees
represented various stakeholder categories. Implementer Deltal held workshops to bring together
potential end users and other stakeholders of DeltaSat-RI before starting the project formally.
All of the Implementer Organizations in the case studies achieved this capability at an
independent level of autonomy. The amount of effort required to account for stakeholder needs
and convince funding agencies to support project proposals varied according to the political
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context for each project. For the AlphaSat-RI and GammaSat-R1 projects, there was high level
political support for investment in science and technology at the national level. Key government
leaders provided pivotal support to the project based more on the potential to enhance national
technological capability than on the benefits of the data. For the BetaSat-R1 project, the process
of evaluating stakeholder needs and developing funding proposals coincided with the process of
formulating a national space policy, national space agency and long term space project road map.
These high level activities are captured in the framework that describes organizational
capabilities related to operating a satellite development organization rather than a single satellite
project. They are discussed more below. Because business development for the BetaSat-R1
project was coupled with business development for the Nation Beta space program, there was a
greater emphasis on describing the benefits that satellite data would bring to the country for
stakeholders.
Table 6-91: Satellite Project Definition Achievements
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Achieved with support locally with with Achieved
Satellite Project during Training In external external mutual independently
facility assistance partner
AlphaSat-R1
Satellite Project AlphaSat-Definition
- Supplier elicitation,
review and selection BetaSat-R1 BetaSat-R1
- Contracting with
System Supplier BetaSat-R2
- Development of BetaSat-R3
project requirements
and preliminary GammaSat-R1
system concept
DeltaSat-R2
The Satellite Project Definition capability is also a part of the set of Investment Capabilities.
Whereas the Business Development aspects describes how Implementers gain approval and
funding from their overseers, the project definition capability focuses on forming and defining
the relationship between the Implementer and Supplier. The steps include finding, reviewing and
selecting a Supplier - perhaps from among a group of candidate suppliers. For the selected
Supplier a contract is negotiated, reviewed and approved. Throughout this process, the system
requirements and the preliminary concept for how the system will meet the requirements are
defined. The seven satellite projects are ranked at three levels of autonomy for the Project
Definition Capabilities. Nation Beta and Nation Gamma worked with external consultants as
they pursued this process, thus their autonomy level is shown as "Achieved locally with external
assistance." The consultants advised in area such as recommending suppliers to consider and
reviewing supplier proposals. For several projects, the Supplier was highly involved in the
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Project Definition activity because the project was seen as a collaboration between mutual
partners. For the AlphaSat-R2 project, Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alphal were in dialog
for years with representatives of Supplier Taul about the possibility of partnering on a satellite.
For the BetaSat-RI project, Implementer Betal did receive support from a consultant, but they
also agreed to work with Supplier Omegal and several of the Supplier's customers on a
constellation with specific technical and operational characteristics. This highly influenced the
project definition process. Although BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 were also designed to fly in
constellation, their technical specifications were not completely determined by the collaboration.
The AlphaSat-R1 and DeltaSat-RI projects were defined with a more independent approach that
did not involve such early collaboration with the Supplier. The complexity and timing of these
satellite projects did not have a clear impact on the level of autonomy.
Table 6-92: Satellite System Design Achievements During Satellite Projects
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Achieved with support locally with with Achieved
Satellite Project during Training in external external mutual Independently
facility assistance partner
Satellite System AlphaSat-R1
Design AlphaSat- AlphaSat-R2
- System modeling R2
- Functional and
physical design BetaSat-R1
- System analysis BetaSat-R2
- Process Planning
- Systems Budget BetaSat-R3 BetaSat-R3
Management
- Application of GammaSat-
system design RI
software DeltaSat-R2
The third capability in the set of Investment Capabilities is satellite system design. The tasks in
this capability include highly technical physics-based modeling and analysis using specialized
software that is dedicated to a particular satellite subsystem. The subsystems engineers define
both the function and physical layout of their portion of the satellite. The design capability also
includes technical management activities such as maintaining up to date documentation of
various budgets such as system mass, volume and estimated cost. Process for assembly and
operations are planned in preparation for production activities. The design process for each
satellite is highly involved and relies heavily on the judgment of the engineers. This is true even
if the design is based on previous satellites because each spacecraft is customized to fit the needs
of the end users. The Implementer Organizations from the seven satellite projects generally
contributed to design only at the level of training within the Supplier Organization. Two projects
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stand out. During the AlphaSat-R2 project, the engineers from Implementer Alphal were newly
hired and unfamiliar with satellite technology. They spent their initial time at Supplier Taul
gaining an orientation to the technology. Later, several of them contributed to design for certain
satellite subsystems as part of the team led by Supplier Taul. The imager and spacecraft were
both new designs; there was no existing template from which to work. During the BetaSat-R2/R3
satellite projects, Implementer Betal arranged with Supplier Omegal to give the Nation Beta
engineers responsibility for designing and implementing BetaSat-R3. The design was based on
an existing satellite platform, but each Nation Beta engineer had to update their portion of
BetaSat-R3 for its new mission. These two projects stand out in terms of the level of autonomy
achieved by the organization in the area of satellite system design. The projects are at different
complexity levels but similar in terms of time. It was the second satellite procurement for both
countries.
Table 6-93: Incremental or Major Product Invention Achievements during Satellite Project
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Achieved with support locally with with. Achieved
Satellite Project during Training in external external mutual Independently
facility assistance partner
AlphaSat-
Incremental/Major R2
Product invention
(creation)
Application of BetaSat-R2
scientific prnciples
to technology
development
In addition to Production and Investment Capabilities, satellite projects may involve Innovation
Capability. There are two steps to fielding a new product innovation. The invention step creates a
new product; the innovation step implements the product in a non-controlled environment and
applies the product to specific mission requirements. The new product may be an incremental or
major departure from previous products. An incremental invention improves upon previous
designs but does not change the architecture of the product. A major product invention proposes
a fundamentally new architecture for a product. The creation of a new product invention involves
the application of scientific principles to new technology development via experimentation or
trial and error. The case study satellites are classified with respect to product invention
achievement based on whether the spacecraft bus or imager payload were new or previously used
designs. Only two satellites from the case studies had new designs for spacecraft and imager;
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these were AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2. All the other satellites were based on heritage designs,
which is an approach that is highly valued in the satellite community. New designs are risky for
the customer and Supplier. Both AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2 were incremental product
inventions. They were not architecturally different in a significant manner from previous optical
remote sensing satellites. They did have slightly different internal structural arrangements and
some new components compared to previously design satellites by the same teams. They
featured higher technical performance, but they provided the same functions as previous
satellites. For both Nation Alpha and Nation Beta, they sought this incremental invention for
complex satellites in their second project.
Table 6-94: Incremental or Major Product Innovation Achievement during Satellite Project
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Individual Achieved with support locally with with Achieved
Satellite Project during Training in external external mutual Independently
Incremental/Major
Product innovation
(implementation)
- Application of
technology to
mission requirement
- Risk Management
- Evaluation of
Technical Maturity
Table 6-94 addresses the implementation of the AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2 satellites as new
products operated in a non-controlled environment. It confirms that the new satellite designs
were not only invented but also implemented as part of a specific mission. Part of implementing
a new product in a mission for an end user is evaluating and managing the risks of the unknown
technology. Satellite developers sometimes address this by introducing redundancy in the design
that combines old and new technology for the same function. If the new, unknown technology
fails, the old reliable technology can replace it. The two tables tell a common story that these
satellite projects were unique in pursuing an incremental product innovation. The desire to do so
was driven by the customer. The Supplier in each case also had incentives to pursue an
incrementally new design. Both Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul benefitted from working
with a customer that was willing to accept the risk of new technology development. For the
Suppliers, this meant a funding source to support new technology development that would
benefit them in later projects. Both Suppliers used the platform from these two projects in later
sales. In terms of capability, Nation Alpha and Nation Beta gained exposure to the development
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AlphaSat-
R2
BetaSat-R2
of a new satellite platform at the training level of autonomy. Although it is a low autonomy level,
the exposure is still significant.
The discussion above considers capabilities at the level of a satellite project. There are also
Production, Investment and Innovation Capabilities at the level of operating a satellite
development organization. In this context, the concern is not just to define and execute a single
satellite project but to execute a long term satellite program and maintain an organization with
people and facilities to support the program. Production at the organizational level means
operating and maintaining the infrastructure that supports satellite system. Investment includes
business development, definition and infrastructure establishment for a satellite program made of
multiple projects. Innovation at this level refers to new organizational or technical processes
rather than products. The tables that describe these achievements gives credit to specific nations
rather than projects; not all of the achievements can be observed in the context of a single project
and some happen between projects. The achievements identified in the tables were valid at the
time of data collection. Organizations may have developed further since that time.
Table 6-95: Satellite Infrastructure Operation and Maintenance by Organizations
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Satellite Development during support In locally with with indepen-
Organizations . . external mutualTraining external assistance partner dently
facility
Satellite Infrastructure Nation Alpha Nation Alpha Nation
Operation and Maintenance Alpha
- Test programming and Nation Beta Nation Beta
execution using
equipment Nation Nation
- Repair and Gamma Gamma
maintenance of physical
capital required for Nation Delta Nation
satellite operation, Delta
assembly and test
Table 6-95 presents the level of autonomy with which nations in the case studies achieved the
capability of operating and maintaining satellite infrastructure. There are two major types of
satellite infrastructure and countries had different levels of autonomy in each type. One type of
satellite infrastructure is the equipment and facilities used to assemble and test satellites. This
type can include clean room, machine shops, electronics laboratories, testing chambers and their
associated equipment. The second type of satellite infrastructure is the ground system that
supports operation of the spacecraft after launch and the reception and processing of the data.
This infrastructure features antenna, computers, power systems, software and other supporting
components. All of the four case study Nations eventually achieved local responsibility for
operation and maintenance of their satellite ground support systems. This is shown in the far
right column of Table 6-95. With regard to systems that allowed satellite assembly and testing,
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three of the four nations only achieved this as guests of the Supplier Organization (far left
column of Table 6-95). Nation Alpha stands out on this table because they did operate local
facilities for limited satellite assembly and functional testing. They started the operations with
support from Supplier Taul and others but continued to operate it independently later on.
Table 6-96: Satellite Program Business Development and Satellite Program Definition by Organizations
Achieved with Achieved Achieved
Satellite Development Achieved during support in locally with with mutual Achieved
Organizations Training external external ndependently
facility assistance
Satellite Program Business Nation
Development or Aproval Alpha
- Development of Nation Betafeasibility studies and
proposals Nation
- Stakeholder needs Gamma
evaluation and
communication
Satellite Development Achieved during Achieved with Achieved Achieved Achieved
Organizations Training support in locally with with mutual Independently
external external partner
facility assistance
Satellite Program (Multiple Nation
Projects) Definition Alpha
- Development of Nation Beta
program proposal and
program architecture Nation
- Evaluating infrastructure Gamma
and personnel needs for
program
Table 6-96 presents the performance of countries in pursuing business development and
definition for a series of satellite projects that make up a long term program. As of the time of
data collection three of the four countries had initiated at least two satellite projects with
Suppliers. They are all credited with achieving this independently. There are two aspects to this
achievement and the countries differ in the extent to which they achieve both aspects. One aspect
is simply gaining approval and funding for a second project after completing the first. The first
satellite project a nation pursues may bring a certain amount of political support due to their
pioneering nature. A nation's first project transforms them from being a satellite service user to a
satellite service provider. The second satellite project does not have the same air of pioneering
transformation. There is a risk that stakeholders that are distant from the satellite activities may
not understand the need for a second satellite project after an initial success. The countries are
given credit in Table 6-96 for overcoming the potential inertia of the first satellite project and
moving on to the second. A second aspect of business development for a satellite program is the
capability to plan and gain support for a long term road map of satellite projects that moves the
nation methodically toward a distant goal of technological capability. A nation may complete
two consecutive satellite projects without having a long term program defined. Nations Alpha,
Beta and Gamma all approached this activity differently. Nation Alpha did not start their first
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project with a clear long term goal for a national satellite program. The opportunity to launch a
small national satellite was presented. The Overseer and Implementer Organizations responded
to launch opportunity by gradually forming a vision for achieving national capability build
satellites. Nation Alpha did not, however, work with high level government leadership to define
a long term series of satellite projects with progressive goals. As they worked on operations for
AlphaSat-R2, Implementer Alphal worked with Overseers Alphal and Alpha2 to define
potential goals for the long term. They did feasibility studies for national satellite projects based
on different types of technology - such as communications. As of the time of data collection
Implementer Alphal had not achieved Overseer approval for a long term road map to serve as
future project goals. They were planning and approving each project as an individual.
Meanwhile, Nation Alpha was still in a long term process to define their national space policy. In
contrast Nation Beta did define a long term road map with specific technical milestones and an
ambitious long term vision. The central governing body in the executive branch of Nation Beta
approved a multi-decade space program with several milestones that marked steps toward
indigenizing space technology. The approval came near the beginning of the BetaSat-R2/R3
satellite project. Milestones on this long term plan included deadlines for building a satellite
locally and for building and operating a launch vehicle locally. Nation Gamma started the
process of defining and gaining approval for a long term series of projects with capability
milestones. As they entered GammaSat-R2 with Supplier Taul they envisioned future strategies
to combine enhanced technical performance of the satellite with organizational autonomy. They
considered the possibility of following a path similar to Nation Beta by which they would buy
multiple satellites during one project, with one focused on performance and the other on training.
Time is an important factor to consider the presentation of data in Table 6-96. Nation Alpha had
a history of a little more than 15 years for their satellite projects; for Nation Beta the timeline
covered on the order of 10 years; and Nation Gamma's experience was about five years.
Table 6-97: Satellite Infrastructure Establishment by Organizations
Achieved Achieved Achieved
Satellite Development Achieved with support locally with with mutual Achieved
Organizations during Training In external external wit a ndependently
facility assistance
Satellite Infrastructure
Establishment Nation Alpha Nation Alpha
- Feasibility studies
- Implementation project
management Nation Beta
- Procurement of
equipment
- Soliciting and selecting Nation
bids Gamma
- Contracting and
oversight
- Hiring and training of Nation Delta
personnel
- Start up of Operations I I I
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Table 6-97 presents the achievement of a single nation in the area of satellite infrastructure
establishment. As defined above, satellite infrastructure includes the ground system for operating
the satellite as well as the equipment and facilities required to assemble and test satellites. Three
of the four nations established new general workspace as part of the case study projects. Nation
Alpha evolved their facilities for both the Implementer and Overseer several times. During the
BetaSat-R2/R3 satellite project, Nation Beta set up a new space agency headquarters campus and
opened several specialized campuses in other parts of the country. Nation Gamma rented and set
up a new office facility for Implementer Gammal during GammaSat-R1. Nation Delta had well
established facilities, but built new office space at the site of the new ground station that was
built for DeltaSat-RI away from Implementer Deltal headquarters. The general facility
implementation is not captured in Table 6-97. The table only presents achievements related to
establishment of satellite ground systems and satellite assembly and test facilities. All four
nations established new ground systems for satellite operation with support from Suppliers or
ground system subcontractors. This places them in the middle column for autonomy. Nation
Alpha also established facilities for satellite assembly and test. In terms of autonomy, they
started with external assistance to define the specifications and standards for the clean room and
electronics laboratory. Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alphal both set up specialized
facilities and worked with local contractors for construction. Thus, Nation Alpha stands out in
achieving satellite infrastructure establishment.
Table 6-98: Incremental/Major Process Invention and Innovations by Organizations
Achieved Achieved Achieved withSatellite Development Achieved during with support locally with mutual Achieved
Organizations Training In external external ndependently
facility assistance
Incremental/Major Process Nation Nation
invention (creation) Alpha Alpha
Application of
scientific,
management or social
science principles to
define new satellite
engineering process,
testing techniques, or
management
approaches
Achieved Achieved Acivdwt
Satellite Development Achieved during with support locally with Ach d with Achieved
Organizations Training In external external partner ndependently
facility assistance
Incremental/Major Process Nation Nation
innovation Alpha Alpha(implementation)
* Implementation of new
satellite engineering
process, testing
techniques, or
management
approaches
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In Table 6-93 and Table 6-94, Nations Alpha and Beta were credited with achieving incremental
product innovations during training because they procured satellites with new spacecraft and
imager designs for their second projects. Table 6-98 considers invention and innovation again for
an organization. In this context, new processes rather than new products signify invention and
innovation. Nation Alpha achieved an incremental process innovation at an independent level of
autonomy by developing steps for monitoring and operating AlphaSat-R2. They worked
independently to define a set of potential anomalies and prepare procedures for countering them.
Nation Alpha also achieved an incremental process innovation by sending their satellite to a
rarely used orbit. This was done with a partner as they worked with Supplier Taul. Nation Alpha
did not claim to be first to propose using the orbit, but they were still pioneers in actually
building a small remote sensing satellite for such a mission and operating it.
6.2.5 Reflections on Capability Building
Before continuing on to Research Question 5, this section considers the outcomes of the
capability building analysis at the individual and organizational level.
6.2.5.1 Individual Capability Building
This section provides several points of reflection about the individual capability building
analysis. The analysis approach provides a useful indication of individual opportunities for
capability building. The analysis does not directly measure individual learning, but it does show
progress over time in the level of application and topic areas that each individual covers. As
someone moves from theoretical training to independent implementation in an area, it is likely
that they are learning the knowledge. The evidence for the tables is based on interviews. It is
possible that some examples for a given individual did not emerge in the interviews. In that
sense, the tables show a conservative estimate for the capability building opportunities. The set
of data presented above is highly gender biased. It primarily shows examples of male engineers.
This does not fully reflect the gender breakdown of the engineering teams at the Implementer
Organizations. Most of the Implementer engineering teams that went to work with the Supplier
Organization did have several women members.
The stories of individual capability building relate to several theoretical concepts. The first is
absorptive capacity. An individual organization has higher absorptive capacity when they have
previous experiences that support their ability to learn new material. In these capability building
profiles, several engineers had related practical experience or previous satellite experience before
they went to visit the Supplier for training. Both spoke of how they used their previous
knowledge in their work at the Supplier. Both felt some level of confidence based on their earlier
experiences. In the case of one engineer from Nation Beta, he worked on large scale power
systems and moved to small scale. His knowledge did not all transfer directly, but he felt
confident in the working environment. Another Nation Beta engineer was trained as part of the
communication satellite project. He felt he learned theory well during that training and it helped
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his hands on work when he arrived at Supplier Omegal. Absorptive capacity is not always
technical. One engineer from Nation Delta felt more confident at Supplier Sigmal because he
had studied at a university in Nation Sigma before the training experience.
6.2.5.2 Organizational Capability Building
The capability building achievements of the organizations in these case studies takes place over
years or decades. Nation Alpha has the longest history, so it is not surprising that they also have
some impressive achievements compared to other nations. Note that the organizational autonomy
scale used to capture achievements is focused on transitioning from a state of dependency on
others for technology to independent understanding of a technology. In other words, the scale
shows the process of mastering a technology. One scholar of technological capabilities in
developing countries proposes that technology mastery is just the first step in a longer series of
steps toward harnessing a new technology in a country. Lall proposes a series of steps including
mastering a technology, adapting the technology to local conditions, improving the technology,
diffusing the technology within the economy and exporting the technology.' The steps are
proposed for a generic technology. In the case of a satellite, adapting a satellite system to local
conditions may be done with both the data and the spacecraft. The steps to process satellite data
depend on the nature of the geography. Nation Alpha took steps to adapt their entire system to
local conditions by choosing an orbit that would give them more frequent coverage of their land.
Improving the technology may be done through the incremental or major product and process
innovations discussed above. As noted, the two new satellite platforms for the AlphaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R2 satellites are examples of improving the technology in partnership with a supplier.
After mastering satellite technology, the Implementers could seek to improve it independently.
Diffusing the technology into the economy could take several forms. Nation Alpha started this
process by working with local firms for some fabrication of parts for AlphaSat-R2 and by using
local firms to build their assembly and test facilities. In general, the satellite technology diffuses
in the local economy when the satellite data is used to support decision making or geographical
analysis. The final step is exporting the technology. None of the case study implementers
reached that stage, but Supplier Taul did go through the entire process from technology mastery
to technology export in a period of about two decades.
In order to highlight the importance of diffusing technology in the economy, Lall proposes an
additional category of organizational capability called Linkages. This includes sharing
information and business with local vendors, customers and researchers. Nation Alpha stands out
in this area, but Nations Beta and Gamma also have vision for working on this. Nation Beta has
investigated local manufacturing opportunities for satellite components. They also developed
several technologies that they hoped to commercialize into the economy for non-space use.
Lall, Sanjaya. "Technological Capabilities and Industrialization." World Development. Vol 20, No 2, p 165-186,
1992.
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Nation Gamma had several relationships with local universities for research on satellite data use.
As part of this relationship, they sometimes worked with local students on projects. These are all
examples of linkages. If new nations pass through all of Lall's steps from mastery to technology
exporting with small satellites, the potential financial impact may not be high. Lall's framework
was built with a focus on mass produced goods that can be exported to many customers around
the world. When a country achieves the capability to export satellites, it may not have a large
impact on the overall economy. It does, however, have the potential for symbolic impact because
the number of satellite exporters in the world is small compared to many other technology
products. There is not room in any country for a large number of firms or organizations
manufacturing satellites. In the more developed countries the well established aerospace
companies are large, vertically integrated companies that grew by merger because the market
was small. Thus, the goal for the Implementer nations in these countries may be different from
Lall's proposed series of steps. Mastery, adaptation, improvement and diffusion of satellite
hardware may be more important than exporting. On the other hand, several countries in these
cases have the goal of exporting satellite data to a global market. The data market does have
room for expansion by new players.
6.3 Research Question 5: What are potential relationships between
architecture and capability building?
This section explores potential links between architecture and capability building in three stages.
The first stage proposes three archetypal project types that provide unifying themes which are
consistent in several projects. The second stage starts to consider how future projects can be
architected to purposely create opportunities for capability building. The third stage considers
factors outside of the architecture - including personal characteristics - that impact the training
experience.
"What archetypal projects highlight the relationship between architecture and capability
building?"
Research Question 5 considers the relationship between the architecture of collaborative satellite
projects and the capability building opportunities that Nations achieve at the individual and
organizational level. One answer to the research question proposes three archetypal project
categories that show a link between key aspects of architecture and capability building
experiences. Table 6-99 introduces three archetypal categories that capture several aspects of
Context, Architecture and Capability Building. The three archetypes are driven by three types of
political and leadership contexts. For each archetype, two or three of the case study satellite
projects fit into the pattern for context, architecture and capability building. These archetypes
provide an initial anchor into relevant processes that link the three areas. Each archetype is
introduced in the following discussion.
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Table 6-99: Three Archetypal Projects that Summarize Links between Context, Architecture and Capability Building
Summary of Archetypal Collaborative Satellite Projects
Structured Project Risk Taking Project Political Pushed
Project
Context
Medium Political Strong political
Political Support Low political support Support; Need to stnpot
Increase. support
Leader in space
organization Key leader in space Key National Level
Leadership understands political organization with vision Leader gives support
and bureaucratic and technical and visibility to
and system understanding satellite activity.
Timing 2 nd National RS Project 2nd or 3rd national RS Ist remote sensing
_______ project project
Architecture
Approval for funding is The high level leaders
done through official The igeeed in
bureaucratic process - Formal approval process funding the project
Funding Approach no favoritism for space for Implementers led by and the Implementers
project. Proposal Overseers. d the te
should demonstrate the do not have to
benefits of the project. convince them.
Choose supplier
Choose based on based on personalKey is to use a formal, Chos aed.on relationship or
Supplier Selection traceable process to personal relationship.. introduction. Key is
choose supplier. someone that is trusted. to work with
someone that has a
similar vision.
Complex and high Mix of high and low Less complex and
Technical Approach pelforeanm i complexity and low performance
performance lowperformance
Phase of Proect Phase A/B to Phase D Phase A to Phase D Phase C and DExperienced
Accountability in Well defined mentor Mix of formal and Flexible, informal
Mentor Relationship relationship informal mentor relationship
Capability Building Opportunities
Level ofApplication of Strong on theoretical Strong on practical and Strong on practical
Training and practical Training on the job training training and medium
on the job training
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Areas of
Organizational High in complexity, Med in Complexity, Low in complexity,
Accomplishment Low in autonomy, High in Autonomy, High Low in autonomy,
(Advances in High in new topic inew topic Coverage High in new topic
autonomy, complexity, coverage coverage
topics)
Example Projects
BetaSat-R2 and AlphaSat-R2 and AlphaSat-R1,
DeltaSat-R2 BetaSat-R3 BetaSat-RI,
________________ 
________________ 
GammaSat-RI
Structured Project Risk Taking Project Political Pushed
____ ___ ___ ___ 
___ 
_  ___ __  ___ 
__ ____ ___ ___ 
___ ___Project
The Politically Pushed Project
Beginning on the far right with the politically pushed project, this archetype is a model that fits
AlphaSat-RI, BetaSat-RI and GammaSat-RI. For the politically pushed satellite project there is
strong political support from a key national leader. This leader takes initiative and has enough
influence to give the project visibility and political recognition. This reality was true for the three
projects in the data set that were first national satellite projects. The political leader fostered
excitement for the pioneering achievement. The architecture for a politically pushed project has
several common aspects. The funding approach is flexible. Because high level leaders are
interested in the project, the Implementer leaders to not have to spend time convincing them of
the value of the project. They focus instead of defining the project activities and technology.
When Implementers choose Suppliers for the politically pushed project, the key factor that drives
them is finding a partner with whom they share a common vision. The Implementer may or may
not use a rigorous selection process to find and compare potential suppliers. This depends on
their familiarity with the space marketplace. The key issue is that they eventually form a personal
relationship or receive an introduction to a Supplier team that supports the Implementer vision
for their first national satellite project. The technical approach for the politically pushed project
is conservative, seeking low complexity and tentative technical performance. The satellite does
not need to be highly ambitious; it only needs to be successful to usher in the first national
project. The Implementers in the politically pushed project are not deeply familiar with the
process of satellite development. They are guided by the supplier as they define the technical
characteristics of the satellite and training experience. The Implementers are not aware of the
different stages of the satellite development lifecycle. The engineers mainly experience the later
lifecycle stages that focus on manufacturing, assembly and testing. The Supplier engineers
provide informal mentorship to the visiting Implementer engineers in a flexible manner that
evolves naturally. The capability building opportunities that result from this combination of
contextual factors and architectural choices are as follows. The level of application of the
training for the Implementer engineers is strongest in the area of practical training where they
work in a hands-on manner but they are mainly forming skills rather than contributing to the
project. There is a medium level of experience with on the job training, especially at the end of
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visit to the Supplier. In terms of organizational advancement in the three axes of capability
building, the Implements make a low advance in terms of complexity, and a low advance in
autonomy. They experience many new topics, however, because the entire satellite development
process is unfamiliar. All of this description applies to the AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-RI and
GammaSat-RI projects. They did not have all of their architectural dimensions in common, but
this set overlaps.
The Structured Project
The first column of Table 6-99 shows the Structured Project Archetype. The Structured Project
may follow the Politically Pushed Project as the second national satellite investment in remote
sensing. The Structured Project faces low political support. The excitement of the first national
satellite project in remote sensing has worn off. The project requires a leader at the level of the
Implementer or Organizational level who understands how to survive in the political and
bureaucratic system that does not necessarily favor their projects. As these leaders apply for
funding from the government, they are no longer granted special status because of the novelty of
space. In this case, they need to demonstrate clearly how the project will bring benefit to the
country. Thus they emphasize the opportunity to generate useful data. As the Implementer
selects a Supplier, they continue to follow a rigid, bureaucratic process in order to fit within
official policy. They use a formal, traceable process to choose the supplier that indicates a rigor.
They do not simply make a personal arrangement based on relationships, even if they know the
Supplier already. The technical complexity of the Structured Project satellite is high and the
performance is excellent. This ensures that the satellite performs a social service worthy of
funding. Also, since the first project was successfully completed, the willingness to invest in
advanced technology is increased. The Implementer is more aware of the satellite lifecycle. They
work with the supplier to ensure that their engineers visit for a longer portion of the development
process, including the design phase. They also seek well defined relationships between Supplier
mentors and Implementer engineers that can be documented and tracked along with other project
deliverables. The Capability Building Opportunities created through this combination of Context
and Architecture are as follows. The training for individuals is highly theoretical and includes
some practical training. The Implementers seek high quality academic experiences that give the
engineers foundational knowledge to understand the design process. The organizational advances
are thus high in terms of exposure to complex technology, low in terms of gaining new
autonomy and high in terms of new topics covered at the theoretical level. This description is
true for BetaSat-R2 and DeltaSat-RI.
The Risk Taking Project
Another potential path that Nations take after early satellite projects is the Risk Taking Project.
In this case the political climate is mediocre. There is a need to increase it by demonstrating the
excitement of space in a fresh way. In this context, a strong leader in the Implementer or
Overseer organization can play an important role by providing vision based on a sound technical
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understanding of satellite technology. As the leader pursues the funding process, they follow the
formal guidelines as they might in the Structured Project. When the Implementer chooses a
Supplier, they are concerned with working with someone that they trust. The trust is important
because it allows the Implementer to consider taking a technical risk with the Supplier as their
guide. The technical nature of the satellite may vary. The key is that in some way, the
Implementer defines an opportunity to take a high risk for high rewards as part of the project.
This may be by seeking exposure to new topics or more autonomy. The Implementer ensures that
their engineers experience all the satellite lifecycle phases and participates fully. The mentor
relationship may be formal or informal; this is driven by the Supplier culture. The Risk Taking
Project provides opportunities for strong practical and on the job training because the
Implementer leadership has clearly defined a new achievement goal for the organization - either
in terms of new topics or autonomy. This summarizes key aspects of the AlphaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R3 projects. They took different risks. For AlphaSat-R2, they sought a new satellite
design in an unusual orbit. For BetaSat-R3 the risk was to allow the Implementer Betal
engineers to work more independently. The common thread was to take a risk that demonstrated
the potential of the technology to advance the nation.
These three archetypal project categories bring together the analysis above. They show potential
links that could start to explain how context leads to specific architectural choices and how these
choices impact the range of capability building opportunities.
How can projects be architected to create best opportunities for capability building?
As future national space organizations pursue collaborative satellite projects that follow the
model studied here, they have the opportunity to learn from the past experiences of others and
create project architectures that are most likely to support their objectives. This section makes an
analogy with a physical satellite to develop an approach to architecting satellite projects.
Satellites are divided into two main sections: the payload or instrument and the spacecraft bus.
The payload is the part of the satellite that provides a useful service to the customer or end user.
The spacecraft bus includes all the subsystems that support the operation of the payload by
supplying structure, thermal protection, radiation shielding, power, computation, navigation,
pointing and communication, among others. For most satellites, payload is the part of the
satellite that achieves the objectives of the customer. The decisions for how to design the
subsystems are all based on the needs of the payload. Each subsystem has several major design
characteristics that represent decision facing the subsystem engineer as they develop their part of
the satellite. There are also key features of the payload and operational plans that impact how
each subsystem is designed. These features are called design drivers. Figure 6-7 shows a
conceptual model of a satellite and highlights nine subsystems with their design drivers. The
figure emphasizes the concept that the design choices for each subsystem are based on the needs
of the payload. The operation of the payload is the ultimate goal of the satellite. Some satellites
have multiple payloads; this increases their complexity. If there are conflicts between the
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technical requirements to operate both payloads, the satellite design team needs to work with the
customer to prioritize the payloads. Depending on the needs of the payloads, some satellites
subsystems are more influential in the design than others. Some subsystems must meet a precise
performance requirement in order for the payload to work; for other subsystems, the performance
is not as critical. For example, if a satellite operates a camera as a payload, it may be the case
that the attitude control subsystem is very important to point the camera accurate. This
requirement may imply technical challenge. At the same time, the requirements on the
communication system to send the data from the satellite to ground stations on earth may be less
critical because the technology is readily available to meet that requirement.
Payload /
Instrument
Spacecraft Bus: Propellant, Power, Weight
Attitude Det. & Communications: Connand and Data
Control: Orbital geometry, data Handling: Lifetime,
Range and accuracy of rate and volume, bit radiation, schedule.
payload/power pointing error rate telemetry req's
Power: Average/peak Thermal: Payload and Structures: Launch
power requirements, battery temperature vibration and
orbital and s/c limits, power acceleration; rocket
geometry, mission life dissipation size
Guidance and Propulsion: Delta-V Computer Systems:
Navigation: Payload and thrust level for Throughput, memory,
pointing, constellation & orbit insertion and radiation hardness,
altitude maint. re's maint. software avail.
(Wertz and Larson, SMAD, 1999)
Figure 6-7: Conceptual model of a satellite showing subsystems and design drivers*c
The concepts illustrated in Figure 6-7 allow an analogy to defining the architecture of a satellite
project. A satellite project can be conceptualized as a system with the equivalent of subsystems
and payloads. For a project, the payloads are replaced with desired outcomes. In the case study
projects, the desired outcomes included a particular technical performance by the satellite system
and increased capability building. The subsystems of a satellite projects are not physical
elements of the project. Instead they are the Architectural Views that define different aspects of
the project. Examples of the Architectural Views defined in Research Questions 1 and 2 include
Organization View, Supplier Selection View, Management and Contract View, Personnel
Management View and Training View. Within each view is a series of dimensions. One
dimension is the combination of a function and potential forms that can execute the function.
Architecting a satellite project means assigning specific objects of form to execute functions for
each dimension. For example, in the Organization View one function is Overseeing the project.
This is executed generically by an Overseer. One architectural choice is to decide what
organization executes the function of Overseeing. Figure 6-8 provides a conceptual model for the
architecture of a satellite project that builds on Figure 6-7. As is the case with a satellite project,
the architectural decisions of assigning forms to functions for each dimension should be driven
by the desired outcomes. Ideally, the assignment of each form supports the technical
282
performance requirements and capability building objectives. In addition, the context brings
constraints that impact the set of options for what elements of form are available to be assigned
to functions. In some cases, contextual constraints make it impossible to assign an ideal element
of form to a particular function and the project must compensate for this deficiency.
System Technical
Performance
Requirerent
Individual and Organizational
Capability Building Objective
Organization View:
Implementer, Supplier,
Overseer, Team Size
Supplier Selection
View: Selection
Process, Priority
Supplier Attributes
Management and
Contract View: Review
Strategy, Supplier
Contract
Satellite Project
Project Initiation and
Approval View:
Funding Approach, Project
Leader, Organizational
Appointment
Facility View:
Supplier Facility
Status, Implementer
Facility Status
Technical Product
View: Mass, Design
Life, Payload
Personnel
Management View:
Engineer Recruitment,
Evaluation. Selection
Training View:
Project Phase, Level
of Application, Mentor
Relationship
Technical Approach
View: Satellite Platform
Heritage, Satellite
Engineering Approach
Figure 6-8: Conceptual model of satellite project architecture showing objectives, views and dimensions
How can decision makers who are involved with collaborative satellite projects determine what
elements of form to assign to functions in order to best achieve technical requirements and
capability building objectives? Such an approach will require three types of knowledge. The
first type of knowledge is about the internal rules that govern each View. These rules define what
functions are relevant, what elements of form are potentially relevant and the different
characteristics of each element of form. The second type of knowledge is about the relationships
between Views. Does a decision to assign one element of form in one View impact other Views?
If Views are linked, a decision about one View may reduce the set of options for another View.
Third, knowledge is needed about the relationship between Views and the requirements and
objectives. How does the choice of each View impact the achievement of the project technical
performance and capability building? The decisions for each View should be driven by these
requirements and objectives.
In the case of a satellite design process, the knowledge about rules governing each subsystem,
relationships between subsystems and the relationship between subsystems and payloads is
generally well understood. These rules and relationships are based on physics; they can be
quantified and modeled using software. It is much more difficult to define the relationships and
rules governing Architectural Views of satellite project. For the rules governing each View, there
is knowledge to be learned from literature. Each Architectural View is a specialty area that has
its own set of knowledge beyond the scope of a specific satellite project. For most Architectural
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Views, there is literature that provides general guidance on the governing rules. For example, the
Supplier Selection View is linked to the larger project management and project delivery
literature that addresses the process of evaluating and choosing a firm during procurement of a
large-scale infrastructure project. The Personnel Management View is linked to a larger literature
that addresses the general strategies for recruiting, evaluating, selecting and retaining engineers
in a government or commercial setting. For all the Views there is some amount of literature or
common practice in other disciplines that can start to elucidate the rules of the View. In some
cases, concepts from the literature may not apply directly apply because they were developed
based on different assumptions or in different concepts. As these situations are discovered, they
will motivate future research.
The relationship between the Architectural Views of a satellite project is an area that will require
further research and literature review to confirm. This is initially explored in the discussion on
Research Question 2. More research and literature review is also needed to define the
relationships between the Views and project outcomes. The evidence about these issues from this
study is inconclusive, because of the exploratory nature of the work. Table 6-100 gives examples
of project dimensions that showed either variation or similarity across projects. Projects tended
to be similar in the type of organization that served as Overseer; most Overseers were relevant
government ministries. Most Implementer Organizations played a similar role in the process of
selecting engineers for training. During engineer recruitment, projects used similar sources of
recruitment and similar evaluation processes. There were fewer examples of similarity than of
variation. Projects varied in dimensions such as the type of Implementer Organization, the type
of Supplier Organization, the Team Size and others. Some of this variation is expected to impact
the project outcomes based on concepts from literature or experiences in other fields.
Table 6-100: Summary of Project Dimensions that show variation or similarity across projects
Examples of Architectural Dimensions with Examples of Architectural Dimensions with
Variation Among Projects Similarity Across Projects
1. Implementing Organization
2. Supplier Organization
3. Implementer Visiting Team Size At Supplier
4. Role Of Supplier As Engineer Selection 1. Overseer organization
Organization for Implementer Engineers 2. Role of Implementer as Engineer Selection
5. Implementer Engineer Recruitment Process Organization
6. Supplier Selection Process 3. Engineer Recruitment source
7. Tai ro Phase (that visiting 4. Engineer evaluation process7. Training Project Phs ta iiig5. Priority supplier attributes
engineers experienced at supplier) 5. porit er attrius
8. Theoretical training 6. Implementer facility status
9. Practical training 7. Supplier facility status
10. Mentor-trainee accountability system 8. On the Job Training Approach
11. Complexity of Technical Product
12. Satellite Platform Heritage
13. Satellite Engineering Approach
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14. Role of Implementer Engineers in Reviews
15. Educational Background of Implementer
Engineers
Table 6-101 gives further information about some of the architectural dimensions that varied
across projects. The case studies reveal the nature of the variation for several dimensions. In
some cases, variation can be observed in several ways. The types of Implementing Organizations
can be divided as government versus private sector; operational versus research; or as focused on
delivering satellite services versus satellite manufacturing. The Supplier firms fit into two groups
that are different in several ways. Two of the Suppliers are smaller, younger organizations with
non-traditional engineering and project management approaches. The third supplier is larger,
more established and represents mainstream technology approaches. The Implementer
organizations sent teams of different sizes to work with the Suppliers. The divisions between
smaller and larger teams are labeled subjectively. Three teams were in the range of six to 15
people while three teams were in the range of sixteen to thirty people. Table 6-101 provides the
source of variation for several other dimensions.
Table 6-101: Discussion of variation among architectural dimensions
Examples of Architectural
Dimensions with Variation Major Source of Variation
Among Projects
Implementers can be split along several divisions:
i .i government versus private organizations; operational
Implementing Organization versus research organizations; or satellite service
versus satellite manufacturing
The suppliers can be split into two groups where two
Supplier Organization suppliers are small in size and use 
non-traditional
approaches; one supplier is large and uses traditional
technology approaches
Implementer Visiting Team Size at Three projects have teams in range of 6 to 15 people;
Supplier three projects have teams in range of 16-30 people.
Role Of Supplier As Engineer In two out of six projects, the Supplier played a strong
Selection Organization for role in selecting Implementer engineers.
Implementer Engineers
Implementer Engineer Recruitment Four projects advertised broadly through public and
Process private channels; two projects relied mainly on private
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channels.
Supplier Selection Process Two projects used informal process; four used formalprocess with review of multiple proposals.
Training Project Phase (that Four projects mainly exposed trainees to Phases C and
visiting engineers experienced at D; Two projects exposed them to Phases A to D.
supplier) I
For each dimension that shows variation, the data inspires initial ideas about potential
relationships within Architectural Dimensions, across Architectural Dimensions and between
Dimensions and Project Outcomes (technical performance and capability building). Examples
are given in Table 6-102. The Architectural Dimension of Implementer Organization seems to
show a connection between the choice of Overseer and choice of Implementer because the
Overseer Organization typically appoints the Implementer. The first observation is that while
most Overseers were similar in nature (most were government ministries related to science and
technology), they chose a variety of types of organizations to serve as Implementers. There is a
plausible conjecture about the relationship between choice of Implementer Organization and the
project outcomes. There were four types of Implementer Organizations, each with a different
operational model. The four types were government linked company, national space agency,
national remote sensing agency and national research agency. The conjecture is that these
different types of agencies might choose different areas of technical focus within the field of
satellite technology. This is not clearly seen. The national remote sensing agency does make a
clear choice to be focused on operations, but it the other three types of agencies appear similar in
their approaches. All three state a long term goal to establish internal capability to design and
manufacture satellites. All three state a long term goal to set up physical infrastructure to support
satellite assembly and testing. All three assign teams to the complete set of satellite subsystem
specialties, including operations. Will it be the case that these three organizations (a company,
space agency and research agency), will differentiate more in the future based on their category?
Or are the labels unimportant because they share the same operational goals? It may be the case
than in the early years of a country's activity in a new technology, specialization is less relevant
because the organization is trying to learn the overall technology and has not yet determined a
long term path.
Table 6-102: Examples of conjectures about relationships among Architectural Dimensions, between Architectural
Dimensions and between Dimensions and Project Outcomes
Architectural Proposed Chain of
Dimension that Relationships Potential Outcome
shows variation
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We might expect different types of implementers to
Implementer Overseer Organization + have different areas of technical focus, but it is not
Organization Implementer Organization clear. One difference is that the Remote Sensing
Agency is more operations focused.
Supplier Supplier Organization -)o Satellite The Supplier Organizations can be divided 
into two
Organization Engineering Approach categories. One emphasizes subsystem design; oneemphasizes subsystem integration
Implementer Visiting Team Size 4 Role Teams of trainee engineers are assigned to different
Visiting Team Size Assignment Philosophy ranges of subsystem roles and learn different
At Supplier I P subsystem topics during on the job training
Table 6-102 also presents conjectures about relationships relating to the Architectural Dimension
that assigns a Supplier Organization to the functions of producing satellite and training
engineers. In these six case studies, the choice of Supplier inherently defines the Satellite
Engineering Approach Dimension because each Supplier has a specific technology approach.
That may not be the case with all Suppliers. In general, it could be possible for a Supplier to
operate with multiple engineering approaches, although there is not much evidence of that in the
aerospace community. The Satellite Engineering Approach Dimension is closely related to many
other aspects of a Supplier Organization. The Engineering Approach defines the types of
facilities a Supplier requires, their contractual preferences, their technical product and their
training approach. It thus impacts the Views for Management and Contract, Facility, Technical
Product, and Training. With regard to training, the conjecture is that the Supplier following a
more traditional satellite engineering approach would emphasize satellite design via subsystem
integration. This type of firm tends to outsource the design and fabrication of many subsystems
to external vendors. Alternatively, the Supplier following a small satellite engineering approach
emphasizes satellite subsystem design. This difference in training should impact the capability
building outcomes, especially with regard to Individual Capability Building experiences. The
data from this study is not designed to systematically compare the individuals along these lines.
This is conjecture provides a starting point for further work.
A similar discussion applies to the Architectural View of Implementer Visiting Team Size at
Supplier. The Team Size dimension impacts the Role Assignment Philosophy Dimension. The
leadership within the Implementer and Supplier Organizations work together to assign
Implementer engineers to technical positions during their training. Small teams used different
philosophies than larger teams. The smaller teams either sought to cover many topics within
satellite engineering by giving each person multiple roles or they choose a small set of topics on
which to focus. Large teams tried to cover as many topics as possible by spreading their
engineers across the disciplines. The difference between these approaches is expected to have
long term impact on the organizational achievements. Perhaps these choices will influence the
way the organization specializes later on. If a team trained a few people in strategically chosen
areas, this choice may shape their future decisions about what aspects of satellite projects to
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outsource. Implementer Organizations that send large teams seeking to cover many topics also
tend to model their satellite organizations after the organization of the Supplier firm. It is not
clear that such an organizational structure is most effective for a new organization in the field
from a different country. The Implementer Team size seems to be an important dimension whose
impact needs to be explored both with more research and with longer observation of the case
study countries.
This discussion has given a few examples to motivate the need to explore connections future that
can inform the architecture of future satellite projects. Along with the potential to assign forms to
functions strategically is the realization that contextual constraints may limit the freedom of
decision makers. Furthermore, the case studies also show that there is not a centralized decision
maker architecting the satellite projects. Decisions are made by a combination of the Overseer,
Implementer, Supplier and other actors from the various nations such as regulators. This research
proposes that key leaders from the Overseers and Implementers may benefit from thinking about
the satellite projects as systems that can be architected. They may not be free to define
Architectural Dimensions as they choose due to constraints or the actions of other stakeholders.
They will be aware, however, of the set of options open to them and the potential impact of
choosing one option over another. Further research will continue to explore the relationships
between and among Architectural Dimensions and Outcomes.
What are alternative explanations beyond architecture for project outcomes?
This section considers alternative influences on project outcomes in order to explore the limits of
architecture as a factor. As the relationship between project architecture and capability building
is discussed, an important idea is that the architecture of a satellite project does not completely
determine capability building. The definition of individual and organizational capability building
distinguishes between opportunities for capability building and the actual learning and
achievements of new capabilities. The architecture of a satellite project directly influences the
opportunities that an individual or an organization has to build capability. Given the same
opportunity, people and organizations respond different. This is based partly on their past
experiences that determine their absorb capacity. It is also based on the level of initiative that
drives the people or organizations to achieve even if the circumstances are not ideal. The
potential benefit of a well architected satellite project is not a guaranteed path to capability
building. It is the chance to reduce unnecessary barriers to learning. The appropriate architecture,
however, does not guarantee learning. The circumstances that influence the engineers in these
case studies include Architectural Dimensions that are defined by choices made by decision
makers as well as contextual factors that are outside the Implementer's control. Some of the
individuals who worked as Implementer engineers in these case studies demonstrated that they
chose to not be limited when faced with circumstances that were not conducive to their
capability building. These individuals had strong internal motivations to improve their
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capabilities. They also had an ability to connect the new work on satellite technology with
previous experiences. They invested in their personal growth regardless of circumstances.
Several types of obstacles were faced by engineers from several Implementer Organizations in
the case studies. The obstacles were in four categories: Timing, Culture, Architectural
Dimension and Personal Characteristic. The Timing obstacles are a general category of
unexpected delays or schedule changes that impacted the training or work experience of the
Implementer Engineers. Culture obstacles are the issues that faced Implementer Engineers as
they moved to a new country and new organization. Sometimes obstacles occurred as a result of
Architectural Dimensions defined by project decision makers, such as the assignment of
engineers to specific roles. Finally, some Implementer Engineers faced obstacles based on their
own personal characteristics such as educational background, personality and time management
skills. Table 6-103 gives some examples of Obstacles that faced one or more Implementer
Engineers. For each obstacle, the middle column of the table defines the type. When possible,
based on the available data, the far right column gives an example of engineers finding
resolutions to overcome the obstacle.
Table 6-103: Engineers from Implementer Organizations Faced and Overcame Obstacles due to several sources
Examples of Implementer Engineers Overcoming Obstacles
Type of Obstacle
Obstacle (Timing, Culture, Architectural Example of ResolutionDimension, Personal
Characteristic)
One engineer was assigned to a
An Implementer Engineer is role that focused on
uncomfortable with team role Architectural Dimension: Role management tasks. He also
assignment for visit to Supplier Assignment Philosophy wanted to use his engineering
Organization skills and sought opportunities for
additional technical assignments.
Some engineers used the
There is a delay in the schedule unexpected time at the
for the Implementer Engineers to Implementer Organization to
travel to the Supplier Timing Issue practice new skills, review
raveto for training. previous work by ImplementerOrganization fand learn from more experienced
engineers.
An Implementer Engineer faces One engineer made a difficultAn Ipleentr Eniner fcesdecision to forgo some
an overwhelming workload while dcso frosm
working at Supplier and needs to Personal Characteristic theoretical training in order 
to
woring aoto upplande nheed to. focus on responsibilities at
decide how to manage their time. Supplier Organization.
An Implementer Engineer is
frustrated because their activities Architectural Dimension: Training
at the Supplier Organization do Approaches
not meet their expectations
regarding the topics they would I
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cover or level of autonomy they
would have.
An Implementer Engineer
unsatisfied with their relationship Architectural Dimension: Mentor
with their mentor at the Supplier Approach
Organization.
An Implementer Engineer One engineer worked closely
encounters cultural differences with their Supplier mentor during
that make it difficult to adjust to Cultural Issue the early part of their visit to get
the Supplier country. assistance with practical tasks in
the community.
An Implementer Engineer is Several engineers proposed new
uncomfortable with their Architectural Dimension: Post- projects to the Implementer
assigned responsibilities in the Training Assignment Leadership and took initiative to
home organization after traning. train new recruits to participate in
the new projects.
The launch of the satellite is
delayed and this causes
uncertainly about responsibilities Timing Issue
for the Implementer Engineers in
the near term.
Due to the Temporary or
Transitional Status of facilities, Architectural Dimension: Some engineers did their best to
an Implementer Engineer faces Implementer or Supplier Facility work well despite minimal
challenges in executing Status facilities.
assignments.
One engineer faced this
An Implementer Engineer finds obstacle. He found that he was
that they do not have an able to be more successful at
adequate educational Personal Characteristic hands on work than theoretical
background for the work they are work. He and his mentor re-
assigned at the Supplier. defined his responsibilities to
focus more on implementation
rather than design.
In each Implementer Team, some of the engineers stand out because they found resolutions to
obstacles that challenged them. One example from Table 6-103 features an engineer that was
uncomfortable with the role he was assigned during his visit to the Supplier. The role was mainly
focused on management tasks; he preferred to work on technical analysis as well. He did not
have the option of changing roles, so he actively sought out additional tasks that gave him
technical experience. The table provides several other examples of engineers who resourcefully
overcame obstacles that threatened their capability building progress. There are a few examples
in the table that present obstacles but not resolution. These come from cases where an engineer
shared a frustration but they did not pursue creative resolution. The Implement Engineers varied
in their performance at addressing obstacles.
This reality that engineers respond differently to obstacles poses a question about the hiring
strategies used by Implementer Leaders when selecting engineers. Can Implementer Leaders
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focus on hiring excellent engineers that overcome obstacles rather than focusing on making a
series of decisions to define an architecture that facilitates capability building? Will these
excellent engineers be able to function well even in a project that presents many obstacles? How
much effort should Implementer Leaders invest in hiring the best engineers as compared to other
Architectural Dimensions?
The data suggests that one major division in terms of hiring strategies is whether to hire people
with more professional or academic experience or people who are less experienced. For six of
the seven projects in these case studies, the Implementers primarily hired young professionals
and recent graduates. The one project that only hired people with experience did not expect those
engineers to remain as employees of the Implementer after the Supplier training. Within the
teams that were primarily made of less experienced engineers, the more experienced engineers
stand out as being effective at resolving obstacles. They are not alone, however; engineers that
resolved obstacles well came from both more and less experienced groups. The "experience
level" of the engineers has several aspects. Some of the more experienced engineers studied for
graduate degrees, either in their home country or aboard. For those that studied internationally,
they benefitted both from the experience of learning new technical topics but also practicing
living outside their own country. Some of the more experienced engineers primarily had
professional experience in related fields. They benefitted from a maturity in the generic aspects
of professional life such as communication, time management and team work. Despite these
benefits of hiring more experienced people, some of the Implementer leadership expressed a
preference for hiring less experienced engineers. These leaders wanted to be the first to train the
engineers and shape their professional values. If a leader follows such a philosophy, they may
also adjust their training expectations to what a fresh graduate from their first university degree
can accomplish during a training experience. In some cases, fresh graduates from a first degree
were hired to the Implementer Organization and then immediately sent for training at the
Supplier Organization. In this case, they did not have necessarily have time to be oriented as
employees of the Implementer. Their first professional experience was in the Supplier
Organization. This may impact their professional formation.
When Implementer leaders seek to hire new engineers as employees and as part of the team that
will train at the Supplier Organization, they face several challenges. First, in the case study
nations, there are not educational programs that specifically train for satellite engineering. Thus
they are looking for people with related engineering degrees that have the potential to learn the
specialty of satellites. This is a manageable challenge. All over the world, firms hire engineers
with degrees in areas such as mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science
and physics to work as satellite engineers. The second challenge is that most Implementers are
government organizations or acting on behalf of their national government. Some of the
Implementers are restricted to hiring people that are national citizens. In some of the case study
countries, this was a severe limitation as many non-citizens also lived in the country and held
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relevant qualifications. The third challenge is that the Implementers need to find engineers that
are willing and able to spend long periods living abroad. In some situations this is difficult. For
women in some of the case study countries, living abroad poses a particular barrier. If engineers
are married or have children, they may not choose to live abroad for training. In these case
studies, the engineers traveled to work with the Supplier as individuals. They did not move with
their families. They often lived as a team in shared housing that was not conducive to families.
The fourth challenge that some Implementers face is the need to compete for engineers with
other organizations that offer comparable jobs. This issue varied across the case study countries.
In some countries, unemployment was high and the jobs at the Implementer were precious and
sought by many people. In other countries, the Implementer had to compete for engineers with
other firms and government organizations that may offer better compensation. These competing
employers included foreign and domestic actors. All the Implementers had to convince engineers
to work domestically rather than seeking jobs abroad. Some of the implementers specifically
recruited engineers that studied in foreign universities. These engineers may have been
especially tempted to take a position abroad. Finally, the Implementers were faced with the
challenge of defining a process to recruit, evaluate and select engineers. This is a classic problem
of imperfect information. The problem is increased when Implementers choose to hire less
experienced engineers in order to train them. When evaluating less experienced candidates, the
goal is to identify the potential for professional achievement rather than actual achievement. This
is inherently challenging. Most Implementers relied on applications and interviews to screen
engineering candidates. Are there ways to improve their recruitment, evaluation and selection
process?
After engineers are hired by the Implementers and trained at the Supplier Organization, another
challenge emerges. In several cases, due to launch delays or time gaps between successive
satellite programs, engineers who were trained by Suppliers chose to leave the Implementer
Organization. This is a major loss to the Implementer who invested in their training. It is not
necessarily a loss to the Nation, if the engineer pursues work in their country that builds on their
training. This was the case in several examples. One Nation Delta engineer left the Implementer
and worked in a domestic satellite communications company where he built on his knowledge.
Some Implementers chose to use incentives or penalties to encourage engineers to remain after
training. These issues of hiring and retention are not unique to the satellite Implementers. They
are faced by many organizations. For these organizations, however, in some cases the retention
tasks is made more difficult by circumstances beyond the Implementer's control. When the
national government is slow to approve a satellite project for an organization that has a limited
range of activities, morale sometimes decreases and engineers prefer to find new positions.
This section has discussed the fact that the architecture does not completely determine the
capability building outcomes of the satellite projects. Much is determined by the personal
characteristics of the engineers. This implies that the human resource approaches by the
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Implementer to recruit, select and retain their engineers are highly important. In that sense, the
human characteristics to circumstances are related to architecture because selecting team
members is an architectural choice. Future work can consider what advice from human resource
management literature might apply to these situations.
ccix Dahlman, Carl, Bruce Ross-Larson, Larry Westphal. "Managing Technological Development: Lessons from
Newly Industrializing Countries." World Development. Vol. 15, No 6, p 759-775, 1987.
cclx Larson, W. and Wertz, R., Space Mission Analysis and Design. Microcosm, Hawthorne, CA, 1992.
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7 Reflections on Literature
This section reflects on concepts from literature and the background discussion in order to
explore whether assumptions and propositions are supported or questioned by the case study
findings. The first area of literature is on Technological Learning. The four case study countries
have all embraced the philosophy behind technological learning that encourages local effort to
harness technology as part of the multi-faceted development process. Several concepts from the
technological learning literature are compared to the study findings.
The first is the concept by Kim"i and Utterback"i' that shows how latecomers may move
through an innovation cycle. The proposal by Kim is that latecomers engage with a mature
technology and initially focus on the process aspects. They later focus on product aspects once
their level of technical sophistication increases. One of the issues with applying this model to the
satellite projects is that the model assumes the product lifecycle of a mass produced commodity.
As a Complex Product Systems, satellites do not have a clear transition into a mature phase
during which product innovations diminish. Despite that caveat, the predictions are somewhat
aligned with observations from the projects. The Architectural Dimension of Training Project
Phase, captured the segment of the satellite lifecycle in which each Implementer team
participated. The phases are defined based on NASA standards. Phases A and B focus on early
design, while Phases C and D focus on detailed design, assembly, integration and testing. In a
sense, Phases C and D are the process or production segments within the lifecycle of a satellite
project. Phase A and B focus on the design of the product. A loose analogy can be made to the
concepts proposed by Kim and Utterback, keeping in mind that they were focusing on the long
term cycle of innovation for a product. They were not modeling the cycle of development for a
single product. Despite that difference, Kim argues that latecomers can focus on learning
production before learning product design. That is close to what happened for the six case study
satellite projects. The AlphaSat-R1, BetaSat-R1 and GammaSat-R1 projects were all the first
national projects for their country. In each of these projects, the Implementer engineers were
present at the Supplier firm for the later satellite lifecycle phases. This was partially due to
delays in their arrival and partially due to the fact that the satellites were based on previous
designs. The training experience in these three projects provided more opportunities to learn
about satellite manufacture, assembly, integration and test than about satellite design. The
evidence suggests that this was not done intentionally by decision makers in the Implementer and
Overseer Organizations. For second national projects - AlphaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R2 - two
Nations made a deliberate plan to expose their engineers to the earlier lifecycle phases and learn
about satellite design.
294
7-1: Outcomes for Training Project Phase Architectural Dimension
Training Project AlphaSat- AlphaSat- BetaSat- BetaSat-R2/ Ga wamaSat- DeltaSat-R2
Phase R1 R2 R1 BetaSat-R3 R1
NASA Phase A Partial
NASA Phase Partial Partia t
NASA Phase
NASA Phase
This strategy of learning production processes first and product design later was not intentional,
but what are the implications? In traditional satellite engineering firms, the production phases
(Phases C and D) are overseen by engineers but executed by technicians that have different
qualifications than the engineers. During the design (Phases A and B), the engineers are the main
actorss adthey use software tools to model and define the plans for the satellite. In the
smaller, less traditional Supplier firms in these case studies, some engineers took a more hands-
on role during Phases C and D, so the distinction was less clear cut. The manufacturing,
assembly and integration of satellites require a series of skills that are challenging but do not
necessarily require an engineering degree to execute. One set of tasks is to use the engineering
designs and solder many electronics boards for various subsystems. The soldering must be done
with specific techniques to achieve space quality. In many satellite firms, this soldering task is
done by technicians who are not required to have a university degree. Other steps performed by
technicians during assembly and integration include machining parts based on engineers'
specifications in a machine shop, fitting and testing valves, assembling models of the satellite for
ground testing and operating environmental testing equipment. These are the types of activities
that Implementer engineers were exposed to if they arrived at the Supplier firm for NASA Phase
C and D. Does it make sense for engineers without professional or satellite engineering
experience to start with these activities or is it better for them to focus on the engineer tasks of
using computer software to define designs? It certainly depends on the long term goals of the
Implementer. Do they plan to become an organization that manufactures satellites or that
oversees Suppliers who fabricate satellites? There are some advantages for a new engineer to
start in a late lifecycle phase. It helps them build familiarity with the implementation process for
satellites. Every designer needs to understand how their design will be implemented so they can
make designs that are easy to manufacture. Also, an Implementer engineer that comes to a
Supplier for training may have similar professional credentials to the technicians who solder,
machine and test. In these case studies most Implementer engineers had university degrees, but
little work experience. The technicians may lack university degrees, but they know the practical
knowledge of their field. Perhaps the work of a technician is an appropriate starting point in the
long term training process for an Implementer engineer. Ideally, an engineer could train as a
technician and later apply that knowledge as they train on satellite design. This is not the case if
Implementers choose to send engineers who are later in their careers and have already worked
professionally. There are disadvantages to training that focuses first on production and later on
295
design. If an Implementer engineer begins in Phases C and D, but they do not have the
theoretical background to understand how satellite work, it may be difficult to absorb the
practical steps. Some of the engineers interviewed for the case studies were in this situation.
They worked only on Phases C and D. They were able to achieve tasks and projects while at the
Supplier firm, but when they returned, they demonstrated a limited understanding of the
theoretical implications of their work. A training progression that begins with theory, proceeds to
focus on design and ends with implementation may be more comfortable for some engineers.
Role of Foreign Technology Sources
Active Passive
Quadrant 1
- Foreign licensing Quadrant 2
Market Mediated - Turn-key purchase - Sale of standard capital
- Technical consultancy good
- Special-order capital
Quadrant 4
Quadrant 3 - ImitationNon-market - Technical assistance - Reverse engineering
Mediated from technology vendors - Observation
Political partnerships . Journals
- Meetings
Figure 7-1: Adapted from Kim's framework on foreign sources of technology
Kim'xlii also proposes a framework describing how latecomers may access new technology from
a variety of foreign sources. The framework is repeated in Figure 7-1. In these case studies, the
primary approach to harnessing foreign technology sources is through quadrant 1, which shows
cases that are require an active role by foreign partners and use market mediation. The market
mediation factor accounts for whether the latecomer directly pays for the technology. Overall,
for these collaborative projects, Implementers paid for special-order capital and training; this fits
into Quadrant 1. The interesting variation arises in how Implementer engineers used the other
quadrants. Quadrant 4 captures the approaches that require the most initiative by the
Implementers. There is little evidence of imitation or reverse engineering in these case studies.
Since satellites are not commodities, it is not practical to obtain an example product and
experiment on it to see how it works. On the other hand, the Implementers that worked with
Supplier Taul did take models or components of their satellites to their home facilities to do
independent work. Implementer Deltal installed a functional model of GammaSat-RI at their
home facility. The model was not in the same shape of the actual satellite, but it had the
functionality to interact with the ground station like the actual satellite. For satellites, perhaps
working with models that have some characteristics of the full product is a feasible and helpful
form reverse engineering. It is risky to experiment on a flight model, but earlier models can be
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used for learning. The Implementers that worked with Supplier Taul also attended conferences
as part of their training. Implementer Gammal also sent their employees to conferences
independently of Supplier Taul. The team that worked on satellite data processing sought to
write many conference papers early in their existence. It was a means of monitoring their
progress and interacting with local universities and the international remote sensing community.
How did the Implementers use Quadrant 3? Each worked with vendors who supplied ground
stations. In some cases, the primary Supplier was a go-between, but Implementer Gammal and
Implementer Betal both worked closely with representatives of their ground station vendors.
They received technical assistance in the sense that vendor representatives came to their
locations for days or weeks and helped them trouble shoot issues or install hardware. A satellite
ground system is also a form of special-order capital, so this aspect is a blend of Quadrant 1 and
3. Implementer Alphal stands out as working with local technology vendors to manufacture
some components for their satellite and install their satellite manufacturing infrastructure. For
these relationships, there was mutual learning. Kim's framework is shown to be relevant to the
case study satellite projects. The Implementers are relatively week in Quadrant 4, which requires
the most initiative.
Table 7-2: Examples of Guidance from Technological Learning Literature
Level Theoretical Guidance Example of Actionable Project SourceImplementation Approach
- Key Leadership should set
Organizations Crisis Construction can high goals to produce an Nonaka 1994 and Kim
improve team performance atmosphere of crisis and 1999
inspire team to productivity
- Provide a mechanism for more
Both Individual and experienced engineers to teachGroups and organizational learing less experience engineers Kim 1999, Nonaka
Individuals niza io lear - Spread knowledge through 1994, Edmonson 2003
organization via strategic job
rotation
Learner initiative partly - Provide individuals with a Cohen & LeventhalIndividual determines absorptive variety of experiences to help 1991, Kim 1999,
Level capacity them maintain creative Nonaka 1994
thinking
Table 7-2 presents a summary of guidance on Theoretical Learning that is identified in the
literature review. How were these ideas exhibited in the case studies? Nonaka and Kim, among
others, point out the benefit of motivation by leaders. They advise that leaders harness externally
generated crises or create artificial crises to give the Implementer Organization a sense of
urgency. This is expected to add to absorptive capacity, which depends partly on the level of
effort of an organization. To some extent all the projects had a sense of crisis because all the
engineers knew that they represented their country. They saw that their work related to
maintaining national pride. Beyond that aspect, three satellite projects stand out as examples of
crisis construction for different reasons. For AlphaSat-R2, leaders created a crisis by setting an
ambitious technical goal of launching into a unique orbit. The interesting dynamic here was that
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the project was delayed for about four years between the completion of the satellite and the
launch. To what extent did the crisis mentality sustain over this long delay? The evidence that it
was sustained is that the team found creative ways to use the time during the delay. They built
small nano-satellites with local universities and increased their understanding of the calibration
process for the instrument on the satellite. There was some dampening of the crisis effect,
however. Key leadership at the Overseer Organization transitioned and some implementation
goals were not met. For the BetaSat-R3 project, the Implementer and Supplier organizations
came together to create a crisis when they decided to launch the satellite that was originally
planned as a training model. This added pressure to the Implementer engineers who were
charged with taking leadership to build the satellite. There was some conflict within this crisis.
The Supplier was also concerned about how the satellite's performance would impact their
reputation. This led to two competing crises. The Implementer engineers wanted to prove their
ability to build the satellite; the Supplier engineers wanted to oversee to ensure to errors. The two
goals were sometimes incompatible. GammaSat-RI was also built with a sense of crisis because
high level political leadership wanted to see a successful project in a short time scale. This
example is primarily positive because the political leaders gave both pressure and the resources
to execute the project successfully. Crisis construction is not always straightforward to manage,
and it can be difficult to sustain when external delays are imposed. Note that AlphaSat-R2 and
BetaSat-R3 were in the category of "risk taking project" with the analysis of archetypal projects
for Research Question 5.
The next line on Table 7-2 talks about strategies to encourage both organizational and individual
learning. Several Implementers made efforts to create a mechanism for more experienced
engineers within their teams to train less experienced engineers. This was particularly relevant
between the first and second projects for Implementers Alphal, Betal and Gammal. When a
first generation team had been trained and a new team was hired, there were both formal and
information approaches to passing on knowledge. Some of the approaches included the
following: having senior engineers give lectures to junior engineers; assigning individual
mentors between senior and junior engineers; assigning senior engineers as supervisors to small
teams of junior engineers; giving junior engineers access to documentation produced in earlier
satellite projects. All of these efforts were helpful. There was generally less effective effort to
use similar strategies when engineers were returning from the Supplier training experience. For
some Implementer teams, engineers needed guidance about how to transition into their role. This
was particularly true for the cases in which Implementers hired recent graduates and sent them
immediately to the Supplier firm before they spent much time working at the Implementer
facility. There were not many examples of strategic job rotation programs designed to give
engineers a broad grasp of different aspects of the Implementer's work. Some savvy engineers
created these experiences for themselves. Some Implementers did not have a well defined
structure that would enable a clear plan for how to rotate someone. This advice overlaps
somewhat with the idea of giving individuals a variety of experiences. The variety may come
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from strategic job rotations or from other avenues. Most of the Implementers organize their work
on a project-basis. Engineers are assigned to a particular team, but they work on projects with
different groups as needed. This is a similar structure to all the Supplier firms. Whereas almost
all engineers within Implementer Deltal and Implementer Gammal were very focused on the
case study satellites explored in this study, Implementer Alphal and Implementer Betal had
more projects and people who did not work at all on the case study projects. In these settings,
individuals did have the opportunity to gain a variety of experience. The variety included
different stages in the satellite lifecycle and combinations of engineering and management
activities. Implementer Alphal also worked on non-satellite projects as a separate line of
business. Some engineers worked on both satellites and these terrestrial projects.
The literature review summarized characteristics of Complex Product Systems (CoPS) as defined
by Hobday and Rush.cl"v Which of these characteristics were evident in the case study satellite
projects? The projects did exhibit the typical ambiguous, competing management objectives of
CoPS. This was partly due to the goal of supplying both a spacecraft and training. Meanwhile,
customers frequently wanted work done both quickly and effectively. Suppliers sought to
achieve this while also addressing schedule delays caused by regulation and launch issues which
were beyond their control. CoPS have design-intensive lifecycles and typically focus on a
primary supplier integration many subsystems developed by a variety of suppliers. This aspect
was somewhat different for the satellite projects led by Supplier Omegal and Supplier Taul.
Both are vertically integrated, although they do outsource specific manufacturing tasks and some
subsystems. CoPS are often developed by project-based organizations, which was true in these
cases. And like other CoPS the organization followed consensus based decision making,
meaning that people throughout the team had the opportunity to give feedback. This was
especially true during reviews at key milestones. Hobday and Rush expect the management tools
to be limited and unproven in CoPS project with limited information technology tools. This was
not completely true. The smaller Supplier firms were transitioning into a more structured
approach to track project information, but they used information technology constantly. Supplier
Omegal, for example, used many software management tools to enable team communication
about physical aspects of the satellites and anomalies in the development process that needed to
be resolved. Risk in CoPS projects is described as hard to control, hidden, and unpredictable.
This was true to some extent. The Suppliers were aware of some risks that consistently hamper
satellite projects. These include the potential for regulatory delay related to export or
immigration issues, launch delays and delays due to technology development. The Suppliers
could not predict exactly when these delays would appear, but they knew that such risks were
common. Hobday and Rush expect customers procuring CoPS to be highly involved, to negotiate
prices and requirements, and to address interests of multiple stakeholders. All of these elements
were true, except the customers in these projects were less experienced in the technology than
the customers assumed by this literature. Finally, Hansen and Rush noted in another study that
CoPS projects are often hampered when they overlapped with organizational changes such as
acquisitions and mergers."" The explanation is that these changes can impact organizational
299
processes and interrupt project progress. In one of the satellite case studies, Supplier Omegal
acquired a small company at the beginning of one project and was acquired by a larger company
near the end of the same project. There is no evidence that these acquisitions disrupted the
project due to changes in processes. This is because the acquisitions had well defined interfaces.
The new owners allowed the acquired firms to continue operations without much change. The
other mechanism by which acquisitions may disrupt projects is by distracting key project
personnel or high level decision makers. The evidence is not clear on the impact of such
distraction. Overall, this discussion does confirm that the satellite projects have many
characteristics of CoPS as defined by Hobday and Rush. The projects escaped some of the
challenges of CoPS when their technology was less complex, Suppliers were more vertically
integrated and the teams smaller than other complex products.
Reflecting on the technology transfer literature, the barriers found by Ofori that hinder transfer in
the construction industry did appear relevant in these case study projects to some extent. Ofori
found the following barriers: 1) The foreign firms with advanced technology are hesitant to
provide assistance that would make local firms more competitive against them in the future; 2)
Incorporating technology transfer into a project bring the risk of increased cost, schedule delay
and complexity; and 3) Each construction project is unique and learners may not be able to apply
knowledge across projects.""' Regarding the first barrier, the Suppliers in the satellite project
case studies choose to transfer to technology to national satellite organizations while they
understand that these teams may compete with them in the future. Some Suppliers have seen
their former trainees become competitors. The Suppliers hoped to turn this from a liability into
an asset in two ways. First, they hoped to stay slightly more technically advanced than these
potential competitors by developing more capable technology. Second, they hoped to maintain
positive relationships with these competitors that could lead to synergy. As the Implementer
Organizations became more technical advanced, the Suppliers hoped to partner with them in
different ways that would allow the Implementers to specialize. They envisioned dividing the
work on future projects - perhaps the Implementer would build instruments and the Supplier
could build buses, for example. Regarding the second barrier, some Suppliers seemed to find that
technology transfer or training did increase, schedule and complexity. These were the Suppliers
that had more structured training and gave the trainees fewer project duties and more learning
tasks. Suppliers seemed to reduce this second barrier by integrating the Implementer engineers
more tightly into their team, so that their work contributed to improving the project. For all
Suppliers, this was the goal to some extent. The capabilities of the Implementer engineer
influenced the ability to do this integration. The third barrier refers to the uniqueness of projects
that limits applicability of knowledge over different experiences. This is less true in this set of
case studies because the Implementers that bought more than one satellite bought similar types of
satellites.
Table 7-3: Summary of Country Characteristics According to Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions
Implementers Suppliers
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Cultural Nation Nation Nation Nation Nation Nation Nation
Dimensions Alpha Beta Gamma Delta Omega Tau Sigma
Individualism Low Low Medium Low High Low High
Power Distance High High High Medium Low Medium High
Uncertainty Medium Medium High Medium Low High High
Avoidance
Masculinity Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium Medium
Within the Technology Transfer literature, some scholars emphasize the role of culture. These
satellite project case studies all brought together Implementers and Suppliers from distinct
countries and cultures. Hofstede defmed cultural dimensions that are exhibited in the workplace.
The study has data relevant to the seven countries that were home to Implementers and
Suppliers.""' The four cultural dimensions are as follows: "power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs. femininity." "l' Table 7-3 shows
how the seven case study Nations compare in terms of the four cultural dimensions. The scores
are shown as low, medium and high for convenience. They are adapted from Hofstede's scale,
which gave each country a score between zero and one hundred. For this analysis, a score of 1 to
35 is Low; 36-65 is Medium; and 66 to 100 is High. A score of Medium reflects a balance
between two extreme characteristics which likely mixes aspects of both. Also note that these
scores are from a study in the early 1980s. National culture changes slowly, so most scores are
still relevant, but they can be taken with caution. Also, these are the scores for the countries, not
the Implementers and Suppliers. The organizations may foster culture that is different from the
predominant national culture. For example, leadership at Implementer Alphal talked about how
their country had high power distance. He did not want that to dominate within his firm and he
tried to develop approaches to reduce the power distance. He noted that it took time to make such
changes, but he saw progress through almost two decades as leader of the organization. A similar
case might apply for Nation Gamma. Implementer Gammal had a low power distance within the
satellite team because the political leadership had created an unusual organization and
empowered young people with great responsibility. Their situation did not seem to reflect the
overall culture.
Table 7-4: Cultural Dimensions in Project Aiphasat-R1
Satellite Project AlphaSat-R1
Nation Alpha Nation OmegaCultural Dimensions Implementer Supplier
Individualism Low High
Power Distance High Low
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Table 7-4 gives the matching of Implementer and Supplier for the AlphaSat-R1 project. Note
that Implementer Alphal and Supplier Omegal are from Nations that have opposite tendencies
in terms of Individualism and Power Distance. Bhagat et al classify Nation Alpha in the category
of vertical collectivism, while Nation Omega has horizontal individualism. Bhagat et al
predict that if two organizations differ in terms of both power distance and individualism, their
partnership for technology transfer is expected to be less effective than the partnership of
organizations with similar orientations. As seen in Table 7-5, Implementer Alphal went from
partnering with Supplier Omegal to Supplier Taul. The Nation Alpha is much closer in scores
for individualism and power distance with Nation Tau than Nation Omega. Thus, we would
expect that their partnership with Supplier Taul would be stronger. The evidence seems to
support that expectation, but the conclusion must be considered cautiously. Implementer Alphal
did transition to working with Supplier Taul instead of continuing to work with Supplier
Omegal. The second satellite project (AlphaSat-R2) did give the Nation Alpha engineers a more
integrated connection to the Supplier team. Thus the evidence is strong that the teams blended
well when cultural dimensions were aligned, but the impact of this blending on technical
performance of the satellite or capability building outcomes is not clear.
Table 7-5: Cultural Dimensions in Project AlphaSat-R2
Satellite Project AlphaSat-R2
Nation Alpha Nation TauCultural Dimensions Implementer Supplier
Individualism Low Low
Power Distance High Medium
Uncertainty Avoidance Medium High
Masculinity Medium Medium
Table 7-6 shows the pairing of cultural dimensions between Implementer Betal and Supplier
Omegal. Nation Beta has the similar scores on cultural dimensions with Nation Alpha. Once
again, this is a project in which two organizations come together but are not well matched in
culture. Why did Implementer Alphal work with Nation Omega for two consecutive projects if
they did not have cultural characteristics that are considered compatible? How did this impact the
capability building? The story is complex. Nation Beta is scored as Low on Individualism and
High on collectivism. This may be true of the country, but evidence from the case showed that
engineers from both Implementer Alphal and Supplier Omegal found that the visiting
Implementer team needed to learn to work together during the BetaSat-R2 project. They were a
newly formed team; they did not have bonds built by common experiences. The individual
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engineers were more concerned about completing their work than ensuring that the whole team
met their goals. This was exhibited during the project reviews. Early on the reviews
demonstrated a lack of communication among the team; later the team showed more cooperation.
At least in the area of team work, collectivism did not seem to dominate. Collectivism was clear
in the interactions between representatives of Implementer Alphal; there was a sense of
expectation that friends and relatives will support each other and be loyal. Power distance
seemed to impact the activities of engineers from Nation Alpha while working at Supplier
Omegal. Both Nation Omega and Supplier Omegal have low power distance while Nation
Alpha has high power distance. "People in large power distance societies accept a hierarchical
order in which everybody has a place.""'" The team of Implementer engineers from Nation Beta
had a hierarchical order based on seniority. At times, team members who had specialized
technical insight into a problem with the satellite felt it was inappropriate to correct a
misconception held by someone who had a higher position. The Supplier Omegal team would
take this kind of correction as a normal approach to problem solving. The power distance
dynamic may have also impacted the relationships between Supplier Omegal mentors and
Nation Beta visiting engineers. Based on culture, the Supplier Omegal mentors would expect a
causal, non-hierarchical relationship. The Nation Beta engineers would look at the mentors as
authority figures if they applied their cultural bias. There is evidence that individual engineers
from Nation Beta reacted differently to this situation. Some became close friends with their
mentors and related very casually; others maintained more distance.
The experiences of Supplier Omegal show an interesting variation in how Implementers reacted
to potential mismatches of cultural dimensions. Supplier Omegal did have some cultural
differences with both Implementer Alphal and Implementer Betal. In one case the Implementer
found a new Supplier with a closer cultural profile; in the second case the Implementer continued
to partner with Supplier Omegal.
Table 7-6: Cultural Dimensions in Projects BetaSat-Ri and BetaSat-R2/R3
Satellite Project BetaSat-R1 and BetaSat-R2/R3
Cultural Dimensions Nation Beta Nation OmegaCulturalDimensions Implementer Supplier
Individualism Low High
Power Distance High Low
Uncertainty Avoidance Medium Low
Masculinity Medium High
Table 7-7 and
Table 7-8 show that during the GammaSat-RI and DeltaSat-RI projects, the cultural differences
were not as extreme as those described above. The language barrier was likely a larger cultural
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factor than these dimensions for the GammaSat-R1 and DeltaSat-R2 projects. All the engineers
(Implementer and Supplier) worked together in English as a second language.
Table 7-7: Cultural Dimensions in Project GammaSat-R1
Satellite Project GammaSat-R1
u s Nation Gamma Nation TauCultural Dimensions Implementer Supplier
Individualism Medium Low
Power Distance High Medium
Uncertainty Avoidance High High
Masculinity Medium Medium
Table 7-8: Cultural Dimensions in Project DeltaSat-R2
Satellite Project DeltaSat-R2
u s Nation Delta Nation SigmaCultural Dimensions Implementer Supplier
Individualism Low High
Power Distance Medium High
Uncertainty Avoidance Medium High
Masculinity Low Medium
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8 Conclusion
This section offers a summary of findings, contributions, and proposals for future work.
8.1 Summary of Findings
This dissertation uses exploratory, inductive research to describe and model the process by which
developing countries pursue international collaboration as part of the process to master complex
technology. The study is motivated by the potential for satellite technology to contribute useful
services and technology applications in developing countries. A second motivation is the activity
among new countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia to establish local capability to design
and build satellites. The dissertation specifically considers case studies of satellite projects that
follow a collaborative satellite development model. In this model, national space organizations
from developing countries contract with foreign firms to supply a satellite and training for local
engineers. Detailed case studies of six satellite projects executed by four developing countries
are analyzed using original frameworks. The research questions consider the implementation
approaches of the projects using the concepts from the Theory of Systems Architecture. The
analysis further compares projects regarding capability building at the individual and
organizational level. To summarize this study, this section presents the key findings from each
research question.
Research Question 1: What are the Architectures of Collaborative Satellite Projects?
The response to Research Question 1 includes adapting an Architectural Framework from the
Theory of Systems Architecture that parses project aspects into categories. The satellite projects
are described using twelve Architectural Views that each account for a different perspective on
implementation issues. Within each view are multiple Dimensions. Each Dimension includes a
function, a generic form that implements this function and the set of specific, alternative forms
that potentially implement the function. The descriptive analysis for this research question
inductively defines the set of Architectural Views, Dimensions, Functions and Forms that are
relevant across all six collaborative satellite projects. The Dimensions are defined based on the
range of approaches pursued by four Implementer Organizations and three Supplier Firms. The
complete answer to Research Question 1 is the full enumeration of Dimensions, Forms and
Functions. This complete description shows the range of implementation options used by the
four Implementer countries. The twelve Architectural Views are as follows: Organization,
Project Initiation, Personnel Management, Supplier Selection, Facility, Training, Contract,
Technical Product, Technical Approach, Management, Policy, Culture and Social Issues.
Research Question 2: How are the Architectures of Collaborative Projects Similar and
Different?
The Architectural analysis reveals the diversity of approaches among the six collaborative
satellite development projects. All the case study Nations are similar in that they choose to use a
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collaborative project with a foreign firm to start their domestic satellite program. They may have
taken other routes such as starting with university satellite projects, buying a satellite without
training or building the satellite locally with foreign consultants. Even though all four nations
pursue similar high level project architecture, Research Questions 1 and 2 revealed diversity in
the specific elements of form. There are more Architectural Dimensions in which the case study
projects vary than Dimensions in which the projects are similar. Using a synthetic procedure of
pattern matching and process tracing, four of the Architectural Views emerge as key to defining
three Archetypal Project Architectures that capture major aspects of the case study evidence. The
four Architectural Views are Project Initiation, Supplier Selection, Training and Technical
Product. The Project Initiation Architectural View describes how Implementer and Overseer
Organizations worked within their national context to demonstrate the value of the project to
their government funding agencies. It also considers the nature of the bureaucratic steps required
to secure funding for the satellite project. The six satellite projects can be classified into two
broad categories regarding their Project Initiation process. Some projects required high effort to
achieve funding, while others moved forward with low effort. The level of effort depended on
the political climate. When a strong national leader supported the satellite program, the
fundraising effort was low. The Supplier Selection Architectural View includes Dimensions
describing the process to select a satellite Supplier firm, the priority attributes Implementers
considered, and the range of competing Suppliers that Implementers considered. By combining
all of these Dimensions, projects can be summarized as pursuing more formal or more informal
Supplier Selection processes. The formal processes are traceable and transparent within a
bureaucratic system. Examples of formal selection processes include calls for proposals, hiring a
consultant to review the selection process or visiting a series of Suppliers. The informal
processes are often based on personal relationships or connections between Implementers and
Suppliers on the basis of a common goal. Examples of informal processes include choosing a
personal acquaintance, responding to an invitation for a collaborative project and selecting a
Supplier based on a referral from an acquaintance. The Technical Product Architectural View
groups all the satellites developed in the case studies into two groups based on complexity. The
more complex satellites had higher mass, longer design life and higher technical performance
than the less complex satellites. Finally, the Training Architectural View considers Dimensions
that describe the training provided to the Implementer engineers by the Supplier Firm. The
training activities can be classified as Theoretical, Practical or On the Job. Projects also differed
in terms of the project phase that trainees experienced and the level of formality in the
relationship between Implementer trainees and their mentors from the Supplier Firm. Given all
of these Dimensions, the Training View can be summarized with three categories. Based on the
training approach and the project phase, three satellites exhibited an emphasis on Practical
training activities; these projects also had informal accountability in the mentoring relationships.
Two satellites emphasized Theoretical training and formal mentoring relationships. The
remaining two satellites emphasized On the Job training and used mentoring as required to
achieve project objectives. The four Architectural Views summarized here captured key
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differences across the satellite projects that align with three Archetypal Projects, as defined in the
summary of Research Question 5.
Research Question 3: What Capability Building Opportunities do Individuals Have?
This analysis assesses the opportunities that individual Implementer engineers have for
capability building in several time periods - before, during and after training with the Supplier.
The original analysis approach accounts for the nature of technical knowledge and the nature of
learning. The knowledge may vary in terms of codification, topic and application. The learning
may vary in terms of topic, autonomy and complexity. During the interaction with the Supplier,
Implementer engineers had some combination of theoretical training, practical on-the-job
training and supervised experience. At the Supplier Firm, Implementer engineers varied in terms
of which satellite topics they covered within the satellite lifecycle - from Project Definition and
Requirements Management to Operations. Five scenarios describe different types of training
experiences for engineers based on the range of topics they emphasized. Subsystem focused
engineers worked primarily on middle project phases; they received requirements, generated a
design and worked through implementation and test for one part of the satellite or ground
system. System focused engineers worked more in the early and late satellite life cycle activities
that consider interactions between subsystems and project management activities. Operations
focused engineers had extensive operations training while at the Supplier Firm. Management
focused engineers had leadership responsibility over their peers and served as a bridge between
the Implementer and Supplier Firm. Local Facility focused engineers did not travel to the
Supplier Firm; they worked independently at the Implementer local to build up new
infrastructure. Most individuals had no experience or limited experience with satellite
engineering before working with the Supplier. Many were recent graduates whose main
experience was theoretical training related to some discipline with satellites such as Mechanical
Engineering, Electrical Engineering or Computer Science. When the Individual Capability
Building profiles are combined for each Implementer, it provides a visual confirmation that the
group of individuals was progressing in level of autonomy and application over time.
Research Question 4: What Capability Building Achievements do Organizations Have?
This analysis defines an approach to observe organizational capability building by adapting well
accepted frameworks to suit the specific case of satellite projects. The challenge for this
adaptation is to deal with the dual nature of satellites as both products and capital goods that
produce data products. The resulting framework offers an example that distinguishes between the
capabilities to develop one complex product and the capabilities required to operate an
organization with a series of such projects. This analysis categorizes the achievements of the
Implementer Organizations. The framework credits each Implementer with their achievements of
specific capabilities at the appropriate level of autonomy (ranging from an achievement during
training to an independent achievement). All the Nations achieved high autonomy on satellite
operation and satellite project definition and approval, but they were more dependent for satellite
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design, manufacture and test. Nations Alpha and Beta stand out in this analysis for achieving
higher autonomy in satellite manufacture, assembly and test. Also, these Nations were involved
with product and process innovations as part of their training experiences. In the long term,
Nations also differed in the extent to which they moved beyond mastery of satellite engineering
to local adaptation, diffusion and innovation activity. Nations Alpha's efforts to set up a local
assembly and integration facility and to manufacture several components of AlphaSat-R2 locally
show progress in this area.
Research Question 5: What are potential relationships between architecture and capability
building?
This analysis uses a pattern matching, process-tracing approach to identify three Archetypal
Project Architectures based on different combinations in the four key Architectural Views
(Project Initiation, Supplier Selection, Training and Technical Product). Three Nations start their
satellite programs with Politically Pushed Projects. These projects are driven by high level
political support. They partner with Suppliers based on vision. Their technical achievements are
modest in terms of complexity and autonomy, but they expose the Nations to many new concepts
in satellite engineering. Later some Nations pursue Structured Projects. Political support has
declined and these projects follow formal, bureaucratic policies to gain approval, select suppliers
and organize training. These projects pursue higher complexity satellites in order to bring
obvious benefit from a highly capable system. This does not increase the autonomy of the
Implementer, but satisfies stakeholders that want to see short term value. Other Nations pursue
the Risk Taking Project for a second or third in a series. This project sees a need to increase
political support by doing something technically impressive. The Supplier is chosen based on
trust and the training is driven by the needs of the technical achievement. This project can
enhance the Nation's autonomy, the level of technical complexity they can manage and new
topics. The actual outcomes depend on the type of risk they pursue. These project types may lay
a foundation for patterns both within projects and across longer term satellite programs. This
study also proposes that the analogy of designing a satellite can be applied to architecting a
satellite project. If further research and literature review reveals the relationships within and
across Project Dimensions, the decision makers can define project architectures that are aligned
with their requirements and objectives.
8.2 Contributions
This section summarizes the theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions of the
research. On a theoretical level, this exploratory work provides detailed descriptions of an
activity that was poorly observed by researchers of Technological Learning. The activity -
collaborative satellite development projects - has the potential to impact national capability
building in developing countries. The research identifies twelve Architectural Views that
demonstrate both the commonality and diversity among implementation approaches in
collaborative satellite projects. Synthesis of the Architectural Views leads to the definition of
three Archetypal Project Architectures that provide a process-based explanation for differences
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in implementation and capability building approaches. The dissertation also identifies four
theoretical propositions that can be pursued through deductive research in order to build theory
about collaborative satellite development projects, technological learning and system
architecture.
In the area of methodology, the dissertation demonstrates the application of the Theory of
Systems Architecture to a study of Technological Learning, which has not been done frequently,
if at all. The Architectural Analysis allows issues from several areas of literature to be considered
within a common framework. The Capability Building Analysis adapts a general set of
capabilities (Production, Investment and Innovation) for the specific case of satellites. This leads
to a detailed definition of the activities required to implement satellite projects and programs.
The dissertation also defines several templates for profiles of capability building that capture
both short and long progress.
On a practical level, this body of work is directed specifically to the decision makers in
Implementer, Overseer and Supplier organizations that execute such collaborative satellite
projects or similar efforts. For this audience, the research provides valuable information about
the opportunities and challenges of collaborative satellite projects. Specifically, the response to
Research Question 1 enumerates a large set of alternatives for how projects can be implemented.
The work begins the process of defining how choices related to Technology, Training, Personnel
Management and other Architectural Views impact projects outcomes desired by the
Implementers and Overseers.
8.3 Future Work
This study used an exploratory perspective to gather large amounts of information and organize
it into a systematic description of collaborative satellite development projects. The research
reveals unknowns about the projects and the decisions facing Implementers in areas such as
training approaches, team structure and supplier relationships. The inductive research for this
dissertation lays a foundation for future deductive research that can refine and test the
conclusions developed here. This section presents these conclusions in the form of four
theoretical propositions.
Proposition 1: The set of 12 Architectural Views applies to satellite projects that follow the
collaborative satellite development model examined in these case studies.
The Views can be considered relevant to a satellite project if at least one function within each
View is executed as part of the project.
Proposition 2: Collaborative satellite development projects can be categorized as one or a
combination of the three Archetypal Architectures: Politically Pushed, Structured and Risk
Taking.
The Archetypal Architectures are defined by the four key views, as mentioned above.
309
Proposition 3: Nations tend to start in Politically Pushed Projects and later transition to
Structured Projects, Risk Taking Projects or a hybrid of several Archetypes. The type of
Archetype for later projects is driven by the nature of leadership in the Implementer Nation.
The case study projects present specific characteristics of Implementer leadership that appear to
drive the type of Archetype pursued. When there is a Bureaucratically Savvy Implementer
Leader that is confident about working through the official system to achieve funding, the
Implementer pursues a Structured Project. A Risk Taking Project is pursued by a Technically
Savvy Implementer Leader with a vision for how their country can achieve a new technical
milestone. Leaders may exercise both types of skills and implement a Hybrid project.
Proposition 4: The Archetypal Architectures facilitate different types of capability building
outcomes at the Individual and Organizational level during the timeframe of the project.
Politically Pushed projects emphasize Practical training with informal mentoring; and the main
organization achievement is covering new topics. Risk Taking projects emphasize On the Job
training and advancement in organizational autonomy; the mentoring approach is driven by
project requirements. Structured projects emphasize Theoretical training, advancement in the
complexity of technology pursued by the organization and formal mentoring.
In order to test and refine these propositions as part of the theory building process, future
deductive work can draw on the global population of collaborative satellite development
projects. There are at least 24 examples of early satellite projects in which nations used the same
collaboration model to purchase training and a satellite from a foreign firm. Some of the relevant
satellite projects include the following: AlgeriaSat-1, 2a & 2b; NigeriaSat-1,2 & X; EgyptSat-1;
KitSat-1, 2 & 3; TiungSat; RazakSat; DubaiSat-1&2; THEOS; ThaiPhat; FaSat-Alpha & Bravo;
PoSat; Tsinghua-1; BilSat; Maroc-TUBSat; LAPAN-TUBSat; FormoSat-1&2. Through
additional field work that builds on the data collection methods used in this dissertation, the
Architectural Views can be explored for more projects. The set of Architectural Views and
variations on the Archetypal projects may also be relevant to studying collaborative projects in
other areas of technology. A defining aspect of satellite technology that makes it important to
learn through collaboration is the presence of tacit knowledge that is best learned through
mentored experience. Other technology areas that may share this feature include the following:
other aerospace systems, other Complex Product Systems, university collaborations, health care,
civil construction, information systems and nuclear systems. In order to apply the Views and
Archetypes to other technology types, it may be necessary to redefine them at a higher level of
abstraction and generality. This direction of research will further the process of describing and
modeling the processes by which learning countries acquire new technologies.
Another stream of future work will pursue prescriptive recommendations for decision makers in
collaborative satellite development projects. This requires a body of research that further
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explores relationships within project dimensions, across project dimensions and between project
dimensions and project outcomes. Whereas the current study uses inductive methods to collect
broad data about the implementation of several collaborative satellite projects, future progress
will be made using deductive approaches. For some of the Project Dimensions, existing
knowledge from literature will supply helpful insights about the rules governing that aspect of
the project. For other Dimensions, new empirical work will be needed. This empirical work will
test hypotheses about the key dimensions of collaborative satellite projects that potentially
influence technological learning - such as training methods, supplier-customer relationships, and
program design.
Looking more broadly, future work can also explore the challenges and opportunities from other
phases of satellite programs. After a satellite is launched, Implementers and their local partners
need to ensure that the data or service is used effectively. The potential benefit of satellite
services often goes unmet because of systems level challenges and poor Technology
Management."a The application of satellite earth observation data, for example, requires
effective coordination across several technical systems located in a wide range of organizations -
including multilateral agencies, space organizations, foreign firms, local and regional
governments, national ministries and communities. This stream of research can describe, model
and prescribe the architectures of the complex systems that deliver satellites services. Potential
data collection approaches include field interviews and observation and analyze may involve a
combination of tools, such as Network Analysis, Design Structure Matrices and Stakeholder
Analysis.
This work gives initial consideration to different types of satellite engineering. Satellite systems
require extensive investments in personnel, facilities, equipment and technical processes. New
countries are pursuing local satellite programs, but the scale and rigor of traditional satellite
engineering do not fit their needs or capabilities. Traditional satellite systems engineering seeks
to reduce risk by using specialized technology and complex management structures with high
overhead costs. Meanwhile, a new wave of satellite engineering techniques is emerging from the
community that develops spacecraft according to the "small satellite" philosophy." They seek
to decrease the cost of satellite systems by reducing performance requirements, increasing risk
tolerance, using technology that is not space qualified, and building satellites with low mass and
volume. In the face of these competing approaches, future work can redefine the standards for
satellite systems engineering for new players. The research will describe, model and evaluate the
relationship between satellite systems engineering and the value that is delivered to end users.
Initially, this research will use technical modeling and practitioner interviews to compare the
traditional and small satellite engineering approaches. The long term goal is to propose and
validate new satellite systems engineering techniques that match the needs of developing
countries. Emerging satellite programs need to develop strategies for long term activity. This
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means finding a path to gradually building capability despite contextual changes in politics,
requirements and constraints.
CClXXi Mennecke, B. & L. West, "Geographic Information Systems in Developing Coutnries: Issues in Data Collection,
Implementation and Management." Chapter 4 in Information technology management in developing countries. Dadashzadeh, M.
Ed, Hershey, PA: IRM Press, 2002.
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9 Appendix A: Detailed Summaries of Case Study Projects
Appendix A provides detailed summaries of the six satellite projects executed by four nations
with three suppliers. The detailed summaries are Written as Analytical Narratives that present
information about each satellite project using an organization scheme based on Architectural
Dimensions that were deductively defined during data analysis. The same set of Architectural
Dimensions provides the foundation to answer Research Questions 1 and 2.
This section first explains the codes used to describe the actors, locations and satellites for each
project. Within each nation that participates in the projects there may be various types of
organizations - Suppliers, Implementers, Overseers and Universities. Suppliers sell satellites and
training services on a commercial basis. Implementers are executing satellite projects and they
seek services from the suppliers. Overseers are from the same nation as the Implementers. They
provide some combination of funding, government policy guidance and oversight. Universities
are academic institutions engaged in teaching and research. Within each organization, there may
be various types of personnel - Engineers, Managers, Political Leaders and Professors.
Engineers are directly engaged in technical activities of satellite projects. Managers are
supervisors of engineers and they are engaged in other activities that may include, project
management, quality assurance, administrative activity, business development, compliance with
regulatory guidelines and interaction between organizations. Political Leaders are working at
high levels of government and defining policy strategy. The Professors category includes
personnel in academic positions in universities with duties of teaching and research. These
categories are summarized in Table 9-1.
Table 9-1: Guide to Dissertation Naming Convention
Generic Objects in Case Studies
Geographic Reference Nation
Supplier
Organizations ImplementerOverseer
University
Engineer
Personnel ManagerPolitical Leader
Professor
Remote Sensing
Satellites Communication
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In order to protect the identity of the participants in the case studies, codes are used to describe
the nations, organizations, personnel and satellites. Table 9-2 introduces the foundational codes
that are used for each of these elements. Each Nation is identified by a Greek Letter, such as
Alpha, Beta, Gamma, etc. The Organizations, Personnel and Satellites are associated with
specific countries and indexed with numbers. The italicized letters in Table 9-2 represent the
numerical indices. For example, the first Nation is Nation Alpha. The first Implementer from
Nation Alpha is Implementer Alphal. The first engineer from Nation Alpha is Engineer Alphal;
and the first remote sensing satellite from Nation Alpha is AlphaSat-R1.
Table 9-2: Guide to Dissertation Naming Convention
Code for Specific Objects from Nation Alpha
Specific Organizations
Supplier Alpha,i Supplier,i from Nation Alpha
Implementer Alpha,k Implementer,k from Nation Alpha
Overseer Alpha,m Overseer,m from Nation Alpha
University Alpha,n University,n from Nation Alpha
Specific Personnel
Engineer Alphap Engineerp from Nation Alpha
Manager Alpha,q Manager,q from Nation Alpha
Leader Alpha,r Political Leader,r from Nation Alpha
Professor Alphas Professor,s from Nation Alpha
Specific Satellites
AlphaSat-R,t Remote Sensing Satellite,t from Nation
Alpha
AlphaSat-C,u Communication Satellite,u from Nation
Alpha
9.1 Nation Alpha
This section summarizes Nation Alpha's two remote sensing satellite projects.
9.1.1 The AlphaSat-R1 Project
Nation Alpha's first satellite remote sensing satellite project was a partnership with Supplier
Omegal.
Initiation and Approval of Satellite Project
The first Nation Alpha small satellite project was officially inaugurated at an event hosted by
Leader Alphal in Project Year 2. In addition, the Nation Alpha cabinet approved the plan to
build a small satellite and provided a budget. It soon became clear that AlphaSat-R1 would not
be completed in time to be launched for free with the AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2
communication satellites. The project had enough momentum at this time, however, to continue.
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The Project Team
This section describes the role of organizations and personnel within the satellite project.
Which Organizations were involved with the project?
The primary Implementer for Nation Alpha was the government-owned firm Implementer
Alpha1. Implementer Alphal served as an institutional home for the engineers that were hired to
work on the AlphaSat-R1 project. Implementer Alphal received its direction from the Nation
Alpha government, with specific leadership from Overseer Alphal, the space research
organization. During this time Overseer Alphal was moved from the central government to the
related government ministry (Overseer Alpha3). Implementer Alphal contracted with Supplier
Omegal (a satellite manufacturing firm) to both build the small satellite and train a cohort of
Nation Alpha engineers. Another organization that eventually played a key role in the project
was the launch provider. More distant project participants include the owners of satellites that
were launched simultaneously with AlphaSat-R1.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
Two types of engineers were selected to participate in the AlphaSat-R1 project. One set was
hired as a core team to go to the location of Supplier Omegal and participate in the development
of AlphaSat-R1. A second set was hired to build up the new Implementer Alphal firm and
prepare for operations of AlphaSat-R1. The two teams of engineers differed in terms of
background, selection process and activities. About seven engineers formed a core team of
trainee engineers that went to Supplier Omegal. These 7 trainees were selected from
universities, industry and military branches and seconded to Implementer Alphal for this project.
This core team of trainees spent nine months in Nation Omega working at Supplier Omegal -
from Project Year 4 to Project Year 5. The AlphaSat-R1 team invited universities, the military
and the Implementer Alpha2 communication satellite firm to propose candidates for the core
team of the satellite project. The core team was then selected via an interview process. Both
Leader Alpha2 (Leader of Overseer Alphal) and the leader of Supplier Omegal participated in
interviewing the candidate engineers. The Supplier Omegal team also contributed to the
selection process by proposing the types of backgrounds that would be appropriate for the
project. For this group, the hiring process targeted experienced professionals who were early in
their careers. The Overseer Alpha1 and Implementer Alphal leadership sought people with
strong interest in the area of space technology. Most of the engineers did not have experience
with space, beyond educational exposure. One exception was an engineer who participated in the
six months of international training activities for the AlphaSat-C1 and AlphaSat-C2
communication satellites. He also joined the AlphaSat-R1 project. The plan for this core team of
engineers was that they would be temporarily seconded from their home organizations as
professors, military officers and industry professionals. After training at Supplier Omegal there
were expected to return to their original positions.
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The second team of engineers was hired directly to Implementer Alphal. They primarily worked
in Nation Alpha, although some of them spent short periods at Supplier Omegal. This second
team was less experienced; they were primarily recent university graduates. They were hired by
Manager Alphal who managed the AlphaSat-R1 project and led Implementer Alphal.
How was a firm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training?
As the leaders of Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alphal, both Manager Alphal and Leader
Alpha2 played a key role in selecting the primary supplier for the AlphaSat-R1 project. These
leaders reviewed proposals from a variety of potential suppliers that spanned both government
and commercial entities. The two leaders did not have previous experience with space
technology projects, so they were learning the space marketplace for the first time. As they
compared the proposals, the key attributes they considered were good technical performance of
the product, extensive training options, long-term experience with small satellites, low price and
a strong relationship to a university. The Nation Alpha team selected Supplier Omegal because
they fit these criteria. Supplier Omegal offered a low cost, small satellite for earth observation.
The satellite had strong performance (in terms of spatial resolution) relative to its weight
Supplier class. Supplier Omegal had flight heritage from multiple missions. Supplier Omegal
also stood out for what they could offer in terms of training. They were willing to host Nation
Alpha engineers during the satellite manufacturing process and license technology for future use
by the Nation Alpha team. Furthermore, Supplier Omegal was a company that spun out of a
university and still retained close ties. The Nation Alpha trainee team could receive teaching and
mentoring from faculty and staff at the university as well as the company. None of the other
prospective partners seemed to offer all of these benefits.
How was the launch provider selected?
The AlphaSat-R1 team went through several stages of seeking an opportunity to launch the
satellite into space. In the first stage, they expected a free launch as part of the AlphaSat-C1 and
AlphaSat-C2 communication project. This opportunity is what actually spurred the AlphaSat-Rl
project. Ultimately, the timing did not allow AlphaSat-R1 to share the communication launch.
There was a two year window between the signing of the communication launch contract and
their actual launch. The procurement of the AlphaSat-R1 small satellite was not complete in that
timeframe. In the second stage, Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alpha1 planned to purchase
launch services via their satellite system provider, Supplier Omegal. Although Supplier Omegal
was not a launch provider, they offered the service of negotiating a launch on behalf of Nation
Alpha. A launch vehicle and approximate time period were initially proposed by Supplier
Omegal for Project Year 4. This opportunity did not materialize, however. Thus, the AlphaSat-
RI team entered a third stage in which they took on responsibility for finding their own launch
opportunity. They went through a process of meeting and negotiating with launch providers from
many countries in three continents - Asia, Europe and North America. Their broad search
316
included a variety of launch approaches, some of which were non-traditional. The attributes they
were primarily searching for were affordable price and strong technical performance. They
ultimately selected launch Supplier Rho 1.
What were the roles of the trainee engineers while at the supplier location and after training?
The technical roles for the Nation Alpha engineers who trained at Supplier Omegal were
determined jointly by both the Nation Alpha and supplier team. As an overall division of labor,
the team at Supplier Omegal focused primarily on satellite engineering and the team of
engineers based at Implementer Alphal focused more on operations. Within the team of seven
Nation Alpha engineers that worked at Supplier Omegal, six worked on specific satellite
specialties and one served as team leader with a more general technical focus. The six specialists
were each assigned to train one primary area of satellite engineering. Because the team was too
small to cover all the subsystems, each of the six also took on a secondary technical area.
After the seven Nation Alpha engineers completed training at Supplier Omegal and the satellite
was delivered to Nation Alpha, this core team of engineers had to work with their original
organizations to decide what to do next. They had not been hired permanently to Implementer
Alphal; they were seconded from their respective organizations for the purpose of the training.
As leader of Overseer Alphal, Leader Alpha2 had originally envisioned that if influential people
from various organizations were trained in satellites, they could take their skills back to their
home organizations and spread the knowledge. So it was natural for the representatives from the
military and universities to return to their original jobs. Only one engineer from this core team
transferred from a university position to working full time at Implementer Alpha1.
Facilities
During the AlphaSat-R1 project, the Implementer Alphal firm worked in a temporary facility
with office space that was not custom designed for their use. As part of the AlphaSat-R1 project,
Supplier Omegal installed a mission operations and satellite control station in a major city of
Nation Alpha. The Nation Alpha team also leveraged the Overseer Alphal facilities as needed.
Supplier Omegal was based in temporary facilities as well. Supplier Omegal spun out of a
university research center. During its early years, the firm shared office and laboratory space
with the university. Supplier Omegal employees were integrated with university employees.
Thus the engineers from Nation Alpha that trained at Supplier Omegal were also based in the
university facilities. The supplier firm rented externally owned facilities for some steps of the
satellite testing process which require large scale infrastructure.
Training
During the nine months that the core team of Nation Alpha engineers worked at Supplier
Omegal, they experienced a set of training activities which included academic courses, technical
lectures, group projects and on-the-job training under the mentorship of Supplier Omegal
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engineers. When the Nation Alpha engineers arrived at Supplier Omegal, the first stage of
training was a series of lectures in the form of a short course. The course was given by staff from
the space research department at the university affiliated with Supplier Omegal. The lectures
provided an overview of spacecraft engineering. Later engineers from Supplier Omegal gave
more detailed lectures about specific specializations within satellite engineering. Every Nation
Alpha engineer attended all the lectures, even lectures for specialties outside of their own. Some
Nation Alpha engineers enrolled in formal degree programs at the university, but it was not
feasible to complete the degrees in the short timescale of the AlphaSat-R1 project. As a group
project, the Supplier Omegal team led the Nation Alpha engineers through a design exercise to
deepen their understanding of satellite engineering and the applications of satellite to national
needs within Nation Alpha. After the initial short courses and lectures, each Nation Alpha
engineer was assigned to work on a particular aspect of the satellite project under a mentor from
Supplier Omegal. The vision was for the Nation Alpha engineers to share responsibilities with
their Supplier Omegal mentors and to contribute to the satellite project. In addition to working
directly on AlphaSat-R1, the Nation Alpha engineers worked on individual projects. The projects
varied in terms of application - some were immediately applicable to AlphaSat-R1. Others had a
long term purpose.
The hands on training activities of the Nation Alpha engineers were impacted by the project
schedule and technical heritage of the mission. The Nation Alpha engineers were delayed in their
arrival to Nation Omega due to bureaucratic problems. Due to this delay, they arrived later than
expected. The Supplier Omegal team had already begun working on the satellite with a fast
paced schedule designed to meet the original Project Year 4 launch goal. The satellite
development process was in a late stage. The phases of design and manufacturing were
complete; what remained was integration and testing of the system. Thus the Nation Alpha
engineers primarily participated in integration and testing aspects of AlphaSat-R1. Later,
however, it became clear that there was more time to work on the satellite because the launch
was delayed. Due to this, the Nation Alpha engineers were able to work with the Supplier
Omegal engineers to plan and implement an additional instrument as payload to the satellite.
Policy, Cultural, Social Issues
The policy issues that impacted the AlphaSat-R1 project came from three sources -Nation
Alpha, Nation Omega and the international community. In the context of Nation Alpha, support
of a key government leader helped initiate the project. Later, there was a danger that political
support would wane due to the three years of launch delay. The minister from Overseer Alpha3
played a role in maintaining communication and support for AlphaSat-R1 within the central
government. In the context of Nation Omega, there were export control regulations. AlphaSat-R1
was a technology transfer project in which an organization in Nation Omega was transferring
knowledge and technical documents to an organization in Nation Alpha. This transfer was
governed by the export control laws and processes of Nation Omega and concluded successfully.
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At the international level, the AlphaSat-RI project needed to work within the requirements for
frequency allocation and filing. The International Telecommunication Union manages these
issues. The process designates how a satellite will use portions of the radio frequency spectrum
to communicate; this must be coordinated to avoid conflicts. AlphaSat-R1 operated within the
amateur radio bands; this limited the complexity and effort required to secure permission for
frequency allocation.
9.1.2 The AlphaSat-R2 Project
Nation Alpha's second remote sensing satellite project was a partnership with Supplier Taul.
The Project Team
This section describes the role of organizations and personnel within the satellite project.
Which Organizations were involved with the project and how were they related?
Implementer Alphal was the main organization with responsibility to implement the AlphaSat-
R2 project under the authority of Overseer Alphal (which transitioned to become Overseer
Alpha2 in the middle of the project). The relationship between Implementer Alphal and the
Overseers evolved during the AlphaSat-R2 project as the national space agency became more
formalized. Overseer Alpha2 was the owner of the AlphaSat-R2 program that provided oversight
and Implementer Alphal was the Implementer firm. Overseer Alpha2 participated in setting high
level requirements for AlphaSat-R2. The other role of Overseer Alpha2 was to be the public face
of the project by interfacing with government and the press. Implementer Alphal worked closely
with the Supplier Taul to implement AlphaSat-R2. The satellite and payload programs were a
collaboration between the two firms. Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alpha2 hired a company
from Nation Lambda (Supplier Lambda1) to provide launch services. A more distant stakeholder
is the national geospatial data agency of Nation Alpha. They did not have any contractual
responsibility or role in the AlphaSat-R2 project. They did have the role, however, of receiving
data from both domestic and foreign satellite data and distributing it to users in Nation Alpha.
Thus, they are part of the AlphaSat-R2 value chain.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
The process of choosing engineers to participate in the AlphaSat-R2 project was also a process
of hiring long term employees into Implementer Alphal. Thus there were two levels of selection.
The Implementer Alphal management hired new employees and choose a subset of these to
travel to Nation Tau to work directly with Supplier Taul engineers on AlphaSat-R2.
Implementer Alpha1 leadership sought candidates both domestically and abroad because many
Nation Alpha students traveled overseas for their studies. Manager Alphal in particular would
often travel abroad for events. During these trips he worked with Nation Alpha embassies in
major cities to find Nation Alpha students. If possible he interviewed them or invited them to do
internships at Implementer Alphal. In the context of the partnership with Supplier Taul, the
leadership from the supplier had the opportunity to specify what type of academic background
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they expected in the visiting engineers. Beyond that, Manager Alphal looked for people who
seemed prepared and eager to learn new technology. Most of the Nation Alpha engineers that
worked on AlphaSat-R2 were recent graduates that were hired specifically to participate in the
new satellite project. No one from the core team of trainees that went to Supplier Omegal for
training was part of the Implementer Alphal team sent to Nation Tau. One engineer, however,
was sent to Supplier Omegal during the AlphaSat-R1 project and continued with Implementer
Alphal during the AlphaSat-R2 project. He was based in Nation Alpha rather than Nation Tau
during the second project.
How was a firm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training?
The process of choosing Supplier Taul as a partner was based on a long term, personal
relationship between the leaders of the key organizations. Leader Alpha2, as founder of Overseer
Alphal, became friends with Professor Taul, a pioneer in Nation Tau's space community. As the
Nation Alpha team considered a second satellite project, they sought specific technical and
management aspects. On the technical side, they wanted a satellite that would be larger and have
greater performance than AlphaSat-R1. From a project management standpoint, they wanted a
process that would allow them to collaborate equally with a partner. They needed a partner that
would share technical and financial risk and allow Nation Alpha engineers to contribute to the
technology development process. A new satellite manufacturing firm had spun out of Professor
Taul's university; the firm was Supplier Taul. Because Supplier Taul showed a willingness to
work with Nation Alpha in joint development of a new spacecraft bus platform and to train
engineers, Nation Alpha chose this small, nascent firm as their partner.
How was the launch provider selected?
The Nation Alpha team (Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alpha2) took responsibility for
finding a launch for AlphaSat-R2. The satellite was designed to operate at a unique orbit in
space. Few launch providers were accustomed to offer this specific service. As with the
AlphaSat-RI project, Nation Alpha considered many potential plans when arranging a launch for
AlphaSat-R2. Early on, Nation Alpha made an agreement with one country to launch AlphaSat-
R2. They later learned that this would not be possible due to international trade restrictions.
Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alpha2 considered other launch options, some of which were
highly creative. Nation Alpha ultimately chose to work with Supplier Lambdal, which was a
new start up that had not yet proven their capability to build a functional rocket. On the other
hand, Supplier Lambdal was able to offer a low price and find a launch site that was not limited
by trade restrictions from which to send AlphaSat-R2 directly to its intended orbit. Implementer
Alphal was the first customer for Supplier Lambdal. At the time that they choose to work
together, Supplier Lambdal was a small start up. The Nation Alpha team found Supplier
Lambdal to be innovative and price competitive. Nation Alpha saw that the two teams could
help each other: Supplier Lambdal provided a low cost launch to a unique orbit and Nation
Alpha's patronage allowed Supplier Lambdal to start building a reputation.
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Where was the team located and how did they transition?
The AlphaSat-R2 team was often split geographically between Supplier Taul and Implementer
Alpha1. The Implementer Alpha1 company leadership stayed in Nation Alpha while an
Implementer Project Manager led teams in Nation Tau. Teams of Implementer Alphal engineers
went to Nation Tau in several waves over a four year period. About eighteen Nation Alpha
engineers lived in Nation Tau; they stayed for different lengths of time. Some stayed as long as 2
years, while others had shorter stints of less than one year. A total of about 30 people from
Implementer Alphal spent some time in Nation Tau. The first team from Implementer Alphal
went to Supplier Taul to begin work on the satellite payload. During this early phase, Nation
Alpha had two partnerships going - with Supplier Taul and a second supplier in a different
country. There were Implementer Alphal employees stationed with both partners
simultaneously. Some Implementer Alphal engineers continued to visit Nation Tau after their
main shift was completed. There was also a team of Implementer Alphal engineers that did not
spend long periods in Nation Tau. Their focus was to gradually build up AIT (Assembly,
Integration and Test) facilities in Nation Alpha to enable them to integrate and test some
subsystems of AlphaSat-R2. After the flight model of AlphaSat-R2 was delivered from Supplier
Taul to Implementer Alphal, the relationship with Supplier Taul did not stop. The Supplier
Taul Project Manager traveled frequently to Nation Alpha to provide support.
What were the roles of the trainee engineers while at the supplier location and after returning
home?
The roles for individual engineers were assigned by joint agreement between Implementer
Alphal and Supplier Taul. The Nation Alpha engineers that worked in Nation Tau focused on
specialties within satellite engineering, including the payload aspects. The team was large
enough to cover many of the satellite engineering specialties. Each person focused on one
specific area. When the Nation Alpha engineers returned from Nation Tau they continued to
work in the specialty area as the project continued in the testing and calibration stage.
Facilities
During the AlphaSat-R2 project, Implementer Alphal transitioned from temporary, generic
office facilities to purpose-built facilities that included hardware laboratory space. At the start of
the project, Implementer Alphal was based in small office space within a technology park in
Nation Alpha. The park was designed to incubate new firms. In this office, there were no
facilities to do hardware work and there was no laboratory space. Next Implementer Alphal
moved to a different location in the same technology park. This new space was larger and it
allowed Implementer Alphal to set up initial laboratory space for hardware work. By the end of
AlphaSat-R2, Implementer Alphal had moved out of the incubating technology park and taken
space in an industrial park. Over time, Implementer Alphal established several types of
hardware workspace in the industrial park location that facilitated satellite integration,
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electronics fabrication, and optical testing. Together all of these made up an Assembly,
Integration and Test facility for AlphaSat-R2. Implementer Alphal did what they could with the
facilities they had at each stage. In the small lab at the technology park, several subsystem
components were manufactured. Before the full AIT facility was completed at the industrial park
location, Implementer Alpha1 engineers started on some hardware work to build structures to
protect electronic components for the satellite. Implementer Alphal used the AIT facility to do
the final assembly and functionality testing of the flight model of AlphaSat-R2 in Nation Alpha.
Implementer Alphal did not have facilities for environmental testing of the assembled satellite.
AlphaSat-R2 was shipped back to Nation Tau after assembly so it could go through
environmental tests at a government facility in Nation Tau. In parallel with Implementer
Alphal's facility expansion, Overseer Alpha2 had facility projects as well. Overseer Alpha2 took
leadership in helping to prepare AlphaSat-R2 to be operational. This involved ensuring optical
calibration and establishing a workflow for satellite operations. Overseer Alpha2 developed a
facility to do optical calibration of AlphaSat-R2, and they established a facility for monitoring
and sending commands to the satellite. A mirror facility for satellite control was set up at
Implementer Alphal to support them. The primary Image Receiving and Processing Station was
operated by the National Remote Sensing Center in Nation Alpha.
Training
This section discusses training preparation and activities at the Supplier firm.
What preparation did trainees have in home country before leaving for supplier location?
Before groups of Nation Alpha engineers went to Nation Tau, Implementer Alphal made some
efforts to prepare them and transfer knowledge that the organization had gained during the
AlphaSat-R1 project. Most new engineers spent several weeks or months in Nation Alpha before
transitioning to Nation Tau. During this time, a few team members that had experienced
AlphaSat-R1 gave lectures about satellite technology or provided informal teaching.
Implementer Alphal also introduced some of these new engineers to project management
methods. Another effort to transfer AlphaSat-RI knowledge was to assign more experienced
Nation Alpha engineers as mentors to the new team members.
What happened during the transition to the supplier location?
Each Implementer Alphal engineer that went to Nation Tau had a unique transition experience.
They were hired at different times and sent to Nation Tau in small groups or as individuals.
Supplier Taul generally provided a technical orientation to new arrivals by hosting a week or
two of theoretical lectures about satellite technology and subsystem design. The Nation Alpha
engineers found this to be new information. As new Nation Alpha engineers arrived in Nation
Tau, they sought support from the veterans who arrive earlier in learning how to live in the new
country.
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What training approaches were used?
The training experience for Nation Alpha engineers with Supplier Taul included technical
lectures, on the job training under a mentor, access to technical documentation about the project,
attendance at conferences and language classes for the local Nation Tau language. Supplier
Taul's approach to training the Implementer Alphal engineers was to give them project-oriented
tasks to achieve and to focus primarily on their specific subsystem. After the introductory
lectures, engineers often needed to learn to use an important tool such as a software package for
design. Once they were able to use the design, analysis or testing tool, the Implementer Alphal
engineers were given specific tasks that were part of the overall team responsibilities and the
satellite development life cycle. The Implementer Alphal engineers did not spend much time
doing extra learning assignments that were outside the scope of the project. The Implementer
Alphal engineers had an informal relationship with their Supplier Taul mentors. They often
shared office space or sat in close proximity. They met regularly for informal discussions.
Policy, Cultural, Social Issues
In the domestic policy context of Nation Alpha, one issue that influenced the AlphaSat-R2
project was the status of the government infrastructure with regard to space. The primary
Overseer (Overseer Alpha2) worked under a government ministry (Overseer Alpha3).
Implementer Alphal and Overseer Alpha2 work with teams from Overseer Alpha3 to propose
long term road maps for national satellite projects. During the time of AlphaSat-R2, Nation
Alpha did not have some of the national policy infrastructure that facilitates satellite projects. For
example, they did not have a national space policy, a space act to defme responsibilities in the
space arena, or ratification of some international space treaties. The space policy document was
under preparation during AlphaSat-R2 and was meant to serve as a foundation for a national
space act. The AlphaSat-R2 project was also impacted by international trade regulations that
made it infeasible to pursue certain launch options and certain communication with launch
providers. Language was an issue in the collaboration between the Implementer Alphal and
Supplier Taul. The two teams spoke different first languages and communicated in an
international second language. It was important for engineers from Nation Alpha to learn the
local language of Nation Tau in order to interact in the society.
9.2 Nation Beta
This section summarizes the first two remote sensing projects for Nation Beta.
9.2.1 The BetaSat-R1 Project
Nation Beta's first remote sensing satellite projects was a partnership with Supplier Omegal.
Initiation and Approval of Satellite Project
Before starting the BetaSat-R1 project, the Nation Beta head of state convened a committee of
five experts to provide advice and help define the satellite project. This was happening in parallel
with the formation of the national space agency of Nation Beta. The committee members were to
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evaluate strategic questions about how to begin the new space program. They considered
whether to buy a satellite and various types of satellites to procure. The committee played a role
in deciding that Nation Beta would buy a remote sensing satellite and invest in training of
personnel. They supported the proposal to make a contract with Supplier Omegal. In addition to
the work of the committee, the newly formed Implementer Betal held stakeholder meetings
before starting the BetaSat-R1 project. The project to procure BetaSat-RI was formally approved
by the central Nation Beta government. About one year later Nation Beta signed the contract
with Supplier Omegal which covered the remote sensing satellite and training of Nation Beta
engineers. The relevant government minister signed on behalf of Nation Beta. Funding was
provided by the Nation Beta government to cover the project. While Implementer Betal
negotiated the contract with Supplier Omegal, they worked with a consultant for technical
guidance. The satellite project was also shaped by the vision of Supplier Omegal to coordinate a
collaborative constellation of satellites that would work together to enhance each other's
capacity. The BetaSat-R1 project joined this constellation.
The Project Team
This section describes the role of organizations and personnel within the satellite project.
Which Organizations were involved with the project and how were they related?
Implementer Betal contracted with Supplier Omegal to execute the BetaSat-RI project. They
also hired consultants to review their technical decisions. Within Nation Beta, several
government organizations were directly involved with the project, including the relevant ministry
Overseer Betal; a government advisory committee for space science and technology; and the
office of the President. Each of these stakeholders was represented at the launch of BetaSat-RI.
While the Nation Beta trainee engineers were in the Nation Omega, they had limited exposure to
other emerging satellite teams that worked with Supplier Omegal. Because Supplier Omegal
was located on the University Omegal campus during that time, Nation Beta engineers would
sometimes share office space with doctoral students from the university. BetaSat-RI shared a
launch with satellites for several other countries.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
Implementer Betal pursued a wide-reaching approach to choose the fifteen trainee engineers that
would go to Supplier Omegal. Aptitude tests were held to find engineers and scientists with
strong performance. Tests were held in several regions of Nation Beta. A selection panel also
held a next level of review. The panel included representatives from Implementer Betal, the
Nation Beta government and Supplier Omegal. The selection process sought engineers that were
relatively early in their careers and had skills in relevant areas such as electronics,
communication and computer science. The selected team of Nation Beta trainee engineers was a
mix of fresh graduates and engineers who had some work experience.
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How was the launch provider selected?
Supplier Omegal selected the launch provider for BetaSat-RI after considering many firms and
comparing them based on cost and reliability. The BetaSat-RI was built to operate as part of a
collaborative constellation; several members of the satellite constellation shared the launch.
How was a firm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training?
When Nation Beta considered the proposal from Supplier Omegal, they evaluated it in terms of
cost, technical performance and training potential. They selected Supplier Omegal because they
found the cost to be low and the technical performance to be acceptable. They also found
Supplier Omegal's offers for training to fit their interests.
Where was the team located and how did they transition?
Implementer Betal was based in the capital of Nation Beta. For the BetaSat-RI project, the
Nation Beta trainee team lived and worked in Nation Omega from the end of Project Year 3 until
the middle of Project Year 5. The whole group of trainees moved from Nation Beta to Nation
Omega together after their selection process and a send off ceremony.
What were the roles of the trainee engineers?
During the BetaSat-RI project, Supplier Omegal defined the team roles and responsibilities for
their engineers and the visiting engineers from Implementer Betal. As was their standard
practice, Supplier Omegal set up a project team built around a core group of engineers that took
responsibility for each section of the satellite. The Nation Beta trainees were assigned to be
mentored by specific members of the Supplier Omegal team. The Supplier Omegal core team
was led by a Project Manager and System Engineer. The Nation Beta engineers worked with
their mentors as well as other Supplier Omegal engineers on their subsystem teams. The specific
assignments for each Nation Beta engineer were focused primarily on satellite engineering with a
few engineers placed in the ground station operations area. The team of Nation Beta engineers
was relatively small. They were scattered throughout the satellite project team. Each was given a
primary assignment, but some were also encouraged to learn a secondary topic. This allowed the
team to cover more disciplines.
Facilities
During the BetaSat-RI project, facilities for both Supplier Omegal and Implementer Betal were
in an early stage of development. Supplier Omegal was temporarily sharing facilities with a
research center in University Omegal. Personnel from Supplier Omegal and University Omegal
shared office and laboratory space. Supplier Omegal did not have facilities for the
environmental testing of the full BetaSat-RI system. They rented such facilities from other
laboratories in Nation Omega. Implementer Betal, having opened in Project Year 1, was also in
temporary facilities throughout the BetaSat-RI project. Implementer Betal rented office space in
the capital city of Nation Beta. This space housed the early management team. A separate site
was used for the first BetaSat-RI ground station in a different section of the capital city. The
325
construction of the BetaSat-RI ground station was executed in about two weeks during Project
Year 5, just before the launch of the BetaSat-RI. The imagery data from the BetaSat-RI was
downloaded and process by Implementer Betal. Supplier Omegal also had the capability to
download data and perform satellite control activities from their facility in Nation Omega. In
Project Year 5, the Nation Beta government approved funding to establish a permanent
Implementer Betal campus outside the capital city with a new ground station, headquarters
office buildings and a section focused on satellite technology.
Training
This section describes training preparation and activities at the Supplier firm.
What preparation did trainees have in home country before leaving for supplier location?
The Implementer Betal engineers that were sent as trainees to Supplier Omegal were all newly
hired for the purpose of the BetaSat-RI project. They traveled as one group to Supplier Omegal.
In the few weeks before they were sent to Supplier Omegal, they had an orientation process that
included presentations from the Implementer Betal team.
What happened during the transition to the supplier location?
As the visiting engineers from Nation Beta arrived in Nation Omega during the BetaSat-RI
project, Supplier Omegal provided support for arranging logistics and orienting the visitors to
the new environment.
What training approaches were used?
During the BetaSat-RI project, the training provided by Supplier Omegal to the visiting Nation
Beta engineers was not highly formalized or structured. The core approach was to integrate the
engineers into a Supplier Omegal engineering team and give them assignments for on the job
training. In addition, the training included technical lectures about theoretical and practical
aspects of satellite technology and a group design project. The Implementer Betal engineers did
not pursue formal academic degrees. As part of the on the job training some Implementer Betal
engineers were exposed to external processes, such as the manufacturing activity of a
subcontractor. For the group design project, the Implementer Betal team was asked to design a
complete satellite. They were given a week to develop a design based on given constraints. The
deliverable was a presentation to Supplier Omegal.
How did trainee engineers interact with mentors?
During the BetaSat-RI project, each visiting engineer from Implementer Betal was assigned to
work under a mentor from Supplier Omegal. These mentors were engineers who also had
responsibilities for design and engineering tasks to complete BetaSat-RI and other satellites. The
visiting Implementer Betal engineers met regularly with their Supplier Omegal mentors for both
formal and informal discussions. Most Implementer Betal engineers shared an office with their
mentor or sat nearby. As a firm, Supplier Omegal did not give highly structured guidance to the
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mentor engineers about how to train the visiting engineers. For some of the Supplier Omegal
team, BetaSat-Ri was their first training experience, although Supplier Omegal had gone
through multiple training projects. The mentor engineers varied in their training approaches and
levels of formality. There were both formal and informal work plans and accountability systems
for the Implementer Betal engineers. Some mentors focused on using their routine work as a
learning opportunity to explain concepts and techniques to the Implementer Betal engineers.
Some created training activities once they understood the strengths and interests of the visiting
engineers. Some gradually developed a structured work plan for their trainees that included a
series of assignments with both theoretical and applied aspects. Much of the work for these
training assignments did not contribute to the development of the BetaSat-RI; it was purely for
learning purposes. Overall, the Supplier Omegal mentor engineers adapted to the capabilities
and interests of the visiting Implementer Betal engineers and tried to give them as many
opportunities as possible to participate in the BetaSat-R1 development.
Policy, Cultural, Social Issues
This section describes domestic and international policy issues.
Were there domestic policy concerns for supplier or implementer?
During the BetaSat-R1 project, Implementer Betal had strong support from the Nation Beta
central government. The national space policy document was approved near the beginning of the
BetaSat-R1 project; this created a support policy environment for Implementer Betal as they
developed the satellite. The central government provided practical support by engaging with
Supplier Omegal via the oversight ministry and by easing customs concerns when the ground
station equipment was imported into Nation Beta. The Nation Beta government also settled a
dispute over frequency allocation that could have hindered the operation of BetaSat-R1. In
middle of the BetaSat-R1 project, the electoral cycle caused some uncertainty and delay during a
time of government transition.
Were there international policy concerns?
For BetaSat-R1, Supplier Omegal had to pursue licenses from export control office of Nation
Omega sell the satellites, provide technical training and send the satellites to launch site in a third
party country.
9.2.2 The BetaSat-R2 & BetaSat-R3 Project
Nation Beta's second satellite project was a partnership with Supplier Omegal to purchase two
satellites.
Initiation and Approval of Satellite Project
From the point of view of Supplier Omegal, the business development effort to win the BetaSat-
R2 project contract began several years before the formal negations. The negotiation process
involved Supplier Omegal, Implementer Betal and a team of consultants supporting the
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Implementer. Supplier Omegal interacted closely with the consultant team. The key players in
the negotiation process were the project managers from Implementer Betal and Supplier
Omegal. They had responsibility for most of the process, but they would defer to the authority of
their organizational leaders when necessary. The official ceremony to recognize the contract was
held in the capital of Nation Beta. The contract scope included the BetaSat-R2 spacecraft, the
ground infrastructure for the new spacecraft and training for the Nation Beta engineers. The
Nation Beta government continued its involvement and oversight of the BetaSat-R2 project after
the contract was signed. Both the president and relevant minister within Nation Beta reviewed
the project.
The Project Team
This section describes the role of organizations and personnel within the satellite project.
Which Organizations were involved with the project and how were they related?
For the BetaSat-R2 & BetaSat-R3 satellite projects, Implementer Betal continued as the
implementer while the same Ministry provided funding and oversight (Overseer Betal).
Although the Ministry did not generally get involved in the day to day issues of the BetaSat-R2
project, they were kept aware of the overall progress of the project. Implementer Betal worked
with the same external consultant for both the BetaSat-Ri and BetaSat-R2 projects. The
relationship between Implementer Betal and the firm was mainly handled by the Nation Beta
program manager and the Supplier Omegal project manager. There were also other secondary
players that contributed to the communication. One Nation Beta engineer served Implementer
Betal as the customer representative that worked on-site with Supplier Omegal.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
The Nation Beta engineers that worked on BetaSat-R2 were a mix of people that had already
worked at Implementer Betal on previous projects (the BetaSat-RI and BetaSat-CI satellite) as
well as new hires for BetaSat-R2. The BetaSat-RI project included 15 engineers while the
communication satellite (BetaSat-C1) was a large team of fifty people. There were four
categories of hiring experiences for the BetaSat-R2 engineers. About 5 or 6 engineers that
worked on BetaSat-R2 were hired into Implementer Betal at the start of the BetaSat-RI project.
Another group of engineers was involved with the BetaSat-CI communication satellite project.
A third category of engineers was hired from outside Implementer Betal just before the BetaSat-
R2 project started; they were sent to Supplier Omegal with the first Cohort of trainees. The
fourth category is made of engineers hired around during the BetaSat-R2 project for the purpose
ofjoining the second training cohort at Supplier Omegal. Among the trainee engineers that were
hired specifically for BetaSat-R2, there were some commonalities to their stories. They became
aware of the job opportunity generally via a newspaper advertisement, a website or advice from a
friend. After applying they were invited to take a test or do an interview - or both. The test
covered writing and math. The math portion was at the secondary school level such as algebra
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and geometry. In Nation Beta, such exams are common as part of the job application process.
The applicants differed in their level of familiarity with Implementer Betal. Some had seen
coverage of the BetaSat-RI launch a few years earlier. Others had not heard of Implementer
Betal at all. Several of the engineers hired by Implementer Betal were recent graduates,
however, even recent graduates had some work experience because they were required to
complete a year of volunteer service. This was a national requirement in Nation Beta. Some
engineers had full time positions with the government or a company before joining Implementer
Betal. The engineers hired to do the training generally did not have previous experience with
space technology before coming to Implementer Betal. A few had theoretical or academic
introductions to space technology and satellite services. Supplier Omegal had limited input on a
customer's selection process of the engineers for both BetaSat-RI and BetaSat-R2. They did not
evaluate or approve the selected engineers that were chosen by Implementer Betal.
How was a firm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training?
For BetaSat-R2, Nation Beta's selection process was to use selective tendering, meaning they did
not hold an open call for bids. Instead Implementer Betal and their consultant met with potential
suppliers to learn about their offerings. They invited only specific satellite suppliers to submit
bids. The consultant reviewed the submissions in terms of technical quality and price. From the
supplier perspective, the BetaSat-R2 project fit into Supplier Omegal's core market area.
Supplier Omegal was competing with several other potential suppliers, some of which were
located in their region and others which were in different parts of the world. Supplier Omegal
sought to win the bid by offering unique training options and a competitive price.
How was the launch provider selected?
The BetaSat-RI, BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3 satellites were all launched from the same country
(Nation Rho). Supplier Omegal worked frequently with this country to procure launch services.
Supplier Omegal also took on the role of selecting a launcher for BetaSat-R2 & R3 to be
launched together. The launch agreement was initially signed before BetaSat-R2 and BetaSat-R3
completed development in Project Year 5. There was a delay, however, and the two satellites
waited about two years to launch in Project Year 7.
Where was the team located and how did they transition?
For the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, the team of engineers from Implementer Betal transitioned to
Supplier Omegal in two major groups. The first cohort included 11 engineers, and the Customer
Representative. They went to Supplier Omegal in Project Year 2. The second cohort arrived as a
group of fourteen in Project Year 4. That brought the number up to 27 in the Nation Beta team.
During the training, most of the trainees worked at Supplier Omegal's main location in one city,
but some were assigned to a secondary location in nearby city. The second location had a focus
on satellite imaging systems. Some of the Cohort 1 engineers studied for a Master of Science
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Degree during their time in Supplier Omegal. A number of them continued to study for a PhD in
Nation Omega after the BetaSat-R2 training was over.
What were the roles of the trainee engineers?
For the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, Supplier Omegal again played a key role in assigning the
visiting engineers into subsystem or discipline team. Each trainee was assigned to specialize in a
specific area of satellite missions. The high level approach was to consider the trainee's
background and interests in order to match them to the appropriate subsystem. The team was
large enough to allow each visiting engineer to focus on one area. Both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2
received tests when they first arrived to establish their math and science, to test their familiarity
with space concepts and to find their area of strength in a subsystem. In addition to the test,
Supplier Omegal also considered the information about the trainees from interviews, CVs and
their expressed interest. The majority of the visiting Nation Beta engineers worked on satellite or
payload engineering, but about five people focused on ground system operations. There were
several leadership roles within the visiting Nation Beta team - Customer Representatives, Project
Manager and Systems Engineer. The customer representative's job was to coordinate issues
between the Project Manager, Training Manager, and CEO from Supplier Omega and the
Program Manager from Implementer Betal. The Nation Beta System Engineer also played a
coordinating role, but focused more narrowly on technical matters. The Nation Beta Project
Manager worked to ensure that all deliverables for the team were completed at the expected cost
and schedule. He was also concerned with the welfare of the team members. Once all the
Implementer Betal trainee engineers completed their stay in Nation Omega and most were back
in Nation Beta, some roles changed. The trainees that spent time in Nation Omega were re-
integrated back into several teams at Implementer Betal, along with new hires from Nation Beta
who had not trained abroad. The Ground Station team evolved to be three groups with five
people working on maintenance of the station hardware, six people working on satellite
operations and three people working on image processing. There were also organizational
changes. One particular section within Implementer Betal was leading the satellite development
activities; most of the Implementer Betal engineers that trained at Supplier Omegal were from
this section. A new leader was chosen for this satellite development section. When he entered the
position, he reorganized this section and reassigned positions. His team included engineers
trained during abroad as well as new recruits. The roles of returning trainees were redefined with
this organizational change. The new organization was based around divisions focused on specific
engineering disciplines. Most people did not change activities, but their team structure changed.
Facilities
During the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, both Supplier Omegal and Implementer Betal transitioned
into facilities that were specifically designed to address their organizational needs and allow
them to grow in terms of personnel. As described above, Supplier Omegal started by sharing
office and laboratory facilities with University Omegal. In Project Year 2 of BetaSat-R2,
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Supplier Omegal moved into a larger, dedicated building with office space and satellite control
facilities. This new building was a short drive away from University Omegal. They continued to
use the university for laboratory and hardware integration facilities throughout the BetaSat-R2 &
BetaSat-R3 project. Supplier Omegal also expanded by acquiring a company in a nearby town
that focused on satellite payloads. Supplier Omegal continued to rent access to external facilities
for environmental testing of the BetaSat-R2 and R3 satellites. Implementer Betal opened a new
campus outside the capital city of Nation Beta. The campus included the headquarters for
Implementer Betal, a section dedicated to the satellite technology team, new ground stations for
Nation Beta's remote sensing satellites, as well as office space and ground stations for Nation
Beta's communication satellite project. As was true with the BetaSat-RI, the primary ground
station for control and image collection from the BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellites was located at
Implementer Betal, but Supplier Omegal also had the capability to serve as a back up ground
station. During the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, Implementer Betal initiated a process to build the
first facilities within its campus for working on the design, manufacture and testing of satellites.
Training
This section describes preparation for training and training activities at the Supplier firm.
What preparation did trainees have in home country before leaving for supplier location?
For the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, two cohorts of Implementer Betal engineers were sent to
Supplier Omegal. Both cohorts had several months or years at Implementer Betal before
departing for Supplier Omegal. The first cohort was a mix of engineers that had already worked
at Implementer Betal for several years as well as new hires. Some of the veterans prepared for
departure to Supplier Omegal by working on tasks in satellite operations or design. The second
cohort was a team specifically hired for the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project. They had several months
at Implementer Betal to prepare. During this time, some veteran Implementer Betal engineers
gave lectures on satellite technology. Implementer Betal also brought in teachers to provide
training in computer skills and programming. There was also time for the trainees to study
relevant material from Implementer Betal's satellite projects.
What happened during the transition to the supplier location?
During the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, the Supplier Omegal team included a full time training
manager that addressed the personal, social, educational and mentorship needs of the visiting
Nation Beta engineers. This role included helping the visitors find housing, learn about the local
culture and integrate into the Supplier Omegal community via social events. The Nation Alpha
engineers arrived in two cohorts, so the veterans could help the later arrivals adjust to Nation
Omega. For the first cohort of Nation Alpha engineers, the transition was both into Supplier
Omegal and University Omegal. Most of the first cohort entered a Masters degree in satellite
engineering at University Omegal. They lived as students on campus during their first two years
in Nation Omega. The second cohort did not have this academic experience.
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What training approaches were used?
The training for the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project was highly structured. The training included
technical lectures about satellite technology, a group design project, skill-based courses,
technical demonstrations, on-the-job experience under a mentor, and contributing to the
manufacture and testing of a training satellite (BetaSat-R3). A subset of the Implementer Betal
engineers completed university degrees through a Master of Science in Satellite Engineering at
University Omegal. The training also included a license to the technical documentation for the
BetaSat-R3 training satellite. These aspects are explained in more detail here. Each of the two
cohorts of visiting Implementer Betal engineers received technical lectures about satellite
technology when they arrived. The lectures were given by staff from both Supplier Omegal and
University Omegal. The group design project was similar to that of the BetaSat-R1 team. The
Implementer Betal engineers were given constraints and requirements for a satellite mission and
they created a design solution by mimicking the team structure and analysis process of Supplier
Omegal. The skill-based courses provided focused, practical training in hardware techniques and
the use of software tools. The technical demonstrations taught about techniques for operating
satellite engineering facilities and manufacturing approaches. The on-the-job experience was
especially relevant for Cohort 1. They shadowed mentors in specific subsystem teams during the
design of the BetaSat-R2. Both Cohort I and Cohort 2 engineers participated in aspects of the
design, manufacture and test for the BetaSat-R3 training satellite. The objective was to give the
Implementer Betal engineers as much responsibility as possible for this satellite, under the
supervision of Supplier Omegal. Twelve Implementer Betal engineers enrolled in Master of
Science degrees at University Omegal. For this group, about two years of the training was spent
in part time study and part time work at Supplier Omegal. The degree requirements included two
semesters of classes and a two semesters of working on a research project. During each semester,
students took two classes. The Implementer Betal engineers spent a two per week at University
Omegal and the remaining days at Supplier Omegal. The research projects for the team were
contributions toward a larger effort to build a very small satellite. Supplier Omegal defined
multiple approaches to monitoring and evaluating trainee performance during the BetaSat-R2 &
R3 project. At a high level these included the following: 1) assigning the trainees to areas of
specialized responsibility; 2) assigning Supplier Omegal personnel to serve in support and
mentorship roles; 3) using the project review process to assess work; 4) subjecting BetaSat-R3 to
flight quality standards; and 5) enforcing deadlines for deliverables in each project phase. In
addition to these approaches that were built into the project, the Supplier Omegal training
manager executed direct evaluations. She gave the trainees tests based on the technical lectures
and tests on computer proficiency.
How did trainee engineers interact with mentors?
During the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project, the Implementer Betal engineers that visited Supplier
Omegal were once again assigned to work under mentors, especially during the On-the-Job
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experience and the work on the BetaSat-R3 training satellite. For this project, mentorship could
come from people in multiple positions depending on the activity, but each Implementer Betal
engineer had a primary mentor. The intent was for each Implementer Betal engineer to affiliate
with a specific subsystem or discipline team and sit at a desk in that team's area within Supplier
Omegal. The newly appointed training manager for Supplier Omegal created a more structured
accountability system for mentor engineers during this project. More mentors developed work
plans for their trainee engineers. The plans included a series of learning tasks and milestones.
The visiting engineers had regular meetings with their mentors and with the training manager to
review their progress in the work plan. For the BetaSat-R2 project, the Implementer Betal
engineers mostly shadowed and did theoretical assignments. For the BetaSat-R3 project, the
Implementer Betal engineers had more direct responsibility and opportunities for hands on
work. During the on the job training, the mentor engineers wrote weekly reports evaluating the
activity and performance of the engineer under their supervision. Those reports were submitted
to CMA02. CMA02 wrote monthly reports to deliver to the customer about training progress,
using material from the mentor reports.
Policy, Cultural, Social Issues
This section describes domestic policy concerns, international policy concerns and cultural
issues.
Were there domestic policy concerns for supplier or implementer?
During the BetaSat-R2 & R3 project the support from the central Nation Beta government
continued to be strong, but the process of funding the new project was slower. Ideally, the
second generation satellites would have launched before the first generation satellites reached the
end of their design life. A delayed in funding made it difficult to reach that goal.
Were there international policy concerns?
For both BetaSat-R1 and the BetaSat-R2 & R3 satellite projects, Supplier Omegal had to pursue
licenses from export control office of Nation Omega sell the satellites, provide technical training
and send the satellites to launch site in a third party country. Supplier Omegal was also impacted
by international export and trade regimes. The need to secure export licenses placed a general
schedule risk on the projects. Also, for both satellite projects, the visiting Implementer Betal
engineers required visas to stay in Nation Omega during their training. At times, there were
delays in processing the visas, causing adjustments to the training schedules.
How did cultural issues impact the project?
As the Nation Beta engineers transitioned into Nation Omega to work with Supplier Omegal,
they faced several cultural differences. Overall, they had to adjust to the new country, which
featured a different climate, unfamiliar food and different social customs. The dominant
languages of Nation Beta and Nation Omega were the same; therefore this was not a major
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change. Specifically within Supplier Omegal, the Nation Beta engineers found several
dimensions in which the work culture was different than their previous experiences. In Supplier
Omegal, the Nation Beta engineers found unfamiliar cultures toward authority, team dynamics,
time management, gender roles and work ethic. The educational systems in Nation Omega and
Nation Beta also had different areas of emphasis; this impacted the relationship between the two
teams.
9.3 Nation Gamma
This section summarizes the GammaSat-R1 project, which was purchased as part of a
partnership with Supplier Taul.
The Project Team
This section describes the role of organizations and personnel within the satellite project.
Which Organizations were involved with the project and how were they related?
The major organizations that were directly involved with the GammaSat-R1 project included
Implementer Gammal (customer), Supplier Taul (primary supplier of the satellite, ground
station and training), Supplier Rhol (launch provider), and Supplier Lambda2 (ground station
supplier). There were also stakeholders within Nation Gamma government that oversaw
Implementer Gammal. The GammaSat-RI spacecraft was "designed and developed by Supplier
Taul....with strong participation from Nation Gamma engineers." While the Implementer
Gammal engineers were in Nation Tau, they were exposed to some other organizations from
Nation Tau. During the launch campaign, the Implementer Gammal team was exposed to new
organizations. The launch provider was Supplier Rhol. Implementer Gammal also signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Nation Rho. The launch was shared by
several other customers including a Supplier from Nation Omega. The Nation Gamma team had
contact with the other customers as they all prepared their satellites just prior to launch.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
Implementer Gammal was established at the beginning of the GammaSat-R1 project, so
choosing engineers for the project was also a process of choosing new employees. Some of the
key factors Implementer Gammal considered were the applicant's majors - which need to be
relevant some satellite discipline - and their interest in the topic. In addition, at least some of the
new hires needed to be willing and able to work in Nation Tau for long periods. Implementer
Gammal specifically chose to work with "fresh people" that were not already proven as experts.
They hired recent graduates in order to "develop them from the start." Implementer Gammal
only hired people from Nation Gamma in order to develop local knowledge. Leaders at Supplier
Taul shared the Implementer Gammal philosophy of hiring young, less experienced engineers.
In hiring for Supplier Taul, leadership targeted less experienced engineers that were recently
graduated and assumed that it would take 1 to 2 years to help them become effective engineers.
"I prefer less experienced people, especially newly graduated people.. .We can train them. Even
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if they study deeper or they have experience in a specific field, we have to train them. Unless
they have experience in a satellite development company, we have to train them." As
Implementer Gammal recruited new engineers to join for the GammaSat-R1 project, the
leadership used word of mouth to let possible candidates know about the opportunity. The
primary way that engineers learned they could apply to Implementer Gammal was from a friend
that was affiliated with the organization or knew someone there. Some Implementer Gammal
engineers sent in an application or CV to show their interest and were interviewed by phone or in
person.
What was the background of the engineers that joined the project?
True to their philosophy, Implementer Gammal hired many engineers directly as they graduated
from university for the GammaSat-R1 project. For most, Implementer Gammal was their first
full time job, although some had short term experiences in other organizations. Many of the new
Implementer Gammal engineers studied at local universities; some universities located in Nation
Gamma have strong international ties. Most of the new hires to Implementer Gammal for
GammaSat-R1 did not have substantial work experience, but some had training that was
particularly suited to some aspect of their work on the satellite. The hiring policy of Implementer
Gammal was purposefully narrow because of their vision to benefit the technological capability
of the local people. They only hired Nation Gamma nationals, which made up a minority of the
population. From this perspective, the hiring pool for qualified engineers that were also Nation
Gamma nationals was small.
How was a firm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training? How was the
launch provider selected?
Implementer Gammal considered a variety of suppliers for their satellite and training project.
Some of these suppliers made visits to Implementer Gammal for dialog during the selection
process. The key attributes that caused them to choose Supplier Taul were their flexibility with
the technical product they were willing to sell and their level of depth with the technology
transfer. Supplier Taul distinguished themselves from other suppliers that had less flexibility in
the specifications they would offer in their satellites. Supplier Taul also was willing to provide
"in-depth" technology transfer. In addition to the technology requirements, Implementer
Gammal sought a competitive price and a timeline that fit their needs. The experience of the
Nation Alpha team with Supplier Taul also helped that firm win the contract. The Implementer
Gammal decision makers liked the fact that Nation Alpha engineers were able to participate
directly in the project work and contribute to the design of AlphaSat-R2. Implementer Gammal
sought a partner that they could work with over multiple projects in a long term partnership.
They also appreciated that the offer by Supplier Taul included an effort to help them adjust to
the new society in Nation Tau. Implementer Gammal selected the launch provider directly - this
was not done by Supplier Taul on their behalf A professor with ties to Nation Gamma, but
based in a different country served as a consultant and helped Implementer Gammal make the
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launch provider and satellite supplier selections. The Implementer Gammal team contacted all
the potential launch providers that they saw as relevant to small satellites. This included about
six to ten companies and governments from around the world. As Implementer Gammal
compared the proposals of these companies, they compared them in terms of price, the technical
reliability of the launch vehicle and the launch schedule. They ultimately selected a service
provider that operated shared launches of a group of small satellites. The launch was shared with
five other satellites owned by organizations from four countries.
Where was the team located and how did they transition?
During the GammaSat-R1 project, the Implementer Gammal project team was generally split.
Part of the team was based in Nation Gamma to work on the terrestrial aspects of the GammaSat-
RI system, including the ground station to communicate with the satellite and the system for
processing information from the satellite. The team that worked on satellite engineering was
nominally based in Nation Tau from project Year 2 through Project Year 5. These engineers
traveled back and forth between Nation Gamma and Nation Tau as needed. At times, they
attended to organizational meetings or family commitments in Nation Gamma, but they spent the
majority of their time in Nation Tau. As one engineer summarized, "We go [to Nation Tau] for
three to four months and come back [to Nation Gamma]. We try to finish most of the work there
and meet the schedule for each milestone. We don't want to miss any milestones there. When we
are here we communicate with [Supplier Taul] over email. It is convenient for us to do that. We
do not want to miss any phase." Implementer Gammal engineers were hired at different times
and made their initial trips to Nation Tau on individual schedules. Some of the early hires started
working at Implementer Gammal in Project Year 1 and moved to Nation Tau for the first time in
Project Year 2. Another set of engineers was hired in Project Year 2 and moved to Nation Tau
later in the same year. Other individuals were hired in Project Year 4 and moved to Nation Tau
for a long term stay in Project Year 5. These are just some examples of the individual hiring and
moving schedules; engineers were hired in throughout the project.
What were the roles of the engineers based at the supplier location and the engineers based at
the home location?
Implementer Gammal took the primary responsibility to make assignments of Nation Gamma
engineers to specific discipline areas. Supplier Taul provided recommendations about the
minimum requirements in terms of degrees. The training from Supplier Taul focused on satellite
design rather than manufacturing of items such as electronics boards. Implementer Gammal felt
that it would be feasible to outsource those types of tasks and find technicians in Nation Gamma
to execute them. Implementer Gammal considered the limitations on what they could learn
given their finite schedule and personnel resources. Implementer Gammal acknowledged that
they would need a larger team of engineers working on a longer program to get more in-depth
technology training. Implementer Gammal chose, however, to do more frequent, shorter projects
in order to have more launching events. This approach satisfied stakeholders that wanted to see
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frequent results. With regard to personnel limitations, Supplier Taul encouraged Implementer
Gammal to choose their training areas strategically. Supplier Taul suggested that Implementer
Gammal assign the engineers to focus on areas that are less available on the world market. The
pioneering team of Implementer Gammal engineers was assigned to roles in the areas of optics,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and computer science.
The roles held by each engineer from Implementer Gammal were influenced by hiring date. The
veterans that were hired in Project Year 1 and Project Year 2 had more substantial opportunities
to contribute to GammaSat-R1 and take on leadership positions. For example, one engineer was
hired in Project Year 1. He first worked as a trainee in the area of optical payload and was based
in Nation Tau. In Project Year 3, he was asked to lead the space activities within Implementer
Gammal. He transitioned to being based at Implementer Gammal in Nation Gamma and
focused on management. A second engineer was also a veteran that helped define Implementer
Gammal in Project Year 1 and 2. He initially served as a software engineer focused on attitude
control for GammaSat-Ri. He was later invited to serve as deputy under the lead for the space
activities. He continued his technical work and still spent time in Nation Tau. He also became the
Team Leader for the Implementer Gammal Software Team. A third veteran that was hired in
Project Year 1 to help establish Implementer Gammal, focused his technical work on software
engineering for the onboard software within the satellite. One engineer was hired in Project Year
3 and took on leadership of the ground-based systems for GammaSat-Ri. He pioneered and led a
small team that prepared to operate the satellite once it was launched. This team also had the role
to receive, process and distribute imagery that was taken by the satellite. This team's job
included participation in the installation of the antenna system to communicate with the satellite
on the Implementer Gammal property.
What roles did engineers play upon return to home location?
When GammaSat-RI launched in Project Year 5, the Implementer Gammal team had already
agreed with Supplier Taul to work together on a second collaborative project to build
GammaSat-R2. Thus, the overall schedule continued of some Implementer Gammal engineers
working primarily at Supplier Taul and spending the majority of their time in Nation Tau.
Facilities
The Implementer Gammal team was based in a small office building of several stories just
outside a major city in Nation Gamma. This was the first building for the new organization and
did not yet have all of characteristics that the team would eventually require. During the
GammaSat-RI project, Implementer Gammal had limited laboratory facilities for hardware
work within their location in Nation Gamma. They did not have laboratories for manufacturing
satellite components or assembling satellite systems. During the GammaSat-R1 project, they did
set up a ground station for satellite operations and to receive and process the satellite images.
They also worked with Supplier Taul to transfer a model of GammaSat-R1 from Nation Tau to
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Nation Gamma. This model had the functionality of the real satellite. They set up the functional
satellite model within their offices at Implementer Gammal and connected it to the ground
station system. This allowed them to check the operation of the ground system before launch the
launch of the satellite. The primary ground station for GammaSat-R1 was in Nation Gamma at
the Implementer Gammal facility. It included the antenna system, Mission Control Station and
Image Receiving and Processing. The Implementer Gammal team spent about one month
installing and testing it. Two engineers from Supplier Lambda2 and eight Engineers from
Implementer Gammal worked together to install the ground station and perform Onsite
Acceptance Testing. Also, four Implementer Gammal engineers went to Supplier Lambda2 for
orientation and training for their ground systems. Those Implementer Gammal engineers who
were based in Nation Tau at the time came to Nation Gamma to help install the ground station.
The engineers from Supplier Taul were not as involved, although a manager of Supplier Taul
went to Nation Gamma for the installation of the ground station at Implementer Gammal. The
steps to set up the ground station included site surveys, defining power requirements, checking
for obstacles to signal quality, building the foundation, laying cables in a trench, setting up a
backup generator, choosing a location for indoor equipment. The team worked long days (6am
to 6pm) to complete the project (instead of their normal schedule of ending at 2pm). The
Implementer Gammal team learned the equipment during the installation process so well that
they could address many of the maintenance issues themselves, although they called Supplier
Lambda2 when needed.
In addition to the ground station in Nation Gamma, Implementer Gammal worked with a
company from Nation Kappa (Supplier Kappal) that operated an antenna farm in North and
South Poles. Implementer Gammal bought access to some of these antenna and they had spare
capacity so they have resold some of that access to a customer. They provide satellite operations
service for that customer.
GammaSat-Ri was taken through environmental testing in Nation Tau using facilities owned by
the Nation Tau government. Supplier Tau 1 did not have these facilities internally.
Training
This section describes preparation for training and training activities at the Supplier firm.
What preparation did trainees have in home country before leaving for supplier location?
The Implementer Gammal engineers transitioned to work at Supplier Taul at unique times.
There was not a specific training program in Implementer Gammal to prepare them for the work
at Supplier Taul. The veterans that were hired in Project Year 1 had the formative experience of
helping define the technology transfer goals and select the satellite supplier for departing for
training. They did some independent study about space as part of this process. Engineers that
were hired later had weeks or months to work at Implementer Gammal before departing for
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Nation Tau. Most did not have previous exposure to space technology. They worked
independently to review material about the Implementer Gammal project or read related books.
Sometimes more experienced Implementer Gammal engineers provided informal explanations
or tutoring.
What happened during the transition to the supplier location (logistics, orientation)?
The Implementer Gammal engineers moved from Nation Gamma to Nation Tau as individuals
or in small groups throughout the GammaSat-R1 project. When Implementer Gammal engineers
arrived in Nation Tau to work with Supplier Taul, the company helped them arrange housing
and logistics. The housing was in a group of apartments located near each other; each apartment
was shared by three to four engineers. Supplier Taul hired a specific person to the visiting
engineers and make logistical arrangements for them. The visiting Nation Gamma engineers had
access to cars that they shared - one for each apartment.
What training approaches were used?
The training aspects of the GammaSat-R1 project included technical lectures, non-technical
training sessions, mentor assignments, access to learning resources (i.e. books, paper and
conference events), hands on training tasks, and on the job training as part of developing
GammaSat-R1. These were the general approaches; they were slightly varied in some cases. For
the engineers that were hired near the end of GammaSat-R1 with a focus on contributing to
GammaSat-R2, the training was less structured. Supplier Taul provided many of the Nation
Gamma engineers with training lectures and technical presentations. They also had them do
activities in mathematics and physics. The lectures were about space technology and space
activity in Nation Tau. The lectures were not highly academic, but they contained new
information. The lectures covered topics such the company profile of Supplier Taul, information
about the space environment, and the various types of satellites and missions. They included an
overview of satellites and how they work and some information about the subsystems. The
lecture portion of the training was for less than a month. It was introductory material that helped
the Nation Gamma engineers learn about what satellites are, what they can do and what the
different sections of satellite are. In addition to the technology-oriented lectures, Supplier Taul
provided some of the Implementer Gammal engineers with training in non-technical subjects
including leadership, time management and communication. "These things are also involved in
space - how to manage and deal with people, how to know how to communicate in conferences.
This is also important. We are trying to maximize the way we work," said one Nation Gamma
engineer. Supplier Taul invited professors from Nation Tau and international universities to give
presentations and training on leadership, communication and team work. The training also
included cultural sensitivity and how to communicate with people from different parts of the
world. The training facilitator put people in small teams and had them elect a leader and execute
a task. The Nation Gamma engineers found it to be unique training that they had not seen before.
Several types of resources were available to facilitate independent learning on the part of the
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Nation Gamma engineers - such as books, papers and conference events. Textbooks and industry
reference books for the various specialties within satellite engineering were provided by both
Implementer Gammal and Supplier Taul. The Nation Gamma engineers found it helpful to refer
to both books and the internet to learn theoretical information. They also found guidance on
techniques for using software languages. The Nation Gamma engineers could access technical
papers easily as well. A number of the Nation Gamma engineers attended conferences during the
GammaSat-R1 project. Different engineers attended general space conferences as well as
specialized meetings on specific aspects of satellite engineering. Most of the conferences were
international meetings outside of Nation Tau. Some of the Nation Gamma engineers were able to
present papers at these meetings. The ground station team based at Implementer Gammal
worked hard to present many papers at the meetings of a relevant international society during the
GammaSat-R1 project years. The training lectures, readings and conference events provided a
foundation for more hands on learning by the Implementer Gammal engineers in Nation Tau.
They worked on technical training tasks and worked under their Supplier Taul mentors to do on-
the-job training while contributing to GammaSat-RI. Each engineer was assigned to particular
subsystem team within Supplier Taul. In the beginning the Nation Gamma engineers worked on
simplified tasks to help them learn about satellite technology. During this phase, they also used
independent reading and studying to learn the basic methods of their subsystem team. This was
preparation for getting directly involved with their subsystem work. Overtime, the Nation Tau
and Nation Gamma engineers worked more directly together and shared tasks for the
GammaSat-RI project.
How did trainee engineers interact with mentors?
Supplier Taul engineers were assigned as mentors for the Implementer Gammal engineers, as
part of the training experience. Each mentor was chosen because they were highly qualified by
experience or education. The Nation Gamma engineers were invited to work closely with these
Nation Tau colleagues. One Supplier Taul engineer described his approach to mentoring as
trying to involve the trainees in the tasks he was doing and to explain the types of challenges he
faced. He would also explain the proposed solutions they were trying. He gave the trainee some
specific responsibility, such as for the completion of one segment of the satellite subsystem.
Another engineer from Supplier Taul was a mentor for several engineers from Implementer
Gammal during GammaSat-R1. In his approach to mentoring, he first tried to understand what
the trainee was interested in and then he directed the trainee to focus on some specific part of the
system. The Implementer Gammal engineers found the Nation Tau team at Supplier Taul to be
open with sharing information; they made themselves available as mentors. Sometimes
Implementer Gammal engineers were mentored by multiple Supplier Taul engineers. As one
example, a Nation Gamma engineer was assigned an official mentor, but he worked with and
received support from at least three people regularly - a supervisor, an advisor and an engineer
he partnered with. Some mentors helped the Nation Gamma engineers outside of work with
issues such as communication, activities and purchases. The Nation Gamma engineers generally
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shared office space with their mentors from Supplier Taul in the small supplier facility.
Depending on the personal style and project needs, they had both formal and informal meeting
schedules between mentors and mentees. The work assignments and accountability system for
the Nation Gamma engineers was informal and driven by the project activities.
Policy, Social and Cultural Issues
Implementer Gammal dealt with both national and international policy issues during the
GammaSat-R1 project. The national issues related to establishing Implementer Gammal as a
government organization and receiving government approval and funding for the program in
space. At a high level, the Nation Gamma policy makers recognized that some of the value for
the satellite projects came from the technology training experience during the project. They did
not wait to see if GammaSat-R1 launched successfully before funding the next generation
GammaSat-R2. Even though Implementer Gammal was officially under a regional government,
the team saw it as a national program. Internationally, Implementer Gammal addressed issues
such as ITAR and ITU requirements. Implementer Gammal learned how to do the ITU
frequency registration and they worked with the national regulatory body for
telecommunications that handles such issues. Implementer Gammal did not go directly to ITU,
but worked through the national telecommunication regulatory. This regulator had experience
because they did registration for other satellites owned by operators in Nation Gamma. There
were international trade restrictions that influenced the parts sourced for GammaSat-Ri. This
was not a major barrier, but did affect some aspects of the design.
Implementer Gammal was a nationally defined team that was committed to execute GammaSat-
RI and other projects for the benefit of Nation Gamma. The engineers expressed a sense of pride
to contribute to their country. Because Implementer Gammal chose to primarily hire recent
graduates for the GammaSat-R1 project, the characteristics of the Nation Gamma education
system were influential on the program. The Implementer Gammal engineers had a variety of
experiences for their primary, secondary and tertiary education. The national system of primary
education in the Nation Gamma has a common curriculum for all students. The language of
instruction is the local language, but an international language is taught as a second language.
Several of the Implementer Gammal engineers attended such national primary schools. There
are also international primary schools where international languages are the primary medium.
For secondary schools in the Nation Gamma system, students are taught in the local language
and they have the opportunity to choose whether to focus on arts or science. There are also
international secondary schools based on various systems. There are both local and
internationally affiliated universities in the Nation Gamma; both tend to teach primarily in an
international language. The Nation Gamma government also offered scholarships for some
students to study abroad in advanced countries. The engineers that went to work in Implementer
Gammal represented all of these different educational paths. It was common for university
students to do short internships during school breaks in the Nation Gamma. The universities in
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the Nation Gamma did not specifically train in space technology, although there were majors in
aerospace engineering and remote sensing. There were Bachelor and Masters programs in
Remote Sensing and GIS, but they are stronger in GIS than remote sensing. So people are more
trained in how to use data than in how to generate it.
The Implementer Gammal engineers moved to Nation Tau and some lived there for several
years during the GammaSat-R1 project. The Implementer Gammal engineers had a variety of
initial impressions to life in Nation Tau. Some found that they adapted well to life in Nation Tau
and enjoyed living there. Others felt that they experienced culture shock, but also looked forward
to the challenge of learning about an unfamiliar place. Some of the major differences that the
Implementer Gammal engineers faced in Nation Tau were moving to a smaller city, eating new
food, dealing with a language barrier and facing a culture where the Nation Gamma religion was
not common. In Implementer Gammal, the working language was flexible. People wrote
documents in both local and international languages, according to their preference. In Supplier
Taul, the Nation Tau engineers use their national language among themselves and they initially
relied on an international language to speak to the engineers from Nation Gamma. They also
offered Nation Tau language classes to help the Implementer Gammal engineers adapt to life in
Nation Tau. In terms of work culture Supplier Taul was not very hierarchical or formal,
although they did have useful, systematic methods. The Implementer Gammal engineers did
need to adjust to a very different work schedule. At Supplier Taul, they worked longer hours and
had different days off. The Nation Gamma and Nation Tau teams sometimes interacted socially
outside of work. They may have meals together or play sports.
9.4 Nation Delta
This section summarizes the DeltaSat-R2 project, which was a partnership with Supplier Sigmal.
Initiation and Approval of Satellite Project
In preparation for the DeltaSat-R2 project, Nation Delta investigated both the needs of the data
user community and the potential sources from which to buy a satellite. Starting three years
before signing the contract with Supplier Sigmal, Implementer Deltal held a series of
workshops for the user community. The documents produced through the workshops contained
mission requirements for the data which the satellite should produce to address the needs of
potential users. In order to understand the options for procurement of the satellite, Nation Delta
conducted a survey, during which government officials traveled to visit space related
organizations in other countries. Ultimately, Supplier Sigmal was selected as the prime
contractor, and a contract was signed between Implementer Deltal and Supplier Sigmal.
The Project Team
This section describes the roles of organizations and personnel in the project.
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Which Organizations were involved with the project and how were they related?
Implementer Deltal played a leadership role within Nation Delta on matters pertaining to
geospatial information, including satellite data. For example, Implementer Deltal was the
secretariat for the Nation Delta government's national committee on Geographic Information
Systems. For the DeltaSat-R2 project, Implementer Deltal worked with Supplier Sigmal as the
prime contractor. Supplier Sigmal's role was to manage the official interactions with
subcontractors for satellite hardware, ground systems and for launch. While the Nation Delta
trainee engineers were in Nation Sigma, they sometimes interacted with subcontracting
companies as part of their training experience. The Nation Delta engineers were not the only
trainee team at Supplier Sigmal at the time; there were also engineers from several other
customer countries. The Nation Delta engineers did not have much interaction with these fellow
trainees. They did not have social activities in common and they were kept separate in their work
stations. Once satellite was launched, the DeltaSat-R2 team worked closely with the section
within Implementer Deltal that process data. These groups provided an interface between the
DeltaSat-R2 operation team and the end users of DeltaSat-R2 data.
How were local engineers selected to join the project?
When Implementer Deltal embarked on the DeltaSat-R2 project, it did not have personnel with a
background in satellite technology. As discussed above, only one university in Nation Delta had
a program focused on satellite technology. There were related degrees available at some Nation
Delta universities, covering topics such as aerospace engineering (with a focus on aeronautics),
telecommunication and satellite data applications. Implementer Deltal chose to hire a new team
of engineers to experience the training at Supplier Sigmal and work as the core satellite
operation team. The hiring experiences of the twenty Nation Delta trainees were all slightly
different. From the leadership perspective, the approach was to recruit broadly using internet and
other mass media. They asked applicants to submit applications and they conducted a series of
interviews. Representatives from Implementer Deltal, Supplier Sigmal and the Nation Sigma
Embassy participated in the interviews. The applicants were not given exams; they were
evaluated based on their educational backgrounds and majors. The three engineers that
represented the Nation Delta military were selected through a unique process. They had to take a
test to be selected. Eighteen of the twenty engineers for the DeltaSat-R2 team did not work for
Implementer Deltal before the satellite project. They came from a variety of previous
experiences, but they generally had limited exposure to space technology. Some had recently
completed graduate school abroad; some were in military organizations; and some were working
in domestic industry. Implementer Deltal leadership sought to hire engineers with work
experience or with graduate study, rather than graduates fresh from their first degrees.
How was afirm selected as the supplier for the satellite system and training?
A committee representing several organizations in Nation Delta worked to select the supplier for
DeltaSat-R2. Nation Delta representatives considered other potential suppliers and visited
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international space facilities as part of the selection process and feasibility studies. Supplier
Sigmal was found to be a trustworthy supplier because of their experience with previous high
resolution earth observation satellites.
How was the launch provider selected?
As Prime Contractor, Supplier Sigmal provided launch services and managed the relationship
with the launch service provider on behalf of Implementer Deltal. During the project, there was
a need to change from one launch vehicle to another due to challenges faced by the launch
vehicle manufacturer. There was no major impact on the satellite from this change as DeltaSat-
R2 was initially designed to be compatible with both launch vehicles.
Where was the team located and how did they transition?
Twenty engineers from Nation Delta spent almost two years in Nation Sigma at Supplier Sigma 1
between Project Year 2 and Project Year 4. The team of 20 arrived in Nation Sigma two batches
because of their hiring times. They left Nation Sigma in several batches, according to their role
in operations. Personnel from Supplier Sigmal also visited Nation Delta. During the year
between the return of the Nation Delta trainees and launch, a Supplier Sigmal team worked in
Nation Delta to set up and commission the satellite operation system.
What were the roles of the trainee engineers while at the supplier location?
While the 20 engineers from Nation Delta were in Nation Sigma, they were assigned to specific
roles within a technical team. These roles would eventually form the basis for their
responsibilities as operators back in Nation Delta. The specific roles were chosen based on
Supplier Sigmal's conventional team structure. The Nation Delta engineers were placed in their
positions based on their educational background and experience, with some input from the
engineer where possible. It included positions such as satellite manager, system engineer and
subsystem specialists such as Mechanical, AOCS (Attitude and Orbit Control System), Power,
Thermal, Software and Payload. A satellite manager has the job of coordinating and monitoring
the work of all the satellite subsystem engineers. The Systems engineer is concerned with the
interfaces in the whole system, including the spacecraft and the ground station. As the two year
training period came to an end, the team roles were re-defined to focus on operations. Another
responsibility of the trainee engineers was to be the monitoring team on behalf of Implementer
Deltal to ensure that Supplier Sigmal provided a strong product. There was a committee of
engineers that advised Implementer Deltal management.
What roles did engineers play upon return to home location?
During Launch and Early Operations, Supplier Sigmal personnel led the technical activities and
the Implementer Deltal team supported them. After about 2 months, the spacecraft was handed
over to Implementer Deltal and the core engineers began practicing their new operational roles
independently.
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Facilities
Supplier Sigmal owned and operated all the fabrication and testing facilities used for DeltaSat-
R2. Supplier Sigmal installed several new facilities in Nation Delta as part of the DeltaSat-R2
project. While the trainee engineers were still in Nation Sigma, Supplier Sigmal started building
up the satellite control rooms and receiving dishes. When the Implementer Deltal engineers
returned from Nation Sigma, much of the ground system infrastructure was already in place.
Implementer Deltal initially intended to put the DeltaSat-R2 Ground Control Station in its
facility in a major Nation Delta city. Later it was found that another location was needed in order
to avoid communication frequency interference with the nearby airport. The Ground Control
Station and antenna were installed in a small Nation Delta city about 150 km from the main
Implementer Deltal facility. A secondary Implementer Deltal facility was established in this
smaller city to host the Ground Control Station. The antenna for receiving imagery was installed
at Implementer Deltal's primary facility. Nation Delta also bought access to a polar antenna
farm in the far north that provided additional access to the satellite.
Training
This section describes the preparation for training and the training activities at the Supplier Firm.
What preparation did trainees have in home country before leaving for supplier location?
Some of the new hires for the DeltaSat-R2 training team had several months after they started
working for Implementer Deltal before they moved to Nation Sigma. A few were hired later and
went to Nation Sigma immediately. Before leaving for Nation Sigma, most engineers prepared
by reviewing technical documents and taking an introductory Nation Delta language course.
What training approaches were used?
During their time in Nation Sigma working at Supplier Sigmal, the Nation Delta trainee
engineers experienced various phases of training activities, each with a different emphasis. The
first phase focused on lecture-based courses; next the whole team worked on a group project. In
the third phase, each engineer worked with a mentor for On-the-Job Training (OJT) which
included observation of integration work or subcontractor facilities in some cases. The last phase
of the training focused on operations. Throughout the project, some of the engineers also had
oversight responsibility for Supplier Sigmal on behalf of Implementer Deltal.
The first phase of training used lecture-based courses to introduce the Nation Delta engineers to
satellite technology. These courses were offered as part of an academic curriculum regularly
presented by Supplier Sigmal. The team arrived in the middle of Project Year 2, and the
coursework extended for 9 months. The first 3 months included basic courses on satellite
engineering and the space environment. Then there were 6 months of advanced courses on
specific satellite subsystems. Everyone attended all the courses, even though they would later be
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specializing on particular subsystem or team roles. The Nation Delta engineers took exams on
the course material. The format and difficulty level of the exams varied.
The Nation Delta engineers completed the basic and advanced courses around the end of 2005.
They next entered into a four month group design project. For the group project, Supplier
Sigmal gave the trainee team the assignment to do an initial design for a remote sensing satellite
that was based on the DeltaSat-R2 design. Supplier Sigmal acted as the customer in this scenario
and provided requirements to the Nation Delta team. Supplier Sigmal also provided technical
assistance. The Nation Delta trainees organized themselves into a team based on their
disciplinary assignments On-the-Job Training. The outcomes of the project were a presentation
and design document. During the project, the group applied part of the project review cycle
utilized by Supplier Sigmal. They presented for three design reviews. At the last review the team
delivered a final report including a data package and presentation. The scope of the design work
included selecting an orbit, choosing the satellite architecture, designing a ground segment and
choosing a launcher. The DeltaSat-R2 design was used as a baseline but the payloads were
slightly different. The team focused first on understanding the DeltaSat-R2 design and proposed
modifications to fit the new requirements.
After the group design project, the Nation Delta trainees started the On-the-Job Training phase at
Supplier Sigma1. Each Nation Delta trainee was assigned to one or more mentors from a
particular subsystem team or specialty role. During this phase, each engineer had a unique
experience based on the type of work they were assigned by their mentor. Overall, the Nation
Delta team was seen as a customer needing training, not as a joint engineering partner. Most
mentors assigned their trainees to do specific hardware or software tasks, but these tasks were
primarily training assignments that did not contribute directly to completing the satellite projects.
Some Nation Delta engineers had the opportunity to participate in Assembly, Integration and
Testing for DeltaSat-R2, such as the thermal, vibration and shock tests. The OJT experience was
a mix of hands on work and observation. In some cases Nation Delta trainees visited clean
rooms, toured labs, observe how Supplier Sigmal interacted with external manufacturers, or
visited subcontractor facilities.
The final phase of the training in Nation Sigma was focused on operations. The operational
training continued when the Nation Delta trainee team returned to Nation Delta. For a few
months before leaving Nation Sigma, Supplier Sigmal team helped the Nation Delta trainees
transition into an operations team. They taught the Nation Delta engineers how to use the
Supplier Sigmal operations hardware and software. A key part of the training focused on
responding to unexpected behavior by the satellite. The Supplier Sigmal engineers taught the
Nation Delta team to carefully assess any problem on the satellite before taking action. They also
introduced the standard procedures for responding to common problems. To test the learning of
the Nation Delta team, they used a simulation system that mimicked the satellite. For about one
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year after the trainee team returned to Nation Delta, the training continued. Two Supplier Sigmal
employees stayed in Nation Delta for that year and provided the Operation Qualification, which
certified the Nation Delta engineers to operate DeltaSat-R2.
Throughout the time in Nation Sigma, the trainee team had an additional responsibility that
influenced their workload. They were the on-sight representatives of Implementer Deltal as a
customer to Supplier Sigmal. They were tasked to provide technical oversight of the DeltaSat-
R2 project and to provide recommendations to Implementer Deltal management about concerns.
Specifically, the trainee team reviewed documents produced by Supplier Sigmal for project
milestones and reviews. There were also documents to review regarding the launch provider. The
trainees assisted the Implementer Deltal Inspection Committee by reviewing these technical
documents and issuing formal questions for Supplier Sigmal with requests for clarification or
further actions.
The Nation Delta trainee team received support from Supplier Sigmal in social and cultural
activities. Supplier Sigmal arranged for them to be offered classes in the Nation Sigma language
and to participate in several tourist trips. These activities and the whole training package were
organized by a specific person designated as the Supplier Sigmal Training Manager. In some
cases the Nation Delta engineers also spent time socially with their mentors from the Supplier
Sigmal team. Throughout the two year training experience, Implementer Deltal management
monitored the progress of the Nation Delta trainees via weekly and monthly reports. The Nation
Delta leadership also attended some of the presentations and reviews in both Nation Sigma and
Nation Delta.
How did trainee engineers interact with mentors?
A central aspect of the OJT experience was the relationship between the Nation Delta trainees
and their Supplier Sigmal mentors. Each Nation Delta trainee was assigned to work one or more
mentors. This assignment reflected the area of specialty that they were learning. Mentors had
flexibility in how they assigned tasks; mentors also defined the expectations for how work was
achieved.
Policy, Cultural, Social Issues
This section describes domestic and international policy concerns and cultural or social issues
during the project.
Where there domestic policy concerns for supplier or implementer?
In terms of trade policy, the Nation Delta government sought to achieve a balance of trade as
they procured the satellite. They made an agreement that Nation Sigma would purchase
agricultural products throughout the project period. The purchases from Nation Sigma were
intended to off-set the cost of the satellite project. Once DeltaSat-R2 was launched, the
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Implementer Deltal team felt an urgency to demonstrate the usefulness of the project in order to
ensure government support for future projects. The cost of the DeltaSat-R2 project was high
relative to Implementer Deltal's traditional budget.
Where there international policy concerns?
International policy issues led to a launch delay. Two countries that were involved with the
launch had a disagreement about range safety for the launch operations. The dispute was
happening while DeltaSat-R2 was loaded into the launch vehicle. Supplier Sigmal took the lead
in managing this problem, with support from the Nation Delta and Nation Sigma governments.
How did cultural, social and regional issues impact project?
The Nation Delta trainee engineers faced social and cultural transitions when they were brought
together and hired to work on DeltaSat-R2. The project involved three languages - the local
language of Nation Delta, the local language of Nation Sigma and the international language in
which the Implementer Deltal and Supplier Sigmal teams worked together. Most Nation Delta
engineers spoke the international language secondarily and had little or no experience with the
local language of Nation Sigma. The working language of Supplier Sigmal was officially an
international language, but the setting around the company was dominated by the local Nation
Sigma language. The Nation Delta engineers studied the Nation Sigma language for a few
months, but the course only provided an introduction to the language. The trainees did not use
the Nation Sigma language for advanced conversation or engineering work. The Nation Delta
engineers had different levels of skill in speaking the international working language. Those that
were less confident struggled initially. Some of the Nation Delta engineers had already lived and
studied abroad; for them the transition was easier. Overall, there were some language challenges
because both teams had to operate in a second language in order to collaborate.
The team of Nation Delta engineers was newly formed for the DeltaSat-R2 project. As they
entered the foreign setting of Supplier Sigmal, they did not yet have a rapport for working
together effectively. This caused challenges in their team dynamics. The Nation Delta team
sometimes asked the Supplier Sigmal team to intervene and help address team relationship
challenges.
10 Appendix B: Interview Material
This Appendix provides the interview questions used for Implementer and Supplier
Representatives. The questions shown here make up the complete list of potential questions.
During each interview, the actual set of questions was tailored to the individuals. Based on the
individual's description of their career path and responsibilities, the relevant questions were
selected from the larger set.
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10.1 Interview Questions for Implementer Representatives
Part A: Introduction
1. Please describe your current position and responsibilities within your organization. What
are the duties of your position?
2. How long have you worked for your organization? How did you come to work for your
organization?
3. What is your educational background? Please tell us about your formal academic
training.
4. Please tell us about your career path. (if necessary)
5. What was your role in the satellite project?
6. Did you have any other responsibilities outside of that role for your organization?
7. How did the project compare with your previous work or educational experiences? In
what ways was it similar or different?
8. Which organizations were involved in the project? How would you describe the roles of
each organization?
9. As part of your work on the project, did you interact directly with the supplier or other
firms?
10. Please describe your work activities in the supplier nation.
a. Did you have a primary mentor or point of contact within the supplier firm?
b. Where you working in the supplier nation?
11. What expectations did you have for working with the firm? Would you say your
expectations were fully met, partially met or not met at all? Why do you say so?
Part B: Capability Building Process
12. What were the objectives of the technology transfer aspects of the project?
13. What methods were used to address and monitor these objectives?
14. How did your work activities change during different phases of the satellite project?
15. What was the project review cycle? How was it implemented? What role did you play
during project reviews?
16. What teams at the supplier firm did you work closely with during the project?
17. What are some examples of your accomplishments during the satellite project
individually?
18. What accomplishments did you see at the ....Small team level? Large group level?
19. From your perspective, what were the primary needs that your organization sought to
address by executing the satellite project? In other words, what benefits does the satellite
project provide?
20. Now that the satellite is nearly finished being built, please think back to the beginning of
the project. What aspects of the project surprised your or changed drastically since the
beginning?
21. Do you think the satellite project was risky - either financially, technically or in other
ways? Why or why not?
22. From your perspective, what aspects of the satellite project went very well? Why do you
think they were so successful?
23. From your perspective, what aspects of the satellite project did not meet your
expectations? Why do you think they were less successful?
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24. Is there anything else you want to tell us about the satellite project?
Part C: Architecture & Context of the Project
25. Did your organization consider other methods besides the satellite projects to address
national goals? In your opinion, did the satellite project provide the desired benefits? Do
you think the satellite project was the best way to provide these benefits?
26. Was there a particular person or small team of people that took the lead in shaping the
satellite project and making key, early decisions?
27. Were you involved with the decision to execute the satellite project? Which people and
organizations were involved with making the decision to execute the project? What role
did you play in the decision making process?
28. Were you involved with the decision to work with the firms that participated in the
project?
a. Which people and organizations were involved with making the decision to work
with the firm? What role did you play in the decision making process?
b. What were the major motivations for working with this firm?
c. Were there any areas of concern about working with this firm? Please tell us more
about them.
d Were other firms considered? How was the final decision made?
29. Within your country, were there any regulatory issues that have influenced the execution
of the satellite project or the formation of the space agency? Were there any regulatory
issues involved with working with the firms?
30. What has been the political context surrounding the satellite project?
31. Did you see any impacts to the project from the global economic environment in general?
How about the global economic environment for space technology?
32. Are there any features of your country's natural environment that motivated or influenced
the satellite project?
33. Are there other government agencies or private enterprises in your country that are
concerned with space technology?
34. What are the long term goals of the space agency? How does this satellite project fit into
the long term goals?
35. Let's talk about the community that will use the satellite data generated by the project.
a. What kinds of organizations are included in the user community? Will you please
give some specific examples?
b. How were these potential users included in the execution of the satellite project?
36. Please describe operations for the satellite.
a. What role did the firm play in satellite operations?
b. Were there any new facilities or pieces of equipment required to do satellite
operations here?
c. What is the funding source for satellite operations? Is it the same as for the
satellite itself?
d. How does the funding for operations compare to the satellite?
37. Please describe the overall structure of your organization.
a. Why is it structured this way? What is the logic behind it?
b. Do you have documentation about the organizational structure, such as an
organizational chart?
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c. In your opinion, is the space agency organization more hierarchical (meaning it
has many vertical levels and a clearly defined chain of authority) or horizontal
(meaning that it has few vertical levels and many divisions with equal authority)?
38. What are the 3 to 5 most important activities executed by the space agency? How would
you describe the teams or groups that execute these important activities?
39. Who are the individuals with whom you work mostly closely in the space agency?
a. What are their positions in the space agency?
b. Do you work primarily with people in similar or different sections of the space
agency than yours?
c. What method did you usually use to interact with them - did you connect with
them via email, phone, or in-person meetings perhaps?
40. What are the top 3 to 5 most important areas of intellectual strength in the space agency?
a. Have these areas changed over time? What effort or choices facilitated this
change?
b. For your specific section of the space agency, are there any areas of knowledge in
which the team wants to grow?
c. What strategies or methods are you using to increase your knowledge in these
areas? How do you feel this is progressing?
41. Does your team share knowledge or information with...
a. Other teams in the space agency? (Please explain)
b. Teams other government offices? (Please explain)
c. Teams in non-government organizations or private companies? (Please explain)
42. Does your team have a particular way to capture or replace knowledge when an
individual leaves the team?
43. Let's talk more about policy making with respect to the space agency. How would you
describe the policy process that facilitates space agency activities?
44. Which government organizations are involved in setting the space agency's budget?
a. What are the specific roles of the individual government organizations?
b. Which government organizations are stakeholders that can influence the agency's
choice of activities?
45. How would you describe the stability of the policy making process for the space agency
since it was founded? Why do you think it happened this way?
46. Have there been any specific political debates surrounding space agency activities? If so,
please explain.
47. How is the military involved with the space agency? Does the military do independent
space activity that does not involve the space agency?
48. How are universities involved with the space agency?
49. Is there anything else that you think we should consider with regard to government policy
and the space agency?
50. Who would you say are the people or organizations that the space agency serves? That is,
who is like the customer for the space agency?
a. What are the needs of these customers?
b. What goals does the space agency set in order to meet these needs?
c. What activities does the space agency do in order to meet these needs?
51. Do you think your country should continue to build and operate satellites?
52. What do you think the space agency should focus on in the future?
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10.2Interview Questions for Supplier Representatives
Part A: Introduction
1. What are your current position and duties in your firm? How long have you held this
position?
2. What is your educational background and career path?
3. Please describe the meetings, deadlines and activities that make up your typical week or
month.
4. In your current position, which other organizations from inside and outside your firm do you
work closely with?
5. Which projects that included training were you involved in? What were your role and
responsibilities in each of these projects?
6. When did you get involved with the project? How long did you continue to work on the
project?
7. Was the project your main assignment at this time?
8. How did working on this project compare with your previous career experiences? In what
ways was it similar or different?
9. Which organizations were involved in the project? What were the roles of each organization?
10. How was the supplier project team organized for this program?
11. Did you interact directly with a client representative in a particular position?
a. What was the position of the people you interacted with most?
b. What media did you usually use to interact with them - did you reach them via
email, phone, or in-person meetings perhaps?
c. What topics did you commonly discuss with your contacts from the client?
d. How does your work with these contacts fit in with the overall project?
Part B: Capability Building Process
12. What was your role in the training aspects of the project?
13. Please describe the components of the training program for the project - such as lectures,
engineering assignments, courses at university, reviews etc.
14. What did you view as the objectives of the training program during the project?
15. What methods were used by the firm to achieve those objectives and to monitor their
achievement?
16. What accomplishments did you observe for the trainee engineers at various levels
a. Individual?
b. Small team?
c. Large group?
17. What expectations did you have for working with the client? Would you say your
expectations were fully met, partially met or not met at all? Why do you say so?
18. From your perspective, what aspects of the satellite project went very well - consider both
the satellite and training aspects? Why do you think they were so successful?
19. From your perspective, what aspects of the satellite project did not go as well - consider both
the satellite and training aspects? Why do you think they were less successful?
20. Do you think the satellite project was risky - either financially, technically or in other ways?
a. (If not...) Please explain why you think it was not risky.
b. (If so...) What aspects of the project made it risky?
21. What would you say were key sources of uncertainty during this project?
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a. (If necessary...) Now that the project is finished, please think back to the beginning
of the project. What aspects of the project surprised your or changed drastically since
the beginning of the project?
22. What were the primary needs that the client sought to address by executing the satellite
project? In other words, what motivated the client to pursue the satellite project?
a. (If necessary...) I'm interested in technical, economic, political, social as well as
other types of motivations.
23. What kinds of organizations are included in the satellite data user community? Please give
some specific examples?
a. How were these potential users (or their interests) included in the execution of the
satellite project?
24. Once the satellite was built, who operated it (Or who will operate it)?
a. What role did your firm play in satellite operations?
b. Were there any new facilities or pieces of equipment required to do satellite
operations?
c. What is the funding source for satellite operations?
i. Is it the same as for the satellite itself?
ii. How does the funding for operations compare to the satellite?
25. How did the complexity of the satellite project align with the competence of the client?
26. [Were there any key technical decisions that drove the complexity, cost or schedule for the
project?
27. Is there anything else you want to tell us about the satellite project?
Upstream and Downstream Influences on the Satellite Project Architecture
28. During your time at the firm have you observed occasions when there were multiple training
teams at the firm during the same time?
a. What were the pros and cons of having multiple teams here simultaneously?
29. Please describe the overall organizational structure of your firm.
a. Why is it structured this way? What is the logic behind it?
30. In your opinion, is your firm's organization more vertical (meaning it has many vertical
levels and a clearly defined chain of authority) or horizontal (meaning that it has few vertical
levels and many divisions with equal authority)?
31. As part of your work on the project, did you interact directly with the client?
a. (If so...) Did you interact with someone in a specific position that represented the
client?
i. What was the position of the person you interacted with most?
ii. What media did you usually use to interact with them - did you reach them
via email, phone, fax or in-person meetings perhaps?
iii. What topics did you commonly discuss with your contacts from the client?
iv. How did your work with these contacts affect (or fit in with) the overall
project?
32. Were you involved with the negotiations regarding the contract for this satellite project?
a. Can you tell us a little about the negotiation process?
33. How did working on this project fit into your firm's overall business strategy?
34. From your firm's point of view, were there any regulatory issues that influenced the
execution of this satellite project or working with the client? (i.e. export control, etc)
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35. Were you aware of any political context surrounding the satellite project?
36. Did you see any impacts to the project from the global economic environment in general?
How about the global economic environment for space technology?
37. Who were the competitor firms that could also be considered for such a project?
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